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DIVIDEND POLICY: EVIDENCE FROM TURKEY 
 
ERHAN KILINCARSLAN 
 
ABSTRACT 
The main aim of this doctoral thesis is to carry the dividend debate into an emerging 
market context, and contribute more evidence to dividend literature. This, however, is 
done different to prior research, by examining the dividend policy behaviour of an 
emerging market over a period of time, after implementing serious economic and 
structural reforms in order to integrate with world markets.  Accordingly, therefore, 
attempting to uncover what behaviour the dividend policy of this emerging market 
shows. In particular, the dividend policies of the companies listed on the Istanbul Stock 
Exchange (ISE) are analysed. Turkey offers an ideal setting for studying dividend 
behaviour as a developing country, which implemented major reforms, starting with the 
fiscal year 2003 in compliance with the IMF stand-by agreement as well as adopting the 
EU directives and best-practice international standards for a better working of the 
market economy, outward-orientation and globalisation.  
Research results suggest that the ISE-listed firms follow the same firm-specific 
determinants of dividend policy as proposed by dividend theories, and as suggested by 
empirical studies conducted in developed markets following Turkey’s adoption of the 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and inflation accounting, starting 
with the fiscal year 2003. Specifically, the primary firm-specific determinants of 
dividend policy are profitability, debt level, firm size, investment opportunities and firm 
age in the context of an emerging Turkish market. 
The findings of this thesis indicate that implementing major economic and structural 
reforms, adopting more flexible mandatory dividend policy regulations and attempting 
to prevent insider lending (non-arm’s length transactions) have led the ISE firms to 
adjust their cash dividends toward their target payout ratio by smoothing their dividends 
as suggested by Lintner (1956) and as exemplified by companies in developed markets. 
Hence, Turkish corporations have also been adopting stable dividend policies and using 
cash dividends as a signalling mechanism since 2003, with the implementation of severe 
economic and structural reforms. 
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Research evidence reveals that the ISE-listed firms have highly concentrated ownership 
structures; mostly owned by families followed by foreign investors, whereas other 
blockholders such as domestic financial institutions and the state, show relatively lower 
shareholdings. Moreover, evidence implies that the implementation of various major 
economic and structural reforms in cooperation with the IMF and the EU directives and 
best-practice international standards, which include the publication of the Capital 
Market Board (CMB) of Turkey’s Corporate Governance Principles in line with the 
World Bank and the OECD, starting with the fiscal year 2003, have resulted in 
significant improvements for the ISE-listed firms corporate governance, transparency 
and disclosure practices and better shareholder protection. Investors, in general, 
therefore, have preference for the potential long-run growth opportunity for the stocks 
they hold in the ISE, since Turkey is a fast-growing market, rather than requiring cash 
dividends as a monitoring mechanism or to control agency problems.   
This thesis extends empirical research on dividend policy into an emerging market, 
which not only passed laws for financial liberalisation, but implemented serious reforms 
to integrate with world markets by using a large panel dataset from Turkey. Although 
the implementation of major reforms and regulatory changes may produce different 
results in different emerging markets, it is believed that this thesis can be a valuable 
benchmark for further longitudinal and cross-country research on this respect of the 
dividend puzzle.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Introduction 
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1.1 Background of the Study  
Corporate finance literature assumes that the main goal of financial management is to 
maximise the wealth of shareholders. Managers must, therefore, always consider how 
their decisions affect the value of their firms’ shares, since share prices are critical 
determinants of shareholders wealth (Ward, 1993; Bishop et al., 2000; Van Horne and 
Wachowicz, 2001). Dividend policy is one of the major categories of corporate financial 
decisions that managers face, and they can affect shareholders wealth through their 
dividend policy decisions (Glen et al., 1995; Brealey and Myers, 2003). More precisely, 
managers’ dividend policy decisions in determining the size and pattern of cash 
distributions to shareholders influence common share prices, and therefore, the wealth 
of shareholders over time (Lease et al., 2000).  
Accordingly, dividend policy has attracted a great deal of attention from financial 
economists in corporate finance literature. Questions such as why firms pay dividends, 
why investors care, and to what extent dividend policy may affect firm’s market value 
have been subject to a long-standing argument (Baker and Powell, 1999). Indeed, 
finance academics have dealt with various theories, such as the tax preference, 
signalling and agency cost theories, in order to explain why companies should pay or 
not pay dividends. Some researchers (Brennan, 1970; Elton and Gruber, 1970; Lintner, 
1956; Rozeff, 1982) have built and empirically tested a great number of models to 
explain dividend behaviour. Others (Baker et al., 1985; Pruitt and Gitman, 1991; Baker 
and Powell, 1999; Brav et al., 2005; Baker and Smith, 2006) have surveyed corporate 
managers to find out their thoughts about dividends. Hence, dividend policy literature 
contains various theories, hypotheses and explanations for dividends. 
Miller and Modigliani (M&M)’s (1961) propose the dividend irrelevance theory, which 
posits that all efforts spent on dividend decisions are wasted, and a managed dividend 
policy irrelevant under the circumstance of a perfect capital market, with rational 
investors and absolute certainty. Although M&M’s argument is logical and consistent 
within a perfect market, once this idealised world gives way to the real world, numerous 
market imperfections such as differential tax rates, information asymmetries, transaction 
costs, and conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders, render the 
irrelevance theory highly debatable. In fact, researchers have focused on the various 
market imperfections in order to respond to M&M’s irrelevance theory and offered 
many competing hypotheses about why companies pay, or not pay dividends (Lease et 
al., 2000).  
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Some researchers (Graham and Dodd, 1951; Gordon and Shapiro, 1956; Gordon, 1959; 
1963) suggest that dividends can increase firms’ values and shareholders wealth. This is 
because, more certainty is attached to dividend payments received today, against 
earnings retention for investment in projects whose future earnings are not certain. 
Firms should, therefore, set a high dividend payout ratio and offer a high dividend yield 
to maximise their share prices - this explanation is labelled as the bird-in-the-hand 
hypothesis. However, there are theories propose, which include the tax preference 
theory (Brennan, 1970; Elton and Gruber, 1970; Litzenberger and Ramaswamy, 1979) 
and the transaction cost theory (Higgins, 1972; Fama 1974; Rozeff, 1982; Scholz, 
1992), whereby, in the existence of market imperfections such as transaction costs and 
uneven tax treatments, dividend payments can decrease firms value as well as can cause 
negative consequences for shareholders wealth. Based on these theories, firms should 
therefore avoid or make minimal dividend payments if they want to maximise their 
share prices.  
Other researchers (Lintner, 1956; Bhattacharya, 1979; John and Williams, 1985; Miller 
and Rock, 1985) indicate that information asymmetry exists when a firm’s management 
has a better understanding about the firms’ true value than outsiders who have only 
access to public information. Hence, managers use dividend payments to convey useful 
information about the current and future prospects of their firm, which is called the 
signalling hypothesis. Furthermore, Jensen and Meckling (1976), Rozeff (1982) and 
Easterbrook (1984) developed the agency cost theory of dividends, which derives from 
problems associated with the separation of management and ownership, and differences 
in managerial and shareholder priorities. This suggests that an effective dividend policy 
minimises agency costs by reducing funds available from managers who may spend 
unnecessarily on unprofitable investments, or even misuse for their own personal 
consumption. Managers are therefore required to look for financing in capital markets. 
Many researchers have developed various competing theories such as the pecking order 
theory (Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984), residual dividend theory (Saxena, 1999; 
Lease et al., 2000), catering theory of dividends (Baker and Wurgler, 2004a; 2004b) and 
maturity hypothesis (Grullon et al., 2002), which add more complexity to the dividend 
controversy.  
Fischer Black (1976, p.5) once described this lack of consensus on the matter as the 
dividend puzzle by stating that “The harder we look at the dividend picture, the more it 
seems like a puzzle, with pieces that just don’t fit together.” Although Black (1976) 
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came to this conclusion almost four decades ago, his observation still seems valid since 
financial economists have not reached a definitive theory of dividends. Furthermore, 
Brealey and Myers (2003), in their textbook, listed dividends as one of the ten important 
unsolved problems in finance, supporting this conclusion. Allen and Michaely (1995, 
p.833) suggested that “Much more empirical and theoretical research on the subject of 
dividends is required before a consensus can be reached.”    
Dividend policy literature is extensive since researchers have developed and empirically 
tested various theories, models and hypotheses by contributing voluminous studies. 
However, despite countless research and extensive debates, the actual motivation for 
paying dividends still remains a puzzle (Baker and Powell, 1999).  In addition to this, 
most of the theoretical and empirical evidence on dividend policy have been based on 
the developed markets, mainly the US and UK markets; therefore, less is known about 
dividend policy and the explanatory power of models for other countries, specifically 
developing countries (in other words, emerging markets). Considering the growing 
importance of emerging markets in terms of global equity investments, these markets 
have comparatively recently started attracting international investors. Accordingly, as 
emerging markets have begun to contribute to the dividend puzzle, researchers have 
started investigating the dividend behaviour of corporations in developing countries 
(Glen et al., 1995; Adaoglu, 2000). In fact, empirical studies, taken in the context of 
developing markets, have been increasing, especially during the last two decades. 
Studies have indicated that emerging markets, to a degree, are generally differentiated 
from developed markets in terms of their effectiveness in meeting requirements of their 
determined functions. This is because of various discords such as political and social 
instability, lack of adequate disclosure, poor laws and regulations, and weaker financial 
intermediaries that provide efficient monitoring due the ineffectiveness of their financial 
markets (La Porta et al., 1999; 2000; Aivazian et al., 2003a; 2003b; Yurtoglu, 2003). It 
is, therefore, not surprising that various aspects of dividend policy behaviour of 
companies listed in the emerging markets tend to differentiate from companies in 
developed markets.  
For instance, renowned cross-country studies such as La Porta et al. (1999), Claessens 
et al. (2000) and Faccio et al. (2001) provide evidence that concentrated ownership by 
large controlling shareholders, generally families, is the dominant form of the 
ownership structure in most developing countries. This is in contrast to Berle and 
Means’s (1932) concept of widely held corporations with dispersed small shareholders 
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and a concentrated control in the hands of managers, which is extensively accepted in 
finance literature as a common ownership structure in developed countries. 
Accordingly, Daily et al. (2003) argued that agency cost theory might function 
differently in family-controlled publicly listed firms. Whereas prior findings from 
widely held companies might not readily be appropriate into this type of setting. In 
these firms, the salient agency problem might be the expropriation of the wealth from 
minority owners by the controlling owners, the principal-principal conflict, rather than 
the principal-managers conflict. Similarly, a number of studies (Manos, 2002; Kouki 
and Guizani, 2009; Ramli, 2010; Ullah et al., 2012; Huda and Abdullah, 2013; 
Thanatawee, 2013; Aguenaou et al., 2013; Gonzalez et al., 2014) emphasised that 
agency cost theory of dividends needs to be uniquely investigated in emerging markets 
and more importantly the ownership structure of the firms in these markets should 
specifically be taken into account while identifying the proxies for agency cost 
variables.  
Aivazian et al. (2003a, 2003b), who are well-known scholars in investigating dividend 
policy behaviour in emerging markets, compared the dividend policies of firms 
operating in developing countries with the dividend policies of US firms. Aivazian et al. 
(2003a) reported that Lintner’s (1956) model still works for US firms but it does not 
work very well for emerging market firms. Current dividends are much less sensitive to 
past dividends in these markets, which supports the notion that the institutional 
structures of developing countries compose corporate dividend policy a less feasible 
mechanism for signalling than for US firms operating in capital markets with arm’s 
length transactions. However, Mookerjee (1992), Pandey (2001), Al-Najjar (2009), 
Chemmanur et al. (2010), Al-Ajmi and Abo Hussain (2011) and Al-Malkawi et al. 
(2014) found evidence supporting the Lintner model when explaining dividend 
behaviour in different emerging markets. They, however, generally reported higher 
adjustment factors, hence lower smoothing and less stable dividend policies compared 
to developed countries. Furthermore, Aivazian et al. (2003b) concluded that firms in 
emerging markets somehow follow the same determinants (either the same or different 
signs) of dividend policy that are suggested by the developed markets. Studies from 
different developing countries such as Al-Najjar (2009), Kirkulak and Kurt (2010), 
Imran (2011), Mehta (2012) and Kisman (2013) supported this conclusion. 
Nevertheless, as Aivazian et al. (2003b) stated that, because of various differences 
between developed and developing markets, even among those developing economies, 
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such as financial systems, ownership structures, laws and regulations and so on, their 
sensitivity to these determinants vary across countries.  
Consequently, the debate on dividend policy is still unsolved and still remains as a 
puzzle. There is no doubt that emerging markets attach more pieces to this puzzle. As 
Glen et al. (1995) stated much more additional research is required to provide a better 
understanding of dividend behaviour in these developing countries. Therefore, this 
doctoral thesis is aimed at carrying the dividend debate into the emerging market 
context with its findings a contribution to dividend literature.  
 
1.2 Motivation of the Study 
The debate on dividend policy has now been extensively researched for more than half a 
century. Earlier research on dividends, in terms of developing theories and empirical 
tests, were focused on developed markets, mainly the US followed by the UK. 
However, researchers have also started investigating the dividend policy behaviour of 
corporations in developing countries, especially over the past two decades, due to the 
growing importance of these markets in terms of global equity investments (Glen et al., 
1995).  
A rapid increase in magnitude of equity portfolio flows, to developing countries, results 
in serious efforts, shown by emerging markets, to converge with the global world-
market portfolio (Bekaert, 1995; Kumar and Tsetsekos, 1999). In this respect, civil law 
countries, which typically developing markets that generally have weaker rules of law 
to protect investors (La Porta et al., 1997; 1999), have started to implement common 
laws in order to integrate with world markets (Karacan, 1998) and to attract foreign 
investors. Furthermore, Bekaert and Harvey (2002) suggested that emerging markets 
need integration, both in terms of economic and financial aspects, with world markets; 
economic integration involves the elimination of barriers to international trade, whereas 
financial integration desires the free flow capital across borders. Such integration 
requires a sequence of regulatory and institutional developments in the operations of 
financial markets. However, Bekaert and Harvey (2002) went on to argue that the 
concept of regulatory liberalisation and integration should be carefully distinguished. A 
country may pass a law that apparently drops all barriers to foreign involvement in local 
capital markets, which is liberalisation but this does not mean that regulatory 
liberalisation are necessarily defining events for market integration. Therefore, Bekaert 
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and Harvey (2002) emphasised that, for any empirical research, it is very important to 
know the approximate date emerging market undertook these structural changes in 
integrating world capital markets.  
Empirical studies taken in the context of developing markets have mostly confirmed 
that dividend policy behaviour in emerging markets generally tend to be, not 
surprisingly, different from developed markets in many aspects. This is because of 
various factors such as political, social and financial instability, lack of adequate 
disclosure, poor laws and regulations, weaker financial intermediaries, newer markets 
with smaller market capitalisations, weaker corporate governance and different 
ownership structures (La Porta et al., 1999; 2000; Kumar and Tsetsekos, 1999; Aivazian 
et al., 2003a; 2003b; Yurtoglu, 2003).  
It is nevertheless exemplified that, while examining the dividend policy behaviour in 
different emerging markets, researchers have not clearly stated or distinguished, as 
suggested by Bekaert and Harvey (2002), between the concepts of regulatory 
liberalisation or integration undertaken in those emerging markets for their study sample 
periods. Furthermore, it could be argued that dividend policy decisions of companies in 
an emerging market should be better understood if researchers report whether the 
emerging market examined passes laws for financial liberalisation or attempts to 
implement serious economic and structural reforms to integrate with world markets. In 
addition, it is questionable whether dividend policies of companies may significantly 
differ based on the process of liberalisation or integration undertaken in the emerging 
market in which they operate.  
Accordingly, the main aim of this doctoral thesis is to investigate dividend policy 
behaviour of an emerging market over the period after implementing serious economic 
and structural reforms, in order to integrate with world markets. In this respect, the 
dividend policies of the companies listed on the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) will be 
examined, since Turkey offers an ideal setting for the study of dividend behaviour of a 
developing country. In particular, with its implementation of major reforms starting 
with the fiscal year 2003 in compliance with the IMF stand-by agreement, as well as its 
adoption of the EU directives and best-practice international standards for a better 
working of the market economy, outward-orientation and globalisation.  
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1.3 Research Context in the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE)  
This section provides a summary of the important developments of the Istanbul Stock 
Exchange (ISE) and explains the rationale for choosing the ISE-listed companies as 
study samples.  
1.3.1 Financial Liberalisation and Earlier Developments of the ISE  
Financial markets in Turkey were strictly regulated until a financial liberalisation 
programme was implemented at the beginning of 1980, which comprised the 
liberalisation of the foreign exchange regime, deregulation of interest rates and 
establishment of financial markets (CMB, 2003; Odabasi et al., 2004). In the first half 
of the 1980s, the Turkish securities markets underwent serious major developments in 
terms of setting up both the legal and institutional structure fitting for sound capital 
movements. The Capital Markets Law (CML) was launched in 1981, followed by the 
establishment of the Capital Markets Board (CMB) in 1982, in order to regulate the 
founding and operations of stock exchanges. After the adoption of related regulations 
enacted and launched in the subsequent years, the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) was 
officially established in December 1985 and commenced its operations on January 3, 
1986 (CMB, 2003).  
Despite long standing macro-economic imbalances, the Turkish capital markets 
attempted to make rapid progression in terms of political and regulatory changes during 
the two decades after 1980. Important institutional and regulatory developments are 
summarised below (Odabasi et al., 2004, p.511; TSPAKB, 2007, p.5).  
 
 1980-1985: Implementing liberalisation program, commencing of primary and 
secondary markets, employing the New Banks Act and Securities Markets Law. 
 
 1986-1987:  First bonds were issued by the Treasury, commencing of the interbank 
market, the Istanbul Stock Exchange and open market operations by the Central 
Bank.  
 
 1988-1990: Becoming a member of SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank 
Financial Telecommunication), allowing convertibility of the Turkish Lira, 
relaxation of restrictions on capital flows, first ADR (American Depository Receipt) 
was issued in the NYSE and establishing ISE Clearing House. 
 
 1991-1992: Establishing the ISE bond market and repo market, implementing EFT 
(Electronic Funds Transfer) system and Insider Trading Law, and the ISE joined the 
WFE (World Federation of Exchanges).  
 
 1993-1994: First overseas exchange listing and rights market were opened as well as 
starting full computerised trading in the ISE, and recognition of the ISE by the US 
SEC (Securities and Exchange Commission).  
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 1995-1996: Establishing Customs Unions with the EU, setting regulations for short 
sales, prosecution for first insider trading, starting Futures Market in the ISE and the 
ISE joined the FEAS (Federation of Euro-Asian Stock Exchanges).  
 
 1997-1998: Setting up various new sub-markets under the ISE and the ISE became 
project-leader in Southeast European Exchanges for substituting street-name by 
customer name.  
 
 1999-2000: Adoption of free-float regime and Banking Law on BIS (Bank for 
International Settlement)/Basel criteria. 
 
 2001-2002: Establishing the TSPAKB (The Association of Capital Market 
Intermediary Institutions of Turkey), Investors’ Protection Fund and Central Registry 
Agency. Remote trading was started at the ISE and pension system regulation was 
passed.  
 
1.3.2 An Overview of the ISE during the period 1986-2002  
With the rapid development since its establishment in 1986, the ISE became highly 
representative of a promising emerging market, with fast growth in terms of the number 
of listed firms, the annual trade volume and the annual market capitalisation, as well as 
indicating high volatility in returns. As can be observed from Table 1.1 on the next 
page, the number of listed firms on the ISE significantly increased from 80 in 1986 to 
315 in 2000 and then decreased to 310 in 2001 and to 288 in 2002 due to the economic 
crises in the early 2000s in Turkey. The annual ISE stocks trading volume sharply 
increased from US$ 13 million in 1986 and reached to a peak of US$ 181.9 billion in 
2000 and then again it considerably fell to US$ 80 billion in 2001 and US$ 70 billion in 
2002 with the economic crises (CMB, 2003).  
Similarly, the total market capitalisation of the ISE grew rapidly. It dramatically rose 
from US$ 0.9 billion at the end of 1986, reaching its peak to US$ 144 billion by the end 
of 1999, just before noticeably decreasing to US$ 69.5 billion by the end of 2000. In the 
following years, it further decline to about US$ 48 billion and US$ 34 billions,  
reflecting the economic crises in the Turkish market that occurred in the early 2000s. 
Odabasi et al. (2004) pointed out that emerging markets are characterised by high 
volatility and high average returns as evidenced by research on stock returns in these 
markets. In this case, they stated that the ISE is highly representative of an emerging 
market. Consistent with their statement, the figures of the annual rate of returns, 
calculated for the ISE-100 Index based on the closing prices in Table 1.1 indicate high 
volatility and extremely high returns in some years during the period, 1986-2002 (CMB, 
2003). 
Birkbeck University of London Page 21 
Table 1.1 Development of Main Indicators of the ISE during the period 1986-2002 
The table illustrates the development of the number of listed firms in the ISE, trading volume, total 
market capitalisation and annual rate of return for the ISE-100 Index based on closing prices 
according to the years. For the ISE-100 Index calculation, the value of the ISE-100 Index in January 
1986 is taken as a base year.  
        
 No. of  Volume of Trade 
Total Market 
Capitalisation 
Annual Rate of 
Return for 
the ISE-100 Index  
 Listed  
Total Annually 
 
Daily Average 
 Firms   
Year 
End of  US$  US$ US$ 
(%) 
Year  (millions)  (millions) (millions) 
        
1986 80  13  0.05 938 71 
1987 82  118  0.44 3,125 294 
1988 79  115  0.45 1,128 -44 
1989 76  773  3.03 6,756 493 
1990 110  5,854  23.70 18,737 47 
1991 134  8,502  34.42 15,564 34 
1992 145  8,567  34.13 9,922 -8 
1993 160  21,770  88.50 37,824 417 
1994 176  23,203  91.71 21,785 32 
1995 205  52,357  208.59 20,782 47 
1996 228  37,737  152.78 30,797 144 
1997 258  58,104  230.57 61,879 254 
1998 277  70,396  283.85 33,975 -25 
1999 285  84,034  356.08 114,271 485 
2000 315  181,934  739.57 69,507 -38 
2001 310  80,400  324.19 47,689 46 
2002 288  70,756  280.78 34,402 -25 
        
  Source: Compiled from CMB (2003) 
 
After its establishment in 1986, the ISE made rapid progress during the period of 1990-
2000. In this period, the Turkish economy also often experienced global effects from a 
number of geopolitical, financial and economic crises; for instance, by the Gulf War 
Crisis in 1991, 1997 Asia Crisis, 1998 Russia Crisis and 2000 Argentina Crisis. 
However, the major financial crisis that strongly affected the ISE was the systemic 
banking crisis that the Turkish economy experienced in the early 2000s (BRSA, 2010). 
As well, persistently increasing public deficit, the issuance of government debt 
securities for financing public debt, high rates of real interest paid on these securities, 
high and volatile inflation and unstable governments, coupled with consistent 
intervention by the military that added political uncertainty, were some of the main 
public and macro-economic imbalances that prevented the Turkish capital markets from 
improving (CMB, 2003; IIF, 2005). Moreover, there were other reasons which had to do 
with the nature of Turkey’s civil law tradition and its inefficient, and inconsistent 
regulatory framework, which ensue paucity of the rule of law and its enforcement; 
particularly, the poor Turkish culture of corporate governance and transparency and 
disclosure practices (Aksu and Kosedag, 2006).  
Birkbeck University of London Page 22 
Studies show that Turkey is a civil law country1 where corporate ownership structure is 
characterised by concentrated family ownership.2 Aksu and Kosedag (2006) emphasised 
that the predicted benefits of good corporate governance and transparency and 
disclosure practices are especially important for emerging markets like Turkey, who are 
eager for external capital as their economies typically grow faster than that of more 
developed countries. Aksu and Kosedag, however, argued that the transparency and 
disclosure practices of the ISE firms were not impressive in terms of financial statement 
disclosure as well as disclosures of shareholder’s rights and board and management 
structures. It was because the ISE’s financial reporting standards (the Turkish Code of 
Commerce, dating back to 1957) were only based on the generally accepted principles 
of accounting and auditing, and the concept of full and fair disclosure. It did not 
therefore regulate financial reporting properly and remained weak in the enforcement of 
rules and lack of a disclosure philosophy in the Turkish business culture.3  
Ararat and Ugur (2003) pointed out specific corporate governance problems and lack of 
efficient transparency and disclosure practices experienced by Turkish firms. These 
                                                          
1
Turkey is a civil law country where the present Turkish Commercial Code is adopted from the 
Continental European Business Law (civil law), dating back to 1957. It had a very late start in the 
liberalisation of its economy and the establishment of its stock market (ISE) whose history only dating 
back to 1986 compared to the developed stock exchanges with hundreds of years of historical 
development (Adaoglu, 1999; 2000; Aksu and Kosedag, 2006). Turkey has a history of poor structural 
and microeconomic policies as well as a poor culture of corporate governance and transparency and 
disclosure practices (IIF, 2005; Aksu and Kosedag, 2006). La Porta et al. (1997), well-known scholars for 
their research interest in emerging markets, also categorised Turkey as a French origin civil law country 
in their study and concluded that civil law countries generally have weaker rule of laws to protect 
investors than common law countries. In fact, they found evidence that French civil law countries tend to 
have poorer minority investors protection and relatively more corruptions among other types of civil law 
traditions. 
 
2
 Gursoy and Aydogan (1999) reported that around 44% of firms listed on the ISE belonged to a family or 
a small group of families and other 30% of them were controlled by holding companies (in other words, 
business groups), showing predominant family involvement in approximately 74% of all firms between 
1992 and 1998. Yurtoglu (2003) found that families ultimately owned about 80% of the 305 firms listed 
on the ISE as of 2001 and families typically tended to organise a large number of firms under a pyramidal 
ownership structure or through a complicated web of inter-corporate equity linkages and also often made 
the use of dual class shares or other corporate charter arrangements through which they can reduce their 
cash flow rights while they firmly have the control on their companies. Similarly, the task force report of 
the Institute of International Finance (2005) documented that as is the case in many other emerging 
markets, the largest domestically owned Turkish firms were mainly family-controlled and one 
shareholder generally controlled more than 50% of voting rights in 45% of the all firms listed on the ISE. 
It is also reported that at least three-fourths of all corporations are owned by families or a holding 
company controlled by a family. Therefore, the protection of minority shareholder interests relies 
primarily on full disclosure and accurate financial reporting (IIF, 2005).  
 
3
 In common law countries, the enforcement of high-quality financial reporting standards is compulsory 
and required for shareholder protection. However, in civil law countries, such as Turkey, standard-setting 
and enforcement are principally functions of government institutions and therefore there is a lower 
demand for high-quality financial reporting and disclosure in such economies, since the reporting 
requirements are oriented towards tax offices and financial institutions (UNCTAD, 2008). Hence, in 
Turkey, accounting and auditing principles were not good enough for enforcement of good shareholder 
protection.  
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included concentrated and pyramidal ownership structures dominated by families, 
ownership of many banks by these groups of companies, inconsistent and unclear 
accounting and tax regulations, and misinformation faced by investors because of the 
absence of inflation and consolidation accounting standards. In addition, Ararat and 
Ugur suggested that, as a result of this infrastructure, agency problems concentrate on 
asymmetric information, weak minority shareholders’ and creditors’ rights, inconsistent 
and unclear disclosure policies, and convergence of ownership and management, which 
create an environment that may foster corruption, share dilution, asset stripping, 
tunnelling, insider trading and market manipulation.  
Indeed, during the late 1990s, a long list of cases in tunnelling became a prominent 
issue in the Turkish public. A majority of these cases were simple resource transfers of 
controlling shareholders from their firms in the form of outright theft or fraud.  Whereas 
a number of listed firms’ minority shareholders were harmed by these events, a bigger 
proportion represented wealth transfers from state banks to controlling owners of 
unlisted firms, concerning, in many cases, evident involvement of politicians (Yurtoglu, 
2003). Likewise, a number of well-publicised cases revealed that unfair treatment of 
minority shareholders was a serious corporate governance problem in Turkey, since 
controlling families had the opportunities to expropriate profits from them. This was 
done typically through the use of company assets or non-arm’s length related party 
transactions (IIF, 2005).4 In the following period, in the early 2000s, the Turkish 
economy experienced a systematic banking crisis, which was the major financial crisis 
that strongly affected the ISE. As a result, 22 banks were transferred to the SDIF 
(Saving Deposit Insurance Fund). The cost of re-structuring these banks and the 
banking system was US$ 53.6 billion, which was equal to one-third of the national 
income in Turkey in 2001 (BRSA, 2010). 
                                                          
4
 For instance, in 1999, the Capital Markets Board (CMB) of Turkey inspected related party transactions 
mutually between Turk Tuborg and its parent company, Yasar Holding, and affiliated companies. The 
CMB found that Tuborg shares held by Bimpas (Tuborg’s marketing company) were sold to Mr.Selcuk 
Yasar, who was the ultimate owner of Yasar Holding, and the price for this transaction was actually paid 
two years later. Tuborg also had a contract with the Altinyunus Hotel, which was another Yasar Group 
company, for a period of 15 years to rent 15 rooms at above published prices. Additionally, Tuborg 
donated a property to the Yasar Foundation in violation of its Articles of Association, whilst selling 
another property to another Yasar Group company (Desa) at a lower than its market price. Lastly, the 
CMB questioned that Turk Tuborg bought shares in Yasar Holding’s bank, namely Yasarbank, to help the 
bank from failing but Yasarbank did eventually fail and was taken over by the Savings Deposit insurance 
Fund (IIF, 2005). 
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1.3.3 Market Integration Process of the ISE since 2003   
Following the November 2002 elections, which resulted in a one-party (non-coalition) 
government, the political uncertainty at some degree faded away and the economic 
programs and structural reforms were jointly carried out by the government and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), commencing in March 2003 (CMB, 2003). 
Turkey’s progress in achieving full membership of the EU in this period also provided 
the strongest motivation in establishing new reforms, rules and regulations to improve 
corporate governance and transparency and disclosure practices; therefore, to integrate 
its economy with Europe and to harmonise its institutions with those of the EU (IIF, 
2005; Aksu and Kosedag, 2006).  
According to the task force report provided by the IIF (2005), the legal and institutional 
environment for corporate governance, and transparency and disclosure practices in 
Turkey improved, particularly in the past few years, in line with the structural reforms 
implemented in collaboration with the IMF. In addition, Turkish government and the 
CMB, together with some private sector organisations such as the Turkish Industrialists 
and Businessmen’s Association (TUSIAD), the Corporate Governance Forum of 
Turkey (CGFT), the Corporate Governance Association (KYD) and the Foreign 
Investors Association (YASED), performed hard to improve the rules for corporate 
governance and transparency and disclosure.  
The Capital Markets Board (CMB) attributed great importance to improve 
communications with investors, issuers and other institutions in 2003, in order to ensure 
that markets functioned in a safer, more transparent and efficient manner, in accordance 
with regulations that were adopted in harmony with international norms and 
developments (CMB, 2003). Accordingly, one of the most important developments was 
that, in line with the EU requirements, the CMB issued the Communiqué Serial: XI, No: 
25 entitled “Accounting Standards in Capital Markets”  in November 2003, adopting 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and enforcing publicly owned and 
traded firms to use new rules. In addition, the CMB obliged the implementation of 
inflation-adjusted accounting at the same time (UNCTAD, 2008).  
Moreover, in cooperation with the World Bank and the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), the CMB’s Corporate Governance Principles 
were published in 2003, aiming to improve the ISE-listed firms’ corporate governance 
practices. The CMB Principles consisted of four major parts. The first part discussed 
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shareholders’ rights and their equal treatments involved with issues such as right to 
obtain and evaluate information, right to vote, right to join the general shareholders 
meeting and more minority rights detailed in this part. The second part included 
principles that were related to disclosure and transparency for establishing information 
policies in firms with respect to shareholders and the adherence of firms to these 
policies. The third part was concerned about firms’ obligations for their stakeholders, 
including their workers, creditors, customers, suppliers, institutions, non-governmental 
organisations, the government, and potential investors who may think of investing in 
these firms in order to regulate the relationship between the firms and their stakeholders. 
The fourth part discussed the functions, duties, obligations, operations and the structure 
of the board of directors as well as the committees to be created to support the board 
operations and executives (CMB, 2003; 2004; Caliskan and Icke, 2011).  
Structural problems in the banking sector basically deepened during 2000 and turned to 
a systemic banking crisis in February 2001. Many amendments were passed to improve 
the transparency and quality of the banking sector. “The Banking Sector Restructuring 
Program” was implemented in May 2001 in order to restructure the public banks, 
resolve banks taken over by the SDIF, rehabilitate the private banking system, and to 
strengthen the surveillance and supervision frame to increase efficiency in the sector 
(BRSA, 2010). Several group banks, which previously funded much of their own 
business group companies’ financial needs, declared bankrupt. With the introduction of 
“the Regulation on Establishment and Operations of Banks” in July 2001, the risk group 
definition and calculation of loan limits for a single group (including banks, businesses 
and subsidiaries in the same group) considering direct and connected lendings were 
established in order to avoid credit risk concentration as well as improve the assets 
structure of the banking sector. As a result of preventing insider lending as a source of 
financing, the ISE firms turned to the equity market with a greater incentive for more 
transparent financing (IIF, 2005).  
Other improvements also took place in order to improve the Turkish market in terms of 
corporate governance and disclosure practices, since it sought to integrate its economy 
with Europe and harmonise its institutions with those of the EU. The government, 
accordingly, accelerated “privatisation” of State Economic Enterprises, together with 
the elimination of legal barriers to market entry, and a general reduction in the state’s 
direct involvement in the economy, indicating the importance of corporate governance 
(IIF, 2005; Aksu and Kosedag, 2006). It is worth noting that 58% of the IPO proceeds 
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in the ISE, between 2003 and 2008, were raised by privatisation activities (TSPAKB, 
2008). Moreover, since pension funds and other large institutional investors were not 
permitted to vote for corporate directors, there were only a few institutional investors in 
Turkey with an interest in good corporate governance, hence the sector was 
underdeveloped (IIF, 2005). However, “Individual Retirement Savings and Investments 
System” was implemented in 2003 (CMB, 2003) in the hope of creating pension funds 
that were expected to serve as institutional investors and increase monitoring in public 
firms (Aksu and Kosedag, 2006).  
A brief timeline and some selected milestones of Turkish Capital Markets from 2003 
and forward are summarised below (TSPAKB, 2007, p.5; 2008, p.40; 2012, p.1-2).  
 2003-2004: Corporate Governance Principles were published. Establishing first 
private pension funds. Adoption of IFRS (International Financial Reporting 
Standards). First exchange traded fund was established.  
 
 2005-2006: Setting up Turkish derivatives exchange. Dematerialisations of 
equities, corporate funds and mutual finds were completed. Taxation of investment 
instruments was changed.  
 
 2007-2008: Opening auction introduced at the ISE. Mortgage law is passed. 
Eurobond market was established within the ISE. The ISE trading hours are 
extended by 30 minutes. New anti-money laundering regulations in line with the 
FATF (Financial Action Task Force).  
 
 2009-2010: Automated disclosure platform introduced. Emerging Companies 
Market and Collective Products Markets is established within the ISE. Regulations 
regarding IPOs are eased. Market was introduced for warrants and ETFs. 
 
 2011-2012: First Islamic bond and electricity futures were issued, FOREX 
regulations were introduced and Investor Education Campaign was initiated.  
 
Reforms implemented after the major financial crisis, as well as a number of well-
publicised unfair treatments experienced by minority shareholders, and the political 
stability obtained after 2002 all provided a significant improvement in fundamental 
indicators. Under the IMF-supported program, inflation fell spectacularly from triple 
digits in 2001 to single digits in 2004, and was realised as 7.7% as of 2005. Real GDP 
growth strikingly picked up and averaged 8% during 2002-2004. Additionally, the 
public sector primary surplus exceeded 5% of GNP, leading to an anticipated decrease 
in net public debt of a percentage of GNP from 92% in 2001 to 65% by the end of 2004. 
As the public debt burden was reduced, the short-term policy interest rates were 
declined below 20% by the end of 2005. These significant structural and 
macroeconomic improvements of Turkish economy greatly increased both competition 
and profitable investment opportunities. This resulted in an increase of interest of global 
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capital, and caused a strong capital entry, oriented directly to the country and formed as 
portfolio investment (IIF, 2005; BRSA, 2010). Indeed, after the implementation of 
major reforms in 2003, the Turkish stock market bounced back and generally had a 
rapid growth in terms of the number of listed firms, trading volume, market 
capitalisation (CMB, 2012) attracting a significant amount of foreign investments 
(Adaoglu, 2008) during the period 2003-2012.  
 
Table 1.2 Development of Main Indicators of the ISE during the period 2003-2012 
The table illustrates the development of the number of listed firms in the ISE, trading volume, total 
market capitalisation, equities traded by foreign investors and annual rate of return for the ISE-100 
Index based on closing prices according to the years. For the ISE-100 Index calculation, the value of 
the ISE-100 Index in January 1986 is taken as a base year.  
        
 No. of Volume of Trade 
Total Market 
Capitalisation 
Foreigners 
Stocks in 
Custody 
Foreigners 
to Total 
Stocks Ratio 
Annual Rate 
of Return for 
the ISE 100 Index 
 Listed Total Daily 
 Firms Annually Average 
Year  
End of US$ US$ US$ US$ 
(%) (%) 
Year (millions) (millions) (millions) (millions) 
        
2003 285 100,165 407.17 69,003 8,690 51.5 80 
2004 297 147,755 593.40 98,073 15,283 54.7 34 
2005 306 201,763 794.35 162,814 33,812 66.3 59 
2006 322 229,642 918.57 163,775 49,313 65.3 -2 
2007 327 300,842 1,192.82 289,986 70,213 72.3 42 
2008 326 261,274 1,040.93 119,698 42,152 67.5 -52 
2009 325 316,326 1,255.26 235,996 56,246 67.3 97 
2010 350 425,747 1,702.99 307,551 71,267 66.8 25 
2011 373 423,584 1,674.25 201,924 45,919 62.2 -22 
2012 395 347,854 1,374.92 309,644 78,545 65.8 53 
        
  Source: Compiled from CMB (2003, 2007, 2012) 
 
Table 1.2 illustrates that the number of listed firms on the ISE significantly increased 
from 285 in 2003 to 395 in 2012. The annual ISE stocks trading volume rapidly grew 
from US$ 100 billion in 2003 and reached a peak of US$ 425.7 billion in 2010. It then 
stayed approximately at this level in 2011, followed by a noticeable decrease to US$ 
348 billion in 2012. Moreover, the total market capitalisation of the ISE sharply 
increased from US$ 69 billion in 2003 to US$ 290 billion by the end of 2007, and then 
decreased to US$ 119.7 billion in 2008, due to the global financial crisis experienced in 
that year. From this point, the total market capitalisation of the ISE showed generally an 
increasing but fluctuating trend, and increased to US$ 309.6 billion by the end of 2012. 
Furthermore, Table 1.2 presents the total stocks held in custody by foreign investors and 
the ratio of stocks owned by foreigners to total stocks traded in the ISE by the end of 
each year during the period, 2003-2012. Indeed, this period has been greatly attracted to 
foreign investors. The ratio of stocks owned by foreign investors to total stocks in the 
ISE was 51.5% by the end of 2003 and steadily increased to 72.3% by the end of 2007. 
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Perhaps due to the 2008 global crisis, this ratio decreased to 67.5% in 2008 and showed 
a further slightly declining pattern in the following years to 65.8% by the end of 2012. 
This still revealed a serious contribution from foreign investors, holding about two-
thirds of the total equities in custody in the ISE. Finally, the figures of annual rate of 
returns calculated for the ISE-100 Index, based on the closing prices in the table, 
indicate a high volatility and high returns in some years, as well as a considerably big 
loss in 2008 over the period 2003-2012.  
1.3.4 Historical Dividend Policy Regulations of the ISE 
Dividend payment decisions are not always solely depended on managers’ judgement to 
pay or not to pay, since factors such as regulations, financial crises and trends in the 
macro-economy might have implications for dividend policy (Kirkulak and Kurt, 2010). 
The evidence from cross-country studies (La Porta et al., 2000; Aivazian et al., 2003a) 
has revealed that there are regulatory differences related to the dividend policy making 
process forced by the governments throughout the world. Especially, as Glen et al. 
(1995) stated, emerging market governments are likely to enforce constrains on the 
dividend policy in order to protect both minority shareholders and creditors.  
Public corporations listed on the ISE are subject to the regulatory policies put into effect 
by the CMB of Turkey. Indeed, the dividend policy in the ISE was heavily regulated 
when it first started to operate in 1986. For the fiscal years 1985-1994, the first 
mandatory dividend policy was implemented by the enactment of Capital Markets Law 
in 1982 and, according to the first regulation on dividend payments, the ISE-listed firms 
were obliged to distribute at least 50% of their distributable income as a cash dividend, 
which was known as “first dividend” in the Turkish capital market. Without paying the 
“first dividend”, all other dividend payments such as the payments to employers or 
maintaining it as retained earnings were not legally possible (Adaoglu, 1999; 2000). 
The main purpose of this mandatory dividend payment regulation was to protect 
minority shareholders rights by providing them satisfactory levels of dividends. This 
was because the liquidity in the stock capital markets was almost non-existent as there 
was no stock exchange before 1986, and the only source of income for minority 
shareholders was the dividend income (Aytac, 1998).  
In 1995, there was a major change in the dividend regulations implemented by the 
CMB, which abolished the mandatory cash dividends distribution requirement for the 
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listed firms in the ISE.5 The amended regulations provided greater flexibility to the 
listed-firms since they were not forced to pay out a certain percentage of their income as 
cash dividends anymore. In fact, firms were allowed to decide between distributing 
dividends and keeping their profits as retained earnings. Furthermore, even if a firm 
decided to pay “first dividend”, payments could be in the form of cash dividends, stock 
dividends or both cash and stock dividends, which were subject to voting in the annual 
general meeting. The main purpose of the changes was to remove the restrictions forced 
on the dividend payments and therefore to allow the investors to interpret the dividend 
policy changes efficiently and to reflect their judgements in the shares prices (Adaoglu, 
1999; 2008). In addition, the abolishment of the mandatory requirement of distributing 
50% of the profits as cash dividends would lessen the firms’ liquidity problems and 
would increase the amount of internal financing for these firms (Aytac, 1998). 
Turkey went through a major economic crisis in 2001, and in order to recover, signed a 
standby agreement with the IMF. As well as seeking to integrate with the EU, it started 
to implement major structural reforms as previously explained. However, the crisis 
resulted in substantial losses for investors, especially small Turkish shareholder who 
heavily invested in the ISE prior to the economic crisis. Although the stock market 
bounced back and attracted a substantial amount of foreign investments after 
implementing various major structural reforms, the fear of small Turkish investors 
continued. In order to attract these Turkish investors back to the stock market, the CMB 
replaced the mandatory dividend policy, beginning with fiscal year 2003 (Adaoglu, 
2008). Kirkulak and Kurt (2010) pointed out that the purpose for mandatory dividend 
policy was to protect minority shareholders rights against the controlling shareholders. 
This is because Turkish firms are generally highly dominated by families and mainly 
attached to a group of companies, where the controlling shareholders, typically families, 
often use a pyramidal structures or dual-class shares to augment control of their firms. 
With the replacement of the second mandatory dividend policy, the ISE-listed firms 
were obligated to pay at least 20% of their distributable income as the “first dividend”. 
However, in a more flexible way from the first mandatory dividend payment policy 
between 1985 and 1994, the listed firms did not have to pay the “first dividend” in cash 
but had the option to distribute it in cash dividends or stock dividends or a mixture of 
both, which was subject to the board of directors’ decision. The total payment, however, 
                                                          
5
 Decree issued by the CMB Serial: IV, No: 9 published in the Official Gazette dated 27/12/ 1994 and No: 
22154. 
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could not be less than 20% of the distributable income for the fiscal year 2003. They 
were also given a right to distribute stock dividends with the requirement that the 
amount of stock dividends is added to the paid-in capital (Adaoglu, 2008; Kirkulak and 
Kurt, 2010).6 
For the fiscal year 2004, the CMB increased the minimum percentage of mandatory 
dividend payments for the ISE-listed firms from 20% to 30%, which then stayed at this 
level for the fiscal year 2005. Then, the minimum percentage of mandatory dividend 
payment level was reduced to 20% again in the fiscal year 2006 and remained at this 
level for the fiscal years 2007 and 2008. Nevertheless, from the fiscal year 2009 
onwards (2010, 2011 and 2012), the CMB decided to not determine a minimum 
dividend payout ratio and to abolish mandatory minimum dividend payment distribution 
requirement for the publicly-listed firms trading on the ISE. This provided total freedom 
to the ISE-listed firms to make their own dividend policy decisions to pay or not to pay, 
with the requirement that any decisions made regarding dividends should be publicly 
disclosed.7  
1.3.5 The Rationale in Examining Dividend Policy of the ISE-listed Firms  
Turkey had a very late start in the liberalisation of its economy and the establishment of 
its stock market, the ISE, whose history only dating back to 1986 compared to the 
developed stock exchanges with hundreds of years of historical development (Adaoglu, 
1999; 2000; Aksu and Kosedag, 2006). Studies reveal that Turkey is a civil law country 
(La Porta et al., 1997), where corporate ownership structure is characterised by highly 
concentrated family ownership (Gursoy and Aydogan, 1999; Yurtoglu, 2003). There is 
also a history of poor structural and microeconomic policies as well as a poor culture of 
                                                          
6
 The CMB decision number: 16535 and dated 30/12/2003, published in the CMB Weekly Announcement 
Bulletin No: 2003/63.  
 
7
 Relating to the fiscal year 2004, the CMB decision number: 51/1747 and dated 30/12/2004 published in 
the CMB Weekly Announcement Bulletin No: 2004/54.  
 
Relating to the fiscal year 2005, the CMB decision number: 4/67 and dated 27/01/2006 published in the 
CMB Weekly Announcement Bulletin No: 2006/3. 
 
Relating to the fiscal year 2006, the CMB decision number: 2/53 and dated 18/01/2007 published in the 
CMB Weekly Announcement Bulletin No: 2007/3.  
 
Relating to the fiscal year 2007, the CMB decision number: 4/138 and dated 08/02/2008 published in the 
CMB Weekly Announcement Bulletin No: 2008/6.  
 
Relating to the fiscal year 2008, the CMB decision number: 1/6 and dated 09/01/2009 published in the 
CMB Weekly Announcement Bulletin No: 2009/2.  
 
Relating to the fiscal year 2009 and onwards, the CMB decision number: 02/51 and dated 27/01/2010 
published in the CMB Weekly Announcement Bulletin No: 2010/4. 
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corporate governance and transparency and disclosure practices (IIF, 2005; Aksu and 
Kosedag, 2006). With the rapid development since the establishment in 1986, the ISE 
became highly representative of a promising emerging market, with fast growth in terms 
of the number of listed firms, trading volume, market capitalisation and foreign 
investment (Adaoglu, 2000) as well as indicating high volatility in returns especially 
during the period 1990-2000.  
In this period, Turkish economy also often experienced global effects from a number of 
geopolitical, financial and economic crises; for instance, the Gulf War Crisis in 1991, 
1997 Asia Crisis, 1998 Russia Crisis and 2000 Argentina Crisis. However, the major 
financial crisis that strongly affected the ISE was the systemic banking crisis that 
Turkish economy experienced in 2001 (BRSA, 2010), which resulted in substantial 
losses for shareholders, especially small Turkish investors who heavily invested in the 
ISE prior to economic crisis (Adaoglu, 2008). Indeed, during the late 1990s, a 
considerably long list of cases in tunnelling took place in the Turkish public. Majority 
of these cases were simple resource transfers of controlling shareholders from their 
firms in the form of outright theft or fraud.  Whereas a number of listed firms’ minority 
shareholders were harmed by these events, a bigger proportion represented wealth 
transfers from state banks to controlling owners of unlisted firms, involving in many 
cases transactions with politicians (Yurtoglu, 2003). 
Having experienced the series of booms and busts during its liberalisation period of its 
economy (from the late 1980s to the early 2000s), the new Turkish government 
(following the November 2002 elections which resulted in a non-coalition government) 
signed a standby agreement with the IMF and began to implement major economic 
programs and structural reforms for a better working of the market economy, outward-
orientation and globalisation, starting March 2003 (CMB, 2003; Adaoglu, 2008; Birol, 
2011). Turkey’s progress in achieving full membership of the EU in this period also 
provided the strongest motivation in establishing new reforms, rules and regulations in 
line with the EU directives and best-practice international standards, to improve 
corporate governance and transparency and disclosure practices; and therefore, to 
integrate its economy with Europe and to harmonise its institutions with those of the EU 
(IIF, 2005; Aksu and Kosedag, 2006; Rawdanowicz, 2010).   
In this context, since the main motivation of this doctoral thesis is to investigate 
dividend policy behaviour of an emerging market after implementing serious economic 
and structural reforms in order to integrate with world markets, the Turkish stock 
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market, namely the ISE, offers an ideal setting for the purpose of this thesis, allowing a 
study of the dividend behaviour of an emerging market, which implemented major 
reforms starting with the fiscal year 2003, in compliance with the IMF stand-by 
agreement, the EU directives and best-practice international standards for a better 
working of the market economy, outward-orientation and globalisation.  
 
1.4 The Importance of the Study  
1. As evidenced by prior studies taken in the context of developing markets, it is 
not surprising that dividend policy behaviour in emerging markets generally tend to be 
different from developed markets in many aspects due to various factors such as 
political, social and financial instability, lack of adequate disclosure, poor laws and 
regulations, weaker financial intermediaries, newer markets with smaller market 
capitalisations, weaker corporate governance and different ownership structures (La 
Porta et al., 1999; 2000; Kumar and Tsetsekos, 1999; Aivazian et al., 2003a; 2003b; 
Yurtoglu, 2003). What if, however, an emerging market implements serious economic 
and structural reforms for market integration? Then what behaviour does the dividend 
policy of this emerging market show? This doctoral thesis, differently from earlier 
research, aims to carry the dividend debate into an emerging market context but 
attempting to answer the above question.  
 
2. As previously explained, the Turkish stock market offers an ideal setting for the 
purpose of this study. There is, however, very limited evidence about the dividend 
policy in Turkey from a few studies (La Porta et al., 2000; Adaoglu, 2000; Aivazian et 
al., 2003a; 2003b; Kirkulak and Kurt, 2010). These studies were undertaken in the 
earlier stage of the ISE while the Turkish economy was yet implementing its financial 
liberalisation programme, suffering long-standing macro-economic imbalances, and 
experiencing a number of financial crises. The Turkish economy implemented various 
major economic and structural reforms in collaboration with the IMF, the EU directives 
and best-practice international standards for a better working of the market economy, 
outward-orientation and globalisation, starting with the fiscal year 2003. This study 
provides empirical evidence about the dividend policy behaviour of the ISE-listed 
companies during its market integration period by examining a long and more recent 
panel dataset from 2003 to 2012.  
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3. The transparency and disclosure practices of the ISE firms were not remarkable; 
because the ISE’s financial reporting standards (the Turkish Code of Commerce dating 
back to 1957) were only based on the generally accepted principles of accounting and 
auditing (Aksu and Kosedag, 2006). In 1990s, Turkey enjoyed an economic growth but 
it was overall an economically unstable decade, with the experience of a number of 
financial crises and the inflation rate surpassing 100% during the decade. As a result of 
the instability, high inflation rates, inconsistent and unclear accounting practices, and 
the absence of inflation accounting standards, the historical financial statements of the 
ISE firms lost their information value and misinformed investors (Ararat and Ugur, 
2003; UNCTAD, 2008). However, the need for a global set of high-quality financial 
reporting standards has especially been important in developing countries and countries 
with economies in transition. They tend to be eager for external capital as their 
economies typically grow faster so that foreign and domestic investors can verify the 
underlying profitability of the firm and therefore the security of their investment with 
the help of comparable and consistent financial data (Aivazian et al., 2003a; UNCTAD, 
2008). 
 
In this respect, the CMB of Turkey attributed great importance to improve 
communications with investors, issuers and other institutions, in 2003, in order to 
ensure that markets are functioning in a safer, more transparent and more efficient 
manner in accordance with regulations that were adopted in harmony with international 
norms and developments (CMB, 2003). Accordingly, one of the most important 
developments was that in line with the EU requirements.  The CMB issued the 
Communiqué Serial: XI, No: 25 entitled “Accounting Standards in Capital Markets”  in 
November 2003, adopting International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and 
enforcing publicly owned and traded firms to use new rules. In addition, the CMB 
requested the implementation of inflation-adjusted accounting at the same time 
(UNCTAD, 2008). This has resulted in a more transparent and more efficient 
worldwide financial reporting standards, providing comparable and consistent financial 
data for foreign and domestic investors, and other institutions. Likewise, the adoption of 
the IFRS and inflation accounting has given researchers a way better opportunity to 
study firm-specific characteristics of firms in the Turkish market. This study, thus, 
investigates what firm-specific (financial) determinants affect dividend policy decisions 
of the ISE-listed firms and whether they follow the same firm-specific determinants as 
suggested by empirical studies from developed markets, while setting their dividend 
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policies over a decade after Turkey adopted the IFRS and inflation accounting, starting 
with the fiscal year 2003.  
 
4. The evidence from cross-country studies (Glen et al., 1995; La Porta et al., 
2000; Aivazian et al., 2003a) revealed that there are regulatory differences related to the 
dividend policy making process forced by the governments throughout the world; 
particularly, emerging market governments are likely to enforce constrains on the 
dividend policy in order to protect both minority shareholders and creditors. For the 
fiscal years 1985-1994, the dividend policy in the ISE was indeed heavily regulated due 
to the first mandatory dividend policy imposed by the CMB, obliging the ISE firms to 
pay at least 50% of their distributable income as a cash dividend. This did not provide 
the managers of these firms much flexibility to choose their own dividend policies. In 
fact, earlier studies (Adaoglu, 2000; Aivazian et al., 2003a) showed that the ISE firms 
followed unstable dividend policies since cash dividend payments were solely depended 
on the firm’s current year earnings as forced by the regulations and any variability in 
earnings was directly reflected in the level of cash dividends.  
 
In 2003, various reforms in accounting standards, corporate governance, transparency 
and disclosure practices were implemented, as well as the restructuring public banks 
and regulating private banks. Risk group definitions and a calculation of loan limits for 
a single group, which generally includes banks, businesses and subsidiaries in the same 
group, considering direct and connected lending, were established. This forced the ISE 
firms to the equity market with greater incentive for more transparent financing since 
insider lending (in other words non-arms length transactions) as a source of financing 
was prevented (IIF, 2005). The CMB of Turkey also implemented much flexible 
mandatory dividend policy regulations (during 2003-2008) and further removed 
restrictions forced on the dividend payments (2009 and onwards) in order to allow the 
ISE managers to set their own dividend policies and reflect their judgements in the 
share prices (Adaoglu, 1999; 2000; 2008). In accordance, this study examines whether 
ISE firms adopt deliberate cash dividend policies to convey a signal to investors, and as 
well, whether they follow stable dividend policies, as in developed markets, by using 
the Lintner (1956) model. Particularly, over a decade after the mandatory dividend 
policy regulations are considerably relaxed and the insider lending (non-arm’s length 
transactions) is prevented as a source of financing along with the implementation of 
major reforms in 2003.  
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5.  Corporate ownership structure in Turkey is characterised by concentrated 
family ownership (Gursoy and Aydogan, 1999; Yurtoglu, 2003; IIF, 2005). Similarly, a 
number of cross-country studies (La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio et 
al.. 2001) provide evidence that shows ownership by large controlling shareholders, 
typically families, as the dominant form of ownership structure in most developing 
economies. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argued that when large shareholders, including 
family shareholders, hold almost full control, they tend to generate private benefits of 
control that are not shared with minority shareholders. In these cases, the salient agency 
problem is therefore expropriation of the wealth of minority owners by the families, the 
principal-principal conflicts. Indeed, during the late 1990s, a long list of cases of 
corruption, share dilution, asset stripping, tunnelling, insider trading and market 
manipulation dominated the Turkish public, and a number of listed firms’ minority 
shareholders were harmed by these events (Ararat and Ugur, 2003; Yurtoglu, 2003; IIF, 
2005). 
 
Cash dividends can be used to either reduce or exacerbate the principal-principal 
conflicts, since dividends are the substitutes for legal protection of minority 
shareholders in the countries with weak legal protections. By paying dividends, 
controlling shareholders return profits to investors, the possibility of expropriation of 
wealth from others is reduced (La Porta et al., 2000). It is difficult to judge whether 
families tend to expropriate of the wealth of minority owners through dividends in 
emerging markets. There are several studies (Faccio et al., 2001; Chen et al., 2005; Wei 
et al., 2011; Aguenaou et al., 2013; Gonzalez et al., 2014)) examined the relationship 
between family-control and dividend policy in emerging markets, with a mixed report 
of findings.   
 
In 2003, the CMB’s Corporate Governance Principles was published in order to 
improve the ISE listed firms corporate governance practices. The CMB Principles 
consisted of four major parts; particularly, shareholders, disclosure-transparency, 
stakeholders and board of directors. All firms traded in the ISE need to comply with 
these principles and publish corporate governance compliance report yearly (CMB, 
2003; 2004 and Caliskan and Icke, 2011). Considering the implementation of various 
major economic and structural reforms, starting with the fiscal year 2003, and with 
many areas improved in Turkish corporate governance practice, its capital market is still 
heavily concentrated and characterised by high family ownership. This study, therefore, 
investigates the link between ownership structure and dividend policy, based on the 
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agency cost theory. It analyses the effect of family control on dividend policy from the 
principal-principal conflict perspective, as well as considering the impact of the non-
family blockholders, such as foreign investors, domestic financial institutions and the 
state, and minority shareholders; particularly, on the ISE firms dividend policy 
decisions over the past decade, when Turkey has employed major reforms, including the 
publication of the CMB’s Corporate Governance Principles in the fiscal year 2003. 
 
6. This study extends empirical research on dividend policy of an emerging 
market, which not only passed laws for financial liberalisation, but implemented serious 
economic and structural reforms to integrate with world markets. Hence, it could be a 
benchmark for future longitudinal and cross-country research. 
 
7. This study particularly provides important indicators on dividend policy 
behaviour of the ISE-listed firms, after the Turkish government implemented various 
major economic and structural reforms in collaboration with the IMF, the EU directives 
and best-practice international standards, all for a better working of the market 
economy, outward-orientation and globalisation, starting with the fiscal year 2003. Such 
a contribution would be of interest to managers of these firms while they make their 
dividend policy decisions, investors who are attracted to invest in firms traded in the 
ISE, and other stakeholders, such as researchers and professional bodies.  
 
1.5 The Structure of the Thesis 
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows:  
Chapter 2 presents a detailed literature review of main dividend policy theories. These 
include the dividend irrelevance theory, signalling theory, agency cost theory, 
transaction cost theory, as well as tax-related explanations, bird-in-the-hand theory, 
pecking order theory, residual dividend theory, catering theory, and maturity 
hypothesis. It provides extensive empirical studies, where these theories were tested in 
order to examine the relationship between theory and practice, from both developed and 
developing markets.  
Chapter 3 empirically investigates what firm-specific determinants affect dividend 
policy decisions of the ISE-listed firms, and whether they follow the same firm-specific 
determinants as suggested by empirical studies from developed markets, while setting 
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their dividend policies a decade after Turkey adopted the IFRS and inflation accounting 
(fiscal year 2003). This investigation considers a more comprehensive empirical models 
by estimating the effects of various financial determinants on dividend policy and 
includes regression techniques, using pooled and panel data analyses (logit/probit and 
tobit estimations). It employs alternative dividend policy measures (the probability of 
paying dividends, dividend payout ratio and dividend yield), and discusses the main 
firm-specific determinants of dividend policy for Turkish firms.  
Chapter 4 attempts to examine whether the ISE-listed firms adopt deliberate dividend 
policies to signal information to investors, and whether they adopt stable dividend 
policies as in developed markets by using Lintner’s (1956) model, a decade after the 
mandatory dividend policy regulations are considerably relaxed and insider lending 
(non-arm’s length transactions) is prevented as a source of financing, along with the 
implementation of major reforms in 2003. It employs richer research models (pooled 
OLS, random effects, fixed effects and system GMM) in order to provide more valid, 
consistent and robust results. The chapter also considers several extensions of Lintner’s 
(1956) model by including additional regressors as explanatory variables, observed in 
the literature and thought to be possibly influencing the dividend policy of the ISE firms 
during the study sample period.  
Chapter 5 provides empirical research for the link between ownership structure and 
dividend policy based on the agency cost theory. Specifically, it analyses the effect of 
family control on dividend policy from the principal-principal conflict perspective and 
also considers the impacts of the non-family blockholders (foreign investors, domestic 
financial institutions and the state) and minority shareholders on the ISE firms dividend 
policy decisions, over a decade when Turkey employed major reforms, which include 
the publication of the CMB’s Corporate Governance Principles in the fiscal year 2003. 
The chapter uses pooled and panel data analyses (logit/probit and tobit estimations), as 
well as employing alternative dividend policy measures (the probability of paying 
dividends, dividend payout ratio and dividend yield), and discusses the findings of this 
empirical analyses.  
Chapter 6 illustrates an overall summary of the research results. In addition, it gives 
recommendations for practice, addresses the research limitations and provides 
suggestions for possible future research. 
 
Birkbeck University of London Page 38 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
A LITERATURE SURVEY ON DIVIDEND POLICY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2    A Literature Survey on Dividend Policy 
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2.1 Introduction 
Dividend policy is one of the most controversial topics in corporate finance literature. 
Finance academics have dealt with various theories in order to explain why companies 
should pay or not pay dividends. Some researchers (Lintner, 1956; Brennan, 1970; 
Elton and Gruber, 1970; Rozeff, 1982) have built and empirically tested a great number 
of models to explain dividend behaviour. Others (Baker et al., 1985; Pruitt and Gitman, 
1991; Baker and Powell, 1999; Brav et al., 2005; Baker and Smith, 2006) have 
surveyed corporate managers to discover their thoughts about dividends. Hence, 
dividend policy literature is extensive and contains various theories, hypotheses and 
explanations for dividends. Despite much research and extensive debate, the actual 
motivation for paying dividends still remains unsolved (Baker and Powell, 1999). 
Fischer Black (1976, p.5) once described this lack of consensus on the matter as the 
dividend puzzle by stating that “The harder we look at the dividend picture, the more it 
seems like a puzzle, with pieces that just don’t fit together.” Although Black (1976) 
came to this conclusion almost four decades ago, his observation still seems valid since 
financial economists have not reached a definitive theory on dividends. Brealey and 
Myers (2003) listed dividends as one of the ten important unsolved problems in finance 
in their textbook, supporting this conclusion. Allen and Michaely (1995, p.833) 
suggested that “Much more empirical and theoretical research on the subject of 
dividends is required before a consensus can be reached.”    
Accordingly, the aim of this chapter is to provide a detailed literature review of leading 
theoretical developments on dividend policy and various empirical studies, which have 
tested these theories in order to examine the relationship between theory and practice, 
from both developed and developing markets. The structure of this chapter is as follows. 
Section 2.2 outlines the main dividend theories. In Section 2.3, the empirical studies of 
dividend policy in developed markets are reviewed, followed by the empirical studies of 
dividend policy in developing markets in Section 2.4. The conclusions are then 
presented in Section 2.5. 
 
2.2 Dividend Policy Theories  
In this section, the major dividend policy theories are discussed, beginning with the 
dividend irrelevance theory, and followed by the signalling theory, agency cost theory, 
Birkbeck University of London Page 40 
transaction cost theory, tax preference theory, bird-in-the-hand hypothesis, pecking 
order theory, residual dividend theory, catering theory and maturity hypothesis.  
2.2.1 The Dividend Irrelevance Theory  
In 1961, Merton Miller and Franco Modigliani (M&M)’s seminal academic paper 
asserted that under the circumstance of a perfect capital market (PCM)8 with rational 
investors9 and perfect certainty,10 a managed dividend policy is irrelevant. The valuation 
is only depended on the productivity of the firm’s assets and not the type of dividend 
payout. In other words, no matter how much care managers take in choosing a dividend 
policy for their company, no particular dividend policy can increase or decrease 
shareholders’ wealth over an alternative dividend policy. The reason for their 
indifference is because shareholders wealth is determined by the income generated by 
the investment decisions managers make, not by how they distribute that income. 
Hence, all the dividend policies are irrelevant.  
Furthermore, according to M&M (1961)’s dividend irrelevance theory, under PCM, 
investors can undo any dividend decisions made by a firm’s managers. Investors can 
gain their desired cash flow level by either selling shares to create homemade dividends 
or using unwanted dividends to buy shares of the firm’s stocks. Consequently, under 
these conditions, one dividend policy is no different from any other dividend policy. 
Under the circumstances of a PCM with rational investors and perfect certainty, M&M 
(1961) illustrated their argument behind their theorem as below:  
In a given year, the required rate of return on a share is equal to the dividend payment 
plus the capital gain provided by selling this share, all divided by the price of the share 
at the beginning of the period. That is (assuming one period world);  
 
                                                          
8
 “In perfect capital markets, no buyer or seller (or issuer) of securities is large enough for his transactions 
to have an appreciable impact on the then ruling price. All traders have equal and costless access to 
information about the ruling price and about all other relevant characteristics of shares. No brokerage 
fees, transfer taxes, or other transaction costs are incurred when securities are bought, sold, or issued, and 
there are no tax differentials either between distributed and undistributed profits or between dividends and 
capital gains.” (M&M, 1961, p.412) 
 
9
 What Miller and Modigliani (1961) mean by rational investors is that under PCM, investors always 
prefer more wealth than less and they are indifferent to whether a specific increase in their wealth comes 
in the form of a dividend payment or an identical increase in a capital gain of their holdings of shares. 
 
10
 The assumption of perfect certainty implies that all investors are certain about the future investment 
and future profits of every corporation. Therefore, there is no need to distinguish between stocks and 
bonds as sources of funds (M&M, 1961).  
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            D1 + (P1 – P0) 
 r =                                       (2.1)     
                  P0 
Where, P0 is the current market price of shares in a given time; P1 is the expected market 
price at the end of the period (the ex-dividend price of the share); D1 is the dividend per 
share paid at the end of the period and r is the required rate of return of the share for the 
period. Reorganising Equation 2.1, we can find the current market price of shares as: 
                 D1 + P1 
P0 =                                                                                                                               (2.2) 
             (1 + r) 
                 
Now, if we suppose that n is the number of shares outstanding at time zero, then the 
current value of the firm (V0) is:  
                      nD1 +nP1 
V0 = nP0 =                                                                                                                    (2.3)         
                            (1 + r) 
 
Moreover, in order to prove that dividends are irrelevant, under the assumptions of 
PCM, Miller and Modigliani (1961) employed the sources and uses of funds equation. 
The firm’s sources of funds are the cash flows from operations (CF1) and the new equity 
financing during any given period (mP1), where m is the number of new shares issued at 
time one and sold at the ex-dividend closing price P1. The uses of funds are the dividend 
payments (nD1) and any investment opportunities (I1) taken in the same time interval. 
As the sources must equal the uses of the funds, therefore: 
CF1 + mP1 = nD1 + I1            (2.4)  
Once the equation 2.4 is re-arranged, 
nD1 = CF1 + mP1 ‒ I1           (2.5) 
Replacing Equation 2.5 into Equation 2.3 for nD1, 
            CF1 + mP1 − I1 + nP1                        CF1 − I1 + (n+m)P1 
V0 =                                            =                                                                                (2.6) 
                      (1 + r)                                    (1 + r) 
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Since (n+m)P1 = V1; therefore,  
                         CF1 ‒ I1 + V1 
V0 =                                                                                                                               (2.7) 
                      (1+r)                                                                                
  
As dividend payments do not appear in Equation 2.7 and since operating cash flows 
(CF1), investments (I1) and required rate of return (r) are not function of dividend 
policy, the value of the firm is not dependant of its current dividend policy. Therefore, 
the analysis11 suggests that the firm’s investment policy is the key determinant of its 
value and dividend policy is residual. Consequently, the dividend policy, under PCM, is 
irrelevant to the value of the firm (M&M, 1961).  
Although Miller and Modigliani’s (1961) dividend irrelevance theory is logical and 
consistent within a perfect market, once the idealised world of economic theory is left 
and we return to the real world, various market imperfections are being observed such 
as differential tax rates, information asymmetries, transaction costs, and conflicts of 
interest between managers and shareholders. In this respect, the irrelevance theory 
becomes highly debatable and these market imperfections might mean that dividend 
policies do matter. Indeed, much of the dividend literature has responded to M&M’s 
irrelevance theory by focusing on the market imperfections and offering many 
competing theories about why companies pay, or not pay dividends.  
2.2.2 Signalling (Asymmetric Information) Hypothesis 
The signalling hypothesis is one of the most widely studied explanations, indicating that 
an information asymmetry12 exists and therefore a firm’s management has a better 
understanding of the firm’s true value than outsiders who only have access to public 
information. Accordingly, managers use dividends to convey useful information about 
the current situation and future prospects of the firm.  
                                                          
11
 The analysis can be carried over to more periods and the results will remain the same; that is the value 
of the firm is not affected by dividend policy. Also, the analysis above completely based on 100% equity 
financing. It can be extended to contain debt financing. However, the inclusion of debt financing does not 
affect the results. Similar to the equity-financed dividends, no additional value is created by debt-financed 
dividends since under the assumption of PCM, capital markets are perfect and complete; hence, amount 
of debt does not affect the total value of the firm (M&M, 1961). 
 
12
 All interested participants such as managers, bankers, shareholders, potential investors and others, have 
the same information about a firm in a symmetrically informed market. However, if one part has superior 
information about the firm’s current position and future performance, then an information asymmetry 
exists (John and Williams, 1985).  
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The idea of dividends signalling information to the market is an old one. Lintner’s 
(1956) famous classic study13 revealed that managers are concerned about dividend 
signalling over time. Lintner argues that managers believe the shareholders deserve a 
fair share of the firm’s earnings through dividends. Although some managers supported 
a long-range payout ratio, they assume that shareholders prefer a steady increase in 
dividends. Therefore, managers intend to avoid making changes in their dividend rates 
that may have to be reversed in the future. In spite of this, managers tend to make 
partial adjustment towards a target payout ratio to smooth dividend payment streams in 
the short run and avoid spectacular and frequent changes. Adopting a smoothed 
dividend policy can prevent the volatility of dividends, which might signal volatility of 
cash flows that will increase a firm’s beta and investors’ required returns, thus 
decreasing firm value. Also, Lintner suggested that managers are reluctant to cut 
dividends unless adverse circumstances are likely to persist since they think dividend 
cuts are bad signals to the market. Consequently, managers are more concerned with 
changes in dividends from one period to the next, rather than absolute levels of 
dividends.  
An alternative approach has been provided by the dividend signalling models, arguing 
that managers use dividends as a device to signal their superior information about future 
performance rather than lagged and current situation, and choose dividend levels to 
show this superior information. Based on this approach, rigorous logical signalling 
models for paying dividends, developed by Bhattacharya (1979), John and Williams 
(1985), and Miller and Rock (1985), propose that if managers are confident about the 
future prospects of their firms, they distribute larger cash dividends as a good signal to 
the investors. Moreover, John and Williams (1985) indicate that the market may value a 
firm’s shares below its intrinsic value under some conditions; for example, if the current 
shareholders are selling their holdings to meet their personal liquidity needs or if the 
firm invests in risky projects. However, under these circumstances, in order to prevent 
or reduce this under-pricing, managers pay larger dividends to their shareholders as a 
credible signal when other firms, whose future prospects are not as good, cannot mimic 
                                                          
13
 Lintner (1956) conducted a survey study on how US managers make dividend decisions. He collected 
28 intensive interviews with managers responsible for the dividend decisions from 28 listed and well-
established firms. After analysing the information collected in his survey, Lintner developed a regression 
model to represent the verbal description of the dividend decisions process, which works over longer 
periods and explains 85% of the dividend changes year to year. Lintner’s model and findings have been 
supported by numerous researchers and therefore remain as a classic study on dividend behaviour.  
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the dividend behaviour of undervalued firms.14 Hence, John and Williams (1985) argue 
that paying larger dividends are taken as a favourable inside information by the market; 
thus, investors prefer to buy the shares of firms distributing larger dividends at higher 
share prices. Contrarily, firms with no or less favourable inside information, in other 
words non-dividend paying firms, should experience negative price reactions.  
2.2.3 Agency Cost Theory  
Jensen and Meckling (1976), Rozeff (1982) and Easterbrook (1984) developed the 
agency cost explanation of why firms should pay dividends. This theory derives from 
problems which are associated with the separation of management and ownership, and 
the differences in managerial and shareholder priorities. The theory suggests that an 
effective dividend policy controls agency cost by reducing funds available for 
unnecessary and unprofitable investments, requiring managers to look for financing in 
capital markets. In their seminal paper, Jensen and Meckling (1976) stated that in the 
light of the costs to managers from possible agency conflicts, it becomes important to 
them that the company is seen to be free of such conflicts. Managers will therefore take 
measures, in addition to those taken by shareholders, to decrease the potential for 
agency conflicts. Subsequently, agency costs are defined as the loss to shareholders of 
controlling agency behaviour, through measures taken by themselves and by managers, 
as well as the costs from any agency behaviour that have not been controlled. Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) identified three components of agency costs: monitoring 
expenditures,15 bonding expenditures16 and residual loss,17 respectively.  
                                                          
14
 What is meant by credible signal in this scenario is that paying larger dividends must be extremely 
costly for other firms those cannot pay as much or even increase dividends. That means that these firms 
do not have favourable inside information to convey; therefore, when the firm delivers larger dividends, it 
is seen as favourable inside information and accepted as credible signal by the market.  
 
15
 Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that dividend payments force managers to raise external finance 
more frequently than they would without paying dividends and this allows outside professionals, such as 
investment banks, regulators, lawyers, public accountants and potential investors, to scrutinize the firm 
and monitor its managers’ activities. This capital market monitoring decreases the agency cost and 
increases the market value of the firm.  
 
16
 Bonding expenditures are associated with the amount of cash flow at managers’ disposal. Dividend 
payments would reduce the agency costs by controlling and improving the forms of incentives that 
managers create for themselves and reducing the amount of cash that they may misuse for their own 
consumption.  
 
17
 Residual loss implies that managers with large balances of excess cash, so called free cash flows, may 
not use this cash in profitable ways that shareholders desire; for instance, investing in negative NPV 
projects or unwise acquisitions. However, dividends reduce the amount of excess cash that managers can 
overinvest or misuse.  
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Easterbrook (1984) hypothesised that dividend payments are used to take away the free 
cash from the managers’ control and pay it to shareholders. Paying larger dividends 
decreases the internal cash flow subject to management discretion and forces the 
company to approach the capital market in order to meet the funding needs for new 
projects. Increase of costly outside capital subjects to the company to the scrutiny of the 
capital market for new funds and decreases the chance of suboptimal investment. The 
efficient monitoring of capital markets also assists to ensure that managers perform in 
the best interests of shareholders (Easterbrook, 1984). Thereby, dividend payments 
might serve as a means of monitoring and bonding management performance.  
According to Jensen (1986), dividends are used by shareholders as a device to reduce 
overinvestment by managers. The managers control the company; hence, they might use 
free cash to invest in projects with negative NPVs, but which increase the personal 
utility of the managers in some way. A dividend payment reduces this free cash flow 
and the scope of overinvestment. Consequently, agency cost theory implies that firms 
with high cash flows should have high payouts, because a generous dividend payment 
enhances the firm’s value by reducing the amount of free cash flows, at the discretion of 
management, and thus controls the agency cost problems (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Rozeff, 1982; Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 1986). 
2.2.4 Transaction Cost Theory 
The financial burden of transaction costs due to dividend payments may affect investors 
while they collect or reinvest these payments. More precisely, some investors (such as 
retirees or income-oriented investors), who rely on dividend income for their 
consumption needs, might prefer high and steady dividend-paying shares; because 
selling part of their holdings could involve significant transaction costs to such 
investors. In contrast, others (such as wealthy investors), who do not need dividend 
income to fulfil their liquidity needs, may prefer none or low payouts to prevent the 
transaction costs associated with reinvesting these unwanted dividends to purchase 
additional shares (Bishop et al., 2000).18 Since transaction costs have to be incurred for 
both groups of investors while transferring one financial asset to another, firms should 
adjust their dividend policy according to shareholders satisfaction to avoid entailing 
transaction costs (Scholz, 1992). 
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 Miller and Modigliani’s (1961) argument of homemade dividends is not costless once the assumptions 
of PCM are relaxed. Therefore, dividend policy may be relevant in the presence of such costs.  
Birkbeck University of London Page 46 
Another argument of transaction costs affect on dividend policy is related to firms’ 
investment decisions, which has been emphasised and tested, more importantly, in 
literature, arguing that the transaction cost is the cost that is associated with external 
financing.  Since external financing might be costly, firms may face heavy burden of 
transaction costs. After paying dividends, firms may have to raise external finance to 
meet their investment requirements. This may result in additional costs to firms who 
prefer to use cheap and easy accessible internal financing to pay dividends instead of 
spending on investment projects. For instance, management of a firm may ignore 
positive NPV investments because cash dividend distributions consume internal funds 
and increasing external funds incur transaction costs. In this context, transaction cost 
appeared as the cost of dividends in Bhattacharya’s (1979) model and Rozeff’s (1982) 
trade-off model. Also, Miller and Rock (1985) defined the cost of dividends as the 
cutback or disregard of the profitable investment opportunities in their model. 
Therefore, the transaction cost theory of dividends holds the hypothesis of a given level 
of investment, and points out the costs of raising external financing due to paying 
dividends. These transaction costs might as well contain the costs of raising additional 
external funds, such as underwriter fees, administration costs, management time and 
legal expenses.  
Based on the transaction cost argument, Rozeff (1982) argues that firms with higher 
levels of leverage, which have greater dependency on external financing, should adopt 
lower payout policies since higher dividend payments raise the transaction cost of 
external financing. Rozeff (1982) suggests that growth opportunities and firms’ 
volatility are other factors that can increase the dependency on costly external sources. 
Growth opportunities imply that firms are faced with good investment projects and 
require funds, whereas firms’ volatility means the dependency on external financing is 
too risky as there is less certainty in terms of estimated earnings to be gained. Overall, 
highly leveraged, risky or growing firms should be paying none or low levels of 
dividends in order to prevent the transaction costs of dividends.  
2.2.5 Tax Related Theories  
One of the earliest arguments around paying dividends is that uneven tax treatment of 
dividends and capital gains may affect the dividend policy decisions of firms who desire 
to maximise their market value, hence influencing the delivery of cash dividends. 
Accordingly, financial economists hypothesised that taxes might have crucial effects on 
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both investors and corporations regarding dividends. The tax preference theory, 
developed by Brennan (1970), Elton and Gruber (1970) and Litzenberger and 
Ramaswamy (1979), proposes that investors who receive favourable tax treatment on 
capital gains (lower taxes on capital gains than dividends) might prefer shares with none 
or low dividend payouts. The reason is that if income tax is greater than the rate of 
capital gains tax, high dividend payments would increase shareholders’ tax burden. 
Therefore, other things being equal, firms should avoid or make minimal dividend 
payments if they want to maximise their share prices.  
However, the tax clientele effect hypothesis, proposed by Miller and Modigliani (1961), 
Black and Scholes (1974) and Miller and Scholes (1978), argues that each investor has 
their own implied calculations of choosing between high or low cash dividends and 
selecting dividend policies according to their tax category circumstances. The logic is 
that there are clienteles for both high and low dividend yields depending on tax 
positions. Some institutional investors who are often tax-exempt and individuals at low 
tax brackets may prefer high cash dividends, whereas others at high tax brackets prefer 
companies with low cash dividends. In other words, since there are enough companies 
to provide these different dividend policies, investors will invest in only companies with 
policies that best fit their tax position. In equilibrium, therefore, no firm can increase its 
value by reducing taxes through its dividend policy; in fact, this may cause a change in 
clientele and could be costly because of trading costs. As a result, the tax clientele effect 
hypothesis supports M&M’s (1961) dividend irrelevancy conclusion.  
Literature examining the impact of taxation on dividends is extensive but can be divided 
into two major categories. First, under the assumption that dividends and capital gains 
are taxed differently, Brennan (1970) developed a model - a version of the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (CAPM) - of stock valuation in which stocks with high payouts have 
higher required before-tax returns than stocks with low payouts. He found that investors 
require higher pre-tax risk adjusted returns on stocks with higher dividend yields in 
order to compensate the tax disadvantages of these returns. Empirical tests of the 
Brennan model have been carried out by Black and Scholes (1974), Litzenberger and 
Ramaswamy (1979; 1982), Miller and Scholes (1982), Blume (1980), Poterba and 
Summers (1984) and Keim (1985) amongst others. Second, another way of testing the 
tax preference hypothesis is to investigate the ex-dividend date price drop. Elton and 
Gruber (1970) argued that taxing dividends more heavily than capital gains affect the 
behaviour of prices on the ex-day. Favourable capital gains tax treatment should lead to 
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a price drop that is less than the dividend payment. Investors, therefore, prefer shares 
that do not pay dividends. This way of testing tax hypothesis was carried out, through 
empirical studies, by Kalay (1982a), Michaely (1991), Koski and Scruggs (1998), 
Kaplanis (1986), Lasfer (1995) and Bell and Jenkinson (2002) amongst others.  
Kalay (1982a), nevertheless, argued that the ex-dividend share price drop less than the 
dividend per share would provide profit opportunities for the short-term traders. This 
argument is referred to as the short-term trading hypothesis, according to which, in the 
presence of dividends and capital gains tax differentiation, arbitrage opportunities for 
the short-term traders exist. Short-term traders are investors who are not subject to the 
differential taxation of dividends and capital gains such as tax-exempt institutional 
investors or security dealers, and will capture dividends and eliminate any excess 
returns by trading on the ex-dividend dates. In this case, ex-day returns reflect the 
transaction costs of short-term traders practicing a dividend-capturing activity. 
Consequently, in the presence of the arbitragers, the tax effect on dividends cannot be 
inferred by observing ex-dividend day price drops, which may just represent transaction 
costs. Michaely (1991) and Koski and Scruggs (1998) showed strong support for the 
short-term trading hypothesis in the US.  
2.2.6 The Bird-in-the-Hand Hypothesis  
A frequently heard argument in favour of dividends is that more certainty is attached to 
dividend payments received today, against dividend retention for reinvestment in 
projects whose future earnings are not certain. Indeed, it was a popular belief in the 
1950s that shareholders prefer dividend payments to capital gains and firms with higher 
dividend payout ratios would be valued more highly (Gordon and Shapiro, 1956). This 
explanation has been labelled as the risk reduction or more commonly the bird-in-the-
hand hypothesis.19 
The logic of this hypothesis implies that there is a relationship between firm value and 
dividend payments, claiming that dividends can increase firm value because dividends 
are less risky than capital gains. Firms bring forward cash inflows to shareholders and 
reduce the uncertainty associated with future cash flows by paying dividends.  The share 
of a dividend paying firm, therefore, is safer than a share of non-dividend paying firm. 
Out of two identical firms, where one pays dividends whilst the other does not, the 
dividend paying firm will have a higher share price. Thus, firms should set higher 
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 As one of the old saying with regard to risk control goes “A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush.”  
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dividend payout ratios and offer higher dividend yields in order to maximise their share 
prices (Gordon, 1959; 1963). 
This hypothesis was derived from the discounted dividend approach, which suggests 
that the value of a share is based on the net present value of the future dividends, and 
the required rate of return on the share. Let us assume, P0 is the current share price, Dt is 
the dividend paid at period t, rt is the required rate of return at period t and Pt is the share 
price at period t. Then, the current value of the share price at time zero (today) is simply 
the present value of all future dividends discounted at an appropriate discounted rate, as 
illustrated below:  
                  D1               D2                    D3                                Dt                Pt   
P0 =                  +                +                 +…..… +                 +                                     (2.8) 
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1       (1 + r2)
2         (1 + r3)
3
                      (1 + rt)
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       (1 + rt)
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When t goes to infinite (t = 1, 2, 3,….∞), Equation 2.8 can be expressed as follows:  
         ∞    
P0 = ∑                                                                                                                         (2.9)                               
          t =1  
Consequently, Equation 2.9 shows that future discounted dividends are the underlying 
determinant of the value of the current share price. Therefore, other things being equal, 
higher dividends increase the value of the firm. 
In favour of the bird-in-the-hand hypothesis, Graham and Dodd (1951) argued that 
investors buy shares to receive dividends and suggested that a dollar of dividends tend 
to have, on average, four times greater impact on share prices than a dollar of retained 
earnings. Although some studies (Gordon and Shapiro, 1956; Gordon, 1959; 1963; 
Walter, 1963) provided support, empirical evidence for the bird-in-the-hand hypothesis 
is very limited and many others have challenged the argument. In particular, Miller and 
Modigliani (1961) argued that the riskiness of a firm’s operating cash flows determine 
the firm’s risk. In other words, the risk of the firm is determined by its investment 
decisions and not by how it is financed; whether the firm retains earnings to finance this 
investment projects or whether it distributes this earnings in dividends and raises the 
necessary investment funds in the capital market, the value of the firm remains the same 
since in both cases the uncertainty regarding the future is unaffected. Therefore, 
increasing the dividend today will not raise the firm’s value by decreasing the riskiness 
of the future cash flows.  
     Dt 
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Accordingly, Miller and Modigliani (1961) strongly disagreed and called this theory the 
“bird-in-the-hand fallacy”. Moreover, Bhattacharya (1979) also claimed that the logic of 
the bird-in-the-hand hypothesis is “fallacious”. He suggested that the riskiness of a 
firm’s cash flow influences the level of its dividends, but any increase in dividend 
payments will not reduce the firm’s risk. Indeed, risky firms facing greater uncertainty 
of future cash flows are more likely to have lower payout policies. Consistent with this 
notion, researchers, such as Rozeff (1982), Lloyd et al. (1985), Schooley and Barney 
(1994) and Moh’d et al. (1995) found a negative relationship between dividends and 
firm risk, indicating that as the risk of a firm’s operations increases, the dividend payout 
ratio decreases, which is totally inconsistent with the bird-in-the-hand hypothesis.  
2.2.7 Pecking Order Theory 
Pecking order theory of capital structure proposed by Myers (1984) and Myers and 
Majluf (1984) is an alternative possible argument for explaining firms’ dividend policy 
behaviour. The claim is that firms seeking to finance new investments prefer to use 
funds according to a hierarchy; first internal funds, then debt issuance and finally equity 
issuance. This “pecking order” suggests that firms favour to finance their activities with 
internally generated earnings to prevent the underinvestment problems20 that involve 
risky leverage and informational asymmetries between managers and investors. If firms 
do not have enough internal finance to fund their operations, then they should issue debt 
to cover their financial deficit. However, only in extreme cases, they should raise 
external equity capital.  
According to this hypothesis (Myers and Majluf, 1984), better firms should have lower 
leverage and lower short-term payout controlling investment opportunities. Also, firms 
with high growth opportunities tend to have high leverage (given that investment 
requires more than the internally generated funds) and these firms should pay out low 
dividends. Subsequently, pecking order theory predicts a negative relationship between 
dividend payments and investment opportunities. Thus, in order to prevent external 
financing and make more use of internal funds for investments, one obvious way to 
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 Raising new equity to fund a positive NPV investment opportunity may be costly if the shares are 
under-valued. In these cases, managers tend to reduce possible profitable investments in order to avoid a 
wealth transfer from existing shareholders to new shareholders. Then, this occurs as a type of 
underinvestment problem. Likewise, since external finance may be associated with significant costs such 
as administrative and under writing costs, and in some cases under-pricing the new securities, managers 
even may choose to pass up a positive NPV investment. However, these underinvestment problems are 
avoided if firms can retain enough internally-generated earnings to cover their positive NPV investment 
opportunities (Myers, 1984).  
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accomplish this is by reducing the amounts of dividends distributed to firms’ 
shareholders. The prediction of a negative relationship between investment and cash 
dividends is not unique to the pecking order theory, as the transaction cost theory makes 
a similar prediction. However, it is in contrast with the agency cost theory of free cash 
flow hypothesis, which suggests paying higher dividends to lessen the amount of 
internally generated free cash flow that managers may misuse by undertaking negative 
NPV investments.  
2.2.8 Residual Dividend Theory  
Residual dividend theory suggests that a firm should pay dividends simply when its 
internally generated earnings are not fully exhausted for investment projects.  According 
to this theory, dividend payments should ideally be the residual of the cash produced by 
the firms’ operations, only after all positive NPV investments have been undertaken 
(Saxena, 1999). Following a residual dividend policy, the amount of residual dividend 
tends to be highly volatile and often zero. This is because, internally generated cash 
flows have inherent variability and desirable investment opportunities with positive 
NPV unpredictable over time (Lease et al., 2000). Thus, such a policy would make 
predicting future dividend payments complicated and would be appropriate only if 
shareholders do not mind the fluctuating dividends (Baker and Smith, 2006). Further, 
Lease et al. (2000) state that firms should pay out at least the residual dividend. It is 
because, if the residual dividend is not paid after all possible positive NPV projects 
taken, the firm may invest this cash in negative NPV projects. Hence, at this point, 
residual dividend theory has some similarities with Jensen’s (1986) agency cost of free 
cash flow argument.  
2.2.9 Catering Theory of Dividends 
Baker and Wurgler (2004a; 2004b) proposed a relatively new explanation, which is 
called the catering theory of dividends. Dividend policy literature has responded to 
Miller and Modigliani’s irrelevance theory by relaxing the assumptions of perfect 
capital markets and focusing on the market imperfections.  Baker and Wurgler (2004a; 
2004b) indicated that the only assumption that has not been relaxed is market efficiency 
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and they proposed a view of dividends, which is based on relaxing market efficiency 
assumption of the dividend irrelevance proof.21 
According to the catering theory of dividends, investors’ preferences for dividends may 
change over time and the decision by firms to pay dividends is driven by investors’ 
preferences for dividends. Therefore, managers cater to investors by distributing 
dividends when investors put a premium on such stocks. Correspondingly, managers 
will omit dividends when investors highly rate firms that do not pay dividends. 
Furthermore, the theory posits that dividends are highly relevant to share value but in 
different directions at different times. Consequently, managers recognize and cater to 
shifts in investors demand for dividend preferences (Baker and Wurgler, 2004a; 2004b). 
Ferris et al. (2006) provided support for the catering theory of dividends and concluded 
that investor demands ultimately drives corporate dividend decisions in the UK.  
2.2.10 Maturity Hypothesis  
Grullon et al. (2002) attempted to link firm age with dividend policy. Specifically, they 
proposed an alternative explanation to Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow hypothesis, 
known as the maturity hypothesis, which suggests that higher dividend increases are a 
sign of change in a firm’s life cycle, particularly as firm’s transition from growth phase 
to a more mature phase.  
According to this explanation, in a growth stage, a firm typically has many positive 
NPV projects and probably earns large economic profits with high level of capital 
expenditure. Such firms are likely to be left with low free cash flows and experience 
rapid growth in their earnings. As the firm continues to grow, competitors enter the 
industry and cannibalize the firm’s market share, and eventually reduce the firm’s 
economic profits. In this transition phase, the firm’s investment opportunity begins 
shrinking, its growth becomes slow, capital expenditures decline, and the firm starts 
generating larger amounts of free cash flows. Ultimately, the firm enters into maturity 
phase in which the return on investments is close to the cost of capital and free cash 
flows are high. Consequently, these mature firms are now able to pay higher dividends. 
Since a firm gets older in terms of age, its investment opportunities decline, which leads 
to slower growth rates and therefore reducing the fund’s requirements of capital 
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 The assumption has three basic components. First, some investors have an uninformed and perhaps 
time-varying demand for dividend-paying shares due to either psychological or institutional reasons. 
Second, arbitrage fails to stop this demand from separating the prices of dividend-payers and non-payers. 
Third, managers logically cater to investors demand (Baker and Wurgler, 2004a; 2004b).  
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expenditure. On the other hand, mature firms tend to have steady earnings with high 
excess to external capital markets and they can be able to preserve a good level of 
funds, which allows them to pay higher dividends (Grullon et al., 2002). 
2.2.11 Conclusions of Main Dividend Policy Theories 
This section discusses the major dividend policy theories. After having started from 
M&M (1961)’s dividend irrelevance theory, which posits that no dividend policy is 
superior to another under the circumstances of perfect capital market assumptions, one 
can say that these leading theories are involved with the relaxation of M&M’s 
assumptions and dealt with dividends in the presence of the various market 
imperfections. It is, however, observed that the main dividend theories provide 
inconclusive or even contradictory explanations with respect to dividends. For instance, 
some (the bird-in-the-hand hypothesis, agency cost theory and signalling hypothesis) 
argue that dividends can increase firm value and shareholders wealth, whereas others  
(the tax preference theory and transaction cost theory) suggest that dividend payments 
can have negative consequences for shareholders wealth. In addition, there are several 
other theories (the pecking order theory, residual dividend theory, catering theory and 
maturity hypothesis) that add more complexity to the dividend debate.  
Accordingly, it can be concluded that none of these theories explain the dividend puzzle 
single-handedly, consistent with Frankfurter and Wood’s (2003, p.167) statement, “No 
theory based on the economic paradigm developed thus far completely explains the 
persistence of corporate dividend policy.” The major reason for this failure may be that 
financial economists have been trying hard to develop a universal or “one-size-fits-all” 
approach, despite the well-known reality that dividend policy may be sensitive to such 
aspects as firms’ characteristics, corporate governance and legal environment (Baker et 
al., 2008). Since there is no single theory to explain the dividend puzzle alone, 
researchers may have attempted to seek an integrated model that combines various 
theories in examining dividend behaviour for the best explanation of corporate dividend 
policy. At this point, it is worth reviewing how these main dividend theories are 
empirically tested, and what implications there are by applying them on different 
markets, during different period of times, using different methodologies by many 
researchers. Therefore, a summary of empirical studies from both developed and 
developing markets will be presented in the following sections.  
 
Birkbeck University of London Page 54 
2.3 Empirical Studies in Developed Markets  
After reviewing main theoretical arguments around dividend policy, this section of the 
chapter will present a summary of the extent empirical studies in developed markets, 
where all these theories, models and frameworks are originally hypothesised, developed 
and tested.  
Miller and Modigliani’s (1961) dividend irrelevance theory is logical and consistent 
within a perfect capital market but various market imperfections are being observed in 
the real world markets, such as differential taxes, information asymmetries, transactions 
costs and conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders. In this respect, the 
irrelevance theory becomes highly debatable and these market imperfections might 
indeed mean that dividend policies do matter. The main empirical research of the 
dividend puzzle generally focuses on three big imperfections, namely the tax 
hypothesis, signalling hypothesis and agency cost theory. Accordingly, the following 
summary of main empirical studies in developed economies is organised around these 
three theories.  
2.3.1 Empirical Studies of Signalling Theory in Developed Markets 
The following selective review of empirical research on the signalling explanation of 
dividend policy in developed markets is divided into two sub-sections; (i) studies of the 
partial adjustment model and (ii) studies of the information content of dividends 
hypothesis.  
2.3.1.1 Studies of the Partial Adjustment Model in Developed Markets  
Lintner (1956) conducted a classic study on how US managers make their dividend 
policy decisions. First, he obtained intensive interviews with managers, usually 
presidents, financial vice-presidents or directors, responsible for the dividend decisions 
of 28 different well-established US industrial firms. After analysing the information 
collected from the survey, Lintner (1956) found that managers believe the shareholders 
deserve a fair share of the firm’s earnings through dividends, and they assume that 
shareholders prefer a steady increase of dividends. Hence, managers tend to avoid 
making changes in their dividend rates that may have to be reversed in the future. 
Consequently, they tend to make partial adjustments toward a target payout ratio to 
smooth dividend payment streams in the short run to avoid spectacular and frequent 
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changes. Lintner (1956) also pointed out that managers are also reluctant to cut 
dividends unless adverse circumstances are likely to persist.  
Based on the findings from his extensive field research, Lintner (1956) developed a 
partial adjustment model to show the verbal description of the dividend process he had 
captured. He suggests that each firm has a target dividend level in any given year, which 
is a function of earnings in that year and its target payout rate, as illustrated below: 
Dit
* 
= ri Eit                                                                                                                  (2.10) 
Where Dit
*
 is the target dividend payment for firm i in year t, ri  is the target payout ratio 
for firm i and Eit  is the net earnings in year t for firm i. Lintner (1956) further argues 
that the firm will only adjust dividends partially toward the target dividend level in any 
given year. Hence, the actual difference in dividend payments from year t-1 to year t 
can be given by:  
Dit  – Di(t-1) = αi + ci (Dit
* − Di(t-1)) + uit                                                                    (2.11) 
Where αi is the intercept term, ci is the speed of adjustment coefficient for firm i, uit is 
the error term, Dit is the actual dividend payment for firm i in year t, and Di(t-1) is the 
previous year’s (t-1) dividend payment for firm i. By substituting ri Eit for the target 
dividend payment (Dit
*
) in the model and rearranging Equation 2.11, the following 
empirically testable equation can be equivalently obtained:  
Dit = αi + β1Eit + β2Di(t-1) + uit                                                                                   (2.12) 
Where β1 = ci ri and β2 = (1−ci). According to Lintner (1956), the constant term (αi) is 
expected to have a positive sign to reflect management’s reluctance to reduce dividends, 
and the speed of adjustment coefficient (ci) shows the stability in dividend payment 
changes and calculates the speed of adjustment toward the target payout ratio (ri) in 
response to earnings changes. Hence, the value ci reflects the dividend smoothing 
behaviour of the firm i to changes in the level of earnings; a higher value of ci implies 
less dividend smoothing, in other words unstable dividend policy, and vice-versa. 
Consequently, firms set their dividend in line with their current earnings and their 
previous year dividends. They make partial adjustments to a target payout ratio and do 
not correspond immediately with the changes in earnings.  
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Lintner (1956) tested his regression model with 196 firm-year observations (28 firms, 
seven years, between 1947 and 1953) and found that 85% of the variations in current 
year’s dividend payments were explained by this model. Moreover, Lintner tested his 
equation for time periods outside of the period he used to build his model, specifically 
the period of 1918-1941, and reported excellent correlations, random residuals and 
highly significant regression coefficients over longer periods of time. Lintner’s 
regression results clearly indicated that managers attempt to do what they described 
verbally; the intercept term (αi) was significant and positive, which he interpreted as the 
indication that managers consciously avoid dividend cuts even when earnings decrease. 
Also, both statistically significant and positively related current earnings (Eit) and past 
dividends (Di(t-1)) coefficients showed steady dividends with sustainable increases.  
Darling (1957) pointed out that Lintner’s model could not cover all the aspects that may 
affect dividend decisions and certain considerations; particularly, liquidity and 
expectations are not properly taken into account. Darling (1957) suggested that 
management’s goal of maintaining financial manoeuvrability associates with 
constructing an adequate level of future liquid balances; hence, making dividend 
decisions within the capital budgeting process. The relationship between earnings, 
investments and external funds implies a proportional relationship of capital budgeting. 
Accordingly, he hypothesised that current earnings and lagged dividends, as well as 
current investments and current use of external funds affect dividends. Therefore, 
Darling (1957) first ran a number of multiple-regression tests on an annual dataset of all 
manufacturing US firms for the period 1921-1954,22 by using a modified version of 
Lintner’s partial adjustment model. The results were consistent with Lintner’s (1956) 
model and further showed that dividends are not only influenced by current flows but 
also by anticipations of future flows. Moreover, Darling (1957) modified the equation 
model by substituting lagged dividends for lagged profits and discovered that this model 
worked better. Second, Darling (1957) constructed another sample of quarterly data on 
common-stock dividends that was collected for a twenty-six-year period of 125 large 
industrial firms from first quarter 1930 to second quarter 1955 by Moody Investors 
Service. The results indicated that Darling’s model also worked for quarterly collected 
data samples, as all the independent variables were statistically significant. 
Consequently, Darling (1957) suggested that dividends tend to vary directly with 
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 The years 1936-1938 were excluded due to the reason that during those years 1936 and 1937, dividends 
were extremely large comparing to earnings whereas dividends were extremely low in 1938.  
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current profits, lagged profits, the rate of amortization recoveries, and tend to vary 
inversely with persistent changes in the level of sales.  
Fama and Babiak (1968) extended Lintner’s model by using dividend policy of 
individual firms instead of using aggregate data. Fama and Babiak used a 
comprehensive sample of 392 major US industrial firms for a 19-year period of 1946-
1964. They tested several specifications of Lintner’s partial adjustment model on 
individual firm data in order to analyse dividend behaviour by using OLS time series 
regressions. Further, Fama and Babiak (1968) used simulations to study statistical 
properties of the diverse dividend models that cannot be examined analytically, in other 
words, to generate various artificial samples from the population in order to estimate the 
coefficients of variables in the model as well as the constant and error terms. Then, 
comparing these estimated coefficients with the actual coefficients of the model that 
used to produce the data. The results of Fama and Babiak’s (1968) empirical study 
showed results consistent with Lintner’s model on individual firm-level dataset. 
Moreover, Lintner’s (1956) partial adjustment model, that includes two explanatory 
variables, the current earnings (Et), the lagged dividends (Dt-1) and the constant 
performed well in comparison to other modified models. Nevertheless, removing the 
constant and adding the lagged earnings variable (Et-1) led to a slight improvement in 
the predictive power of the model. Also, net income seemed to be a better proxy for 
profits than either cash flow or net income and depreciation included as different 
variables in the model.  
Dewenter and Warther (1998) compared dividend policies of US and Japanese firms. 
They also partitioned the Japanese sample into Keiretsu-member, hybrid and 
independent firms due to institutional differences in the structure of corporate 
ownership and the nature of group interactions. The study reported the results from 
testing Lintner’s partial adjustment model on 313 US firms listed on the S&P 500 and 
180 Japanese firms listed on the Morgan Stanley Capital International Index, with at 
least 5 years of non-zero cash dividends and earnings data during the period 1983-
1992.23 The empirical results showed support to the notion of Lintner’s speed of 
adjustment in terms of dividend signalling. Specifically, it was found that the median 
speed-of-adjustment estimates were 0.055 for the US firms and 0.094 for all Japanese 
firms, whereas those estimates were 0.117 for Keiretsu firms, 0.082 for hybrid firms and 
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 Dewenter and Warther (1998) also attempted to restrict the sample to firms with six, eight or ten years 
of data and the results did not change.  
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0.021 for independent firms.  Accordingly, Dewenter and Warther (1998) first pointed 
out that US dividends were much smoother than before. Second, the speed-of-
adjustment results confirmed that US dividends were smoother than Japanese dividends, 
and Japanese Keiretsu-member firms tended to adjust dividends more quickly than both 
US firms and other type of Japanese firms. This suggested that the Japanese business 
environment is, in general, characterised by less information asymmetry problems; 
hence, there is less need for the dividend-smoothing mechanism. Finally, the analysis on 
dividend cuts showed that Japanese firms cut dividends in response to poor performance 
more quickly than US firms.24 
McDonald et al. (1975) examined the firm’s dividend, investment and financing 
decisions in France. Their sample comprised 75 French firms in nine manufacturing and 
distribution industries in each of seven years, 1962-1968. McDonald et al. (1975) stated 
that the empirical validity of Lintner’s model has been supported by many researchers 
using time-series data, but they estimated the basic and modified Lintner’s model with a 
cross-section specification, in which current dividend payments were a function of 
earnings and past dividends, as well as investment and financing. The estimated 
coefficients from OLS and two-stage least squares (2SLS) indicated that earnings and 
past dividends were statistically significant at the 1% level in all years, whereas 
investment and financing variables were insignificant. Therefore, McDonald et al. 
(1975) concluded that dividend payments of French firms are well explained by 
earnings and past dividends in the dividend model of Lintner.  
Chateau (1979) tested the partial adjustment model on a sample of 40 large Canadian 
manufacturing firms for the period 1947-1970 by using alternative econometric 
procedures. Chateau (1979) stated that the choice of econometric procedure is the most 
crucial process in order to provide more robust and consistent results in obtaining a 
common model. Accordingly, a number of different estimation procedures were 
employed, including OLS, OLS corrected Hildreth-Lu, instrumental variables, quasi-
generalised least squares, augmented least squares and maximum likelihood estimator. 
Among these different econometric techniques, OLS and augmented least squares 
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 More precisely, the close ties between managers and shareholders in Japanese firms, as in Keiretsu 
firms, considerably reduce the information asymmetries and agency conflicts compared with their US 
counterparts. Also, investors of Japanese firms, especially Keiretsu firms, tend to have longer-term 
investment horizons and they are more likely to be less interested in short-term dividend signals as the 
information conveyed will eventually be revealed through other mediums, regardless of dividends policy. 
Therefore, Dewenter and Warther (1998) hypothesised that Japanese firms, Keiretsu-member firms 
especially, do not fear or would be less concerned with smoothing their dividend patterns in response to 
earnings changes than US firms.  
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seemed to provide more reliable estimations of the partial adjustment model, which 
showed support to Lintner’s explanations of dividend behaviour and revealed that 
constant term removal or retention did not seem to affect the econometric fit of the 
predictive power of the Lintner model. The empirical results further indicated that 
sampled Canadian manufacturing firms tended to distribute 30% of their net disposable 
cash flow as dividends and within the current year, they allocated only about 10% of 
their cash flow increase to dividends – a partial adjustment of approximately one third 
of its expectations. In general, Canadian firms followed stable dividend policies. When 
the behaviour of Canadian firms compared with the American counterparts, it was 
observed that Canadian firms were relatively more conservative, especially when it 
comes to short-term dividend strategies, even though they had higher payout ratios.  
Survey researchers have taken another path to study the actual behaviour of 
corporations in setting dividend policy. Instead of using secondary data to find evidence 
to support or reject various dividend theories, they have asked managers about their 
perception of dividend policy, which supplement methods of inferring management 
motives by providing direct evidence about managerial attitudes (Baker et al., 2002). 
Baker et al. (1985) surveyed the chief financial officers (CFOs) of 562 NYSE firms 
from three industry groups (utilities, manufacturing and wholesale/retail) to identify the 
major factors in determining their dividend policy. Based on 318 usable responses 
(56.6% response rate), survey results suggested a number of important conclusions. 
First, the results revealed that the major determinants of dividend policy decisions still 
appear markedly similar to Lintner’s findings, that firms should avoid changing 
dividends rates that may soon need to be reversed, have a target payout ratio, and 
periodically adjust the payout towards the target. The general agreement reported from 
the respondents was that dividend policy affects share value as there is an importance 
attached to dividend policy in maintaining or increasing share price. The results 
suggested the significance managers gave to factors influencing dividend policy differs 
based on industry classification. Particularly, the opinions of respondents from the 
utilities were significantly different from those of other two industries.  
In another study, Baker et al. (2002) surveyed CFOs of NASDAQ financial and non-
financial firms. They sent a questionnaire to 630 firms and received 188 usable 
responses, obtaining a response rate of 29.8%. The study results were strongly 
consistent with Lintner’s (1956) findings. The responses from dividend-paying 
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NASDAQ firms significantly agreed with the statements supporting Lintner’s 
explanation and stressed the dividend continuity. This meant that firms still set their 
dividend policy in a manner consistent with that developed by Lintner more than four 
decades ago. Further, NASDAQ managers extensively supported statements in line with 
the concept that dividend policy matters. They agreed that an optimal dividend policy 
maximizes stock prices; therefore, a firm should formulate its dividend policy to 
provide maximum value for their shareholders. Finally, the results showed a strong 
support for the signalling explanation, whereas they offered little or no support for the 
tax preference, agency cost and the bird-in-the-hand explanations. As well, industry 
classification (financial versus non-financial) had little effect on how managers view 
different explanations about dividend policy.  
More recently, Brav et al. (2005) conducted survey responses from financial executives 
of 384 US firms with a 16% response rate. They separately obtained 23 in-debt 
interviews to determine the factors influencing dividend and share repurchase decisions. 
With respect to dividend policy, their research showed support for Lintner’s behaviour 
model, especially indicating that one of Lintner’s key findings still holds; managers are 
reluctant to cut dividends and the current level of dividend payments is taken as given 
unless adverse circumstances are likely to persist. However, Brav et al (2005) identified 
two important differences compared with Lintner. First, firms target the dividend payout 
ratio less than they used to, and they do not correct toward their target ratio as fast as 
they used to (in other words, more smoothing through time). Second, managers think 
share repurchases are now an important way of payout and they state that the flexibility 
of repurchases relative to dividends is one of the main reasons why repurchases have 
increased. In general, they also reported that the respondents’ views provide little 
support for agency, signalling and clientele hypothesis of dividend policy, and tax 
considerations play a secondary role. 
Overall, the studies reviewed in this sub-section (Darling, 1957; Fama and Babiak, 
1968; McDonald et al., 1975; Chateau, 1979; Baker et al., 1985; Dewenter and Warther, 
1998; Baker et al., 2002; Brav et al., 2005) are strongly supportive of Lintner’s (1956) 
explanation of dividend behaviour and reported consistency across different study 
samples and periods of time.  
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2.3.1.2 Studies of the Information Content of Dividends Hypothesis in Developed 
Markets  
The information content of dividends hypothesis asserts that managers have prior inside 
information about their firms’ future performance. Hence, they use cash dividend 
announcements to convey changes in their expectations about future prospects of the 
firm to the public. Since dividend decisions are almost exclusively at managers’ 
prudence, and if they are confident about the future performance of the firm, then they 
distribute larger cash dividends as a good signal to the investors. Conversely, a mirror 
argument applies to dividend decreases, which are seen as a signal that managers 
anticipate permanently lower cash flows (Bhattacharya, 1979; John and Williams, 1985; 
Miller and Rock, 1985). 
Aharony and Swary (1980) attempted to ascertain whether quarterly dividend 
announcements provide information beyond that already provided by quarterly earnings 
numbers. They only examined quarterly dividend and earnings announcements released 
to the public on different dates within any given quarter in order to make a distinction 
between earnings announcements that precede or follow and those that closely 
synchronized with dividend announcements in any given quarter. A sample of 149 
industrial firms was selected from those listed on the NYSE during the period 1963-
1976, including 2,612 dividend announcements that follow and 787 that precede 
quarterly earnings announcements by at least eleven trading days.25 Then, the sample 
data were grouped according to the direction of dividends changes from one quarter to 
another, and by the number of trading days between earnings and dividend 
announcement dates in any given quarter. The empirical results indicated that 
shareholders of companies that announced dividend increases realised, on average, 
positive abnormal returns over the twenty days surrounding announcement days. 
However, most of the statistically significant abnormal returns occurred during the 
dividend announcement date and dividend declaration date (two-day excess return). 
Moreover, they were of similar magnitude for both groups whether earnings 
announcements precede or follow dividend announcements (0.72% and 1.03%, 
respectively). A mirror argument applies to dividend decreases with a two-day excess 
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 The main difficulty lied in the fact that quarterly earnings and dividend figures often were released to 
the public at approximately the same time. In these cases, any noticeable adjustment of stock prices might 
be the result of a confounding of the information signalled by earnings and dividends. Thus, in order to 
separate possible dividend effects from those of earnings, Aharony and Swary (1980) considered only 
those quarterly dividend and earnings announcements released to the public on different dates within any 
given quarter.  
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return of -3.76% and -2.82% respectively; noticeably abnormal returns for the dividend 
decreases were much greater than those of dividend increases. Aharony and Swary 
(1980) interpreted their findings as strongly in line with the information content of 
dividend hypothesis, since changes in quarterly cash dividends provide information 
beyond that provided by quarterly earning numbers and stock market adjusts efficiently 
to quarterly dividend information.  
Healy and Palepu (1988) examined whether dividend policy changes convey 
information about future earnings by concentrating on dividend initiations and 
omissions. They collected a sample of 131 dividend initiations and 172 dividend 
omissions from NYSE/AMEX firms between 1969 and 1980. First, they examined the 
market reaction to the announcements of dividend initiations and omissions by 
estimating abnormal returns26 for dividend initiation and omission firms. The results 
exhibited that the mean two-day announcement return was 3.9% for initiation and -9.5% 
for dividend omissions, suggesting that share price increases upon dividend initiations, 
and decreases upon dividend omissions. Second, Healy and Palepu (1988) investigated 
whether there are systematic earnings patterns released by firms; hence, they calculated 
earnings changes for the five years before, the year of and the four year after the 
dividend initiation and omissions. The study findings suggested a number of important 
conclusions. First, there are significant earnings increases for as many as five years 
prior to dividend initiation announcements, as well as significant earnings decreases for 
two years prior to dividend omission announcements. Second, dividend-initiating firms 
have earnings increases for the year of and two years following a dividend initiation and 
these increases tend to be permanent. While, dividend-omitting firms have earnings 
decreases for two year prior to and in the year of the dividend omission announcement, 
then they experience a recovery in earnings in subsequent years. Finally, after 
controlling for prior earnings changes, and information already provided by earnings 
changes announcements to the market, the abnormal stock price reactions to the 
dividend initiations and omissions are related with the firms’ earnings changes in the 
year of and one year following the dividend announcements. Hence, dividend initiations 
and omissions appear to convey incremental information about firms’ future earnings 
performance.  
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 Abnormal returns were defined as market-adjusted returns, which was the difference between firms’ 
returns and the returns on the CRSP equal-weighted market portfolio.  
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Similarly, Michaely et al. (1995) investigated both the short-term and long-term effects 
of dividend initiation and omission announcements. The centre of their empirical 
research was to discover whether there were following excess returns after the market 
had an initial chance to react to the announcement of a change in dividend policy. By 
using the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) tapes, they collected all 
companies that traded at least two years on the NYSE and AMEX prior to the initiation 
of first cash dividends, and those that had an identifiable omission announcement during 
1964 to 1988. This procedure resulted in a final sample of 561 cash dividend initiation 
and 887 cash dividend omission events over a 25-year period. In order to investigate the 
short-run reactions to omissions and initiations, they calculated excess returns for the 
firms in both samples, for the time period before and for the three-day window (from 
the day before the event to the day after) around the announcements. The results of t-
tests showed that for the initiation sample, excess return in the prior year was 15.1% and 
during the three-day announcement period, the initiation portfolios experienced a 
significant additional excess return of 3.4%. Firms omitting dividends performed quite 
poorly in the year before the omission declaration with -31.8% of the average excess 
return and the omission sample had a significant additional excess return of -7.0% in the 
three days surrounding the announcement. In order to investigate the long-term 
reactions to omissions and initiations, the return performances were computed, for up to 
three years after the announcements. For initiating firms, the stock prices continued to 
increase even after the dividend initiation event; the first year excess return was 7.5% 
and the three-year excess return was 24.8%. For omitting firms, a drift in the opposite 
direction was observed; the first year excess return was -11.0% and the three year 
excess return was -15.3%. Consistent with Healy and Palepu (1988), Michaely et al. 
(1995) concluded that omission announcements were associated with a mean price drop 
of about 7%, whereas initiations were associated with a mean price increase of over 3% 
in the short-run. Also, long-term drifts, following announcements of initiations and 
omissions, showed that omissions were associated with negative excess returns, while 
initiations were associated with positive excess returns. It seemed that these drift 
patterns were quite consistent through time as the study examined these events over the 
25-year period.  
More evidence questioning the ability of changes in dividends to signal information 
about the future pattern of earnings comes from Benartzi et al. (1997). If changes in 
dividends convey information about the future earnings, they predicted that (1) firms 
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increase (decrease) dividends in a given year (year 0) would have positive (negative) 
unexpected earnings in the following years (years 1, 2 and so forth), and (2) amongst 
firms that increase dividends, the larger the dividend increase, the greater the 
unexpected earnings in the subsequent years, if signalling is costly. In spite of this, 
Benartzi et al. (1997) undertook an attempt to compare the unexpected earnings of firms 
that changed their dividends with those that did not. Using the CRSP and Compustat 
tapes, they created a sampled that contained a quite large dataset of 7,816 firm-year 
observations from 1,025 US firms traded on NYSE/AMEX over the period 1979-1991. 
Empirical results presented a strong correlation between dividend changes and earnings 
changes in a given year (year 0). Firms that increase their dividends experience earnings 
increases, which are significantly higher, than firms that did not change their dividends. 
Also, larger dividend increases associated with the larger earnings increases in that year. 
Likewise, firms that decrease their dividends experience significantly more severe 
decline in earnings in the same year compared with the no-dividend changing firms. 
Nevertheless, inconsistent with the information content of dividends hypothesis, no 
correlation is found between the sign and magnitude of dividend increases and earnings 
changes in the subsequent years (year 1 and 2). Besides, firms that cut dividends in a 
given year experience significant earnings growth in future years. Therefore, Benartzi et 
al. (1997) reject the hypothesis that changes in dividends have information content 
about future earnings changes. Instead, they suggest there is a strong past and 
concurrent link between earnings and dividend changes. 
Jensen and Johnson (1995) attempted to specifically concentrate on dividend drop 
announcements instead of dividend changes. Their research differed from previous 
studies in three important ways. First, they analysed 21 firm characteristics rather than 
focusing only on firm earnings and stock prices. Second, in order to assess real 
motivation for the dividend decrease, they examined firm financial characteristics both 
before and after the dividend drop announcements. Third, they investigated all firms 
that reduce their dividends after having established a stable dividend policy. Jensen and 
Johnson (1995) included firms that paid non-decreasing dividends at least 12 
consecutive quarters and then dropped their dividends by 20% or more into their 
sample. The final sample consisted of 268 observations of 218 decreases and 50 
omissions from 242 different NYSE/AMEX firms, during the period of 1974-1989. The 
study findings showed a drop in earnings before the dividend reduction and earnings 
increase afterwards. Also, stock prices followed a similar pattern, but the rebound in 
stock prices subsequent to the dividend decrease was not significant. Furthermore, the 
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extension of examining 19 other variables in addition to earnings and stock prices, to 
provide a more absolute picture of firm before and after a dividend drop, revealed that 
the dividend cuts led to improvement in liquidity positions and to reduction in the level 
of debt. While earnings and firms financial situation rebounded significantly after a 
dividend decrease, several financial characteristics that suggest lingering problems were 
identified. Particularly, after a reduction, dividend-decreasing firms tended to sell more 
fixed assets, purchase fewer fixed assets, spend less on R&D and reduce employees at a 
faster pace. Hence, the evidence was consistent with the view that dividend reductions 
do not necessarily signal a decline in earnings, in other words, inconsistent with the 
information content of dividends hypothesis. Rather, these dividend cuts tend to signal 
the beginning of restructuring activities and a turn around in financial decline.  
Akhigbe and Madura (1996) investigated the dividend signalling hypothesis, based on 
the long-term performance of corporations following dividend initiation and omission 
announcements. They predicted that if the dividend signalling hypothesis holds, then the 
dividend initiations should be realised by improvements in the long-term performance, 
while the omissions should be realised by future decreases. Their analysis focused on a 
sample of US firms that introduced dividends and a separate sample of US firms 
omitted dividends during the period 1972-1990. Particularly, 128 dividend 
announcements of dividend initiation and 299 announcements of dividend omissions 
were studied. They found that firms experience favourable long-term share price 
performance after dividend initiations. Also, a positive relation between the immediate 
share price response and the one-year cumulative abnormal returns was found for 
dividend initiation firms. On the contrary, firms omitting dividends experience 
unfavourable long-term price performance. Further, the results showed that the long-
term valuation effects, resulting from dividend initiations, are more favourable for firms 
that are smaller and overinvested, and those had relatively poor performance prior to the 
initiations. The long-term valuation effects resulting from dividend omissions are more 
unfavourable for larger firms and for relatively large dividend omissions.  
DeAngelo et al. (1996) examined whether firms use dividends to signal their views of 
future earnings prospects by focusing on firms whose annual earnings suddenly 
declined after nine or more consecutive years of a stable growth in order to separate the 
implications of the signalling hypothesis from the other factors that may influence 
firms’ dividend policy. Particularly, the sample contained 145 NYSE firms having a 
decline in annual earnings from 1980 to 1987, after a steady earnings growth over at 
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least nine or more years. By examining the dividend policy of corporations that 
anticipate the current decline in earnings, which is yet to be corrected in the near future, 
having to convey this information to the market would allow evaluating whether that 
dividend changes are signals of future rather than past changes. However, the empirical 
results offered no support for the argument that dividend increases in the year of 
downturn (Year 0) are useful devices of improved future earnings performances. 
DeAngelo et al. (1996) explained their inconsistent findings on dividend signalling in 
two possible ways. They first suggested that managers may suffer from a behavioural 
bias, so called over-optimism, which leads them to misjudge future earnings while 
growth performances decline. Second, it may be the reason that the cash commitments 
to dividend increases in the sampled firms were relatively small. The median firm’s 
dividend increase in Year 0 was only 3.5% of earnings, 2.1% of operating cash flow and 
3.7% cash plus marketable securities. Since the conventional argument is that dividends 
are credible signals because they require firms to pay in substantial amounts, the small 
amount of the incremental cash payout suggested that firms can send overly optimistic 
dividend signals to the market at low cost but neglecting the reliability of such signals.  
Lipson et al. (1998) studied whether dividend initiations are associated with favourable 
subsequent earnings surprises. They investigated the performance of newly public firms 
that initiated dividends and those that did not. The reason of choosing newly public 
firms was that those firms should employ signalling activities in order to differentiate 
themselves from other firms that investors might observe as having similar future 
prospects. Particularly, Lipson et al. (1998) compared the performances of 99 newly 
public US firms that introduced dividends in the period 1980-1986 and a matched 
sample of non-initiating newly public firms, as well as 99 size-matched US firms that 
are already paying dividends in the same industry over the same period. After 
calculating the absolute earnings surprises for the dividend-initiating firms, non-
initiating firms and size-matched firms in the first year, the results showed that among 
them only the initiating firms had favourable earnings surprises, compared to the 
previous year’s earnings. Similar results were obtained in the second year following the 
dividend initiations. Also, Lipson et al. (1998) separately compared the performances of 
initiation and non-initiating firms and they found consistent evidence that earnings 
surprises were more favourable for the dividend-initiating firms. Hence, these findings 
provided support for dividend signalling, suggesting that the initiating firms tend to 
distinguish their future prospects compared with other newly public firms.  
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After all, Aharony and Swary (1980), Healy and Palepu (1988), Michaely et al. (1995), 
Akhigbe and Madura (1996) and Lipson et al.(1998) have reported evidence consistent 
with the information hypothesis of dividends that announcements of dividend policy 
changes do convey information about future prospects of firms. However, Benartzi et 
al. (1997), Jensen and Johnson (1995) and DeAngelo et al. (1996) have found that 
dividend policy change announcements do not necessarily signal about the future 
earnings changes of firms.  
2.3.1.3 Conclusions for Empirical Studies of Signalling Theory in Developed Markets 
The empirical studies of the signalling theory of dividends in developed markets that are 
reviewed in this section are summarised in Table 2.2 and 2.3 in Appendix I.  
With regard to Lintner’s (1956) partial adjustment model, there is substantial empirical 
evidence to support the notion that dividends are used to signal important information to 
the market. Lintner (1956) argued that managers believe the shareholders deserve a fair 
share of the firm’s earnings through dividends and they assume that shareholders prefer 
a steady increase of dividends. As a result, managers tend to prevent making changes in 
their dividend rates that may have to be reversed in the future. They, therefore, make 
partial adjustments toward a target payout ratio to smooth dividend payments stream in 
the short run and avoid spectacular and frequent changes. Lintner (1956) also found that 
managers are reluctant to cut dividends unless adverse circumstances are likely to 
persist. Indeed, many studies are strongly supportive of Lintner’s (1956) findings and 
reported consistency of results across different periods of time, including Darling 
(1957), Fama and Babiak (1968), McDonald et al. (1975), Chateau (1979), Baker et al. 
(1985), Dewenter and Warther (1998), Baker et al. (2002) and Brav et al. (2005). 
Moreover, Baker et al. (1985, p. 83) stated that, “……the results show that the major 
determinants of dividend payments today appear strikingly similar to Lintner’s 
behavioural model developed during the mid-1950’s.” Similarly, Benartzi et al. (1997) 
and Baker and Powell (1999) concluded that Lintner’s model of dividends was the best 
description of the dividend setting process available even after all these years.  
The information content hypothesis of dividends suggests that managers have prior 
inside information about their firm’s future performance. They, therefore, use cash 
dividend announcements to convey changes in their expectations about the firm. 
However, empirical evidence is inconclusive regarding this hypothesis. Many 
researchers have investigated whether announcements of dividend policy changes, such 
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as increases/decreases and initiations/omissions, signal information about future 
prospects of firms. For instance, Aharony and Swary (1980), Healy and Palepu (1988), 
Michaely et al. (1995), Akhigbe and Madura (1996) and Lipson et al. (1998) have 
reported evidence consistent with the information hypothesis of dividends, that 
announcements of dividend policy changes do convey information about future 
prospects of firms, whereas Benartzi et al. (1997), Jensen and Johnson (1995) and 
DeAngelo et al. (1996) have provided evidence inconsistent with the information 
hypothesis of dividends, claiming that dividend policy change announcements do not 
necessarily signal about the future earnings changes of firms.  
2.3.2 Empirical Studies of Agency Cost Theory in Developed Markets  
The following selective review of empirical research on the agency cost theory of 
dividend policy in developed markets is divided into four sub-sections; (i) studies of the 
cost minimisation model, (ii) studies of the capital market monitoring hypothesis, (iii) 
studies of the free cash flow hypothesis, and (iv) studies analysing the conflicts of 
interest between shareholders and debtholders.  
2.3.2.1 Studies of the Cost Minimisation Model in Developed Markets  
Rozeff (1982) supported the idea of paying dividends in order to reduce agency costs 
but he also indicated that a more generous dividend policy leads a firm to raise external 
finance that might be associated with increased transaction costs. In this respect, Rozeff 
(1982) developed the cost minimisation model, which combines transaction costs and 
agency costs to an optimal dividend policy that is the outcome of a trade-off between 
equity agency costs and transaction costs. Optimal dividend payments have the benefit 
of reducing equity agency costs as well as balancing against an increase in transaction 
costs. The empirical model developed by Rozeff (1982) and hypothesised signs of the 
variables can be described as below:  
PAY = α − β1INS − β2GROW1 − β3GROW2 − β4BETA + β5STOCK + Ɛ               (2.13) 
Where, PAY is the average payout ratio over a seven-year period 1974-1980; INS is the 
percentage of stock owned by insiders in 1981; GROW1 is the realised average growth 
rate of revenues over a five-year period 1974-1979; GROW2 is the forecasted growth 
rate of revenues by the Value Line Investment Survey over the five-year period 1979-
1984; BETA is the firm’s estimated beta coefficient of returns reported by Value Line 
(1981 issue) and STOCK is the natural logarithm of the number of common 
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shareholders in 1981.27 In order to test his model, Rozeff (1982) collected a large sample 
of 1,000 US firms over a seven-year period 1974-1980, including 64 different 
industries, in 1981. The results of OLS regressions provided consistent evidence with 
his cost minimisation model, which explained 48% of the cross-sectional variability in 
payout ratio across individual firms, and reported the estimated coefficients on the five 
explanatory variables are statistically significant as well as having predicted directional 
signs by the model.  
Lloyd et al.’s (1985) research is one of the first studies to replicate and expand the work 
of Rozeff (1982). More specifically, they pointed out the importance of the effect of 
firm size and argued that larger firms are more likely to have lower percentages of 
insider ownership and higher numbers of common shareholders. Also, larger firms are 
more likely to be mature and have easier access to capital markets and hence they are 
less dependent on internally generated funds. In this context, they expanded Rozeff’s 
(1982) original model by adding the firm size variable, which was measured as the 
natural logarithm of the firm’s sales revenue. Further, Lloyd et al. (1985) used the OLS 
cross-sectional regressions on a dataset that consisted of 957 US firms based on the July 
to September 1984 edition of Value Line and their results showed that all the 
explanatory variables were statistically significant and beared the predicted signs. 
Consequently, the study presented credibility to the work of Rozeff (1982) and found 
that firm size is also an important explanatory variable that has a positive impact on the 
payout ratio. 
Schooley and Barney (1994) also examined the agency cost theory of dividends by 
modifying Rozeff’s (1982) model. First, they employed “dividend yield” as the 
dependent variable instead of payout ratio in order to make sure that the denominator of 
the dependant variable is a market measure (stock price) rather than an accounting 
measure (net income). Besides, by using the dividend yield, they attempted to avoid 
                                                          
27
 Rozeff’s (1982) model contained two proxies for agency costs, namely INS and STOCK. First, it is 
predicted that there should be a negative relationship between the percentage of stock owned by insiders 
(INS) and the payout ratio; if a higher percentage of stocks held by insiders, their ownership will be more 
concentrated and easily influence managers behaviour, therefore reducing agency costs and leading to a 
lower or none dividend payments. It is further hypothesised that there should be a positive relationship 
between the second agency cost variable (STOCK), which is the number of common shareholders, and the 
dividend payout ratio since more dispersion of ownership among outsiders, the more difficult monitoring 
becomes, hence leading to higher dividends. Moreover, Rozeff (1982) employed three variables to 
measure transaction costs, namely GROW1, GROW2 and BETA. It is hypothesised that all the transaction 
costs variables, the past growth, forecasted growth and firm’s beta, are negatively related to the payout 
ratio; if a firm experiences a rapid growth, other things being equal, the firm needs funds for investments, 
therefore retaining its earnings to avoid costly external financing. Similarly, if a firm has higher beta, 
which represents the riskiness of the firm, then it would prefer a lower or none payout policy to lower its 
costs of external financing.  
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problems associated with negative or astronomic dividend payout ratios when the firm’s 
net income is negative or closes to zero. Second, Schooley and Barney (1994) argued 
that the relationship between dividend payout ratio and percentage of managerial stock 
ownership may not be monotonic as suggested by Rozeff. Accordingly, they used the 
CEO’s ownership percentage instead of the insider ownership that was combined 
ownership percentages of a broad class of insiders and further added the squared 
percentage of CEO stock ownership as another explanatory variable in the model to 
investigate the hypothesised parabolic relation between dividend yield and CEO 
ownership. After running the OLS cross sectional regressions on the study sample of 
235 industrial US firms’ data centred around 1980, their results showed that the relation 
between the percentage of CEO stock ownership and the dividend yield is non-
monotonic. As predicted, CEO ownership is significant and negatively related to 
dividend yield, while the squared CEO ownership is significant and positively related, 
with all other independent variables also significant in the model (past growth, future 
growth, beta, and ownership dispersion respectively). Additionally, School and Barney 
(1994) reported that dividend yield falls as CEO stock ownership increases to 14.9% 
level, and dividend yield increases thereafter.  
Moh’d et al. (1995) applied a number of changes to both the method and proxy 
variables used in the original cost minimisation model of Rozeff (1982). First, they 
aimed to test whether variations in payout ratios across time can be accounted for by 
changes in the agency/transaction costs structure. Therefore, in order to asses the 
dynamic relation whereby firms adjust their dividend payments each year in response to 
information known, variables were not aggregated and prior period’s dividend payout 
ratio was added to the model as an explanatory variable. Also, they modified Rozeff’s 
(1982) measure of the firm’s beta coefficient to evaluate the separate effects associated 
with transaction costs, and therefore the beta variable was substituted for measures of 
operating leverage, financial leverage and the intrinsic business risk. Further, Moh’d et 
al. (1995) included 26 industry dummies in the regression to control for each industry 
effect. Finally, they also added firm size, as suggested by Lloyds et al. (1985), and the 
percentage of common stock held by financial institutions as independent variables in 
the model. Using more specific proxies for the agency cost theory and “time-series 
cross- sectional” analysis, Moh’d et al. (1995) tested their modified model on 341 US 
firms over 18 years from 1972 to 1989. The empirical results indicated consistency with 
Rozeff’s original findings and, more importantly, showed that firms do appear to 
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respond to the dynamic changes in the agency/transaction costs structure over the time; 
specifically, dividend policy is affected by firm size, rate of growth, operating/financial 
leverage, intrinsic business risk and ownership structure. The results also reported a 
significant and positive relationship between institutional ownership and payout ratio, as 
well as a significant and positive coefficient for lagged payout ratio, which causes the 
past growth variable to become insignificant and indicates that it has little or no role in 
the dynamic adjustment of dividend payments. Consequently, Moh’d et al. (1995) 
found that firms do perform to minimise the sum of agency cost and transaction cost 
towards an optimum level of dividend payout; however, this relationship holds not only 
across firms but within the firms across time as well.  
Farinha’s (2003) empirical study provided an analysis of the agency explanation for the 
cross-sectional variation of corporate dividend policy in the UK, by modifying Rozeff’s 
(1982) cost minimisation model. Following School and Barney (1994), Farinha (2003) 
hypothesised that the relationship between insider ownership and dividend policy might 
be non-monotonic and employed past growth, future growth opportunities, shareholder 
dispersion, institutional stock ownership, firm size and industry dummies based on the 
original and various modified versions of the cost minimisation model. Moreover, 
Farinha (2003) included a number of different explanatory variables for the analysis in 
the hope of finding other complimentary instruments for agency/transaction costs and 
dividend policy argument, such as debt, stock return variance, incorporate tax, free cash 
flow, return on assets, the percentage of external directors, the log of the number of 
analysts following a particular firm, and dummy variable of CADBURY, which takes 
the value of 1 if a firm states it is full compliance with the Cadbury (1992) Code of Best 
Practice,28 and zero otherwise. By using OLS cross sectional regressions, Farinha (2003) 
examined a sample of UK firms (693 in 1991 and 609 in 1996) for two five-year 
periods 1987-1991 and 1992-1996, in order to test whether insider ownership affects 
dividends policies in line with a managerial entrenchment perspective. Consistent with 
predictions, strong evidence found that there is a strong U-shaped relationship between 
dividend payouts and insider ownership in the UK market. The findings indicated that 
after a critical entrenchment level estimated in the region of 30%, the coefficient of 
                                                          
28
 Cadbury (1992) Code of Best Practice was published in 1992. The document reviewed the role of 
corporate boards in corporate governance and provided a set of recommendations of best practices to 
improve the accountability and monitoring function of the directors ok UK firms. After publication of the 
report, the London Stock Exchange asked its listed firms to state their compliance or reasons for not 
complying, with the Code’s recommendations. Hence, the analysis of the relationship between dividend 
policy and Cadbury (1992) compliance would be a novel way of investigating agency cost for dividend 
payments given the Cadbury (1992) recognised role in corporate governance in the UK (Farinha, 2003). 
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insider ownership changes from negative to positive. Compliance with the Cadbury 
(1992) Code of Best Practices was found to have a significantly positive effect on 
dividend payments. Also, strong evidence of a significant and positive impact of 
common shareholders dispersion on dividend payouts was reported, consistent with the 
existing agency cost literature. 
In conclusion, there is strong evidence that Rozeff’s (1982) cost minimisation model, 
which combines transaction costs and agency costs to an optimal dividend policy, is 
empirically valid. Indeed, the studies reviewed in this sub-section (Llyod et al., 1985; 
Schooley and Barney, 1994; Moh’d et al., 1995; Farinha, 2003) have found results 
consistent with Rozeff’s original findings and indicated the relationship between 
dividend policy and agency cost variables.  
2.3.2.2 Studies of the Capital Market Monitoring Hypothesis in Developed Markets 
The function of dividend policy as a monitoring mechanism of managerial activities is 
grounded by Easterbrook (1984), who argues that dividends play a role in controlling 
agency related problems by facilitating primary capital market monitoring on the firm’s 
activities and performance, since dividend payments force firms to raise capital more 
often in capital markets. However, the dividend-induced monitoring for shareholders 
may not be costless, such as tax burden or issuance costs. Easterbrook (1984) further 
suggests substitution devices for controlling agency costs when non-dividend 
monitoring mechanism is placed. For instance, the presence of large blockholders is 
more likely to make the use of a costly dividend payout mechanism to induce capital 
market monitoring redundant. Alternatively, firms might be driven to the capital market 
by other circumstances, such as experiencing high growth, and hence making less use of 
the dividend device for controlling agency costs due to the need of financing high 
growth. 
Crutchley and Hansen (1989) provided support for the monitoring rationale for 
dividends as well as the substitution effects between dividends, managerial ownership 
and leverage. They pointed out that there are several ways to reduce equity agency cost. 
One way is to increase dividends. Paying larger dividends increases the chance that 
external equity capital will have to be raised. When new equity is raised, managers are 
monitored by regulators, investment bankers and providers of new capital. Hence, this 
monitoring induces managers, who intend to retain their employment to act more in line 
with stockholders’ interests. A second way could be increasing managerial stock 
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ownership in the firm; thus, better aligning their interests with shareholders’ interests. 
Further, raising more debt financing might be the third way of reducing equity agency 
costs.29 Using more debt reduces total equity financing in terms of reducing the scope of 
the manager-shareholders conflict. Crutchley and Hansen (1989) studied 603 US 
industrial firms for the period 1981-1985 in order to test the agency costs of monitoring 
argument with regard to dividends, managerial ownership and leverage.
 
Particularly, 
they hypothesised that the three policies are jointly determined by the impact of five 
characteristics, which were firms’ stock diversification, earnings volatility, floatation 
costs, advertising and R&D expenditure, and firm size. Accordingly, each of the three 
policy decisions was separately regressed on all five firm-specific characteristics. The 
results of the regression tests showed that managers use a combination of policies, 
including dividend policy, leverage policy and managerial ownership incentives, in 
terms of monitoring and controlling the agency costs in the most efficient way.  
Born and Rimbey (1993) also tested Easterbrook’s (1984) agency cost argument 
relating to dividends as a monitoring device. They hypothesised that the share prices of 
firms that announce both capital financing and dividend increases should raise more 
value than firms that announce dividend increases alone due to monitoring issues. 
Examining the shareholders response to 490 US firms that initiated or resumed a cash 
dividend policy, including 388 of which non-financed and 102 of which financed, from 
1962 to 1989, Born and Rimbey (1993) reported that the abnormal returns were 
positively related to the extent of the dividend increases and this result held for the firms 
that engage in financing, which suggested that the dividend is not redundant 
information. Unlike its prediction, the average abnormal returns of financing firms did 
not showed an increase as much as the non-financing firms. However, a cross-sectional 
analysis of the abnormal returns associated with the dividend announcements revealed 
that financing firms enjoy a higher return per unit of dividend yield than non-financing 
firms. This result supported the primary hypothesis of the study and therefore provided 
evidence in line with Easterbrook’s (1984) agency cost model.   
Hansen et al. (1994) tested the relevance of the monitoring hypothesis for explaining 
the dividend policies of regulated electric utilities. They argued that agency conflicts 
                                                          
29
 Crutchley and Hansen (1989) further noted that each of the three agency cost control mechanisms; 
dividends, leverage and managerial ownership, is not costless. For instance, increasing managerial 
ownership may result managers’ wealth to be poorly diversified and then they would require increasing 
amounts of compensation. Also, paying larger dividends might associate with substantial transaction 
costs. Similarly, debt financing may lead to conflicts of interest between shareholders and bondholders. 
Therefore, managers choose the policy mix of these three mechanisms to minimise agency cost.  
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might be particularly severe with regulators involved and hence by paying dividends, 
the regulated firm exposes its managers and regulators to capital markets monitoring. 
However, managers and shareholders of unregulated firms have access to a number of 
different internal and external mechanisms to control agency cost. Consequently, this 
suggest that if an important potential monitoring role of dividends is to be captured, 
evidence of this is most likely to be found in the case of regulated utilities. Furthermore, 
it is argued that the costs involved with dividend-induced monitoring are significantly 
lower for regulated utilities than for industrials. Because the floatation costs associated 
with issuing new equity can be, at least partially, passed on to ratepayers. Accordingly, 
Hansen et al. (1994) hypothesised that, since dividends are both more useful and less 
costly for utilities, they should have a higher payout ratio than non-regulated industrial 
firms. Comparing the mean dividend payout ratios of electric utilities with the S&P 400 
industrial firms during two five-year periods, 1981-1985 and 1986-1990, the results 
showed that regulated utilities pay larger proportions of dividends than non-regulated 
industrials in terms of being more capital intensive, therefore increasing the likelihood 
of dividend-induced monitoring as hypothesised. Moreover, Hansen et al. (1994) 
examined implications of cross-sectional regularities relating dividend payout ratio to 
proxy measures for the severity of the shareholders-manager conflict, the shareholder-
regulator conflict and the cost of monitoring these conflicts within the regulated electric 
utilities. By studying the dividend policies of 81 US utility firms from 1981-1985 and 
70 US utility firms from 1986-1990, the cross-sectional regression results illustrated 
that regulated utilities that experience higher regulatory and managerial conflicts of 
interest, lower floatation costs and lower growth opportunities tend to pay higher 
proportion of cash dividends to increase the probability of primary market monitoring. 
Hence, the evidence of the study was consistent with the monitoring hypothesis that 
regulated electric utilities use dividend-induced monitoring for controlling agency 
problems, which occur from the shareholder-regulator and shareholder-manager 
conflicts.  
Noronha et al. (1996) investigated the validity of the monitoring rationale for dividends 
and whether the resultant simultaneity of dividends and capital structure decisions are 
dependent on the characteristics of the firms, as they relate to the growth opportunities 
and to the presence of non-dividend mechanisms for controlling agency conflicts. 
Having considered that dividend-induced monitoring obtains benefits, but also bear 
costs, they indicated the existence of non-dividend devices. The presence of a large 
outside shareholder might serve as an external monitor, or growth-induced might force 
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the firm to raise external capital and trigger capital market monitoring. Accordingly, 
Noronha et al. (1996) hypothesised that for firms with high growth opportunities and/or 
alternative non-dividend monitoring and/or monitoring from both sources, the empirical 
validation of the monitoring rationale for dividends are not anticipated. However, for 
firms with low growth opportunities and/or those characterised by low prevalence of 
any alternative non-dividend monitoring devices, the monitoring rationale for dividends 
is expected to be empirically valid. Noronha et al. (1996) collected a sample of 341 US 
industrial firms from S&P 400 over the period 1986-1988. The sample was first 
stratified according to the prevalence of alternative non-dividend monitoring 
mechanisms. A firm was considered as having non-dividend monitoring mechanism 
based on two criteria; the incentive component of managerial compensation and the 
existence of a large shareholder.30 Further, the sample was then stratified according to 
the firm’s growth opportunities.31 This stratification procedure led to two subsamples; 
131 US firms with high use of non-dividend monitoring mechanisms and/or with high 
growth-induced capital market monitoring and 210 US firms with low non-dividend 
control mechanisms and low growth-induced capital market monitoring. Noronha et al. 
(1996) tested the monitoring rationale for dividends by running regressions on a 
modification of the cost minimisation model. The results were consistent with 
monitoring hypothesis and simultaneity between capital structure and dividend 
decisions is dependent on specific firm characteristics; in particular, the payouts of 
firms with alternative mechanisms and high growth are not related to proxies for agency 
cost variables, whereas the dividend decisions of firms with less alternative non-
dividend devices and low growth are made in line with Easterbrook’s monitoring 
rationale. 
Overall, the studies reviewed in this sub-section (Crutchley and Hansen, 1989; Born and 
Rimbey, 1992; Hansen et al., 1994; Noronha et al., 1996) showed support to notion that 
dividend policy may play a role in controlling agency related problems by facilitating 
primary capital market monitoring on firms’ activities and performance, as proposed by 
                                                          
30
 Firms had an above average incentive component in their managerial compensation packages, which 
aligns management-shareholder interest, and a single large outside blockholder having at least 5% of the 
firm’s equity, which serves as an external monitor as well as a potential take-over threat, were classified 
as possessing alternative non-dividend mechanism. Compensation data was obtained from Forbes 
magazine surveys, and the incentive component was measured as total compensation to the firm’s top 
executives less the salary component, the difference divided by the total compensation.  
 
31
 Firms’ growth opportunities are measured by Tobin’s Q ratio that was measured as the market to book 
ratio, which was computed as the sum of the market value of equity and book values of long-term debt 
and preferred stocks, the total divided by the book value of total assets. Firms with Tobin’s Q ratio above 
the sample average were categorised as high on growth opportunities, otherwise low.  
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Easterbrook (1984). They also presented evidence that dividends can be used as 
substitutes with other non-dividend monitoring mechanisms such as managerial 
ownership, leverage and growth. 
2.3.2.3 Studies of the Free Cash Flow Hypothesis in Developed Markets  
Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow hypothesis argues that managers with large amount of 
excess cash, which he calls free cash flow, may act in ways not in shareholders’ best 
interests. Instead of undertaking positive NPV investment projects by this cash, they 
might overinvest by accepting marginal investment projects with negative NPVs. 
However, substantial cash dividend payments would, all else being equal, lessen the 
amount of free cash flow that managers may misuse and also the scope of 
overinvestment; hence, increase the market value of the firm. Conversely, a dividend 
decrease would result in undertaking more negative NPV projects and decreasing the 
market value of the firm.  
Lang and Litzenberger (1989) followed Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow argument and 
called the extended form the overinvestment hypothesis. They used Tobin’s Q ratio, the 
market-to-book ratio (hereafter Q), to distinguish between value-maximising firms and 
overinvesting firms, and argued that if Q for a given firm is greater than unity (Q>1), 
the firm is a value-maximiser since the market value reflects the book value plus the 
positive NPV of the investment, whereas a Q less than one (Q<1) indicates 
overinvestment. According to Lang and Litzenberger’s overinvestment hypothesis, 
firms with Q less than one (over-investors) experience positive abnormal stock returns, 
following a substantial increase in dividends; because, the market anticipates this as a 
reduction in the overinvestment problem (a good indicator). It means that increases in 
dividends decrease the amount of cash that would have been otherwise invested in 
suboptimal projects. Contrarily, substantial dividend decreases suggest that the potential 
for the overinvestment problem may have increased (a bad indicator). However, 
dividend payout increases or decreases by firms with Q greater than one (value-
maximisers) merely reflect optimal investment decisions; therefore, the overinvestment 
hypothesis further predicts that average price reactions to all substantial dividend 
changes (either increases or decreases), should be larger for overinvesting firms than for 
value-maximising ones.  
Lang and Litzenberger (1989) tested their argument on a sample of 429 substantial 
dividend change announcements of US firms for the period 1979-1984. They reported 
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that the average reaction to substantial dividend changes by firms having a low Q is 
almost four times larger than the firms having a high Q, which is in line with the 
overinvestment/free cash flow hypothesis and supports the argument that dividends may 
constrain management’s ability to invest beyond the levels that shareholders desire. 
Although this evidence is consistent with the overinvestment hypothesis, it is also 
consistent with the signalling hypothesis. Hence, Lang and Litzenberger (1989) 
attempted to distinguish between the effects of signalling and the overinvestment 
hypotheses by re-arranging their sample and examining the average reactions for firms 
with low and high Q groups based on the dividend increase and decrease 
announcements. The signalling hypothesis suggests strong reactions to substantial 
dividend decreases, regardless of Q ratio, as such announcements signal negative 
information concerning future cash flows, whereas the overinvestment hypothesis 
argues that the reactions to dividend changes of firms having low Q would be greater. In 
this respect, Lang and Litzenberger (1989) found that the mean reactions to dividend 
increases and decreases for low Q groups are both significant; whereas the average 
reaction to dividend decreases for high Q firms are insignificant. Consequently, these 
findings are consistent with the overinvestment hypothesis but inconsistent with the 
signalling hypothesis.  
Howe et al. (1992) aimed to provide an extension of Lang and Litzenberger’s analysis 
of free cash flow and they investigated whether the free cash flow argument is valid for 
explaining share repurchases and specially designated dividend (SDD) announcements. 
Their sample consisted of 55 announcements of tender offer share repurchases and 60 
announcements of SDDs of US firms from January 1979 to December 1989. Both the 
share buybacks and SDD samples are further separated into two sub-samples, according 
to whether Q ratios for the firms are less or greater than one. The empirical results 
indicated that market reaction to share repurchases and SDDs were not statistically 
different from each other at any conventional significance level across samples of high 
Q ratio (value-maximisers) and of low Q ratio (over-investors). Furthermore, they 
performed several cross-sectional regressions to test if cash flows have an independent 
effect on abnormal returns. However, the regression results also showed that the free 
cash flow hypothesis does not hold in explaining excess returns for share repurchases 
and SDD announcements, since the coefficient of cash flow is insignificant in all 
regressions. Therefore, Howe et al. (1992) concluded that results are inconsistent with 
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Lang and Litzenberger’s (1989) findings and they rejected the free cash flow 
hypothesis.  
Agrawal and Jayaraman (1994) attempted to use another method to examine whether 
dividends reduce the opportunity for managers to use free cash flows in a self-serving 
manner. Additionally, they investigated the interactions of dividend policy, financial 
leverage and managerial ownership. Since both dividends and debt reduce the amount 
of excess cash that managers can misuse, Agrawal and Jayaraman (1994) predicted that 
dividends and debt are substitute mechanisms, and firms with low debt ratios, in other 
words all-equity firms, tend to follow a policy of high dividend payout. They further 
argued that managers’ equity ownership provides another way of monitoring, in 
addition to debt and dividends, in order to reduce the agency cost of free cash flow. 
Agrawal and Jayaraman (1994) used a sample of all-equity and levered firms, which 
consisted of 71 industry-sized matched pairs of all-equity and levered US firms during 
1979-1983. They reported that dividend payout ratios of all-equity firms were 
significantly higher than levered firms.
 
They also reported that firms with high 
managerial ownership had lower dividend payouts than the firms with low managerial 
share holdings. Consequently, their results indicated that dividends, debt and managerial 
ownership are served as alternative mechanisms to reduce the possible corruption 
related to the agency cost of free cash flow.  
In another study, Johnson (1995) also investigated whether dividends and debt are 
substitute devices to reduce the agency costs associated with free cash flows. In 
particular, he examined share price responses to announcements of straight debt issues, 
by arguing that there are systematic differences between low and high dividend payout 
firms. Drawing on the arguments that debt and dividends are alternative tools in 
controlling agency cost of free cash flows, Johnson (1995) hypothesised that debt issues 
should be more advantageous to firms with low dividend payout. Because, debt and 
dividends are both inputs to control, the marginal level of one should depend on the 
input level of the other. Based on this substitution argument, the share price response to 
bond announcements should be more favourable for firms with lower payout ratios and 
should be negatively related to dividend payout. Johnson (1995) studied 129 straight 
debt offerings of AMEX/NYSE industrial firms for the period 1977-1983. The results 
indicated that low dividend payout firms had an average two-day excess return of 
0.78%, which is positive and significantly different from zero at the 10% level, while 
high payout firms generated an average two-day excess return of -0.18% that is not 
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significantly different from zero. This is consistent with the view that debt and 
dividends are substitutes and debt can be used for reducing agency costs of free cash 
flows.   
Overall, studies reviewed in this sub-section generally showed support for Jensen’s 
(1986) free cash flow hypothesis; with the exception of Howe et al.’s (1992) study. 
However, since both agency cost of free cash flow and the signalling hypothesis imply 
relatively similar effects on share prices, empirical evidence in this area is quite mixed. 
For instance, Lang and Litzenberger (1989), Agrawal and Jayraman (1994) and Johnson 
(1995) have reported evidence consistent with the free cash flow argument but they 
cannot completely rule out the cash flow signalling hypothesis.  
2.3.2.4 Shareholders-Bondholders Conflict in Developed Markets 
The conflict of interest between shareholders and bondholders is another type of agency 
costs regarding dividends. It is argued that dividends can be potentially used to 
expropriate wealth from bondholders to shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Alli 
et al., 1993). As stated by Lease et al. (2000, p.76), “All else being equal, shareholders 
would like to receive as large as dividends as possible. Large dividends mean that even 
if the firm eventually defaults, the shareholders will have received some return on their 
investment prior to the default. In other words, dividends are a means to transfer a 
firm’s assets from the common pool shared by all the security holders of the firm to the 
exclusive ownership of the shareholders.” Consequently, bondholders tend to control 
this problem through restrictions on dividend payments in the bond indenture (Smith 
and Warner, 1979; Kalay, 1982b).  
Woolridge (1983) analysed the effects of unexpected dividend changes on the values of 
common stock, preferred stock and straight bonds related to the wealth transfer and 
information content hypotheses, by arguing that if a firm finances an unexpected 
dividend distribution with additional debt or reducing investment, a wealth transfer 
between shareholders and bondholders may exist. This action could also be that 
managers aim to convey about their firms’ prospects to the market. Indeed, the wealth 
transfer and signalling effects of dividend policy are not necessarily mutually exclusive. 
It is more likely that both effects are reflected in security prices, but one effect 
dominates the other.  Woolridge (1983) predicted the changes in security prices under 
these two different hypotheses as illustrated in Table 2.1 below.  
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Table 2.1 Security Responses to Unexpected Dividend Changes  
The table illustrates the predicted responses of different securities, namely common stocks, preferred 
stocks and debt, to both positive and negative unexpected dividends changes under the wealth 
transfer and signalling effects of dividends hypotheses. 
 
  Positive Unexpected 
Dividend Change 
 Negative Unexpected 
Dividend Change 
 
    
  Wealth 
Transfer 
Signalling 
 Wealth 
Transfer 
Signalling 
 
    
       
Common Stocks  + +  − −  
       
Preferred Stocks  − +  + −  
       
Debt  − +  + −  
        
Source: Woolridge (1983, p.1609) 
 
Woolridge’s (1983) research sample consisted of 317 positive and 50 negative 
unexpected dividend changes of NYSE firms over the period 1971-1977. The study 
findings indicated that common stock price reactions to the 317 unexpected dividend 
increases were positive and statistically significant, whereas the stock reactions were 
significantly negative to the 50 unexpected dividend decreases. These findings were 
consistent with both the wealth transfer and signalling hypotheses, since both of them 
predict the same share price movements towards unexpected dividend increases and 
decreases. Woolridge (1983) therefore stated that the straight debt and preferred stocks 
returns must have been analysed to discover the predominant effect of unexpected 
dividend changes on security prices. Further analyses revealed that both bond price 
reactions and preferred stock reactions were positive to the unexpected dividend 
increases, whereas they showed a negative reaction to the unexpected dividend 
decreases. Therefore, together with the common and preferred stock results, the 
nonconvertible bonds findings supported the conclusion that the information content, 
rather than wealth transfer, is the predominant hypothesis regarding unexpected 
dividend changes on security values.  
Jayaraman and Shastri (1988) examined the valuation impacts of SDDs by analysing 
stock and bond price reactions to their announcements. It is argued that dividend 
increases convey good information about the firm’s prospects but unexpected or extra 
dividend payments, such as SDDs, could cause wealth transfer from bondholders to 
shareholders by reducing the asset base of the firm. Hence, Jayraman and Shastri (1988) 
suggested that there is a greater likelihood of observing wealth transfer around SDD 
announcements than regular dividend increases. Further, they hypothesised that the 
wealth transfer hypothesis would be accepted over the information content hypothesis, 
if significant negative bond price reactions were observed to SDD announcements. 
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Jayaraman and Shastri (1988) collected a stock sample that consisted of 2,023 SDD 
announcements from either NYSE or AMEX by 660 firms over the period 1962-1982. 
Their bond sample included 154 straight bonds issued by 63 firms in their stock sample. 
Their results indicated that share price reactions to SDDs are positive and statistically 
significant. However, since both the information content and the wealth transfer 
hypotheses predict positive share price reactions to dividend increases, Jayaraman and 
Shastri (1988) further examined the reactions of the bond prices to SDDs to determine 
which effect, information or wealth redistribution, dominates. Having analysed the 
behaviour of bond prices around the 154 SDD announcements, they found that bond 
prices remain unaffected by announcements of SDDs. Consequently, the results of this 
study were consistent with the information content hypothesis and provided no support 
for the wealth transfer hypothesis.  
Moreover, Dhillon and Johnson (1994) analysed stock and bond reactions to dividend 
changes in an effort to examine these two hypotheses. Nonetheless, in contrast to prior 
studies mentioned above, their findings provided supports for the wealth transfer 
hypothesis over the information content argument, since they found that the bond price 
reactions to announcements of large dividend changes are opposite to the stock price 
reactions. The evidence, however, cannot rule out the information content hypothesis 
completely. Dhillon and Johnson (1994) studied a full dividend change sample, which 
consisted of 131 announcements, including 61 dividend increases and 70 dividend 
decreases from NYSE/AMEX listed firms over the period 1970-1987. The dividend 
increase sample consisted of two sub-samples: 15 dividend initiations and 46 large 
dividend increases (exceeding 30 percent). The dividend decrease sample consisted of 
three sub-samples: 19 dividend omissions, 43 large dividend decreases (exceeding 30 
percent) and 8 small dividend decreases. Their results showed that stock returns were 
statistically positive for the dividend increases announcements, whereas bond returns 
were negative despite not being quite significant. Moreover, the study results showed 
that bond returns were significantly positive to dividend decrease announcements, while 
stock returns were significantly negative. Dhillon and Johnson (1994) concluded that 
bond prices decline when dividends are increased, whereas bond prices increase when 
dividends are decreased, in an opposite manner of stock prices. Therefore, their 
evidence supported the wealth redistribution hypothesis to the associated agency 
problems.  
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Long et al. (1994) employed another way of examining whether firms attempt to 
expropriate from bondholders by focusing on the underinvestment problem and the use 
of dividend policy to expropriate lenders’ wealth. They hypothesised that, if debt creates 
an incentive for shareholders to under-invest and expropriate bondholders’ collateral by 
using dividend policy, then firms should increase dividends after new debt is issued. In 
this respect, they investigated the dividend behaviour of firms after debt (straight debt 
and convertible debt) was issued. The final sample of the study consisted of 141 straight 
debt and 78 convertible debt issues of NYSE firms from 1964 to 1977. Their initial 
results presented little support for the wealth transfer hypothesis but further analyses 
were taken to investigate the issue more in depth. Long et al. (1994) then compared the 
dividend growth rates of firms issuing debt with the benchmark NYSE index. However, 
further analyses showed no systematic differences in dividend growth rates between the 
two samples or the benchmark NYSE. Firm issuing straight debt showed a higher but 
insignificant average rate of increase for the following years after issuing. Likewise, 
firms issuing convertible debt showed a higher growth rate than firms on average, but 
still there was no statistically significant difference. Consequently, Long et al. (1994) 
suggested no evidence that firms manipulate dividend policy to expropriate wealth from 
new bondholders to shareholders. Despite dividends do increase following the issue of 
debt, the increases were in line with the market as a whole in terms of both timing and 
relative magnitude.  
Overall, the studies reviewed in this sub-section showed that there is not enough 
evidence that dividend payments are used to transfer wealth from bondholders to 
shareholders. Woolridge (1983), Jayaraman and Shastri (1988) and Long et al. (1994) 
reported no evidence in favour of the wealth transfer hypothesis, whereas Dhillon and 
Johnson (1994) supported the wealth distribution hypothesis but still cannot rule out the 
information content hypothesis completely.  
2.3.2.5 Conclusions for Empirical Studies of Agency Cost Theory in Developed 
Markets  
The empirical studies of the agency cost theory of dividends in developed markets that 
are reviewed in this section are summarised in Table 2.4 to 2.7 in Appendix I.  
In terms of shareholder-manager conflicts of agency cost theory, the empirical evidence 
is extensive and strong in suggesting that dividend policy is a mechanism to reduce 
these kinds of agency problems. First, there is strong evidence that Rozeff’s (1982) cost 
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minimisation model, which combines transaction costs and agency costs to an optimal 
dividend policy, is empirically valid. A number of studies based on Rozeff’s (1982) 
specification to explain dividend policy, including Llyod et al. (1985), Schooley and 
Barney (1994), Moh’d et al. (1995) and Farinha (2003), have found results consistent 
with Rozeff’s original findings and indicated a relationship between dividend policy and 
agency cost variables.  
Furthermore, there is evidence that dividend policy may play a role in controlling 
agency related problems by facilitating primary capital market monitoring of firms’ 
activities and performance, as proposed by Easterbrook (1984). Also, there is evidence 
that dividends can be used as substitutes with other non-dividend monitoring 
mechanisms. A string of studies investigating the monitoring role and substitution 
effects of dividends, including Crutchley and Hansen (1989), Born and Rimbey (1992), 
Hansen et al. (1994) and Noronha et al. (1996), have presented evidence consistent with 
dividend policy acting as a corporate monitoring vehicle, and with substitution effects 
between dividends and other alternative control devices, such as managerial ownership, 
leverage and growth. Moreover, various empirical studies have shown support for 
Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow hypothesis in order to explain dividend policy decisions; 
however, since both agency cost of free cash flow and signalling hypothesis imply 
relatively similar effects on share prices, empirical evidence on this area is quite mixed. 
For instance, Lang and Litzenberger (1989), Agrawal and Jayraman (1994) and Johnson 
(1995) have reported evidence consistent with the free cash flow argument but they 
cannot completely rule out the cash flow signalling hypothesis.  
Finally, in terms of shareholder-bondholder conflict of agency costs, there is not enough 
evidence that dividend policy is used to expropriate from bondholders to shareholders. 
This is not easy to test empirically because the evidence is mixed and there is a possible 
difficulty in distinguishing between two important hypotheses; the wealth transfer and 
signalling hypotheses. Researchers have, however, investigated the impact of dividend 
policy on both the share and bond markets to explain the conflicts of interest between 
shareholders and debtholders. Woolridge (1983) supported the information content 
hypothesis and observed no evidence of the wealth transfer hypothesis. Further, 
Jayaraman and Shastri (1988) and Long et al. (1994) found no evidence that firms use 
dividends to transfer wealth from debtholders to shareholders. In contrast, Dhillon and 
Johnson’s (1994) study showed support for the wealth distribution hypothesis but they 
still cannot rule out the information content hypothesis completely.  
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2.3.3 Empirical Studies of Tax Effect in Developed Markets 
The following selective review of empirical research on the tax effect of dividend policy 
in developed markets is divided into two sub-sections; (i) studies of the relationship 
between dividend yields and risk-adjusted returns and (ii) studies of the ex-dividend day 
share price behaviour. 
2.3.3.1 Studies of the Relationship between Dividend Yields and Risk-Adjusted 
Returns in Developed Markets 
In order to analyse the relationship between tax risk-adjusted returns and dividend 
yields, Brennan (1970) formulated an after-tax version of the capital asset pricing model 
(CAPM), which maintains that a security’s pre-tax excess return is linearly and 
positively related to its systematic risk and to its dividend yield. Brennan (1970) argued 
that if dividends are taxed at higher rates than capital gains, then higher pre-tax returns 
are associated with higher dividend yield securities, to pay off investors for the tax 
disadvantages of dividends. The Brennan model can be expressed as:  
E(Rit – rft ) = α0 + α1βit + α2(dit − rft )                                                                        (2.14)                             
Where, Rit is the before tax rate of return on asset i in period t, rft is the risk-free rate of 
interest in period t, βit is the systematic risk for asset i in period t, dit is the dividend yield 
of asset i in period t, α1 is the weight of systematic risk on Rit and α2 is the weight of 
dividend payout on Rit. Accordingly, the equilibrium equation explains the relationship 
between pre-tax expected return, its systematic risk, and the estimated dividend yield. 
Brennan (1970) indicated that the structural parameters, α1 and α2 are both not 
dependant on the level of dividend yield in this pricing relationship. The parameter α2 is 
a proxy for the weighted average of the marginal income tax rates of investors and if it 
is significantly positive, the results are interpreted as evidence of a tax disadvantage 
over dividends. Hence, when this tax disadvantage exists, investors require higher pre-
tax risk-adjusted returns on stocks with higher dividend yields to compensate for the tax 
disadvantages of these returns, concluded by Brennan (1970).  
However, Black and Scholes (1974) argued that investors invest in companies with cash 
dividend policies suitable for their tax circumstances in line with the tax clientele 
hypothesis; thus, there will be no relation between expected dividend yields and risk-
adjusted stock returns. Black and Scholes (1974) constructed a sample of 25 investment 
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portfolios from common stocks listed on the NYSE over the period 1936-1966, in order 
to examine the relationship between dividend yields and stock returns, by using a 
slightly different version of the Brennan model32 and by testing the effect of a long-run 
estimate of dividend yield (the ratio of previous year’s dividends to the year-end share 
price) paid on stock prices. Their results showed that the dividend yield coefficient was 
not significantly different from zero for the entire time period (1936-1966) or for any of 
the ten-year sub-periods. In other words, the expected returns on high-yield dividend 
stocks were not significantly different than the expected returns on low-yield dividend 
stocks either before or after taxes, other things being equal. Consequently, Black and 
Scholes’s findings were inconsistent with the tax-preference theory but provided 
support for the tax clientele hypothesis. Therefore, they advised investors to ignore 
dividends when shaping their portfolios.  
Moreover, Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979) strongly challenged the results of 
Black and Scholes (1974) and criticised their methods. Litzenberger and Ramaswamy’s 
empirical research design differed in several ways; specifically, they extended the 
Brennan model by using a monthly dividend yield definition in classifying securities 
into yield classes rather than a long-run dividend yield definition as in Black and 
Scholes (1974). Also, they used individual data instead of grouped data, and they 
corrected the error in variable problems in beta estimation by using maximum 
likelihood estimator. Using ordinary least squares (OLS), generalised least squares 
(GLS) and maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) on a sample of all common stocks 
listed on the NYSE from 1936 to 1977, the results showed that the coefficient on the 
dividend yield variable (0.236) was positive and highly significant. This meant that 
there was a strong positive correlation between before tax expected returns and dividend 
yields of common stocks, indicating that for every dollar increase in dividend yields, 
investors require an extra 23 cents in before-tax expected returns. Litzenberger and 
Ramaswamy (1979) interpreted their results as support for Brennan’s (1970) model, 
concluding that the positive dividend yield coefficient is the evidence of a dividend tax 
effect.  
                                                          
32
 Black and Scholes (1974) employed the specification below:  
 
                                                  ( di – dm ) 
Ři = α0 + [Řm  –  α0 ] βi  +  α1                      + εi                                  
                                                       dm  
 
Where, Ři is the rate of return on the i
th
 portfolio, α0 is an intercept term that should be equal to the risk-
free rate (Rf ) based on the  CAPM, Řm is the rate of return on the market portfolio, βi is the systematic risk 
on the i
th
 portfolio, α1 is the dividend impact coefficient, di is the dividend yield on the i
th
 portfolio, dm is 
the dividend yield on the market, measured over the previous 12 months, and εi is the error term. 
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Nevertheless, Miller and Scholes (1982) raised objections to Litzenberger and 
Ramaswamy’s (1979) conclusion and criticised their short-term (monthly) definition of 
dividend yield. They argued that a short-term dividend yield definition was 
inappropriate for spotting the effect of differential tax treatment of dividends and capital 
gains of stock returns, and suggested that the significantly positive dividend yield 
coefficient was not the result of a tax effect but was caused by information bias. 
Because, Litzenberger and Ramaswamy ignored the potential information effect of 
dividend omission announcements; a dividend omission announcement the market 
perceives as a bad news, reduces the return of zero dividend yield group and tends to 
bias upward the dividend yield coefficient. Accordingly, Miller and Scholes (1982) 
attempted to correct for the information bias and re-performed Litzenberger and 
Ramaswamy tests on a sample of NYSE stocks over the period 1940 -1978. Their 
empirical results reported that the dividend coefficient was not statistically different 
from zero. Hence, Miller and Scholes (1982) interpreted their results as inconsistent 
with the tax effect hypothesis and they attributed the Litzenber and Ramaswamy 
findings to information effect rather than the tax effect.33   
Blume (1980) re-examined the relationship between dividend policy and total returns on 
a risk-adjusted basis by extending the Black and Scholes (1974) experiment on a sample 
that contained all NYSE securities for the period 1936-1976. Although monthly returns 
were available, Blume (1980) used cross-sectional regressions estimated with quarterly 
returns, arguing that if there were a measurable tax effect involved with dividend yield, 
the effect would differ between months and periods in which a stock went ex-dividend 
and those in which it did not. They stated that, since most dividend-paying stocks paid 
dividends quarterly, the use of quarterly returns should make the estimated regression 
less sensitive to any possible differential tax effect. Further, Blume (1980) employed the 
portfolio method to test for dividend effect in the same manner with the Black and 
Scholes study. The study results revealed a considerably more complicated relationship 
between returns realised on common stocks and dividend yields than has been 
                                                          
33
 In order to answer this criticism, Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1982) re-examined the expected short-
term dividend yield variable by using an alternative measure. They applied an expected dividend yield 
variable, which was based on only past information about all companies in their previous study’s data 
sample. Particularly, the sample contained only stocks either that declared dividends in moth t-1 and 
distributed them in month t, or stocks those delivered dividends in month t-1 and thus were not likely to 
pay dividends again in month t. By employing this procedure, Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1982) 
claimed that the prediction rule for the expected dividend yield was solely announcement effect-free since 
the information was available to the investor ex-ante. Moreover, after using information-free sample, their 
results were consistent with their previous findings and revealed a significant and positive dividend yield 
coefficient, providing evidence that strongly supports the tax-effect hypothesis.  
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suggested in prior research. Even though the results showed a positive and significant 
dividend yield coefficient consistent with the tax effect hypothesis, the significance of 
the dividend yield variable varied over time.  Blume also found that the returns on non-
dividend paying stocks tended to exceed, on average, the returns on most dividend 
paying stocks over 41 years to 1976, which was totally inconsistent with the 
interpretation of the dividend coefficient as a tax effect. Thus, Blume (1980) concluded 
that the relation across stocks is far too complicated to be entirely explained by tax 
effects.  
Poterba and Summers (1984) attempted to investigate tax effect in the UK since British 
data provided great potential to test dividend issues regarding taxes. This was because 
there had been two radical changes and a number of minor changes in British dividend 
tax policy during the last 30 years prior to their research. The first important change 
occurred in 1965, when the government introduced a capital gains tax at a statutory rate 
of 30%. The second change occurred in 1973, when an integrated corporate income tax, 
which effectively reduced the dividend tax rate on personal and corporate investors and 
actually offered a dividend subsidy to untaxed institutions, was introduced. 
Accordingly, in their tests, prior to 1965 (no capital gains tax) was referred to as 
Regime I. Between 1965 and 1973, introduction of capital gains tax, was referred to as 
Regime II, whereas after 1973, introduction of imputation system for dividends, was 
referred to as Regime III.  
By using monthly data on British securities (3,500 UK firms for a 26-year period during 
1955-1981) and employing the after-tax CAPM described by Litzenberger and 
Ramaswamy, Poterba and Summers (1984) ran a number of regression tests to examine 
the relationship between dividend yield and risk-adjusted return. The results showed 
that taxes influence the relationship between dividend yields and stock returns; more 
specifically, the estimated tax penalty on dividends declined from 74% to 45% between 
Regime II and Regime III, whereas the evidence on changes between Regime I and 
Regime II were less clear. However, Poterba and Summers (1984) pointed out that the 
main puzzle in the results was why the estimated tax rates were so high. They further 
stated that it may be the cause of some sort of miscalculating of risk, or due to 
information effect. Despite these biases, they concluded that the valuation of dividends 
changes across tax regimes provided strong evidence that taxes explain part of the 
positive relationship between yields and stock market returns.  
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Furthermore, Keim (1985) studied the empirical relation between stock returns and 
long-run dividend yields by using CAPM, examining whether the findings can really 
point towards the tax effect or whether they are related to other causes acknowledged in 
the existing literature. He collected a sample of NYSE stocks that ranged from 429 US 
firms in January 1931 to 1,289 US firms in December 1978, according to the selection 
criteria in which he constructed six dividend yield portfolios; the first portfolio included 
all zero-dividend firms and other five ranked from lowest to highest positive dividend 
yield firms. The empirical findings revealed a significant non-linear relationship 
between yields and stock returns, but both the magnitude of the significant returns and 
non-linearity of the yield-return were concentrated in the month of January. Also, 
estimates of regression coefficients on dividend yields were significantly larger in 
January than in any other months and were too large to be suggested as tax brackets 
associated with after-tax asset pricing models. Hence, Keim (1985, p.487) concluded 
that “……..the observed relation between long-run dividend yields and stock returns 
may not be solely attributable to differences in marginal tax rates for dividends and 
capital gains.” Although the results of Keim (1985) showed evidence of a yield-tax 
effect, these results were not entirely consistent with the after-tax CAPM, due to the 
significant effect of the month of January (in other words the effect of seasonality) on 
the relation between dividend yields and stock returns.  
More recently, Kalay and Michaely (2000) performed the Litzenberger and 
Ramaswamy (1979) research using weekly data. They constructed a sample that 
included all NYSE stocks with at least 260 weeks of data available over the period 
1962-1986. By using three different methods for their analysis (the OLS, GLS and 
MLE), Kalay and Michaely (2000) found that the dividend yield coefficient was 
positive and significantly different from zero, which implied the tax effect rather than 
the information effect; consistent with Brennan (1970) and Litzenberger and 
Ramaswamy (1979) but inconsistent with Miller and Scholes (1982). However, Kalay 
and Michaely (2000) stated that their evidence indicated the empirical regularity was 
not limited to a particular period or to a particular time during the year but Brennan 
(1970) and Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979) developed a single-period model, 
which predicts cross-sectional return variations as a function of dividend yield. 
Contrarily, Kalay and Michaely’s empirical evidence reveals that stocks experience 
only time-series return variations and does not find cross-sectional return variations. 
Hence, their findings do not support Breannan’s and Litzenberger and Ramaswamy’s 
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models; nevertheless, this does not mean that their results do not support the tax 
hypothesis either. Since Brennan (1970) makes assumptions about the tax structure, 
such as no tax clienteles, short-term capital gains, foreign investors, transaction costs or 
tax arbitrage, Kalay and Michaely (2000) concluded that the well-known tax models do 
not explain their evidence. However, they stated that their empirical findings are in 
some ways related to a more complex tax effect theory, which is yet to be developed.  
2.3.3.2 Studies of the Ex-Dividend Day Share Price Behaviour in Developed Markets 
Elton and Gruber (1970) argued that the ex-dividend behaviour of a firm’s common 
shares should be correlated to the tax rates of its marginal shareholders. A shareholder 
who sells shares before a share goes ex-dividend loses the right to the previously 
declared dividend. If he sells the share on the ex-dividend day, he maintains the 
dividend but should expect to sell it at a lower price because of this dividend retention. 
In a perfect market, the share-price drop on the ex-dividend day should reflect the value 
of dividend per share vis-à-vis capital gains to the marginal shareholder. While 
dividends and capital gains are taxable at different rates, the relative tax rate on these 
two types of income influence the decision. In this context, one can infer marginal 
shareholder tax brackets from observing the ex-dividend behaviour of common shares. 
Assuming investors are risk neutral and there are no transaction costs, Elton and Gruber 
(1970) specified the conditions for “no profit” opportunities around ex-dividend day in 
the presence of tax differentials and built the equation of the after-tax returns from 
capital gains to after-tax returns from dividends as below: 
PX ‒ tC (PX  ‒ PY) = PZ  ‒ tC (PZ  ‒ PY) + D(1− tD)                                                       (2.15) 
Where, PX is the cum-dividend share price (the last day the share is traded with the 
dividend), PY is the price at which the share was initially purchased, PZ is the ex-
dividend day share price (the first day of share is traded without the dividend), D is the 
amount of the dividend, tC is the personal tax rate on capital gains, and tD is the personal 
tax rate on dividends.  The left-hand side of the equation presents the after-tax receipts 
of seller who would receive if he sold the share cum-dividend and had bought it initially 
for PY. The right-hand side presents the expected net receipts from sale on ex-dividend 
day. Re-arranging the equation leads to:  
  (PX  ‒ PZ)            (1− tD)                                                  
                    =                                                                                                             (2.16) 
      D                    (1− tC)                                                       
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Where, the statistic (PX ‒ PZ) / D corresponds to the ex-dividend behaviour, that would 
lead a shareholder with a particular tax rates (tD and tC) to be indifferent as to timing of 
purchases and sales of a common share. For the market to be in equilibrium the price 
movement on the ex-dividend day must be such as to leave marginal buyers and seller 
of the share indifferent as to whether they buy before or after the share goes ex-
dividend. Conversely, if the expected ex-dividend price was either too high or too low, 
marginal buyers or sellers would change the timing of their purchases or sales until 
share prices were in equilibrium. Therefore, the statistic (PX ‒ PZ) / D must reflect the 
marginal tax rates of the marginal shareholders and it should be possible to infer these 
tax rates by observing the statistic (PX ‒ PZ) / D.  
In order to test their hypothesis, Elton and Gruber (1970) examined 4,148 observations 
from all shares listed on the NYSE that paid a dividend during the period of April 1, 
1966 - March 31, 1967, and were traded on both the ex-dividend day and the prior day. 
They found that the ex-dividend price drop was smaller than the dividend per share. The 
average price share decline was 77.67% and the marginal tax bracket for the average 
shareholders was 36.4%. They interpreted these findings as the ex-dividend day 
behaviour of common share prices, as evidence for differential rates of taxation, leads 
investors to discount value of taxable cash dividends relative to capital gains. Moreover, 
Elton and Gruber (1970) carried further tests to see whether the dividend policy of a 
firm influences the tax rate of its marginal shareholders. In other words, to test the 
hypothesis that shareholders who hold shares with high dividends should be in low tax 
brackets, relative to shareholders who hold shares with low dividends. The results 
showed that implied tax brackets were significantly and negatively related to firm’s 
dividend yield and payout ratio. This was supportive of the tax clientele effect that in an 
environment of differential taxation of dividends and capital gains, high (low) marginal 
tax rates investors would hold shares with low (high) dividends. Consequently, Elton 
and Gruber (1970) concluded that their evidence is consistent with the tax effect 
hypothesis, that shareholders have a tax-induced preference for capital gains, suggesting 
that investors in higher brackets show a preference for capital gains over dividend 
income, compared to those in lower tax brackets. Along with this tax effect, Elton and 
Gruber (1970) also confirmed that their results showed support of Miller and 
Modigliani’ s  tax clientele effect, arguing that firms seem to attract a rational clientele 
who prefer their dividend policy. Hence, a change in dividend policy could cause a 
costly change in shareholder wealth, rather than the dividend policy itself.  
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Kalay (1982a), however, criticised Elton and Gruber’s conclusion, arguing that 
equilibrium prices around the ex-dividend day tend to be determined, not only by the 
long-term trading investors, but also by the short-term traders. He developed the short-
term trading hypothesis, purposing that if the ex-dividend share price drop is less than 
the dividend per share, it provides arbitrage profits for the short-term traders, who are 
not subject to the differential taxation of dividends and capital gains. Kalay (1982a) 
claimed that in a risk-neutral world with no restrictions or imperfections as such 
transaction costs, dynamic arbitrage could eliminate a possible tax effect on prices. 
These short-term traders with the same tax rate on dividends and capital gains could buy 
the share before it goes ex-dividend and sell it just after the dividend payment. To re-
examine the ex-dividend day evidence, Kalay (1982a) collected a sample of NYSE 
firms of 2,540 cash dividends paid between 1 April 1966 and 31 March 1967. He found 
that lower ex-dividend day price drop than the dividend per share, and higher relative 
drop for high-yield stocks, suggesting that an ex-dividend day share price drop less than 
the dividend per share provides profit opportunities for the short-term traders. Kalay 
(1982a) concluded that as explained before, the marginal tax rates of shareholders 
cannot be inferred, in general, from the relative price drop. The evidence was not 
necessarily consistent with the tax effect or the tax clientele effect. However, the 
evidence was still consistent with the hypothesis that, on average, the investors involved 
in the trading population, pay higher taxes on dividends rather than on capital gains. 
This evidence captures the effects of both the short-term traders and the tax rates of the 
trading population.  
Michaely (1991) analysed the behaviour of share prices around ex-dividend days after 
the implementation of the 1986 Tax Reform Act (TRA)34 in the US, which significantly 
reduced the difference between the tax rates of realised long-term capital gains and 
dividend income in 1987, and utterly eliminated the differential in 1988. Because, using 
the changes in tax systems offered new evidence about the effect of taxes on ex-
dividend share price behaviour. Further, Michaely (1991) stated that according to long-
term trading hypothesis, the ex-dividend price drop should reflect the differential taxes 
between dividend income and capital gain income of the long-term traders. 
Alternatively, short-term trading hypothesis argues that the market pricing is dominated 
                                                          
34
 The 1986 TRA dramatically reduced the tax difference between capital gain and dividend income. For 
the period 1979-1986, 60% of capital gains were excluded from taxes. After 1986 TRA, in 1987, the 
transition year, the maximum tax rate on capital gains was set to 28%, while the maximum ordinary 
income tax rate was set to 38.5%. However, since January 1988, the TRA eliminated all distinction 
between capital gains and ordinary income taxes.  
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by short-term and corporate traders. Hence, a change in the tax law could be used to test 
these hypotheses more directly by comparing the premiums before and after the 
implementation of the 1986 TRA. Michaely (1991) collected closing prices for the 50 
days surrounding the ex-day (-25 to +25) for all companies listed on the NYSE, which 
paid dividends over the period 1986-1989. The sample contained 4,306 observations in 
1986; 4,499 observations in 1987; 4,785 observations in 1988 and 4,799 observations in 
1989. The empirical findings showed that this tax law change, which reduced the tax 
difference between capital gains and dividend income, and then entirely eliminated the 
differential, had no effect on the ex-dividend share price behaviour, which is 
inconsistent with the tax effect hypothesis, since long-term individual investors have no 
significant effect on ex-day share prices during this time period. On the other hand, the 
results supported the argument that the activity of short-term traders and corporate 
traders dominates the price setting on the ex-day.  
Moreover, Koski and Scruggs (1998) investigated whether short-term trading reduces or 
eliminates the tax effect on ex-dividend day prices, by analysing trading volume around 
ex-dividend days. Their argument was that, understanding who trades on ex-dividend 
days is important in determining if ex-days premiums reflect marginal investors’ tax 
rates, trading costs, or both, and to understand the determinants of ex-dividend 
premiums and trading volume. In this context, short-term traders, who are willing to 
make use of ex-day returns, would lead to abnormal trading volume. Likewise, even if 
the existence of tax clientele cannot be inferred from ex-day returns, it can still be 
inferred from abnormal trading volume around ex-days. If the tax differential between 
capital gains and dividends affects ex-dividend returns, security dealers, who are tax 
neutral, would increase their trading volume around ex-days.35 In order to test their 
hypothesis, Koski and Scruggs (1998) collected a sample data on trading volume by 
dealers and corporations for 70 ex-dividend days between November 1990 and January 
1991, using audit file data from the NYSE TORQ database. The abnormal trading 
volume around ex-dividend days were based on an event window of 11 days centred on 
the ex-dividend date (-5< t <5). The results demonstrated that the means of the standard 
                                                          
35
 For instance, if low dividend-yield shares are held by dividend adverse investors, then security dealers 
tend to take long-positions to capture dividends by buying shares cum-dividend and sell them at the ex-
dividend price, which drops the share price less than the value of the dividend they captured. Similarly, if 
high dividend-yield shares are held by dividend favourable investors in where the ex-day share price is 
expected to drop by more than the nominal amount of the dividend, then dealers tend to take short-
positions by selling shares cum-dividend and buying them ex-dividend. Also, US corporations were 
exempt from taxes by 70% of inter-corporate dividends received during 1990 and 1991, the period 
examined by this study; therefore, they had strong incentive to involve with short-term trading in order to 
capture dividend income.  
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abnormal volumes showed strong evidence that tax neutral security dealers execute in 
short-position dividend capture strategy to profit around ex-dividend days. Also, the 
aggregate volume, for both buy and sell, was positively related to dividend yield and 
negatively related to the transaction costs at conventional significance levels. 
Accordingly, Koski and Scruggs (1998) suggested that tax-neutral dealers engage in 
short-term trading for arbitrage profits, which eliminates and is inconsistent with the tax 
clientele hypothesis around ex-dividend days.  
Kaplanis (1986) used a different methodology to examine share price behaviour around 
ex-dividend days in the UK. He pointed out that one downside of all of the empirical 
research, testing the presence of tax effect on ex-days, was that they were formulated in 
terms of the expected price drop in where it was only possible to employ the actual 
price drop as a proxy for the expected one. Kaplanis (1986) presented an alternative 
method of testing the tax effect hypothesis, which was based on the direct estimation of 
the expected fall-off implied in the prices of options, as opposed to the actual share 
price fall-off. He argued that if the expected fall-off was significantly different from the 
dividend, this would imply that the results would be inconsistent with the short-term 
trading hypothesis. Further, if there was a positive relationship between the dividend 
yield and the fall-off, the results would be consistent with the tax clientele hypothesis. 
In order to test his argument, Kaplanis (1986) collected 360 pairs of cum and ex-
dividend closing offer prices of options written on 14 different British companies listed 
on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) from 1979 to 1984, as well as the simultaneous 
underlying offer prices. The results showed that expected implicit fall-off around ex-
dividend days in option prices was about 55% of the dividend and the fall-off had a 
significant and positive correlation with the dividend yield. The actual price drop was 
very similar to the implied decline from option prices. Kaplanis (1986) concluded that, 
since the average expected proportionate fall-off was significantly lower than unity and 
showed a positive relationship with the dividend yield, the results were consistent with 
the tax clientele hypothesis and inconsistent with the short-term trading hypothesis. 
Thus, the usual assumption made in valuing options on dividend paying shares, that the 
decline is equal to the dividend, is not realistic and would cause downward-biased 
estimates of the option value.  
Furthermore, Lasfer (1995) investigated share prices behaviour around the ex-dividend 
days before and after the implementation of the 1988 Income and Corporation Taxes 
Act (ICTA), which decreased the tax differential between dividends and capital gains 
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considerably in the UK. The analysis focused on the 1988 UK ICTA, an equivalent to 
the 1986 Tax Reform Act in the US, in a similar approach as Michaely (1991). The 
abolition in 1988 of all rates of income tax over 40% and the taxation of capital gains at 
the tax-paying investor’s highest income tax rate, provided a distinctive controlled 
experiment to test the impact of taxation on share prices behaviour on the ex-days. 
Lasfer (1995) hypothesised that the pre-1988 ex-day returns should be positive and 
significant in order to reflect the tax differential; however, since the 1988 ICTA 
eliminated the tax differential on dividend income and capital gains for the investors, 
ex-day returns should decrease in the post-1988 period and even become negative and 
insignificant to reflect the tax credit related with the cash dividends. Accordingly, the 
study sample contained a total of 10,123 observations drawn with 2,891 events in the 
pre-1988 period and 7,232 events occurred in the post-1988 period, covering the period 
April 6, 1985 to April 5, 1994. The results showed that, consistent with the tax 
hypothesis, in the pre-1988 period, ex-dividend day returns were positive and 
significant. Contrarily, in the post-1988 period, ex-dividend day returns were, in most 
cases, negative and insignificant. Also, ex-day returns were significantly related to 
dividend yield and to the length of the settlement period, but they were not influenced 
by the commonly used measures of transaction costs, such as the bid-ask spread and 
trading volume. Hence, unlike the US market, ex-day returns in the UK were not 
affected by short-term trading. It might be that, either the institutional legislation was 
effective or the UK market was efficient, and ex-day returns and the tax credit were not 
high enough to outweigh transaction costs. However, Lasfer (1995) concluded that 
taxation affects significantly ex-dividend day share price behaviour in the UK.  
In a similar study, Bell and Jenkinson (2002) examined the impact of major changes in 
dividend taxation, introduced in July 1997 in the UK. The tax reform was structured in 
such a way that the immediate impact fell almost entirely on the largest investor class in 
the UK, specifically pension funds.36 It was estimated that over one-third of UK equities 
were held by pension funds in 1997 and the impact of the tax change was to raise the 
taxation on dividends by £5 billion per annum. Hence, Bell and Jenkinson (2002) used 
this major tax change to investigate whether pension funds were the marginal investors 
                                                          
36
 Despite Finance Act 1997 had broad-ranging implications for dividend taxation in the UK, the 
immediate and largest effect was captured significantly on tax-exempt pension funds since they suffered a 
decline in the value of their UK dividend income of 20 percent. However, Finance Act 1997 did not alter 
the dividend burden of individual or corporate investors. It mostly affected some other investors such as 
charities, investors with tax-exempt savings accounts but in no case the dividend tax increase anywhere 
near as crucial as that for pension funds.  
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in the UK, and if it was the case, how taxes affected the valuation of dividends. They 
analysed the impact of 1997 Tax Reform by estimating the extent of any change in the 
valuation of dividends prior and after the reform. Their argument was that, the drop in 
price around the ex-day should reflect the value of dividends, comparing capital gains to 
the marginal investor clientele. Then, if investors were indifferent in terms of dividends 
and capital gains, share price should fall one-for-one with the dividend paid on each 
share. Based on the tax treatments, on the other hand, investors might be different 
between dividends and capital gains. Therefore, the ratio of the ex-day price decline, to 
the amount of the dividend, should reflect the relative taxation of dividend and capital 
gains of the clientele having that particular share. Bell and Jenkinson’s (2002) study 
sample contained 9,673 ex-dividend day observations from 1,478 LSE-listed 
companies. Before 1997, the study results showed strong clientele effects since drop-off 
ratios were positively related to dividend yields, which provided support for the 
hypothesis that effective rates of capital gains tax were significantly lower than statutory 
rates for many investors, and as well as that, pension funds were the effective marginal 
investors for high-yielding firms. However, after the Finance Act 1997, significant 
changes in drop-off ratios were found, especially for high-yielding firms. Particularly, 
the drop-off ratios reduced on average by 13% to 18% depending on the company size. 
This showed further evidence for pension funds and other tax-exempt investors being 
the marginal investors for high-yielding firms whose valuation of dividend income was 
reduced by 20 percent after 1997. Consequently, the study results provided strong 
evidence to support the tax clientele hypothesis and were consistent with the tax effect 
hypothesis, that taxation significantly affects the valuation of dividend income.  
2.3.3.3 Conclusions for Empirical Studies of Tax Effect in Developed Markets 
The empirical studies of tax effect of dividends in developed markets that are reviewed 
in this section are summarised in Table 2.8 and 2.9 in Appendix I.  
In terms of the relationship between dividend yields and returns, empirical evidence is 
inconclusive. Under the assumption that dividends and capital gains are taxed 
differently, Brennan (1970) developed a model of stock valuation in which stocks with 
high payouts have higher required before-tax returns than stocks with low payouts. 
Indeed, he discovered that investors require higher pre-tax risk adjusted returns on 
stocks with higher dividend yields in order to compensate the tax disadvantages of these 
returns. In contrast, using his model, Black and Scholes (1974) and Miller and Scholes 
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(1982) find no evidence of such a tax effect, whereas Litzenberger and Ramaswamy 
(1979, 1982) and Poterba and Summers (1984) do find evidence that pre-tax returns are 
related to dividend yield. Moreover, Blume (1980), Keim (1985) and Kalay and 
Michaely (2000) have reported evidence of a yield-tax effect, but their results were not 
entirely consistent with the tax effect hypothesis; therefore, they concluded that the 
relation across stocks is far too complicated to be fully explained by tax effect.  
Empirical results on the ex-dividend day studies of testing tax hypothesis are also 
inconclusive. For instance, Elton and Gruber (1970), Kaplanis (1986), Lasfer (1995) 
and Bell and Jenkinson (2002) have provided evidence that taxes are important 
determinants of the firms payout decisions, suggesting that taxation affects significantly 
ex-dividend day share price behaviour, and shareholders in a higher tax brackets have a 
tax-induced preference for capital gains over dividend income, compared to those in 
lower tax brackets; thus, consistent with the tax clientele hypothesis. Nevertheless, 
Kalay (1982a), Michaely (1991) and Koski and Scruggs (1998) argued that in the 
presence of short-term traders, the marginal tax rates of the shareholders cannot be 
inferred by observing ex-dividend day share price drops. Because, short-term traders 
such as tax-neutral dealers and corporate traders, who are seeking for arbitrage profits, 
dominate the price setting on the ex-days. In fact, they have reported findings that 
supported the short-term trading hypothesis around ex-dividend days, eliminating the 
tax effect. Subsequently, even though tax effects on share prices may be observed 
around ex-dividend days, there are tax clienteles for different dividend policies who 
would only invest companies with policies that best fit their tax position. In equilibrium, 
one can argue that no firm can increase its value by reducing taxes through its dividend 
policy. Therefore, it is clear that the dividend puzzle is far too complex to be explained 
by taxes alone.  
2.3.4 Conclusions of Empirical Studies in Developed Markets 
The main empirical research of the dividend puzzle particularly focuses on three big 
imperfections; the asymmetric information, agency problems and taxes. After reviewing 
various main empirical studies in developed markets in this part of the thesis, several 
conclusions are reached and briefly summarised as follows:  
(a) There is substantial empirical evidence supporting Lintner’s (1956) partial 
adjustment model of signalling theory, which is characterised by firms involving in 
dividend smoothing and partially adjusting dividends to a long-term percentage of 
Birkbeck University of London Page 97 
permanent earnings. This approach has been central to the dividend debate and has still 
remained valid, after all these years when the original findings were presented in 1956. 
Specifically, firms believe in the stability of dividends, concerning that the market 
reacts favourably to dividend increases and unfavourably to decreases. Hence, they tend 
to prevent making changes in dividend rates that may have to be reversed in the future, 
and they are reluctant to cut dividends, unless adverse circumstances are likely to 
persist. Further, the level of earnings and lagged dividends are the most crucial 
determinants of the current dividend level.  
 
(b) Even though Lintner’s (1956) model is consistent with the signalling rationale 
for dividends, empirical evidence is inconclusive with the information content 
hypothesis of dividends, suggesting that managers have prior inside information about 
their firms’ future performance; hence they use cash dividends announcements to 
convey changes in their expectations about the firm. There has been no consensus 
achieved on the argument that dividend policy change announcements do necessarily 
signal about the future earnings changes of the firms. There is not strong evidence that 
announcements of dividend increases/decreases and initations/omissions 
characteristically trigger an impact on share prices in the same direction.  
 
(c) There is strong evidence in favour of the cost minimisation model, which was 
developed by Rozeff (1982), combining transactions costs and agency costs to an 
optimal dividend policy. A number of studies reported empirical results consistent with 
Rozeff’s original findings and indicated a relationship between dividend policy and 
agency cost variables. Similarly, there is evidence that dividend policy may play a role 
in controlling agency related problems by facilitating primary capital market monitoring 
of firms’ activities and performance as proposed by Easterbrook (1984). There is also 
evidence that dividends can be used as substitutes with other non-dividend monitoring 
mechanisms, such as managerial ownership, leverage and growth. However, empirical 
evidence based on Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow hypothesis is quite mixed. Since both 
agency cost of free cash flow and signalling hypothesis imply relatively similar effects 
on share prices, even though many empirical studies showed support for the free cash 
flow hypothesis, they cannot completely rule out the cash flow signalling hypothesis. 
 
(d) There is not enough evidence that dividend policy is used to expropriate wealth 
from bondholders to shareholders. Again, this is not easy to test empirically as the 
evidence is mixed, because of the possible difficulty of distinguishing between the 
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wealth transfer and signalling hypotheses. Nevertheless, a number of researchers found 
no evidence of the wealth transfer hypothesis, whereas a few showed support, but they 
still cannot rule out the signalling hypothesis.  
 
(e) The tax effect hypothesis asserts that when dividends are taxed at higher rates 
than capital gains, generous dividends reduce shareholder’s wealth through taxes.  
Therefore, the share prices of firms with high dividend payouts will reflect this tax 
disadvantage. On the other hand, the tax clientele hypothesis suggests that not all 
investors are taxed at the same rate and those investors will invest in companies with 
cash dividend policies suitable for their tax situation. Since clienteles exist for low and 
high dividend policies, companies cannot increase their values by reducing taxes 
through their dividend policies.  
 
(f) Some researchers found that the existence of the clientele effects determines the 
ex-dividend day share prices, as the ex-dividend price drop should reflect the 
differential taxes between dividend income and capital gains income of the marginal 
investors. Alternatively, short-term trading hypothesis challenged this point by arguing 
that in the presence of short-term traders, such as tax-neutral dealers and corporate 
traders, the marginal tax rates of the shareholders cannot be inferred by observing ex-
day share price drops. Because, short-term traders, who are seeking for arbitrage profits 
will dominate the price setting on the ex-days; hence, eliminating the tax effect. 
Accordingly, empirical evidence of studies testing the tax related hypothesis is 
completely inconclusive. 
 
(g) The literature on dividend policy in developed markets, where the main dividend 
policy theories are originally developed, have provided extensive evidence regarding 
the dividend debate, by contributing voluminous empirical studies. Although some 
hypotheses and models (for instance, the Lintner or Rozeff models) have been strongly 
supported by many scholars, no general consensus has yet been reached after several 
decades of investigation, despite extensive debate and countless research. Consequently, 
the main motivation for paying dividends is still unsolved and therefore remains as a 
puzzle.  
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2.4 Empirical Studies in Developing Markets 
Even though dividend policy literature is extensive, since researchers have developed 
and empirically tested various theories, models and hypotheses by contributing 
voluminous studies, most of the theoretical and empirical evidence on dividend policy 
have been used data from developed markets, mainly the US and followed by the UK. 
Therefore, little is known about dividend policy and the explanatory power of models 
for other countries, specifically developing (emerging) markets, where imperfections 
are the norm rather than expectations, and much stronger than in developed markets. 
Indeed, emerging markets are generally differentiated from the developed markets to a 
degree in terms of their effectiveness in meeting requirements of their determined 
functions, since various conflicts are associated, such as political and social instability, 
lack of adequate disclosure, poor laws and regulations, weaker financial intermediaries 
that provide efficient monitoring due the failure in the effectiveness of their financial 
markets (La Porta et al., 1999; 2000; Aivazian et al., 2003a; 2003b; Yurtoglu, 2003). 
Considering the growing importance of emerging markets in terms of global equity 
investments, these markets have comparatively recently started attracting international 
investors. Accordingly, emerging markets attach more pieces to the dividend puzzle and 
researchers have started investigating the dividend behaviour of corporations in 
developing countries (Glen et al., 1995; Adaoglu, 2000). The purpose of this section, 
therefore, is to review the literature of dividend policy in the context of developing 
countries. The following selective review of empirical research in developing markets is 
divided into three sub-sections; (i) studies of the partial adjustment model, (ii) studies 
related to agency cost theory of dividends and (iii) studies examined the determinants of 
dividend policy in developing markets.  
2.4.1 Studies of the Partial Adjustment Model in Developing Markets 
Various studies to date have tested Lintner’s (1956) model and have been strongly 
supportive of his findings as well as reported consistency of results across many studies 
at different periods of time in developed markets. In this respect, Mookerjee’s (1992) 
research is one of the earliest studies that apply the Lintner model to a developing 
market, rather than a developed one. Specifically, Mookerjee (1992) first attempted to 
determine whether the basic Lintner model explains aggregate dividend payout 
behaviour in a developing country, India, where the financial and institutional 
environments within which firms operate are different than those from developed 
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countries. Second, a variant model of Lintner, which was achieved by the inclusion of 
external financing as an explanatory variable, was tested in order to find out whether it 
improves the predictive power of the basic Lintner model in the Indian context. The 
OLS regression results on a sample of annual data for the aggregate Indian corporate 
sector, during the period 1950-1981, showed that the basic Lintner model was 
successful in explaining corporate sector dividend payments behaviour in India. The 
results further revealed that the inclusion of the external financing into the model, as an 
explanatory variable, significantly improved the fit of the model, which also indicated 
that firms in India use external finance to augment dividend payments. Overall, the 
findings of Mookerjee’s (1992) study showed support of Lintner’s (1956) argument and 
also suggested that the availability of external finance can be an important determinant 
of dividend payments in some developing economies with the viability of external 
finance at subsidized rates. 
Adaoglu (2000) investigated whether the ISE-listed companies follow stable dividend 
policies in the emerging Turkish market, as they do in developed markets, by using the 
Lintner model. The ISE’s history dated back to 1986 and had some significant changes 
in the dividend policy regulations in 1995. For the fiscal years 1985-1994, the ISE firms 
were obliged to pay at least 50% of their distributable profit as a cash dividend but in 
1995, amended regulations provided flexibility to companies and did not force them to 
pay a certain part of their profit as dividends. Accordingly, the companies were allowed 
to decide to pay dividends in the form of cash dividends, stock dividends or in a 
combination of both forms. They were also free to choose between paying dividends 
and retaining their earnings. Due to the significant regulatory change, Adaoglu (2000) 
focused on two periods, 1985-1994 and 1995-1997, and obtained panel data from 76 
industrial and commercial companies listed on the ISE, with at least 5 years of nonzero 
cash dividends during this period.37  
Moreover, Adaoglu (2000) estimated the Lintner model by using panel data regressions 
(pooled OLS, fixed and random effects) and used firm-level data, in other words, 
dividend and earnings per share values, following Fama and Babiak (1968). The 
empirical findings showed significant and positive constant and earnings coefficients 
but insignificant lagged dividends coefficient. Also, Lintner’s speed of adjustment 
                                                          
37
 Adaoglu (2000) followed the same strategy as Dewenter and Warther (1998) who employed in order to 
find out the degree of dividend smoothing for the Japanese firms. Tests were repeated for at least four, six 
and seven years of nonzero cash dividends and the results led to the same findings regarding the 
regulation effect and dividend stability of the ISE companies.  
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factor was found to be 1.00, which was at the maximum level. That means the ISE firms 
did not smooth the dividends during the period 1985-1997. Hence, the results suggest 
that there were significant differences between the ISE companies and the developed 
market companies’ dividend behaviour; Turkish firms followed unstable dividends 
policy unlike their counterparts in developed markets. The main factor determining the 
cash dividend payments was the current earnings in a given year and any variability in 
the earnings of the firm is directly reflected in the level of cash dividends. Further, even 
though the 1995 regulatory change provided greater flexibility in the dividend policy 
setting process, the ISE companies continued to follow unstable dividend policies, 
which was also inconsistent with Lintner’s argument of dividend policy behaviour.  
Pandey (2001) aimed to study the dividend behaviour of Malaysian corporations by 
attempting to answer whether payout ratios differ across industries, what dividend 
responses are possible when earnings change, and whether Malaysian firms follow 
stable dividend policies. Pandey (2001) conducted a sample of 248 industrial companies 
listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) for the period 1993-2000. The 
study results, first, showed that there are significant differences across industries in 
payout ratios in Malaysia. For instance, plantation and consumer products industries 
distribute highest dividends, as they have fewer growth opportunities. In contrast, 
construction industry has the lowest payout ratio since its cash needs are greater for 
financing growth opportunities. Second, it is found that a large number of Malaysian 
firms increased their dividends when their earnings increased, while they were also very 
prompt to omit dividends when they suffer losses. Finally, both the OLS and fixed-
effects regressions results provided support for the Lintner model in the emerging 
Malaysian market, revealing that Malaysian firms relied both on past dividends and 
current earnings in setting the current period’s dividend payments. However, they had 
lower payout ratios and higher adjustment factors, pointing out those Malaysian firms 
have low smoothing and less stable dividend policies.  
In their famous study regarding dividend policy behaviour in emerging markets, 
Aivazian et al. (2003a) compared the dividend behaviour of firms operating in 
developing countries with the dividend policies of US firms. Their sample consisted of 
the largest firms from eight emerging markets (South Korea, Malaysia, Zimbabwe, 
India, Thailand, Turkey, Pakistan and Jordan) and 100 US firms over the period 1980-
1990. They considered the US market as a market-oriented economy, whereas all eight 
emerging markets are mainly bank-oriented economies. The different institutional 
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regimes were found to be important, since dividends are more predictable in arms length 
capital markets in developed countries, to provide assurance for external investors. 
However, in emerging markets where firms are more bank-oriented, they then 
hypothesised that the dividends are more immediate to reflect the firm’s unpredictable 
internal cash flows. The empirical results revealed that it is indeed generally more 
difficult to predict dividend changes for the emerging market companies because the 
quality of firms decreasing dividends were much more similar to those increasing 
dividends, than for the US companies. Further, regression results suggested that current 
dividends in developing countries were much less sensitive to lagged dividends than for 
the US control sample of companies. In fact, it was found that the Lintner model still 
worked well for the US firms, whereas it did not work very well for the emerging 
market companies. In conclusion, these results supported the notion that the institutional 
structures of developing countries compose corporate dividend policy a less feasible 
mechanism for signalling, or for reducing agency costs than for US firms operating in 
capital markets with arm’s length transactions.  
Al-Najjar (2009) examined the dividend policy decisions of Jordanian non-financial 
firms. The aim was to identify the determinants of dividend policy decisions of firms 
listed on the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) and to examine whether they smooth their 
dividend payments as proposed by the Lintner model. The study sample consisted of a 
panel data from 86 non-financial firms traded on the ASE during the period 1994-2003. 
The results of pooled OLS and panel model regressions showed that current earnings, 
past dividends and the constant term were all statistically significant and positively 
related to the current dividends. Moreover, when comparing the speed of adjustment 
coefficient and the target payout ratio of the Jordanian sample (0.429 and 0.478 
respectively according to the pooled model, as it was found to be more favourable than 
panel models) with Lintner’s (1956) results, Jordanian firms had higher adjustment 
factors with lower target payout ratios. Consequently, Al-Najjar (2009) suggested that 
the Lintner model is valid for explaining dividend behaviour in Jordan. Further, 
Jordanian firms have target payout ratios and they partially adjust dividends toward 
their targets, even though relatively faster compared to the US (developed) market, 
which indicates that Jordanian firms smooth their dividends and therefore follow stable 
dividend policies. 
In another study, Chemmanur et al. (2010) compared corporate dividend policies of 
firms in Hong Kong and the US. Their sample contained industrial and commercial 
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companies listed on the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong and industry-matched US 
corporations listed on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ, covering the period 1984-
2002. They attempted to examine dividend smoothing by the Lintner dividend model 
and using time-series regressions at both the aggregate and firm levels. The empirical 
results reported the speed of adjustment parameter of 0.279 for US firms, which was 
less than half of the speed of adjustment value of 0.684 for Hong Kong firms. This 
meant that the extent of dividend smoothing by firms in Hong Kong is significantly less 
than those in the US, since they adjust their dividends toward a long-term target payout 
ratio much faster than in the US. Accordingly, Chemmanur et al. (2010) concluded that 
compared to US firms, Hong Kong firms follow a more flexible dividend policy 
commensurate with current year earnings. 
Furthermore, Al-Ajmi and Abo Hussain (2011) investigated the applicability of 
Lintner’s thesis of dividend policy by using an unbalanced panel data for a sample of 54 
Saudi-listed firms (708 firm-year observations) during 1990-2006.  Their empirical 
results showed that lagged dividends and current earnings have the expected signs and 
are significant and therefore supported the partial adjustment model proposed by 
Lintner, suggesting that dividend payments by firms listed on the Saudi Securities 
Market seem to be shaped by previous dividend levels and current earnings. Moreover, 
the results reported the speed of adjustment of 0.71 and the implied target payout ratio 
of 0.43, which indicated that Saudi firms have more flexible dividend policies, since 
they act quickly to increase dividend payments, and are willing to cut dividends when 
earnings decline and pay no dividends when losses are experienced.  
More recently, Al-Malkawi et al. (2014) examined dividend smoothing of Omani 
companies using Lintner’s (1956) partial adjustment model. The study sample consisted 
of 104 corporations listed on the Muscat Stock Market over the period 2001-2010. Their 
results provided empirical evidence supporting the validity of Lintner’s original 
findings; Omani companies seem to adjust their dividends toward the target payout ratio 
gradually but more interestingly with a relatively low speed of adjustment of 0.257, as 
compared to other firms in developed and emerging economies. In addition, the 
empirical evidence also suggested that the 2008 global financial crisis had no significant 
impact on dividend stability of Omani corporations. Therefore, Al-Malkawi et al. 
(2014) concluded that signalling is an important concern, because Omani companies 
attempt to smooth their dividend payment streams and adopt stable dividend policies.  
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2.4.2 Studies related to Agency Cost Theory of Dividends in Developing Markets 
Agency cost explanation of dividends in the context of emerging markets has attracted a 
number of researchers. Unlike the studies in developed countries that have paid 
extensive amount of attention to the principal-agency conflicts38 on dividend policy, 
where financial markets mostly contain the publicly-held companies with dispersed 
ownership and the control in the hands of professional managers, these researchers 
pointed out that concentrated ownership, by large controlling shareholders, is the 
dominant form of ownership structure in most developing countries and therefore the 
salient agency problem is expropriation of the wealth of minority owners by the 
controlling shareholders. This implies the conflict between controlling and minority 
shareholders, the principal-principal conflicts.39 Indeed, a few recent cross-country 
studies have provided evidence that concentrated ownership by large controlling 
shareholders is the dominant form of the ownership structure in most developing 
economies, in contrast with the Berle and Means (1932) image of the widely held 
corporation (La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2000; Shleifer and Visny, 1986).  
La Porta et al. (1999) examined the ownership structures of large firms in 27 different 
countries40 across the world, from the richest common law countries to countries with 
poor shareholder protection. Their results revealed that the ownership structure of Berle 
and Means’s widely held corporation was only a common form for large firms in the 
richest common law countries. However, in the countries with poor shareholder 
protection, only relatively few of these firms were widely held; even the largest firms 
were more likely to have controlling shareholders and are generally dominated by 
                                                          
38
 In their classic study, Berle and Means (1932) drew attention to the prevalence of widely held 
corporations in the US, in which ownership structure of firms is dispersed among small shareholders but 
the control is concentrated in the hands of managers. The Berle and Means widely held corporation is 
extensively accepted in the finance literature as a common organisational form for firms in the richest 
common law countries, including the US, the UK, Canada and Australia. Accordingly, the traditional 
agency cost theory drives from the problems associated with the separation of management (the agent) 
and ownership (the principal), and the differences in managerial and shareholder priorities, in other words 
the principal-agent conflicts, developed by Berle and Means (1932), Jensen and Meckling (1976), 
Easterbrook (1984) and Rozeff (1982), is also referred to as Agency Problem I in this thesis like prior 
studies.  
 
39
 In most emerging economies, companies usually have controlling shareholders that own significant 
fractions of equity, typically founding families. The controlling shareholders can efficiently determine the 
decisions of managers, in fact top managers almost always come from the controlling family, and they 
can implement policies that benefit themselves at the expense of minority shareholders (La Porta et al., 
1999). In this context, problem arising from the principal-principal conflicts, which is also referred to as 
Agency Problems II in this thesis like prior studies.  
 
40
 Argentina, Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, Spain, the 
UK, the US, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Israel, Italy, South Korea, 
Mexico, Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland. 
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families or the state, whereas equity control by financial institutions was far less 
common. Furthermore, the results indicated that the controlling families typically have 
power over their corporations in considerable excess of their cash flow rights, primarily 
through the use of pyramidal structures and their direct involvements in management.  
Claessens et al. (2000) investigated the separation and control for 2,890 companies in 
nine East Asian countries (Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand) by collecting the ownership data as of the 
end of fiscal year 1996 or the closest possible year. Their findings showed that a single 
shareholder controlled more than two-thirds of publicly-listed East Asian firms and 
about more than half of all listed companies were dominated by families. Moreover, 
corporate control was usually enhanced through pyramid structures and cross-holdings 
between companies in all East Asian corporations, therefore voting rights generally 
exceeded formal cash-flow rights. Separation of management from ownership control 
was rare and top management of approximately 60% of family-controlled companies 
were related to the family members of the controlling shareholder. Significant cross-
country differences also existed however; for instance, corporations in Japan were 
generally widely held, whereas corporations in Indonesia and Thailand were typically 
family dominated. State ownership was significant in Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, 
Singapore and Thailand. Consequently, Claessens et al. (2000) suggested that these 
findings indicated the ability and incentives of controlling shareholders to expropriate 
from minority shareholders.  
Yurtoglu (2003) studied the ownership and control structures of publicly-listed firms in 
Turkey. The study sample consisted of 305 firms listed on the ISE in 2001. The research 
results indicated that while holding companies, in other words business groups and non-
financial firms, were the most common owners at the direct level, in fact families 
ultimately owned 80% of all firms listed on the ISE. Families typically tended to 
organise a large number of firms under a pyramidal ownership structure or through a 
complicated web-of inter-corporate equity linkages, and also often made the use of dual 
class shares or other corporate charter arrangements, through which they can reduce 
their cash flow rights whilst they firmly have the control on their companies. The 
analysis also showed that such variations implemented by controlling families did have 
consequence in significantly lower market-to-book ratios, suggesting large agency costs 
because of the conflicts of interest between controlling families and minority 
shareholders, which harm the latter, while benefit the former shareholders.  
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Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argued that when large shareholders, especially family 
owners, hold almost full control, they tend to generate private benefits of control that 
are not shared with minority shareholders. Controlling shareholders can expand the 
companies’ cash flows and implement policies that benefit themselves in such ways as 
paying themselves extreme salaries, providing top managerial positions and board seats 
to their family members even though they are not capable.41 In these cases, the salient 
agency problem is therefore expropriation of the wealth of minority owners by the 
controlling shareholders, so called Agency Problems II. Furthermore, it is argued that 
families are almost always involved in the management of their firms, which provides 
greater alignment between the interests of shareholders and managers. Therefore, family 
control is one of the most efficient forms of organisational governance of monitoring 
managers and may bring more effective management and supervision, which leads to 
zero or lower owner-manager agency costs (Agency Problem I) than other large 
shareholders or dispersed corporations. Nevertheless, family control increases the moral 
risks arising from the abuse of control rights and families might have powerful 
incentives to expropriate wealth from minority investors (La Porta et al., 1999; Ang et 
al., 2000; Anderson and Reeb, 2003).  
La Porta at al. (2000) argued that cash dividends can be used to reduce Agency Problem 
II by guarantying a pro-rata payout to entire shareholders and removing corporate 
wealth from controlling shareholders, hence preventing expropriation of the wealth of 
minority owners by large controlling equity holders. They further suggested that one of 
the main remedies to these types of agency problems is the law. Corporate law and legal 
environment can supply outside investors and existing shareholders specific powers42 to 
protect their wealth against expropriation by controlling families. La Porta et al. (2000) 
                                                          
41
 Based on the Agency Problem II arguments, family owners may use their controlling power to 
exacerbate the principal-principal conflicts in various ways. Morck and Yeung (2003) identified the 
“other people’s money” problem, which involves with a situation in where families have significant 
control over a firm with a very little investment in that firm. Indeed, by the separation between cash flow 
and control rights through pyramidal company structures or multiple classes of voting power of shares, 
controlling shareholders can divert resources to themselves and obtain “private benefits of control”, such 
paying themselves extreme salaries, providing top managerial positions and board seats to their family 
members even though they are not capable (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Another common form of 
expropriation of wealth from minority owners is refer to as “tunnelling”, which is defined as the transfer 
of assets and profits within a family-owned business group, where the controlling family transfer assets 
and profits in which they have higher ownership from firms with lower ownership through non-market 
prices (Johnson et al., 2000).  
 
42
 These powers could vary from the right to vote on important corporate matters, to the right to sue the 
firm for damages, to the right to receive the same per share dividends as the controlling owners, which are 
the legal protections that explain why becoming a minority shareholders is a reasonable investment 
strategy, rather than just being a complete giveaway of funds to others who are under a few, if any, 
obligations to return (La Porta et al., 2000).  
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proposed two alternative agency models based on the legal environment and dividends, 
namely the outcome model and substitute model. According to first view, dividends are 
an outcome of an effective system of legal protection of shareholders. Under an 
effective system with strong protections, minorities use their legal powers to force firms 
to disgorge cash in the form of dividends, which are then an “outcome” of an effective 
system of legal protection of shareholders, hence preventing controlling owners to 
expropriate corporate wealth. The substitute model posits that dividends are substitutes 
for legal protection in the countries with poor shareholders protection since companies 
with weak shareholders protection need to establish a reputation for good treatment of 
minority investors. A reputation for good treatment of shareholders is worth the most in 
economies with poor legal protection of minority shareholders, who have little else to 
rely on. By paying dividends, controlling shareholders return profits to investors, which 
reduce the possibility of expropriation of wealth from others, therefore establishing a 
good reputation. The outcome model predicts that dividend payments are higher in 
countries with effective shareholder protection. Contrarily, the substitute model argues 
that in countries with effective shareholder protection, the need for a reputation 
mechanism is weaker; therefore, so is the need to distribute dividends, then suggesting, 
ceteris paribus, that dividend ratios should be higher in countries with poor legal 
protection of shareholders than in countries with strong protections. Moreover, the 
outcome model also states that firms with better investment opportunities should have 
lower payout ratios in economies with good shareholder protections. However, the 
substitute model predicts that in markets with poor legal environment, firms with better 
investment opportunities may pay out more to maintain their reputations (La Porta et al, 
2000).  
Accordingly, La Porta et al. (2000) collected a sample of 4,103 firms from 33 
countries43 around the world during the period 1989-1994 to investigate dividend 
policies of large corporations by using two alternative dividend models developed by 
them. The cross-country sample provided the advantage of different legal protections of 
minority shareholders across these countries to examine and compare dividend policies 
of companies whose minority shareholders face different risks of expropriation of their 
wealth by corporate insiders. The study results showed that firms operating in countries 
                                                          
43
 La Porta et al. (2000) classified their sample as civil law countries, Argentina, Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, 
Norway, Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan and Turkey, and common law 
countries, Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, India, Ireland, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, South 
Africa, Thailand, the UK and the US.  
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with better protection of minority shareholders pay higher dividends, providing 
consistent report for the outcome agency model of dividends. Also, in these economies, 
fast growth firms distribute lower dividends than slow growth firms, in line with the 
argument that legally well-protected minority shareholders tend to wait for their 
dividends, when investment opportunities are good. Nevertheless, in poorly protected 
countries, shareholders are more likely to take whatever dividends they can get, 
regardless of investment opportunities, suggesting that this apparent misallocation of 
investment is most probably part of the agency cost of poor legal protection.  
Faccio et al. (2001) investigated how dividend behaviour is related to the structure of 
ownership and control of East Asian firms with a benchmark sample of West European 
firms based on the Agency Problem II argument. They examined 5,897 companies from 
five West European (France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK) and nine East Asian 
(Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan 
and Thailand) countries during the period 1992-1996. Their analysis showed that, unlike 
most US companies widely held, the predominant form of ownership in East Asia was 
control by a family, which often supplied a top manager, and widely held corporations 
were in the minority. This form of ownership, in other words “crony capitalism”, was 
actually more pronounced in Western Europe. Therefore, these findings suggested that 
the salient agency problem in these countries is expropriation of wealth from outside 
shareholders by controlling shareholders, which are the families in most cases. This 
type of expropriation is more likely to arise when the corporation is affiliated to a group 
of corporations, all controlled by the same shareholder, which was found to be true for 
about half of the firms in Western Europe and East Asia. Faccio et al. (2001) further 
studied the relationship between dividends and the ownership and control structures of 
firms in both regions. Their empirical analysis indicated evidence on the expropriation 
that takes place within business groups, and on the differences in expropriation between 
Western Europe and East Asia; particularly, group-affiliated firms in Europe pay 
significantly higher dividends than in Asia and are dampening insider expropriation. 
Additionally, the presence of multiple large shareholders increases dividend rates in 
Western Europe but decreases in East Asia, suggesting that other large owners tend to 
help reducing the controlling shareholder’s expropriation of minority owners in Europe, 
whereas they appear to exacerbate it in Asia.  
Furthermore, Manos (2002) studied the agency cost theory of dividend policy in India 
by using a version of Rozeff’s (1982) cost minimisation model, which was modified 
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according to the context of emerging Indian market. The study sample consisted of 661 
non-financial companies listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange in 2001 and the study 
results provided support to the cost minimisation model and the agency rationale for 
dividend policy. Particularly, agency costs variables, measured as foreign ownership, 
institutional ownership, insider ownership and ownership dispersion, were found to be 
positively related to the target payout ratios of Indian firms. The positive relationships 
between dividends and foreign ownership, and ownership dispersion, were in line with 
the expectations, suggesting that it may be more difficult for foreign investors to 
monitor the managements, as well, the increase in the dispersion of stock ownership of 
the firm increases the collective action problem of monitoring, and therefore the need 
for the dividend-induced capital market monitoring. Contrarily, institutional ownership 
and insider ownership were expected to be negatively correlated and the estimated 
positive correlation contradicts to the agency literature. Manos (2002) stated that it may 
be the level of institutional monitoring is insufficient due to the greater agency conflicts 
in India; thus, they force the firms to payout higher to induce capital market monitoring 
and that the issues with the insider ownership required further investigation.  
Chen et al. (2005) analysed a sample of 412 Hong Kong firms during 1995-1998 and 
their empirical results, related to the relationship between family ownership and 
dividend policy, showed that, for small firms, there was a significant negative 
relationship between dividend payouts and family ownership of up to 10% of the firm’s 
shareholdings and a positive relationship for family ownership between 10% and 35%. 
Hence, Chen et al (2005) interpreted their findings as the fact that dividend payouts are 
potentially used by controlling families in smaller Hong Kong companies as a tool of 
extracting resources out of the firms they control. When their shareholdings increase, 
family managers may care more about their dividend income compared to their cash 
salary, since on average their cash salary is much lower than their dividend income. 
However, it may also be the case that other shareholders foresee the potential 
expropriation by the families and require higher payouts from firms with potentially the 
largest agency conflicts.  
In another study, Kouki and Guizani (2009) provided an empirical examination of the 
agency cost explanation of the dividend policy, by attempting to identify the influence 
of shareholder’s identity on dividends in Tunisia. They collected a panel sample of 29 
firms listed on the Tunisian Stock Exchange over the period 1995-2001. The study 
results showed that ownership structures of Tunisian firms highly influence their 
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corporate dividend polices. Specifically, it is revealed that there was a significantly 
negative relationship between the institutional ownership and dividends paid per share. 
Similarly, the relationship between state ownership and the level of dividends paid to 
shareholders was significantly negative. However, the results indicated that the 
existence of multiple large shareholders, in other words highly concentrated ownership, 
significantly increase the dividend payments in Tunisia. In addition, a strong effect of 
the free cash flow on dividend policy was found; the more the cash available the higher 
the dividend per share. In terms of the firm size effect, there was a significantly negative 
relationship between firm size and dividends, suggesting that larger firms have more 
liabilities and thus are less likely to distribute dividends in order to not borrow even 
more capital. Finally, Tunisian firms with better investment opportunities were more 
likely to pay dividends, whereas those with high leverage tended to pay out a lower 
level of dividends. 
Using a data sample of 1,486 Chinese A-share listed firms for the period 2004-2008, 
Wei et al. (2011) found that families have lower cash dividend payouts and lower 
tendencies to distribute dividends than non-family firms in China, and a favourable 
regional institutional environment has a significant positive impact on the payout ratios 
with tendency to pay dividends of listed companies. The results also showed that the 
impact of the regional institutional environment on cash dividends is stronger in family 
controlled firms than in non-family firms. Having interpreted their results, Wei et al 
(2011) suggested that family control in China seemed to increase Agency Problem I 
rather than Agency Problem II, which has a significant negative impact on cash 
dividend payments due to a lack of effective supervision and the occupation of leading 
positions by incapable family members, which usually reduces corporate efficiency. 
Then, a favourable regional institutional environment takes a positive corporate 
governance role by helping to lessen Agency Problem I and encouraging family firms to 
distribute cash dividends. Accordingly, they further suggested that a high cash dividend 
payout is more likely to be the consequences of the “outcome model” of dividends, 
which is proposed by La Porta et al. (2000), by a favourable regional institutional 
environment. 
Aguenaou et al. (2013) investigated the effect of ownership structure on dividend 
policies for firms listed on the Casablanca Stock Exchange during the period 2004-
2010. The study results revealed that family ownership negatively influences the level 
of distributed dividends. Aguenaou et al. (2013) suggested that family ownership is a 
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typical aspect of firms in the Moroccan market and the low dividend payout ratios are 
justified by high agency problems in family controlled firms. Because, family 
shareholders increase the cost for firms since their lack of diversification, the hiring of 
unskilled family members and the abuse of other shareholders’ rights, which all may 
result in poor transparency and absence of accountability.  
More recently, using a dataset of 458 Colombian companies over the period 1996-2006, 
Gonzalez et al. (2014) examined the effects of family involvement on dividend policy 
and how family involvement influences agency problems between majority and 
minority shareholders. Their results showed that family influence in relation to the level 
and likelihood of dividend payments differs considerably according to the type of 
family involvement. Specifically, family involvement in management does not affect 
dividend policy, whereas family involvement in both ownership and control through 
pyramidal structures has negative impacts. But family involvement in control through 
disproportionate board representation has a positive effect on dividend policies of 
Colombian companies. Therefore, family influence on agency problems, and hence on 
dividend policy as a mitigating device, varies depending on family involvement.  
2.4.3 Studies of the Determinants of Dividend Policy in Developing Markets 
The determinants of dividend policy in the context of developing markets have been 
investigated by a number of studies.  
Aivazian et al. (2003b), the most well-known scholars of their research interest in 
emerging markets, investigated the dividend policy in eight developing countries (South 
Korea, Malaysia, Zimbabwe, India, Thailand, Turkey, Pakistan and Jordan), compared 
to a control sample of ninety-nine US firms over the period 1981-1990. They found that 
the same firm-specific determinants influence the dividend policy in emerging markets 
as in the US and emerging market firms show dividend behaviour similar to US firms. 
More precisely, the empirical results showed that, for both developing country and US 
firms, profitability influences dividend payments since high return-on-equity tends to 
mean high dividend payments. In contrast, higher debt ratios correspond to lower 
dividend payments, indicating that financial constraints affect corporate dividend 
policy. Further, the market-to-book ratio has a positive effect on dividend payments, 
contrary to expectations. The results also suggested little evidence of business risk and 
size influence dividend policy in a significant or sensible way. For emerging market 
firms, dividends are negatively related to the tangibility of firm assets. This may 
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correspond to the drop in short-term assets that are available as collateral for short-term 
bank debt, which would reduce short-term borrowing capacity in bank-dominated 
markets. Overall, Aivazian et al. (2003b) concluded that the same firm-specific 
determinants are important for emerging market firms as for US firms, even though 
financial systems are significantly different from those in the US; however, emerging 
market firms are more sensitive to some of the determinants, pointing out the greater 
financial restrictions under which they operate.  
In a previously mentioned study, Al-Najjar (2009) also investigated the dividend 
decisions of 86 non-financial Jordanian firms from 1994 to 2003. The empirical results 
showed the factors that affect the dividend policy decisions in emerging Jordan market 
are similar to those determinants that affect the likelihood of paying dividends in 
developed markets, which are consistent with Aivazian et al. (2003b). Moreover, Al-
Najjar (2009) reported that the probability of paying dividends increases with 
profitability, growth opportunities and firm size’ increases, whereas it decreases as debt 
ratio, institutional ownership, business risk and assets tangibility increase. Nevertheless, 
assets liquidity tends to have no influence on the probability of paying dividends in 
Jordan.  
Kirkulak and Kurt (2010) examined the dividend policy in Turkey, specifically the 
dividend payment decisions of the ISE-listed firms (with a sample of 2,326 firm-year 
observations and a sub-sample of 732 firm-year observations of dividend reductions) 
over the period 1991-2006, which was a period characterised by important regulation 
changes and financial crises.44 Their findings showed that the percentage of dividend 
paying firms decreased from 51.28% in 1991 to 35.64% in 2006, suggesting a declining 
trend in dividend paying Turkish firms. It was found that earnings were the main 
                                                          
44
 The ISE had some significant changes in the dividend policy regulations; the first mandatory dividend 
payment policy was implemented between 1985 and 1994. The second mandatory dividend payment 
policy was redeployed in 2003.  For the fiscal years 1985-1994, the ISE firms were obliged to pay at least 
50% of their distributable profit as a cash dividend but in 1995, amended regulations provided flexibility 
to companies and did not force them to pay a certain part of their profit as dividends. Accordingly, the 
companies were allowed to decide to pay dividends in the form of cash dividends, stock dividends or in a 
combination of both forms. They were also free to choose between paying dividends and retaining their 
earnings. The second mandatory dividend policy was implemented in 2003, which required that the 
amount of first dividends had to be depicted in firms’ main covenants and could not be less than 20% of 
distributable profit. Dividends could be paid as either cash or stock dividends as well as a mixture of them 
but could not be less than 20% in total.  
 
Furthermore, Turkey experienced several financial crises during the sample period. First, it was the big 
financial shock due to the depreciation of Turkish Lira in 1994. In 1999, the Turkish disinflation program 
collapsed and the economy suffered heavy turbulence. Then, the economic recession in Southeast Asia, 
followed by the Russian crisis in 1998, adversely affected the Turkish economy. In 2001, a rigorous 
banking crisis emerged in Turkey, which resulted many corporations declared bankruptcy and others 
experienced huge losses.  
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determinant of the dividend payments since Turkish firms with large current earnings 
were more likely to distribute dividends. Contrarily, the debt level had no significant 
effect on dividend policy, whereas high growth potential did, which could be partly 
attributed to Turkey’s mandatory dividend payment policy that forced even firms with 
growth potential to pay the required level of dividends. It could also be that increased 
levels of investment opportunities increased the confidence in future prospects of these 
firms. The results further indicated that current earnings significantly affected the 
dividend reduction decisions, since dividend reductions were associated with low 
earnings; shrinking earnings forced dividend paying firms to cut their dividends. The 
debt level had no effect on dividend payment decisions but it significantly influenced 
the dividend reductions, as increased levels of debt indicated greater reductions in 
dividends. Moreover, the firms with low investment opportunities were likely to reduce 
dividends, while the ones with high investments opportunities tended to increase 
dividends to convey positive signals to investors, which was consistent with the 
signalling hypothesis. Finally, the results showed that the financial crises had a very 
clear impact on both dividend payment and reduction decisions.  
Imran (2011) investigated the firm-specific factors determining the dividend policy 
decisions of Pakistani engineering companies trading on the Karachi Stock Exchange by 
using a sample of 36 corporations during a thirteen-year period 1996-2008. The 
research results displayed that current year dividend per share is a positive function of 
the previous year’s dividends paid per share, earnings per share, profitability, sales 
growth and the firm size, while it is negatively related to the cash flow. Accordingly, 
Imran (2011) suggested that the Pakistani engineering firms with higher sales and 
higher profitability distribute more cash dividends to their shareholders. Likewise, the 
larger firms tend to increase the amount of cash dividends since they have more access 
to different sources of finance. Besides, firms are reluctant to cut their dividends from 
the previous year’s level, in fact they desire to at least meet or increase the payout ratio 
from their previous level. Also, the negative correlation between dividends and cash 
flow implied that firms plough back their extra cash, whereas the liquidity of the firm 
has no effect on the dividend policy in the case of Pakistani engineering firms.  
More evidence in the context of an emerging market, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), 
was provided by Mehta (2012), examining the most important determinants affect the 
dividend policy of the firms on a sample of 44 non-financial firms listed on the Abu 
Dhabi Stock Exchange over a five-year period 2005-2009. The results showed that firm 
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size, business risk and profitability explain 42% of total variations in the dividend 
payout policy, but since profitability is not always significant, firm size and business 
risk are the most important determinants in making dividend policy decisions by the 
UAE companies. First, firm size is significantly and positively related to the dividend 
payout; hence, the larger-sized firms pay out more dividends as compared to firms with 
smaller size. Second, the firms with high price-to-earnings ratio have lower risk and 
high growth prospects, suggesting that the higher the firm's price-to-earnings ratio, the 
lower its risk, and the higher the firm’s payout ratio. Hence, the hypothesis that risk has 
a negative relationship with dividend payout is acceptable. Finally, contrary to most 
literature in developed countries, the study results do not show enough evidence that the 
profitability, liquidity and leverage are important factors in influencing the dividend 
policy decisions in the UAE.  
In a most recent study, Kisman (2013) aimed to find out the most essential factors that 
affect the probability of paying or not paying dividends in Indonesia. In order to fulfil 
the purpose, the study examined a sample of 34 firms continuously listed on the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) from 2005 to 2011. The results showed that 
profitability, agency cost variable (ownership dispersion) and liquidity had no impact on 
the probability of paying dividends. Kisman (2013) interpreted these findings as that 
profitability and liquidity had no effect because the emerging Indonesian market firms 
are generally small with low profitability and high investment opportunities; however, 
even if these small firms make profits and reach high level of liquidity, they prefer to 
retain earnings to fund investments, due to the difficulties of finding external financing 
or of hedged risk. Further, Kisman (2013) pointed out that Indonesian firms are 
generally dominated by a family group or a particular group of companies where the 
control is in the hands of small group of major controlling shareholders; therefore, it is 
not surprising that the minority shareholders have no effect in determining dividend 
policy of Indonesian firms. Finally, the results showed that investment opportunity and 
solvency had significantly negative effects, whereas firm size had a significantly 
positive impact on the probability of paying dividends in Indonesia. 
2.4.4 Conclusions of Empirical Studies in Developing Markets  
The empirical studies related to the developing markets that are reviewed in this section 
are summarised in Table 2.10 to 2.12 in Appendix I. Developing countries have 
comparatively recently attracted researchers who attempt to explain dividend policy 
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behaviour in these economies, and have attached more pieces to the dividend puzzle 
(Glen et al., 1995). Empirical studies taken in the context of developing markets are 
relatively limited, when compared with the developed markets. However, a number of 
studies reviewed in this part of the thesis provide a generic understanding of dividend 
policy in these markets, allowing us to make the following conclusions:  
(a) Some of the empirical studies expand existing academic research into emerging 
markets context by testing a Western-based model; particularly, Lintner’s (1956) partial 
adjustment model of dividends in order to find out whether the model holds true and to 
identify the implications of the model in emerging markets. Lintner’s (1956) famous 
classic study revealed that managers are concerned about dividend signalling over time 
and indeed various studies to date reported consistent results with Lintner’s findings in 
developed markets. However, the evidence is mixed in developing markets. The 
evidence conducted from the US market as well as other eight different emerging 
economies by Aivazian et al. (2003a) showed that the Lintner basic model still works 
for US firms but it does not work very well for emerging firms since current dividends 
are much less sensitive to past dividends in these markets. Similarly, Adaoglu (2000) 
found inconsistent findings with the Lintner argument and concluded that Turkish firms 
follow unstable dividend policies. Contrarily, Mookerje (1992) in India, Pandey (2001) 
in Malaysia, Al-Najjar (2009) in Jordan, Chemmanur et al. (2010) in Hong Kong, Al-
Ajmi and Abo Hussain (2011) in Saudi Arabia and Al-Malkawi (2014) in Oman 
reported evidence supporting the Lintner model in explaining dividend behaviour in 
these emerging markets, but they generally have higher adjustment factors, hence lower 
smoothing and less stable dividend policies compared to developed countries.  
 
(b) Empirical evidence related to agency cost theory of dividends is extensive in 
developed markets; however, they generally assume that firms in these developed 
markets are widely-held and the control is concentrated in the hands of managers (the 
principal-managers conflicts). Nevertheless, a number of cross-country studies (La 
Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio et al., 2001) provided evidence that 
concentrated ownership by large controlling shareholders, typically families, is the 
dominant form of the ownership structure in most developing countries. When large 
shareholders, including family shareholders, hold almost full control, they tend to 
generate private benefits of control that are not shared with minority shareholders. In 
these cases, the salient agency problem may therefore be expropriation of the wealth of 
minority owners by the controlling shareholders, in other words the principal-principal 
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conflicts, so called Agency Problems II (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; La Porta et al., 
1999; Ang et al., 2000; Anderson and Reeb, 2003). Accordingly, Daily et al. (2003) 
suggested that agency cost theory may function differently in family-controlled publicly 
listed firms and that prior findings from widely held corporations may not readily 
generalise into this setting. Moreover, a number of researchers (Manos, 2002 in India; 
Chen et al., 2005 in Hong Kong; Kouki and Guizani, 2009 in Tunisia; Wei et al., 2011 
in China; Aguenaou et al., 2013 in Morocco; Gonzalez et al., 2014 in Colombia) have 
indicated that ownership structure approach is highly relevant in explaining dividend 
policy based on agency cost theory. Consequently, agency cost theory of dividends 
needs to be uniquely investigated in emerging markets and, more importantly, the 
ownership structure of the firms in these markets should specifically be taken into 
account while identifying the proxies for agency cost variables.  
 
(c) A number of researchers investigated the firm-specific determinants of dividend 
policy in the context of developing markets. Aivazian et al. (2003b) in eight emerging 
markets, Al-Najjar (2009) in Jordan, Kirkulak and Kurt (2010) in Turkey, Imran (2011) 
in Pakistan, Mehta (2012) in the UAE and Kisman (2013) in Indonesia found that 
approximately the same determinants influence dividends policy decisions in 
developing markets as in developed countries. However, as Aivazian et al. (2003b) 
stated that due to various differences between developed and developing markets, even 
among those developing economies, such as financial systems, ownership structures, 
laws and regulations and so on so forth, their sensitivity to these determinants vary 
across countries. Indeed, the dividend sensitivity to some variables differs; for instance, 
profitability is generally found to be significantly and positively related to dividend 
policy (Aivazian et al., 2003b; Al-Najjar, 2009; Kirkulak and Kurt, 2010; Imran, 2011) 
but Mehta (2012) and Kisman (2013) reported no significant relationship between 
profitability and dividends in the UAE and Indonesia respectively. 
 
(d) Although a number of studies reviewed here provide a generic understanding of 
dividend policy in different developing markets, empirical evidence related to these 
markets is relatively limited compared to the developed markets. Hence, much more 
empirical research is needed to be contributed in the context of developing countries. 
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2.5 Conclusions  
This chapter of the study provides a literature survey on the dividend debate; which 
shows that corporate dividend policy literature offers various theoretical explanations 
and contains voluminous empirical research. Although Miller and Modigliani’s (1961) 
dividend irrelevance theory is logical and consistent under the circumstances of perfect 
capital market assumptions, once this idealised world is left and we return to the real 
markets, various imperfections exist and this theory becomes highly debatable. Indeed, 
researchers proposed a range of leading dividend theories involved with the relaxation 
of M&M’s assumptions and dealt with dividends in the presence of the various market 
imperfections, including the signalling theory, agency cost theory, transaction cost 
theory, tax-related explanations, bird-in-the-hand theory, pecking order theory, residual 
dividend theory, catering theory and maturity hypothesis. However, none of these 
theories explain the dividend puzzle single-handedly.  
Empirical research regarding dividend policy is extensive. Many scholars have built and 
empirically tested a great number of models relating to these theories to explain why 
companies should pay or not pay dividends, whereas others have surveyed managers to 
learn what their thoughts are on the subject of dividends (Baker and Powell, 1999). 
However, the chapter shows an inconclusive judgment on the actual motivation for 
paying dividends despite countless research as in line with Fisher Black’s (1976, p.5) 
statement that “The harder we look at the dividend picture, the more it seems like a 
puzzle, with pieces that just don’t fit together.” 
Furthermore, all these leading dividend policy theories, models and frameworks are 
originally developed based on developed markets. In fact, earlier studies on dividend 
policy in terms of developing theories and empirical tests were focused on mainly the 
US market and followed by the UK market. Therefore, less is known about dividend 
behaviour and the explanatory power of models for other countries, particularly 
developing (emerging) economies, where market imperfections are the norm rather than 
expectations, and much stronger than in developed countries. Nevertheless, considering 
the growing importance of emerging markets in terms of global equity investments, 
these markets have recently started attracting international investors at a considerable 
level. Accordingly, emerging markets attach more pieces to the dividend puzzle and 
researchers have started investigating the dividend behaviour of corporations in 
developing countries (Glen et al., 1995; Adaoglu, 2000).  
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Even though the empirical research in developing markets has relatively contributed 
little evidence compared to developed markets, researchers have also started examining 
the dividend policy behaviour in emerging economies, especially over the past two 
decades. A number of studies reviewed in this chapter in the context of emerging 
markets have mostly confirmed that dividend policy behaviour in these markets 
generally tend to be, not surprisingly, different from developed markets in many 
aspects, due to the various factors such as political, social and financial instability, lack 
of adequate disclosure, poor laws and regulations, weaker financial intermediaries, 
newer markets with smaller market capitalisations, weaker corporate governance and 
different ownership structures  (La Porta et al., 1999; 2000; Kumar and Tsetsekos, 
1999; Aivazian et al., 2003a; 2003b; Yurtoglu, 2003).  
However, it is observed that while examining dividend policy behaviour in different 
emerging markets, researchers have not clearly stated or distinguished, as suggested by 
Bekaert and Harvey (2002), between the concepts of regulatory liberalisation or 
integration undertaken in those markets for their study sample periods. Dividend 
policies of companies may indeed significantly differ based on the process of 
liberalisation or integration undertaken in the emerging markets in which they operate. 
It could, therefore, be argued that dividend policy decisions of companies in an 
emerging market should be better understood if researchers report whether the emerging 
market examined passes laws for financial liberalisation or attempts to implement 
serious economic and structural reforms to integrate with world markets. In this respect, 
the chapter raises the following question: 
 What behaviour does the dividend policy of an emerging market show after 
implementing serious reforms for a better working of the market economy, outward-
orientation and globalisation, in other words for market integration?  
Accordingly, an interesting research idea, which emerged directly from the theoretical 
and empirical research surveyed in this chapter, is to carry the dividend debate into an 
emerging market but, differently to prior research, to examine the dividend policy 
behaviour of a particular emerging market that implemented serious economic and 
structural reforms for the integration with world markets, and to identify what behaviour 
the dividend policy of this emerging market shows afterwards. This doctoral thesis is 
aimed to answer the above research question.  
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Table 2.2 Studies of the Partial Adjustment Model in Developed Markets 
Researcher(s) Aim of the study Methodology (data sample and model) and main findings of the study Hypotheses consistent with results 
 
 
Lintner (1956) 
 
 
To discover what are 
the most important 
determinants of 
dividends while US 
managers setting their 
firms’ dividend policy. 
Data sample: 
US, 28 well-established industrial firms, 1947-1953. 
Methodology: 
 In-depth interviews with managers who were responsible for setting their dividend policy. 
 Regression model to describe the dividend change behaviour. 
Model and findings: 
Change in dividends = α + (speed of adjustment coefficient) x (target dividend* – actual 
previous year’s dividend) + u 
R2 = 85% 
*Target dividend = the target payout ratio x the current year’s earnings after tax. 
Managers tend to make; (i) stabilize dividends and 
sustainable increases whenever possible, (ii) dividend 
smoothing with establishing an appropriate target 
payout ratio to avoid frequent and spectacular 
changes in the short run, (iii) avoiding dividend cuts 
unless adverse circumstances are likely to persist. 
Also, the level of current earnings and the pattern of 
lagged dividends are the most important factors on 
dividend policy. 
 
 
Darling (1957) 
 
 
 
Testing modifications 
of Lintner’s partial 
adjustment model. 
Data sample: 
 US, an annual data set of all manufacturing firms for the period 1921-1954 with the years 
1936-1938 omitted. 
 US, quarterly data on common stock dividends of 125 large industrial firms from first 
quarter 1930 to second quarter 1955 with the years 1936-1938 omitted. 
Methodology: 
Multiple-regression. 
Model and findings:  
Regression measures for dividend functions: 
 All manufacturing firms, annual data, 1921-1954 (1936-1938 excluded). 
I. Dividends =  763 + 0.134 net income** + 0.122 lagged income** + 0.288 amortisation*  
                          –   0.0094 change in sales***                      ►  Adjusted R =  0.975 
II. Dividends = 288 + 0.148 net income** + 0.619 lagged dividends* + 0.05 amortisation* 
                          – 0.047 change in sales***                          ►  Adjusted R =  0.989 
 125 large industrial firms, quarterly data, 1930-1955, and 1936-1938 excluded 
I.  Dividends =  269 + 0.306 net income** + 0.136 lagged income** + 0.143 amortisation** 
                          – 0.0054 change in sales ***                       ►  Adjusted R = 0.992 
II. Dividends = 152 + .322 net income** + 0.370 lagged dividends** + 0.054 amortisation** 
                          – 0.0056 change in sales ***                       ►  Adjusted R = 0.995  
 
 
 
 Consistent with the Lintner model; however, 
dividends are not only influenced by current flows 
but also by anticipations of future flows. 
 
 Based on the certain managerial goals such as 
maintaining market position, providing adequate 
manoeuvrability, dispersing stock ownership and 
based on the budgetary constrains imposed on firms, 
dividends tend to vary directly with current profits, 
lagged profits, the rate of amortization recoveries and 
tend to vary inversely with persistent changes in level 
of sales. 
 
 
 
Fama and 
Babiak (1968)  
 
Testing the Lintner 
model using individual 
firm data instead of 
using aggregate data. 
 
 
 
 
Data sample:  
US, 392 major industrial firms for the 19 years 1946-1964 
Methodology: 
OLS time series regression and simulations.  
Model and findings: 
 Lintner’s partial adjustment model. 
 Modified versions of Lintner’s model; removing the constant and adding the lagged 
earnings variable into the model. Also, including cash flow and depreciation as other 
explanatory variables.  
 Consistent with the Lintner model; the current 
earnings, lagged dividends and constant perform 
well. 
 However, removing the constant and adding the 
lagged earnings into the model lead to a slight 
improvement in the predictive power of the model. 
 Net income seemed to be a better proxy for profits 
than either cash flow or net income and depreciation 
included as different variables in the model. 
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
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Table 2.2 Studies of the Partial Adjustment Model in Developed Markets (continues) 
Researcher(s) Aim of the study Methodology (data sample and model) and main findings of the study Hypotheses consistent with results 
 
  
Baker, Farrelly  
 and  Edelman 
 (1985)  
Investigating the 
determinants of 
dividend policy by 
comparing with 
Lintner’s model and 
evaluating managers’ 
agreement with 
Lintner’s findings. 
Data sample: 
US, 318 usable responses from the NYSE firms during 1983, with a 56.6 % response rate: 114 
utilities, 147 manufacturing and 57 wholesaler/retailers. 
Methodology:  
 Postal survey. 
 Five-point equal interval scale. 
 Chi-square difference test. 
 Consistent with Lintner’s findings; firms tend to 
avoid changing dividend rates which maybe soon 
need to be reversed, have a target payout ratio and 
periodically adjust the payout toward the target.  
 The importance of factors influencing dividend 
policy differs based on industry classification. 
 General agreement from mangers that dividend 
policy affect share value. 
 
 
McDonald, 
Jacquillat and 
Nussenbaum 
(1975) 
 
Examining the 
dividend, investment 
and financing decisions 
of French firms by 
using Lintner’s partial 
adjustment model. 
Data sample:  
France, 75 firms in each of seven years, 1962-1968. 
Methodology: 
OLS and two-stage least squares (2SLS) regressions. 
Model and findings: 
 Modified versions of Lintner’s model by adding investment and financing variables and 
estimating the models with a cross-sectional specification.  
 All variables are deflated by firm size, as measured by sales. 
 Estimated coefficients of earnings and lagged dividends were significant at the 1% level in 
all years, whereas investment and financing proxies were insignificant in both OLS and 
2SLS results. 
 
 
Consistent with Lintner’s findings, the study reveals 
that dividend decisions of French firms are well-
described by earnings and lagged dividends as in the 
Lintner basic model since investment and financing 
variables were insignificant in the dividend equation. 
 
 
Chateau 
(1979) 
 
Testing Lintner’s partial 
adjustment model by 
using alternative 
econometric procedures  
Data sample: 
Canada, 40 large manufacturing firms for the period 1947-1970. 
Methodology: 
OLS, OLS corrected Hildreth-Lu, instrumental variables, quasi-generalised least squares, 
augmented least squares and maximum likelihood estimator. 
Model and findings:  
 Lintner’s partial adjustment model with and without the constant. 
 Constant term retention or removal does not seem to affect the econometric fit of the 
predictive power of the model. Among the estimation procedures, ordinary and augmented 
least squares seem to provide more reliable estimates for the partial adjustment model. 
 
 Provide support to the partial adjustment model. 
 
 Canadian large manufacturing firms follow stable 
dividend policies. Especially, they are relatively 
more conservative compared to US firms when it 
comes to short-term dividend strategies even though 
they have a higher average payout ratio.  
 
 
Dewenter and 
Warther(1998) 
 
Comparing dividend 
policies of US and 
Japanese firms to 
earnings changes by 
using the Lintner 
model. 
Data sample: 
313 US firms listed on the S&P 500 and 180 Japanese firms listed on the Morgan Stanley 
Capital International Index during the period 1983-1992.  
Methodology: 
OLS regression, Wilcoxon rank-sum test and logit regression. 
Model and findings: 
 Lintner’s partial adjustment model without the constant. 
 Running the model on US and Japanese samples as well as sub-samples of Japanese firms. 
 The median speed of adjustment estimates are 0.055 for all US firms, 0.094 for all Japanese 
firms, and 0.117, 0.082 and 0.021 for keiretsu, hybrid and independent firms respectively. 
 The notion of Lintner’s speed of adjustment in 
terms of dividend signalling explanation is supported. 
 US dividends are smoother than Japanese 
dividends and Japanese firms cut dividends in 
response to poor performance more quickly than US 
firms. 
 Japanese keiretsu-member firms adjust dividends 
more quickly than both US and Japanese independent 
firms since they are subject to less information 
asymmetry and fewer agency conflicts than US firms. 
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Table 2.2 Studies of the Partial Adjustment Model in Developed Markets (continues) 
Researcher(s) Aim of the study Methodology (data sample and model) and main findings of the study Hypotheses consistent with results 
 
 
Baker, Powell 
and Veit 
(2002)  
Investigating the 
relationship between 
dividend policy and 
share value and four 
common theories for 
paying dividends: the 
signalling, tax-
preference, agency cost 
and bird-in-the-hand 
theories. 
 
Data sample:  
US, 188 usable responses from cash dividend-paying NASDAQ firms in 1999, with a 29.8 % 
response rate. 
 
Methodology:  
 Postal survey. 
 Five-point equal interval scale. 
 T-tests and chi-square difference tests. 
 Strongly consistent with Lintner’s findings; 
dividend-paying NASDAQ firms set their 
dividend policy in line with Lintner’s explanation 
and emphasise dividend continuity. 
 Optimal dividend policy maximises stock prices. 
 Strong support for the signalling explanation 
whereas little or no support for the tax-preference, 
agency cost and the bird-in-the-hand theories. 
 
 
 
Brav,  
Graham, 
Harvey and 
Michaely 
(2005)  
 
 
Determining the factors 
influencing dividend 
policy and share 
repurchases decisions at 
the beginning of 21st 
century. 
 
Data Sample:  
US, (i) 384 usable responses from US firms in 2002, with a 16 % response rate. Also, 
separately conducted 23 in-depth interviews. (ii) A sample of US firms matched to the survey 
respondents for three distinct sub-periods for regression tests; 89 firms in the first sub-period 
of 1950-1964, 244 firms in the second period 1965-1983, and 233 firms in the third time-
interval of 1984-2002. 
Methodology: 
 Postal survey. 
 In-depth interviews. 
 Five-point interval scale and t-tests. 
 Regression tests. 
Model and findings:  
Regression-based evidence by using Lintner’s the partial adjustment model. 
 Results for the matched sample for the chosen sub-periods. 
                                  1950-1964 (N=89)           1964-1983 (N=244)           1984-2002 (N=233) 
The median of: 
Speed of adjustment            0.74                                   0.39                                   0.37                                   
Target payout                      0.35                                   0.29                                   0.21 
Adjusted R2                          0.64                                   0.40                                   0.32 
 
 Results for all Compustat firms with valid data for the chosen sub-periods. 
                                   1950-1964 (N=513)       1964-1983 (N=1705)         1984-2002 (N=1856) 
The median of: 
Speed of adjustment            0.66                                   0.35                                   0.22                              
Target payout                      0.35                                   0.24                                   0.11 
Adjusted R2                          0.56                                   0.37                                    0.30 
 
 
 
 Consistent with Lintner’s findings. Especially, 
indicating that dividend policy is conservative; 
hence, managers are reluctant to cut dividends and 
the current level of dividend payments is taken as 
given unless adverse circumstances are likely to 
persist.  
 
 Results indicated two important changes regarding 
Lintner’s findings. First, firms target the dividend 
payout ratio less than they used to, and they do not 
correct their target ratio as fast as they used to (in 
other words, more smoothing through time). 
Second, managers favour share repurchases, which 
are now an important way of payout and provides 
greater flexibility, compared to dividend payments. 
Hence, this is one of the main reasons why 
repurchases have increased. 
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Table 2.3 Studies of the Information Content of Dividends Hypothesis in Developed Markets 
Researcher(s) Aim of the study Methodology (data sample and model) and main findings of the study  Hypotheses consistent with results 
 
 
 
Aharony and 
Swary (1980)  
 
 
Investigating whether 
quarterly dividend 
announcements provide 
information beyond that 
already provided by 
quarterly earnings 
numbers. 
 
Data sample:  
US, 149 NYSE industrial firms during 1963-1976, including 2,612 quarterly dividend 
announcements that follow and 782 that precede quarterly earnings announcements. 
Methodology: 
 Dividing the sample into sub-groups by using the dividend expectation model. 
 Estimating the daily average (AR) and cumulative daily average (CAR) abnormal returns of 
securities in twenty days surrounding the dividend announcement days. 
 Mean comparison t-tests. 
Model and findings: 
 Most of the statistically significant abnormal returns occurred during the dividend 
declaration date (AD-1) and the dividend announcement date (AD); in other words, two 
days excess return. 
 Two-day excess returns: 
When earnings announcements precede or follow dividends 
- For dividend increases: +0.72 %and +1.03 percent, respectively. 
- For dividend decreases: -3.76 and -2.82 percent, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 Capital market reacts to dividend announcement as 
strongly in line with the information content of 
dividends hypothesis. 
 
 Changes in quarterly cash dividends do convey 
information about future prospect of a firm, beyond 
that already provided by quarterly earnings 
numbers. 
 
 Market reactions to dividend decreases are much 
greater in magnitude than dividend increases. 
 
 
 
 
 
Healy and 
Palepu (1988) 
 
 
Examining whether 
dividend policy 
changes, particularly 
initiations and 
omissions, convey 
information about 
future earnings.  
 
 
Data sample: 
US, 131 NYSE/AMEX firms that initiated dividends and 172 NYSE/AMEX firms that omited 
dividends during the period 1969-1980. 
Methodology:  
 t-test of mean abnormal returns for the period 60 days prior to 20 days after the 
announcements of dividend initiations and omissions. 
 t-test and Wilcoxon test of mean and median earnings changes for the 5 years before, the 
year of and 4 years after the dividend policy changes. 
 Cross-sectional regressions. 
Model and findings: 
 The mean two-day announcements return (days -1 and 0) for the initiation firm is +3.9 
percent and for the omitting firm is -9.5 percent, both significant at the 1 % level. 
 Initiating firms have positive earnings changes for up to 5 years before and in the year of 
the dividend announcements, whereas omitting firms have negative earnings changes for 
up to 2 years before and in the year of the dividend event. 
 Standardised earnings change = α + β1the market-adjusted two-day announcement return + 
β2 prior earnings change + β3 cumulative market-adjusted return from day following 
earnings announcement for year -1 to 2 days before the dividend announcements. 
 
 
 
 Consistent with the hypothesis that dividend 
initiations and omissions appear to convey 
incremental information about firm’s future 
performance.  
 
 Significant earnings changes for as many as 5 years 
prior to dividend initiations, whereas significant 
earnings decreases for 2 years prior to dividend 
omissions.  
 
 Dividend initiating firms have earnings increases 
for the year of and 2 years following initiation 
events and these increases tend to be permanent. 
Dividend omitting firms have earnings decreases 
for 2 years prior and in the year of the 
announcements. Then they experience a recovery 
in following years.  
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Table 2.3 Studies of the Information Content of Dividends Hypothesis in Developed Markets (continues) 
Researcher(s) Aim of the study Methodology (data sample and model) and main findings of the study  Hypotheses consistent with results 
 
 
 
 
Michaely, 
Thaler and 
Womack 
(1995) 
 
 
 
Investigating both the 
short-term and long-
term effects of dividend 
initiation and omission 
announcements. 
 
Data sample:  
US, 561 cash dividend initiations and 887 cash dividend omissions of NYSE/AMEX firms 
over a 25-year period, 1964-1988. 
Methodology: 
Mean comparison t-tests. 
Model and findings: 
 Short-run reactions: 
For the initiation sample: Average excess return in the prior year is 15.1% and during the 
three-day (from the day before the event to the day after) announcement period, the initiating 
firms experience a significant additional excess return of 3.4%. 
For the omitting sample: Average excess return in the prior year is -31.8% and during the 
three-day announcement period, omitting firms experience a significant additional excess 
return of -7.0%. 
 Long-term reactions: 
For the initiation sample: The first year excess return following the announcements is 7.5% 
and the following three-year excess return is 24.8%. 
For the omitting sample: The first year excess return following the announcements is -11% and 
the following three-year excess return is -15.3%. 
 
 
 
 Consistent with Healy and Palepu’s (1988) 
findings that dividend initiations and omissions 
signal information about firm’s future 
performance. 
 
 Omission announcements are associated with a 
mean price drop of about 7%, while initiations are 
associated with a mean price increase of about 3% 
in the short-run. Further, regarding long-term drifts 
following the dividend events, the omissions 
involved with negative excess returns, whereas 
initiations involved with positive excess returns. 
Also, these drift patterns seem consistent through 
time as the study examines these events over the 
25-year period. 
 
 
 
Benartzi, 
Michaely and 
Thaler (1997) 
 
 
Testing whether 
changes in dividends 
signal information 
about the pattern of 
future earnings. 
 
Data sample: 
US, 1,025 NYSE/AMEX firms with 7,186 firm-year observations during 1979-1991. 
Methodology:  
 Categorical analysis: The sample divided into 7 groups according to changes in dividends 
and then unexpected earnings changes of each group were compared for up to two years 
from the year of dividend change announcements.   
 Two tailed t-tests. 
Model and findings: 
The study findings showed a strong relationship between dividend changes and earning 
changes in a given year (year 0). However, regarding the following years of the dividend 
change announcements, none of the dividend increasing groups had significantly faster 
earnings growth than the no-change group, nor does the largest increase group grew faster than 
the smallest dividend increasing group. Dividend decreasing firms presented even more bizarre 
earnings in following years as they were significantly positive and much greater those of the 
no-change firms.  
 
 
 
 
 
 Inconsistent with the hypothesis that dividend 
changes have information about the future earnings 
changes.  
 
 Instead, the study results suggest that there is a 
strong past and current link between earnings and 
dividend changes. 
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Table 2.3 Studies of the Information Content of Dividends Hypothesis in Developed Markets (continues) 
Researcher(s) Aim of the study Methodology (data sample and model) and main findings of the study  Hypotheses consistent with results 
 
 
 
Jensen and 
Johnson 
(1995) 
 
 
Examining dividend 
drop announcements in 
order to assess real 
motivation for the 
dividend decreases by 
studying firm-specific 
financial characteristics 
both before and after 
the dividend drop 
announcements. 
 
 
Data sample:  
US, 268 observations of 218 decreases and 50 omissions (by at least 20% in magnitude) from 242 
different NYSE/AMEX firms during the period of 1974-1989. 
Methodology: 
 Changes in firm-specific financial data in the three years before, the year of and two years 
following a dividend decline were analysed. 
 21 financial variables were examined for each firm and these variables were grouped into 6 
major categories: performance, cost structure, financial condition, financing, restructuring and 
discretionary. 
 The median values for each variable was examined over the 6-year period relative to itself 
(unadjusted) and relative to its industry (adjusted). 
 Graphical representations and Wilcoxon signed ranks test were employed. 
Model and findings: 
 The results spotted a decline in earnings before the dividend drop and an increase afterwards. 
Stock prices showed a similar pattern but the rebound in stock prices after the dividend drop was 
not significant. 
 Dividend cuts lead to improvement in liquidity position and to reduction in the levels of debt.  
Also, dividend decreasing firms tend to sell more fixed-assets, purchase fewer fixed-assets, 
spend less on R&D and reduce employees at a faster pace to sort out their lingering financial 
problems.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The evidence was in line with the view that 
dividend drop announcements do not 
necessarily signal a decline in earnings. In other 
words, inconsistent with the information 
content hypothesis of dividends. Rather, these 
dividend cuts tend to signal the beginning of 
restructuring activities and a turn around in 
financial decline. 
 
 
 
Akhigbe and 
Madura 
(1996) 
 
 
Investigating the 
dividend signalling 
hypothesis for the long-
term performance of 
corporations following 
dividend initiation and 
omission 
announcements. 
 
Data sample: 
US, 128 dividend initiations and 299 dividend omissions during the period 1972-1990. 
Methodology:  
 t-tests to examine the significance of average monthly abnormal price returns following 
dividend announcements from month t+1 to month t+36 for both initiations and omissions. 
 Cross-sectional regression by using weighted least squares. 
Model and findings: 
 Dividend initiations:  
Long term abnormal return = 1.0069 + 0.1078 magnitude of dividend change – 0.0872 size** –    
0.1213 Tobin’s Q ** – 2.6820 return on assets*                  ► Adjusted R2 = 0.142  
 Dividend omissions: 
Long term abnormal return =  – 0.067 – 0.029 magnitude of dividend change** – 0.0355size** – 
0.0221 Tobin’s Q – 0.0531 return on assets                         ►Adjusted R2 = 0.084  
 
 
Firms experience favourable long-term share 
price performance after dividend initiations. 
However, firms omitting dividends experience 
unfavourable long-term price performance. 
Cross-sectional analyses indicate that the long-
term valuation effects resulting from dividend 
initiations are more favourable for firms that 
smaller and overinvested, and those had 
relatively poor performance prior to the 
initiations. The long-term valuation effects 
resulting from dividend omissions are more 
unfavourable for larger firms and for relatively 
large dividend omissions. 
 
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 2.3 Studies of the Information Content of Dividends Hypothesis in Developed Markets (continues) 
Researcher(s) Aim of the study Methodology (data sample and model) and main findings of the study  Hypotheses consistent with results 
 
 
 
DeAngelo, 
DeAngelo and 
Skinner 
(1996) 
 
 
Investigating whether 
firms use dividends to 
signal their views of 
future earnings 
prospects by focusing 
on firms whose annual 
earnings suddenly 
declined after a long 
term of a stable growth.  
 
 
Data sample:  
US, 145 NYSE firms having decline in annual earnings during the period 1980-1987 after a steady 
earnings growth over at least nine or more years, including 99 of them increasing dividends, 44 no-
change and 2 reducing dividends. 
Methodology: 
 Mean comparison t-tests and Wilcoxon tests. 
 The random walk and growth-adjustment models to estimate abnormal future earnings. 
 Cross-sectional regression. 
Model and findings: 
 Both parametric and non-parametric tests showed no indication of positive earnings surprises for 
dividend-increasing firms. The random walk estimates suggested that firms-increasing dividends 
had earnings in year 1 to 3 that did not differ significantly from year 0 earnings. The growth-
adjusted estimates showed dividend increasing firms even had reliably negative earnings surprises 
in the following years.  
 Abnormal future earnings = α + β1past earnings growth rate + β2current earnings + β3 lagged 
earnings + β4extraordinary items + β5discounted operations + β6special items + β7dividend signal  
+ ѐ  
 ► Dividend signal variable was measured in 4 different ways and based on the different 
specifications of this variable, 4 regressions were run. However, in all regressions, the coefficients 
of dividend signalling variables were close to zero and not significant.  
 
 
 
 Inconsistent with the information content 
hypothesis. Dividend increases are not a 
reliable indicator for improved future 
earnings performance. 
 
 Emphasising two possible ways to explain 
inconsistent findings on dividend signalling:  
 
1. Managers may suffer from behaviour 
bias as they tend to convey over-
optimistic signals naively or deliberately. 
 
2. The cash commitments to dividend 
increases are relatively small. Thus, the 
small amount of the incremental cash 
payout conveys misleading signals. 
 
 
 
Lipson, 
Maquieira and 
Megginson 
(1998) 
 
 
Examining whether 
dividend initiations are 
associated with 
favourable subsequent 
earnings surprises by 
using the methodology 
of DeAngelo et al. 
(1996). 
 
Data sample: 
US, 99 newly public firms those initiating dividends and a matched sample of non-initiating firms as 
well as 99 size-matched firms those are already paying dividends in the same industry during the 
period 1980-1986. 
Methodology:  
 Comparison analysis by using Wilcoxon test. 
 The random walk, the growth-adjustment and the growth-in-sales models to estimate abnormal 
earnings returns. 
 Comparing dividend commitment of initiating firms with the corresponding resource commitment 
of non-initiating firms if they were to introduce similar dividends. 
Model and findings: 
 Earnings surprises are more favourable for the dividend initiating firms. 
 Cash dividend payments of the initiating firms were, on average, about 5% of earnings. If non-
initiating firms paid similar dividends as initiating firms, their cash dividend payments would be 
8.5% of earnings, which was also larger than the 3.5% level of dividend increase as a percentage 
of earnings found by DeAngelo et al (1996). 
 
 
 Consistent with the dividend signalling 
hypothesis that dividend-initiating firms use 
dividends to distinguish themselves from 
other newly listed public firms in the same 
industry and in contrast with DeAngelo et al. 
(1996). 
 
 If non-initiating firms were to pay dividends 
at the same level of dividends as initiating 
firms, they would have  paid higher 
dividends, which suggesting that firms do not 
initiate dividends until they believe those 
dividends can be sustained by future 
earnings. 
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Table 2.4 Studies of the Cost Minimisation Model in Developed Markets 
Researcher(s) Aim of the study Methodology (data sample and model) and main findings of the study  Hypotheses consistent with results 
 
 
 
Rozeff (1982) 
 
 
Developing and testing 
the cost minimisation 
model of dividends. 
 
Data sample: 
US, 1000 firms over a seven-year period 1974-1980, including 64 different industries. 
Methodology: 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) cross sectional regression. 
Model and findings: 
 Payout ratio = 47.81 – 0.09 Percentage of stock owned by insiders – 0.321 Average past growth 
rate of revenues – 0.526 forecasted average growth rate of revenues – 26.543 Firm’s beta + 
2.584 Log of number of common stockholders. 
 All coefficients are statistically significant. 
 Adjusted R2 = 48% 
 
 
 
Consistent with the agency cost perspective of 
dividend policy and the cost minimisation 
model. Optimal dividend payments have the 
benefit of reducing equity agency costs as well 
as balancing against an increase in transaction 
costs. 
 
 
 
 
Lloyd, Jahera 
and Page 
(1985) 
 
Expanding the cost 
minimisation model by 
including size as an 
explanatory variable 
and testing if the model 
still holds credibility.  
 
Data sample: 
US, 957 firms in 1984. 
Methodology: 
OLS cross sectional regression. 
Model and findings:  
 Payout ratio = 0.52 – 0.093 residuals from regression of percentage of insider stock ownership 
on size – 0.564 past growth – 0.216 forecasted growth – 0.184 beta + 0.025 residuals from 
regression of log number of common stockholders on size + 0.016 log of sales. 
 All coefficients are statistically significant at least at the 5% level. 
 Adjusted R2 = 31% 
 
 
Agency cost variables in the original model 
could be proxies for the omitted variables size 
since larger firms tend to have lower insider 
ownership and higher numbers of common 
shareholders. Hence, after having included a 
size variable in the model and controlling for 
the multicollinearity, results showed support for 
the cost minimisation model and for the 
significance of size.  
 
 
Schooley and 
Barney (1994)  
 
Examining whether 
dividends and CEO 
stock ownership are 
substitute mechanisms 
to reduce agency cost 
by using a variant of the 
cost minimisation 
model. 
 
 
Data sample:  
US, 235 industrial firms in 1980. 
Methodology: 
OLS cross sectional regression. 
Model and findings: 
 Dividend yield = 0.10657 – 0.18055 expected growth*** − 0.03302 past growth** – 0.04843 
beta*** + 0.05519 log of common stockholders*** – 0.00149 CEO ownership*** + 0.00005 
squared CEO ownership** 
 Adjusted R2 = 49.8% 
 
 
Consistent with the cost minimisation model of 
dividends. However, the relationship between 
dividends and insider ownership is parabolic, 
rather than monotonic as reported in the 
original model. Also, the critical entrenchment 
level was found in the region of 14.9 %, where 
the coefficient of CEO ownership changes from 
negative to positive.  
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 2.4 Studies of the Cost Minimisation Model in Developed Markets (continues) 
Researcher(s) Aim of the study Methodology (data sample and model) and main findings of the study  Hypotheses consistent with results 
 
 
Moh’d, Perry 
and Rimbey 
(1995) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Testing a dynamic 
modification of the cost 
minimisation model.  
 
Data sample: 
US, 341 firms over 18 years from 1972 to 1989. 
Methodology: 
Panel data and time-series cross sectional analysis by using weighted least squares. 
Model and findings: 
 Payout ratio = 13.533 + 0.465 lagged payout ratio*** + 0.013 past growth – 0.473 forecasted 
growth*** + 0.310 size (log of sales) – 1.868 intrinsic business risk*** – 16.266 operating 
leverage risk*** – 12.492 financial leverage risk*** + 0.036 institutional ownership** – 0.054 
insider ownership*** + 1.140 log of common stockholders*** 
 
 R2 = 33.8% 
 
 
Consistent with the cost minimisation model 
and concluding that firms try to minimise sum 
of agency costs and transaction costs towards 
an optimum level of dividend payout but this 
relationship holds through time as well as 
across firms.  
 
 
 
Farinha 
(2003) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Testing the agency cost 
explanation for the 
cross sectional 
distribution of dividend 
policies by performing 
a modified version of 
the cost minimisation 
model and by looking at 
the managerial 
entrenchment 
hypothesis. 
 
Data sample:  
UK, 693 firms in 1991 and 609 firms in 1996 for two 5-year periods 1987-1991 and 1992-1996. 
Methodology: 
OLS cross sectional regression. 
Model and findings: 
 For 1991:                             
Payout ratio = 0.6509 – 0.0053 insider stock ownership*** + 0.0001 squared insider stock 
ownership*** – 0.1439 past growth*** + 0.0038 forecasted growth – 0.0006 debt – 0.0014 volatility of 
stock** – 0.0005 cash + 0.0197 incorporate tax** + 0.0008 common shareholders + 0.0002 
institutional ownership + 0.0421 external directors holdings + 0.0069 log of analysts – 0.0198 size** 
– 0.0114 return on assets***  
  
► Adjusted R2 = 33.39 % 
 
 For 1996:                               
Payout ratio = 0.7282 – 0.0036 insider stock ownership** + 0.0001 squared insider stock 
ownership*** – 0.0804 past growth** + 0.0107 forecasted growth – 0.0003 debt – 0.0036 volatility of 
stock*** + 0.0007 cash + 0.008 incorporate tax + 0.00012 common shareholders** + 0.0012 
institutional ownership**– 0.0373 external directors holdings + 0.0351 log of analysts** – 0.0383 
size*** – 0.011 return on assets*** + 0.0399 Cadbury compliance**  
 
► Adjusted R2 = 43.91 % 
 
 
 
Consistent with managerial entrenchment 
hypothesis, strong evidence found that there is a 
U-shaped relationship between dividends and 
insider holdings in the UK. After a critical 
entrenchment level of insider ownership 
estimated in the region of 30%, the coefficient 
of insider ownership becomes positive from 
negative.  
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 2.5 Studies of the Capital Market Monitoring Hypothesis in Developed Markets 
Researcher(s) Aim of the study Methodology (data sample and model) and main findings of the study  Hypotheses consistent with results 
 
 
Crutchley and 
Hansen 
(1989) 
 
 
 
 
Testing whether 
dividend policy acting 
as a monitoring vehicle 
and investigating the 
substitution effects 
between dividends and 
other two controlling 
devices; managerial 
ownership and leverage. 
 
Data sample:  
US, 603 industrial firms for the period 1981-1985. 
Methodology:  
OLS cross sectional regression. 
Model and findings:  
 OWNERSHIP = – 0.007 + 0.167 stock diversification*** + 0.388 earnings volatility*** + 0.456 
floatation costs***  – 0.058 advertising and R&D – 0.015 size*** 
       ► Adjusted R2 = 8% 
 
 LEVERAGE = 0.160 – 0.846 stock diversification*** – 1.848 earnings volatility*** + 3.151    
floatation costs***  – 0.875 advertising and R&D*** + 0.021 size** 
       ► Adjusted R2 = 36% 
 
 DIVIDEND = 0.076 – 0.035 stock diversification*** + 0.034 earnings volatility* - 0.442 
floatation costs***  – 0.037 advertising and R&D*** + 0.004 size*** 
       ► Adjusted R2 = 46% 
 
 
 Consistent with the concept that managers 
use a combination of policies including 
dividends policy, leverage policy and 
managerial ownership incentives in terms 
of monitoring and controlling the agency 
costs in the most efficient way. 
 
 The mix of policies is jointly determined 
by the impact of five firm’s specific 
characteristics, which are stock 
diversification, earning volatility, floatation 
costs, advertising and R&D expenses and 
firm size.  
 
 
Born and 
Rimbey 
(1993) 
 
 
 
Examining the relation 
between prior financing 
activity  and the market 
response to initial 
dividend 
announcements  
 
Data sample:  
US, 490 firms that initiated or resumed a cash dividend policy from 1962 to 1989; 388 of which non-
financed and 102 of which financed prior to dividend announcements. 
Methodology: 
Mean comparison t-test and cross sectional regression analyses. 
Model and findings:  
 Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) during the 61 trading-days surrounding dividend 
announcement, by using comparison t-test: 
 
Event periods:                                (-25 to -2)                       (-1 to 0)                       (+1 to +25)                           
Non-financing sample (N=388):      1.405%                         3.299%***                                  -0.883% 
Financing sample (N=102):              2.585%                         1.585% ***                                12.16%   
 
 Regression results: 
Financing sample:           Price reaction = − 0.08 + 2.80 Dividend yield***       ► Adj. R2= 20.17% 
Non-financing sample:     Price reaction =     0.015 + 1.745 Dividend yield***   ► Adj. R2= 24.35% 
 
 
 
Consistent with Easterbrook’s (1984) agency 
cost hypothesis of dividends, suggesting that 
firms that simultaneously raising capital and 
increasing their dividend payments increase 
more value than firms that just increase their 
dividends due to monitoring issues.  Since the 
results provided supports for this conclusion, 
financing firms enjoy a higher return per unit of 
dividend yield than non-financing firms.  
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 2.5 Studies of the Capital Market Monitoring Hypothesis in Developed Markets (continues) 
Researcher(s) Aim of the study Methodology (data sample and model) and main findings of the study  Hypotheses consistent with results 
 
 
 
Hansen, 
Kumar and 
Shome (1994) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Testing the relevance of 
monitoring hypothesis 
for explaining the 
dividend policies of 
regulated electric 
utilities. 
 
Data sample:  
 US, all S&P 400 industrial firms during two 5-year periods; 1981-1985 and 1986-1990 for 
comparison analysis. 
 US, 81 electric utility firms from 1981 to 1985 and 70 electric utility firms from 1986-1990 for 
regression analysis. 
Methodology:  
Mean comparison t-test, panel data and OLS cross sectional regression. 
Model and findings: 
 Comparison analysis of mean payout ratios: 
 Period               Electric utility firms                 S&P industrial firms                    Difference 
1981-1985                66.25%                                       36.16%                                 30.09%***                  
1986-1990                69.56%                                       33.77%                                 35.79%***            
 
 Regression results:  
For 1981-1985 (N=81):                                
             Payout ratio =  99.95 – 1.24 regulatory commission rank** – 0.73 insider ownership*** – 3.60 
                                     floatation costs*** –  0.49 growth rate** 
             ► Adjusted R2= 25% 
 
For 1981-1985 (N=70):                                
              Payout ratio =  104.36 – 2.30 regulatory commission rank*** – 0.48 insider ownership***  
                                       – 1.05 floatation costs* –  0.55 growth rate***     
             ► Adjusted R2= 26% 
 
 
 
 Consistent with the monitoring hypothesis 
that regulated utility firms use dividend-
induced equity financing to control equity 
agency cost. 
 
 Regulated utilities pay larger proportion of 
dividends than non-regulated industrials in 
terms of being more capital intensive, 
thereby increasing the likelihood of 
dividend-induced equity financing. 
 
 The dividend policies of regulated utility 
firms are highly influenced by the degree of 
conflicts with managers and regulators as 
well as floatation costs and growth 
opportunities.  
 
 
 
Noronha, 
Shome and 
Morgan 
(1996) 
 
Investigating the 
monitoring rationale for 
dividends and whether 
the dividends and 
capital structure 
decisions are dependent 
on the growth and non-
dividend mechanisms 
for controlling agency 
conflicts. 
 
Data sample: 
US, 341 industrial firms during the period 1986-1988, consisted of sub-sample A: 131 firms with 
non-dividend agency controlling mechanisms and/or high growth-induced. Sub-sample B: 210 firms 
with low non-dividend control mechanisms and low growth-induced. 
Methodology:  
OLS cross sectional regression. 
Model and findings: 
 Subsample A: Payout ratio = 0.935 – 0.527 insider holdings – 0.068 log of shareholders  + 0.026 
                             variance of stock returns + 0.065 size – 0.005 growth**            
                              ►  Adjusted R2= 20% 
 Subsample B: Payout ratio = 0.292 – 0.312 insider holdings** + 0.039 log of shareholders**  
                        –   0.331 variance of stock returns + 0.016 size** – 0.003 growth** 
                                             ► Adjusted R2= 49%. 
 
 
 
Consistent with monitoring hypothesis and 
simultaneity between capital structure and 
dividend decisions are dependent on particular 
firm characteristics. Firms with alternative 
mechanisms and high growth, the pay out of 
these firms are not related to proxies for agency 
cost variables. Whereas firms with low 
alternative non-dividend devices and low 
growth, dividend decisions are made regarding 
to Easterbrook’s monitoring rationale.  
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 2.6 Studies of the Free Cash Flow Hypothesis in Developed Markets 
Researcher(s) Aim of the study Methodology (data sample and model) and main findings of the study  Hypotheses consistent with results 
 
 
 
Lang and 
Litzenberger 
(1989) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Testing the validity of 
the extended form of 
Jensen’s free cash flow 
hypothesis, so called the 
overinvestment 
hypothesis. 
 
Data sample:  
US, 429 substantial dividend change announcements (more than 10% in magnitude) during the 
period 1979-1984. 
Methodology: 
Event study and mean comparison t-test analyses – comparing the average daily returns on dividend 
announcements day for firms with Tobin’s Q < 1 and >1. Further, the sample is divided into 
dividend increase and decrease announcements.  
Model and findings: 
 Average daily returns on dividend change announcements days: 
                                                Q > 1                      Q < 1               (Q < 1) – (Q > 1) 
Average returns                      0.003**                     0.011***                  0.008*** 
 Average daily returns on dividend increase and decrease announcement days:  
                                              Increases                Decreases                Difference  
Q > 1                                      0.003**                   -0.003                      0.000 
Q < 1                                      0.008 ***                  0.027***                  0.019*** 
 (Q < 1) – (Q > 1)                     0.005***                  -0.024** 
 
 
 
 Average reaction to substantial dividend 
changes is almost four times stronger for 
overinvesting firms compared with value-
maximising firms. This is consistent with 
the overinvestment/free cash flow 
hypothesis, but also with signalling theory. 
 
 Further analysis showed that average 
reaction to substantial dividend decreases 
is insignificant for high Tobin’s Q firms, 
whereas it is significant for low Tobin’s Q 
firms. Therefore, this evidence is consistent 
with the overinvestment hypothesis but 
inconsistent with signalling theory.  
 
 
 
Howe, He and 
Kao (1992) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Testing whether 
Jensen’s (1986) free 
cash flow hypothesis is 
valid for explaining a 
broader set of cash 
transactions, namely 
share repurchases and 
specially designated 
dividends (SDDs), by 
following Lang and 
Litzenberger’s approach  
 
 
 
 
Data sample:  
US, 55 share-repurchases and 60 specially designated dividends announcements during 1979-1989.  
Then the sample is divided into firms with Tobin’s Q < 1 and > 1. 
Methodology: 
Event study, comparison t-test analysis and cross sectional regressions. 
Model and findings:  
 Mean access returns based on two-day risk-adjusted returns:  
Announcements            Low Q firms                   High Q firms                         Difference 
Share repurchases             7.64%                             7.17%                        No significant difference  
Special dividends              2.84%                             3.97%                        No significant difference 
 Cross sectional regression results:  
Share repurchases:      
Low Q firms:          Two-day abnormal return = 0.0597 + 0.340 cash flow    ► Adjusted R2 = 2.96% 
High Q firms:         Two-day abnormal return = 0.1024 – 0.3307 cash flow   ► Adjusted R2 = 6.98% 
Specially designated dividends:  
Low Q firms:          Two-day abnormal return = 0.025 + 0.0389 cash flow    ► Adjusted R2 = 2.30% 
High Q firms:         Two-day abnormal return = 0.052 + 0.0505 cash flow    ► Adjusted R2 = 2.20% 
 
 
 
 
Inconsistent with Lang and Litzenberger’s 
(1989) overinvestment hypothesis since there is 
no statistically significant difference in 
announcements effects across samples of high 
Q firms and low Q ratio firms. Further, several 
separate cross sectional regression results 
showed that Jensen’s free cash flow hypothesis 
does not hold explaining for excess returns for 
repurchase and special dividends 
announcements since the coefficient of cash 
flow was found insignificant in all regressions.  
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 2.6 Studies of the Free Cash Flow Hypothesis in Developed Markets (continues) 
Researcher(s) Aim of the study Methodology (data sample and model) and main findings of the study  Hypotheses consistent with results 
 
 
 
Agrawal and 
Jayaraman 
(1994) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Examining whether 
dividends reduce the 
opportunity for 
managers to use free 
cash flows and 
investigating the 
interactions of dividend 
policy, leverage and 
managerial ownership. 
 
Data sample:  
US, 71 industry-sized matched pairs of all-equity and levered firms during 1979-1983. 
Methodology:  
Comparison analyses by using two-tailed t-tests and Wilcoxon signed-ranks, and OLS regressions. 
Model and findings:  
Comparison analyses for  payout ratio and dividend yield for all-equity and levered firms: 
                                                 Mean                                                      Median                                .                                   
                               All-equity    Levered      t-statistic      All-equity    Levered   Wilcoxon probability 
Dividend per share:       0.325         0.188           3.20
***
         0.318           0.167             0.001
***
 
Dividend yield:              0.038         0.030           1.31             0.036           0.021             0.020
**  
 
OLS cross sectional regression results: 
 Payout ratio = 0.501 – 0.300 leverage***  – 0.004 managerial holdings***  + 0.003 managerial 
                                  holdings x leverage* – 0.302 free cash flow – 0.072 growth               
                                  ►  Adjusted R2= 17% 
 Dividend yield = 0.056 – 0.028 leverage*** – 0.0004 managerial holdings*** + 0.0003 
                        managerial holdings x leverage – 0.016 free cash flow – 0.013 growth 
                                  ►  Adjusted R2= 11% 
 
 
 
 
 
 Consistent with the hypothesis that 
dividends act as substitutes for debt to 
reduce the agency cost of free cash flows. 
 
 In line with the hypothesis that dividends 
and managerial stock ownership serve as 
alternative devices to reduce the possible 
corruption related to the free cash flow in 
all- equity firms.  
 
 
 
 
Johnson 
(1995) 
 
 
Investigating whether 
dividends and debt are 
substitute devices in 
order to reduce agency 
cost of free cash flow 
by examining share 
prices responses to 
announcements of 
straight debt issues of 
high and low dividend 
payout firms to spot the 
systematic differences 
between these two type 
of firms. 
 
Data sample: 
US, 129 straight debt offerings from the AMEX/NYSE industrial firms in the period 1977-1983. The 
sample is divided into low/high payout firms and further divided into high/low growth firms. 
Methodology:  
Event study, comparison analysis and weighted least squares regressions. 
Model and findings: 
Event study results:                      
                                                  Low Dividend              High Dividend            Difference  
Average two-day excess 
returns  (in % terms)                       0.78% *                       - 0.18%                      0.96%** 
 
Weighted least squares regression results:  
 All firms (N=129) :              Two-day excess return =  0.0093 – 0.0299 payout ratio***     
                                                                                   ►Adj. R2 = 5.06% 
 Low growth firms (N=64):  Two-day excess return =  0.0164 – 0.0416 payout ratio**   
                                                       ►Adj. R2 = 1.245% 
 High growth firms (N=65): Two-day excess return =  – 0.0018 + 0.0145 payout ratio  
                                                       ►Adj. R2 = - 1.26% 
       
.  
 
 
 
 Consistent with the hypothesis that debt 
and dividends are substitutes in order to 
reduce agency cost of free cash flows. 
 
 The results support that the substitution 
effect between debt and dividends are only 
significant for low growth firms; hence, in 
line with Jensen’s (1986) argument that 
low growth firms are likely to have greater 
agency cost problems of free cash flows.  
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 2.7 Studies of the Shareholders-Bondholders Conflict in Developed Markets 
Researcher(s) Aim of the study Methodology (data sample and model) and main findings of the study  Hypotheses consistent with results 
 
 
 
 
Woolridge 
(1983)  
 
 
Analysing the effects of 
unexpected dividends 
changes on the values 
of common stock, 
preferred stock and 
straight bonds with 
regard to the wealth 
transfer and information 
content hypotheses. 
 
Data sample:  
US, 317 positive and 50 negative unexpected dividend changes of NYSE firms from 1971 to 1977. 
Methodology: 
Event study, Comparison Period Return Approach (CPRA) and t-tests. 
Model and findings: 
Mean daily returns (MDRs):  
 For unexpected dividend increases:  
                                   Common stock ( n=317)      Preferred stock (n=125)      Straight bonds (n=248) 
Observation period                    0.66%                                 0.56%                                   0.10% 
Comparison period                    0.07%                                 0.27%                                   0.00% 
Difference (t-statistic)                7.71**                                  4.49 **                                  1.36 * 
 
 For unexpected dividend decreases:  
                                   Common stock ( n=50)         Preferred stock (n=26)        Straight bonds (n=45) 
Observation period                  -2.38%                                  -0.38%                                 -0.66% 
Comparison period                    0.01%                                   0.05%                                 -0.11% 
Difference (t-statistic)              -9.19 **                                  -0.95                                    -2.53**   
 
 
 
Positive (negative) dividend change 
announcements produce positive (negative) 
common stock returns; hence, this is consistent 
with both signalling and wealth transfer 
hypothesis. Further, unexpected dividend 
increases (decreases) are associated with 
positive (negative) straight debt and preferred 
stock returns. Overall, these results present that 
signalling is the predominant effect influencing 
security prices around dividend change 
announcements.  However, the wealth transfer 
hypothesis cannot still be ruled out completely.  
 
 
 
Jayaraman 
and Shastri 
(1988) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Testing the wealth 
transfer and the 
signalling hypotheses 
by examining the 
valuation impacts of 
specially designated 
dividends (SDDs) 
announcements on 
stock and bonds prices. 
 
Data sample:  
US, Stock sample: 2,023 SDD announcements of 660 NYSE/AMEX firms from 1962 to 1982. 
       Bond sample:    154 straight bonds of 63 NYSE/AMEX firms from 1962 to 1982. 
Methodology:  
Event study, Central Limit Theorem. 
Model and findings:  
 Daily average excess returns of stocks for the three days around SDD announcements:  
Sample                                           Event days                              Average Excess Return (%) 
Full Stock Sample (n=2,023)         -1, 0, +1                                                1.629** 
Stock sample Corresponding to 
Bond sample (n=150)                    -1, 0, +1                                                 1.517**  
 
 Daily average excess premium returns of bond around SDD announcements  
                                                          -1                                                  - 0.022     (Not significant) 
Full Bond Sample (n=154)                 0                                                  - 0.020     (Not  significant) 
                                                         +1                                                  - 0.017     (Not significant) 
 
 
 
Stock price reactions to SDDs are positive and 
significant; hence, this is consistent with both 
the signalling and wealth transfer hypothesis. 
However, further analysis reveals that bond 
prices remain unaffected by SDDs 
announcements. Consequently, these results 
suggest the signalling hypothesis is the 
predominant effect and provide no support for 
the wealth transfer hypothesis. 
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 2.7 Studies of the Shareholders-Bondholders Conflict of Agency Cost in Developed Markets (continues) 
Researcher(s) Aim of the study Methodology (data sample and model) and main findings of the study  Hypotheses consistent with results 
 
 
 
Dhillon and 
Johnson 
(1994) 
 
 
Testing stock and bond 
price reactions to 
dividend changes in an 
effort to examine the 
wealth transfer and the 
signalling hypotheses. 
 
Data sample:  
US, 131 dividend change announcements, including 61 increases and 70 decreases from 
NYSE/AMEX firms during the period 1970-1987. 
Methodology: 
Event study, the mean-adjusted returns methodology, comparison t-test. 
Model and findings:  
Standardised daily mean excess two-day returns:  
 For dividend increases 
          Sample:                                        Stocks                       Bonds                     Sample size  
  1. Total sample                                     0.98**                        -0.37                              61 
       1a. Initiations                                   0.28                          -0.49                              15 
       1b. Large increases (>30%)            1.21**                         -0.33                              46 
 For dividend decreases  
  2. Total sample                                   -2.01**                          0.69**                           70 
       2a. Omissions                                -1.09**                          0.84                               19 
       2b. Large decreases (>30%)          -2.70**                          0.81**                            43 
       2c. Small decreases                        -0.54                           -0.01                               8  
 
 
 
The study results provide supports for the 
wealth transfer hypothesis over the information 
content hypothesis since the findings showed 
that bond price reactions to announcements of 
large dividend changes are opposite to the stock 
price reactions. However, the evidence cannot 
rule out the information content hypothesis 
completely.  
 
 
 
Long, Malitz 
and Sefcik 
(1994) 
 
 
Investigating whether 
firms attempt to 
expropriate 
bondholders’ wealth by 
focusing on the 
underinvestment 
problem and the use of 
dividend policy to 
expropriate lenders’ 
wealth. 
Data sample:  
US, 141 straight debt and 78 convertible debt issues of NYSE firms from 1964 to 1977. 
Methodology:  
Event study, comparison t-test. 
Model and findings:  
 Average proportion of firms that increase and decrease dividends following debt issue. 
                                                                                                     Years after Issue                            .  
  Straight debt (n=141)                                      Year1        Year2        Year3        Year4       Average 
 Percentage of increases                                    56.0%        49.6%       59.6%        57.4%        55.7% 
 Percentage of decreases                                    7.1%         11.3%        9.2%         11.3%         9.8% 
 Convertible debt (n=78)   
 Percentage of increases                                    44.2%        44.2%       36.4%        41.6%        41.6%    
 Percentage of decreases                                   12.8%        20.8%       18.2%        18.2%        17.5% 
t-statistic, differences of % of increases            1.67
*
           0.76          3.28
***       2.23**        1.99** 
t-statistic, differences of % of decreases           1.39            1.89
*         1.93*          1.4            1.65*    
 Average proportion of firms that increase and decrease dividends following debt issue. 
                                                                                              
Straight debt (n=141)         Convertible (n=78)        Market (n=2,200) 
Average percentage of increases                   55.7%                           41.6%                            48.2% 
t-statistic on difference with market               1.73
*                          -1.14  
Average number of decreases                         9.8%                            17.5%                           11.0% 
 
t-statistic on difference with market             -0.44                              1.78
*
 
 
 
 
 
First, the results provided little support for the 
wealth transfer hypothesis but further analysis 
of the dividend growth rates of firms issuing 
debt comparing with the benchmark NYSE 
index, showed that no systematic differences in 
dividend growth rates between the two samples 
or the benchmark NYSE. Therefore, these 
findings suggest no evidence that firms 
manipulate dividend policy to expropriate 
wealth from new bondholders to shareholders. 
Despite dividends do increase following the 
issue of debt, the increases are in line with the 
market as a whole in terms of both timing and 
relative magnitude.  
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 2.8 Studies of the Dividend Yield and Risk-Adjusted Return in Developed Markets 
Researcher(s) Aim of the study Methodology (data sample and model) and main findings of the study  Hypotheses consistent with results 
 
 
 
Black and 
Sholes (1974)  
 
 
Examining the effect of 
dividend yield on the 
risk-adjusted returns 
before and after taxes. 
 
Data sample:  
US, 25 investment portfolios from common stocks listed on the NYSE over the period 1936-1966. 
Methodology:  
Cross-sectional and pooled time-series regressions. 
Model and findings: 
 A modified version of Brennan’s (1970) CAPM model by adding a dividend payout term. 
 A long-run estimate of dividend yield was employed. 
 Portfolio method (grouped data) was used. 
 
►Results showed that the dividend yield coefficient was not significantly different from zero 
either for the entire time period or for any of the ten-year sub-periods.  In other words, the 
expected returns on high-yield dividend stocks were not significantly different than the expected 
returns on low-yielded stocks either before or after taxes, other things being equal. 
 
 
 
 Inconsistent with Brennan’s (1970) after-
tax CAPM model, stating that there is no 
evidence of tax effect on dividends. 
 
 Provided support for the tax clientele 
hypothesis, suggesting that investors 
should ignore dividends when shaping their 
portfolios. 
 
 
 
 
 
Litzenberger 
and 
Ramaswamy 
(1979) 
 
 
Examining the effect of 
dividend yield on the 
risk-adjusted expected 
returns during both the 
ex-months and the non 
ex-months.  
 
Data sample: 
US, all common NYSE stocks from 1936 to 1977. 
Methodology:  
Cross-sectional regression; OLS, GLE and MLE. 
Model and findings: 
 An extended Brennan’s (1970) CAPM model. 
 A monthly dividend yield definition was employed instead of long-run definition. 
 Individual data was used instead of grouped data. 
 
 ►Results revealed that the dividend yield coefficient was positive and statistically significant. 
Hence, the dividend yield coefficient of 0.236 indicated that for every unit of increase in dividend 
yield requires about an extra 23 percent in before tax expected returns.  
 
 
 There is a strong positive correlation 
between before tax expected returns and 
dividend yields of common stocks, and the 
positive dividend yield coefficient is the 
evidence of a dividend tax effect. 
 
 Consistent with Brennan’s (1970) after-tax 
CAPM model, stating that investors dislike 
cash dividends and require compensation 
to receive them. 
 
 
Miller and 
Scholes 
(1982) 
 
Re-examining 
Litzenberger and 
Ramaswamy’s (1979) 
study by attempting to 
correct for the possible 
information bias.  
 
Data sample: 
US, all common NYSE stocks from 1940 to 1978. 
Methodology:  
Cross-sectional and time-series regressions. 
Model and findings: 
 Litzenberger and Ramaswamy’s (1979) tests. 
 A possible information-bias free dividend yield definition was employed. 
 Individual data was used instead of grouped data. 
 
  ► Results showed that the dividend yield coefficient was insignificant. 
 
 
 
Inconsistent with the tax effect hypothesis and 
they also argued that Litzenberger and 
Ramaswamy’s findings related to information 
effect, rather than the tax effect.  
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Litzenberger 
and 
Ramaswamy 
(1982) 
 
Re-examining 
Litzenberger and 
Ramaswamy’s (1979) 
study by using an 
information-free 
expected short-term 
dividend yield.  
Data sample: 
US, all common NYSE stocks from 1936 to 1977 but this time, the sample contained only stocks 
those declared dividends in month t-1 and distributed in month t, or stocks those delivered dividends 
in month t-1 and thus were not likely to pay dividends again in month t. 
Methodology:  
Cross-sectional regression; OLS, GLS and MLE. 
Model and findings: 
 An extended Brennan’s (1970) CAPM model. 
 An information-free expected short-term dividend yield. 
 Individual data was used instead of grouped data. 
 ► After using information-free sample and short-term dividend yield, results still showed a 
significant and positive dividend yield coefficient.  
 
 
 
 
Results still provided evidence that strongly 
supports the tax-effect hypothesis.  
 
 
 
Blume (1980) 
 
Re-examining the 
relationship between 
dividend policy and 
total returns on a risk-
adjusted basis by 
extending the Black and 
Scholes (1974) 
experiment.  
Data sample: 
US, all common NYSE stocks from 1936 to 1976. 
Methodology:  
Cross-sectional regression, mean square error criterion. 
Model and findings: 
 The Black and Scholes (1974) experiment. 
  A quarterly dividend yield definition was employed. 
  Portfolio method was used. 
► Results showed a positive and significant relation, on average, between the quarterly realised rate 
of returns and both the beta coefficient and the anticipated quarterly dividend yields. However, the 
significance of the dividend yield varied over time. 
► Most strikingly, over the entire period examined, the average quarterly returns on non-dividend 
paying stocks for a given beta exceeded the quarterly returns on most dividend-paying stocks.  
Consistent with the tax effect hypothesis since 
results revealed a positive and significant 
dividend yield coefficient. Nevertheless, the 
significance of the dividend yield variable 
varied over time and also the returns on non-
dividend paying stocks tended to exceed, on 
average, the returns of most dividend paying 
stocks over 41 years to 1976, which is totally 
inconsistent with the tax effect hypothesis. 
Therefore, it is concluded that the relation 
across stocks is far too complicated to be 
entirely explained by tax effect.  
 
 
Poterba and 
Summers 
(1984)  
 
Investigating the 
relationship between 
dividends and stock 
price movements 
through different tax 
regimes.  
Data sample: 
UK, 3,500 British companies for a 26-year period during the period 1955-1981. 
Methodology:  
GLS regression. 
Model and findings: 
 The after-tax CAPM described by Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979). 
 Using monthly data. 
 Using different tax regimes,  Regime I: No capital gains tax  
                                                      Regime II: Introduction of capital gains tax  
                                                      Regime III: Introduction of  imputation system for dividends  
 ► Results showed that the estimated tax penalty on dividends declined from 74 to 45 percent 
between Regime II and Regime III, while the evidence on changes between Regime I and Regime II 
was less clear. 
 
Despite the estimated tax rates were so high due 
to information effects or the possibility of 
miscalculating of risk, the findings suggested 
the importance of taxes in determining the 
relationship between dividend yields and stock 
returns. 
 
Consistent with the tax effect hypothesis; the 
valuation of dividends changes across tax 
regimes provided strong evidence that taxes 
explain part of the positive relationship between 
yields and stock market returns.  
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Keim (1985) 
 
 
Investigating the 
relationship between 
stock returns and long-
run dividend yields by 
using CAPM. 
 
Data sample: 
US, a sample range from 429 NYSE firms in Jan 1931 to 1,289 NYSE firms in Dec 1978. 
Methodology:  
Cross-sectional and time-series regressions. 
Model and findings: 
 The CAPM model. 
 A long-run dividend yield definition was employed. 
 Portfolio method was used. 
 
► The average returns of the dividend yield portfolios were non-linearly related with average 
yields. Further, an inverse relationship was found between positive yield and firm size. 
 
► Much of the relation between yields and stock returns was due to a significant non-linear 
relation between dividend yields and returns in the month of January (seasonality). 
 
 
 
Results showed evidence of a yield-tax effect 
but because of the significant effect of the 
month of January, in other words the effect of 
seasonality, on the relation between dividend 
yield and stock returns, these results were not 
entirely consistent with the tax effect 
hypothesis.  
 
 
 
 
 
Kalay and 
Michaely 
(2000) 
 
 
Performing the 
Litzenberger and 
Ramaswamy (1979) 
experiment by using 
weekly data 
 
Data sample:  
US, all common NYSE stocks that had a data for at least 260 weeks during the period 1962-1986. 
Methodology:  
OLS, GLS and MLE. 
Model and findings: 
1. Litzenberger and Ramaswamy’s (1979) tests by using weekly data. 
 
2. Litzenberger and Ramaswamy’s tests by using weekly data but with a long-run definition 
of dividend yield. 
 
► Using weekly data, the Litzenberger and Ramaswamy experiment resulted in a significant 
and positive dividend yield coefficient but with a long-run definition of yield, the results showed 
an insignificant coefficient, which was the evidence of time-series return-variation.  
 
 Results indicated that stocks experience only 
time-series return variations and did not find 
cross-sectional return variations, meaning 
that the long-run risk adjusted returns are not 
related with dividend yield. Therefore, the 
findings are inconsistent with Brennan’s and 
Litzenberger and Ramaswamy’s models.  
 
 However, the results are not completely 
inconsistent with the tax hypothesis and it 
could be that these empirical findings are in 
some ways related to a more complex tax 
effect theory, which is yet to be developed.  
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Elton and 
Gruber (1970) 
 
Investigating the 
relationship between 
marginal tax rates of the 
marginal shareholders 
and dividends by 
examining the ex-
dividend share price 
behaviour. 
Data sample: 
US, 4,148 observations from the NYSE shares that paid dividends between April 1, 1966 and March 31, 1967. 
Methodology:  
Event study around the ex-dividend days, Central Limit Theorem, Spearman’s Rank test. 
Model and findings: 
 (PX   ‒ PZ ) / D = (1- tD )/(1- tC); the ratio of price change on ex-days to nominal dividend amount should 
reflect the marginal tax rates of marginal shareholders. 
 Ranking the sample based on the dividend yield from lowest to highest into 10 deciles as well as calculating 
the implied tax brackets associated with each decile, hypothesising that there is a negative relationship 
between investors’ tax brackets and dividend yield. 
 Repeating the same procedure based on the payout ratio. 
► Results showed that the ex-dividend price drop was smaller than the dividend per share. 
► The average share price decline was 77.67% and the marginal tax bracket for the average shareholders  was 
     36.4%. 
► The implied tax brackets were significantly and negatively related to the dividend yield. 
 
 Consistent with the tax effect hypothesis 
that shareholders in a higher tax brackets 
have a tax-induced preference for capital 
gains over dividend income comparing to 
those in lower tax brackets. 
 
 Consistent with the tax clientele effect as 
well, suggesting that a change in dividend 
policy could cause a costly change in 
shareholders wealth, rather than dividend 
policy itself. 
.  
 
 
Kalay (1982a) 
 
Re-examining the 
documented empirical 
evidence of the ex-
dividend day behaviour 
of stock prices in terms 
of the short-term 
trading hypothesis.  
Data sample: 
US, a sample of NYSE firms of 2,540 cash dividends paid between April 1, 1966 and March 31, 1967. 
Methodology:  
Event study, Spearman Rank Correlation. 
Model and findings: 
 (PX   ‒ PZ )/D =1; the arbitrage would ensure that the price drop is equal to dividend in the absence of risk 
and transaction costs. However, transaction costs are unavoidable for the arbitrager’s trade, then (PX   ‒ PZ)/D 
will take any value within the bounds that are implied by arbitragers, which would range around 1. 
 In the presence of short-term traders, in other words arbitragers, the marginal tax rates of the shareholders 
cannot be inferred by observing ex-dividend price drops - (PX   ‒ PZ )/D. 
► Results showed that lower ex-dividend day price drop than the dividend per share and higher relative drop 
for high-yield stocks, suggesting that an ex-day share price drop less than the dividend per share provides 
profit opportunities for the short-term traders. 
 The marginal tax rates of shareholders 
cannot be inferred, in general, from the 
relative price drop. Hence, this evidence 
was not necessarily consistent with the tax 
effect or the tax clientele effect. 
 Nevertheless, the evidence was still 
consistent with the hypothesis that, on 
average, the investors involving the trading 
population pay higher taxes on dividends 
rather than on capital gains. This evidence 
captures the effects of both the short-term 
traders and the tax rates of the trading 
population. 
 
 
Michaely 
(1991) 
 
Analysing the 
behaviour of share 
prices around ex-
dividend days through a 
change in the tax law.  
Data sample: 
US, all firms listed on NYSE, which paid dividends during the period 1986-1989, containing 4,306 events in 
1986; 4,499 events in 1987; 4,785 events in 1988 and 4,799 events in 1989. 
Methodology:  
Event study, OLS and Fisher sign tests. 
Model and findings: 
 By using OLS market model, then mean ex-day premiums for the 50 days surrounding the ex-day (-25 to 
+25) for 1986, 1987, 1988 and 1989 were calculated. 
 A change in the tax law, namely 1986 TRA in the US that significantly reduced the difference between the 
taxes of realised capital gains and dividend income, was used to test the tax related hypotheses by comparing 
the premiums before and after the implementation of the 1986 TRA. 
 The sample further was divided into deciles from lowest to highest according to dividend yield and 
premiums were estimated for 1986 and 87 by using OLS market model. 
 ► The mean ex-dividend day premiums were insignificantly different from each other for before and after the 
implementation of 1986 TRA. 
 
 The tax law change, which reduced the tax 
difference between capital gains and 
dividend income and then entirely 
eliminated the differential, had no effect on 
the ex-dividend share price behaviour. 
Therefore, results were inconsistent with 
the tax effect and the long-term trading 
hypothesis. 
 
 On the other hand, results supported that 
the activity of short-term traders and 
corporate traders dominates the price 
setting on the ex-day.  
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Koski and 
Scruggs 
(1998) 
 
 
Investigating whether 
short-term trading 
reduces or eliminates 
the tax effect on ex-
dividend day prices by 
analysing trading 
volume around ex-
dividend days.  
 
Data sample: 
US, 70 ex-dividend day observations between Nov, 1990 and Jan, 1991 of NYSE stocks. 
Methodology:  
Event study, t-test and OLS regression. 
Model and findings: 
 The abnormal trading volume around ex-days were calculated on an event window of 11 days 
centred on the ex-dividend date (-5 < t < +5). 
  SAV = ß0 + ß1Yield + ß2Spread  
Where, SAV is the standardised abnormal trading volume on the last cum-dividend day and is defined 
as actual volume minus the average volume during normal trading period, standardised by the standard 
deviation of the normal trading volume. Yield is the dividend yield where the price is the mean of 
closing prices for share i over days -10 to -6 relative to ex-dividend Day 0. Spread is the proxy for 
transaction costs and is estimated as the average of spreads for all bid and ask quotes for share i on the 
cum-dividend day. 
►Results of t-tests showed strong evidence that tax neutral security dealers execute in short-positions 
dividend capture strategy to profit around ex-days. 
► SAV (Purchases) = 1.281 + 75.955 Yield** - 66.523 Spread** 
     SAV (Sales) = 1.296 + 70.596 Yield* - 64.504 Spread** 
► Regression results showed that abnormal trading volumes around ex-days, for both buy and sell, is 
positively related to dividend yield and negatively related to transaction costs.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
Consistent with the short-term trading 
hypothesis; tax-neutral dealers engage in 
short-term trading for arbitrage profits, which 
eliminates and is inconsistent with the tax 
clientele hypothesis around ex-dividend days. 
 
 
 
Kaplanis 
(1986) 
 
 
Examining share price 
behaviour around ex-
days in the presence of 
tax effect by estimating 
directly the expected 
fall-off implied in the 
prices of options as 
opposed to the actual 
share price fall-off.  
 
Data sample: 
UK, 360 pairs of cum and ex-dividend closing offer prices of options written on 14 different British 
firms from the LSE during 1979-1984 as well as the simultaneous underlying offer prices. 
Methodology:  
Event study, OLS, GLS and MLE. 
Model and findings: 
 First, the implied expected fall-off was estimated by using cum and ex-dividend prices. 
 Then, the sample was ranked according to dividend yield and put into 3 groups from lowest to 
highest to test if the fall-offs vary monotonically with the dividend yield. 
 Lastly, the actual market adjusted fall-offs and the estimates of the expected fall-offs were 
compared. 
► The results showed that the expected implicit fall-off around ex-dividend days in option prices was 
about 55% of the dividend and significantly different from it. Also, the fall-off had a significant and 
positive correlation with the dividend yield and the actual price drop was very similar to the implied 
decline from option prices. 
 
.  
 Since the average expected proportionate 
fall-off was significantly lower than unity 
and showed a positive relationship with the 
dividend yield, the results were consistent 
with the tax clientele hypothesis and 
inconsistent with the short-term trading 
hypothesis. 
 
 Thus, the usual assumption made in 
valuing options on dividend paying shares, 
that the decline is equal to the dividend, is 
not realistic and would cause downward-
biased estimates of the option value. 
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Lasfer (1995)  
  
 
Investigating share 
price behaviour around 
the ex-dividend days 
before and after the 
implementation of the 
1988 ICTA that 
decreased considerably 
the tax differential 
between capital gains 
and dividend income in 
the UK. 
 
Data sample: 
UK, a total of 10,123 observations from British firms with 2,891 events in the pre-1988 and 7,232 
events occurred in the post-1988 during the period April 6, 1985 – April 5, 1994. 
Methodology:  
Event study, t-test, Mann Whitney test and OLS regression. 
Model and findings: 
 Ex-day returns were computed using the market model over the event window (-10, +10) relative 
to ex-days. 
 To test for the potential short-term trading effects, the estimated ex-day returns were regressed on 
the corresponding bid-ask and trading volume, which were both used as a proxy for transaction 
costs. 
 
►Results showed that in the pre-1988 period, ex-day returns were positive and significant, whereas in 
the post-1988 period, ex-day returns were, in most cases, negative and insignificant. 
►Also, ex-day returns were significantly related to dividend yield and to the length of the settlement 
period but they were not influenced by the commonly used measures of transaction costs such as the 
bid-ask spread and trading volume.  
 
 
  
 
 Consistent with the tax effect hypothesis, 
suggesting that taxation significantly 
affects ex-dividend day share price 
behaviour in the UK. 
 
 Unlike the US market, ex-day returns were 
not affected by short-term trading; thus, 
inconsistent with the short-term trading 
hypothesis. It might be that either the 
institutional legislation was effective or the 
UK market was efficient, and ex-day 
returns and the tax credit were not high 
enough to outweigh transaction costs.  
 
 
 
 
Bell and 
Jenkinson 
(2002)  
 
Analysing the 
behaviour of share 
prices around ex-days 
before and after the 
Finance Act 1997, 
which was structured in 
such a way that 
immediate impact fell 
almost entirely on the 
largest investor class in 
the UK, namely pension 
funds.  
 
Data sample: 
UK, 9,673 ex-dividend day observations from 1,478 firms listed on the LSE during 30 days before and 
after July 2, 1997. 
Methodology:  
Event study, OLS regression. 
Model and findings: 
 Elton and Gruber (1970) model was used to examine ex-day price behaviour. 
 Estimated share price drop-off ratios before and after the Finance Act 1997 were compared to test 
the tax hypothesis. 
 Tests for the tax clientele hypothesis involved with comparing drop-off ratios to dividend yield. 
►Before 1997, the results showed that the average drop-off ratios ranged from 0.84 to 1.16 depending 
on the sample and measurement method. Also, strong clientele effects were found since drop-off ratios 
were positively related to dividend yields. 
►After 1997, the results showed significant changes in drop-off ratios, especially high yield firms. 
Drop-off ratios were found to be reduced on average by 13 to 18 percent depending on the firm size. 
 
.  
 
 
 
The study results provided strong evidence 
supporting the tax clientele hypothesis and 
were consistent with the tax effect hypothesis 
that taxation significantly influences the 
valuation of dividend income.  
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Mookerjee 
(1992) 
 
Testing the Lintner 
model of firm’s 
dividend behaviour and 
modifications of the 
model on Indian 
sample. 
 
Data sample:  
India, the aggregate corporate sector in India over the period 1950-1981. 
Methodology:  
OLS. 
Model and findings:  
 Lintner’s partial adjustment model.  
 Modified versions of Lintner’s model by adding external finance as an explanatory variable and 
removing the constant. Further, including lagged earnings and lagged external finance as other 
explanatory variables. 
 Significant explanatory variables with the signs as hypothesised by the model and an Adjusted R2 
value of 61% were reported. Also, a significantly positive external finance coefficient was found.  
 
 
The basic Lintner model tends to explain the 
dividend behaviour in India well and the 
model is able to explain 61% of the variations 
in dividend payments. However, inclusion of 
the external finance as an additional 
independent variable improves the 
explanatory power of the model. This 
evidence suggests that Indian firms may use 
external finance to augment dividend payout 
rates. 
 
 
Adaoglu 
(2000) 
 
Examining the dividend 
policy decisions of 
Turkish companies by 
using the Lintner 
model.  
 
Data sample:  
Turkey, 76 industrial and commercial firms listed on the Istanbul Stock Exchange, 1985-1997. 
Methodology:  
Panel data; pooled OLS, fixed effects and random effects regressions. 
Model and findings:  
 Lintner’s partial adjustment model. 
 Employed dividend per share as the dependent variable instead of aggregate dividends. 
 Significant and positive constant and earnings, whereas insignificant lagged dividends. 
 Speed of adjustment = 1.00, target payout ratio = 0.517 and Adjusted R2 = 89.4%. 
 Random effects model is found to be the most appropriate estimation.  
 
Significant differences between Turkish firms 
and the developed market firms’ dividend 
policies since the ISE firms follow unstable 
dividends policy unlike their counterparts in 
developed markets. The main factor 
determines the cash dividend payments is the 
current earnings in a given year. Any 
variability in the earnings of the firm is 
directly reflected in the level of cash 
dividends. 
 
 
Pandey (2001) 
 
Studying the dividend 
behaviour of Malaysian 
firms by examining (1) 
the industry effect, (2) 
earnings change and (3) 
stability of dividends 
using the Lintner 
model.  
 
 
Data sample:  
Malaysia, 248 industrial firms listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange, 1993-2000. 
Methodology: 
Panel data; pooled OLS, fixed effects, random effects, and multinomial logit regressions. 
Model and findings:  
 Lintner’s partial adjustment model. 
 Following Fama and Babiak (1968), dividend and earnings per share are used. 
 Significant variations in payout ratios of industries are found by Kruskal-Wallis analysis. 
 Profitable firms pay more dividends and firms experiencing losses tend to omit dividends. 
 Fixed effects model is found to be the most appropriate estimation. 
 
Lintner model explains the dividend 
behaviour of Malaysian firms since they rely 
on both current earnings and past dividends. 
However, Malaysian firms have lower target 
payout ratios and higher adjustment factors, 
indicating low smoothing and less stable 
dividend payments. Also, different industries 
have different payouts and profitable firms 
have higher payouts. 
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Aivazian, 
Booth and 
Cleary 
(2003a) 
 
Cross-country 
comparisons of 
dividend policy 
between the largest 
firms from eight 
emerging markets and a 
control sample of US 
firms. 
Data sample:  
The largest firms from eight emerging markets (South Korea, Malaysia, Zimbabwe, India, Thailand, 
Turkey, Pakistan and Jordan) and 100 US firms over the period, 1980-1990. 
Methodology: 
Pooled OLS. 
Model and findings:  
 Lintner’s partial adjustment model by following Fama and Babiak’s (1968) method; dividend and 
earnings per share are used. Also, the model was run separately on all observations and only 
dividend-paying observations for each country. 
 The Lintner model works remarkably well for the US data with Adj. R2s around 89-90%; however, 
the estimates are not as reliable in these emerging markets with much lower Adj. R2 s ranging from 
19.7% for Thailand to 72.5% for Zimbabwe.  
The Lintner model still works well for US 
firms, whereas it does not work very well for 
emerging market firms. Also, current 
dividends are much less sensitive to past 
dividends in these countries. Further, it is 
more difficult to predict dividend changes for 
such emerging countries since the quality of 
cutting dividends are much similar to those 
increasing dividends. In short, the institutional 
structures of these developing countries make 
dividend policy a less practical mechanism.  
 
 
Al-Najjar 
(2009) 
 
Investigating the 
determinants of 
dividend policy in 
Jordan as well as 
examining whether 
Jordanian firms smooth 
their dividends by using 
the Lintner model. 
Data sample:  
Jordan, 86 non-financial firms listed on the Amman Stock Exchange, 1994-2003. 
Methodology:  
Panel data; pooled and panel tobit and logit models, pooled OLS, random and fixed effects regressions. 
Model and findings:  
 Logit and tobit regressions showed that dividends increase with profitability, growth opportunities, 
and firm size’ increases, and are negatively related to debt ratio, institutional ownership, business risk 
and assets tangibility. However, assets liquidity has no effect on dividends. 
 Lintner’s model is used but using firm-level (dividend and earnings per share) data. 
 All variables and constant term are significant and positively related to dividends. 
 Pooled model is more favourable than panel models. 
 Target payout ratio and speed of adjustment coefficients are 0.478 and 0.429 respectively (according 
to the pooled model as it is more favourable).  
Dividend policy in Jordan is governed by 
similar determinants as suggested by the 
developed markets such as leverage ratio, 
institutional ownership, profitability, business 
risk, assets structure, growth rate and firm 
size.  
 
The Lintner model is valid for explaining 
Jordanian firms’ dividend behaviour. Indeed, 
Jordanian firms have their target payout ratios 
and they partially slowly adjust dividends to 
their target - but relatively faster than those in 
developed markets. 
 
 
Chemmanur, 
He, Hu and 
Liu (2010) 
 
Comparing dividend 
policies of firms in 
Hong Kong and the US 
in order to study 
dividend smoothing 
using the Lintner 
model.  
Data sample:  
Hong Kong and US: Industrial and commercial firms listed on the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong and 
industry-matched US firms listed on the NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ over the period 1984-2002. 
Methodology:  
Time series regression. 
Model and findings:  
 The Lintner model and its variants using both aggregate and firm levels data. 
 Regression results on aggregate data showed that the Lintner model works well in explaining current 
dividend payments in both Hong Kong and US markets. 
 The goodness of fits for both markets are high with Adj. R2s in the high eighties. 
 On a firm level basis, the speed of adjustment parameter for US firms is 0.279 and for Hong Kong 
firms is 0.684. 
Lintner model explains dividend behaviour of 
both Hong Kong and US firms since they rely 
on both current earnings and past dividends. 
However, the extent of dividend smoothing by 
firms in Hong Kong is significantly less than 
those in the US, which indicates that they 
adjust their dividends toward a long-term 
payout ratio much faster than in the US. 
Hence, compared to the US firms, Hong Kong 
corporations follow a more flexible dividend 
policy commensurate with current year 
earnings.  
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Table 2.10 Studies of the Partial Adjustment Model in Developing Markets (continues) 
Researcher(s) Aim of the study Methodology (data sample and model) and main findings of the study  Hypotheses consistent with results 
 
 
 
Al-Ajmi and 
Abo Hussain 
(2011) 
 
 
Testing the stability of 
dividend policy in 
Saudi Arabia using 
Lintner’s (1956) model.  
 
Data sample:  
Saudi Arabia, an unbalanced panel dataset for a sample of 54 firms during the period 1990-2006, 
totalling 708 firm-year observations.  
Methodology: 
Fixed effects panel regression. 
Model and findings:  
 Lintner’s (1956) model and several versions of the model by following Fama and Babiak’s 
(1968) method (firm-level data). 
 Results revealed that, in all of the tested models, the coefficients on both lagged dividends and 
current earnings are positive and significant. 
 Basic Lintner model explains 67.8% of variability in dividend payments, evidenced by R2 value. 
 The speed of adjustment of Saudi firms is 71% and the implied target payout ratio is 43%. 
 
Consistent with the partial adjustment model 
purposed by Lintner (1956), that is, current 
year dividend payments of Saudi firms are 
functions of current year earnings and lagged 
dividend levels.  
 
Saudi firms have, on average, higher speed of 
adjustment estimates, which suggests that 
Saudi firms tend to adopt more flexible 
dividend policies and they act quickly to 
increase dividends as well as willing to cut 
dividends when earnings decline. 
 
 
 
Al-Malkawi, 
Bhatti and 
Magableh 
(2014) 
. 
 
Examining dividend 
smoothing of Omani 
companies using 
Lintner’s (1956) partial 
adjustment model.  
 
Data sample:  
Oman, 104 firms listed on the Muscat Stock Market over the period 2001-2010, totalling 936 firm-
year observations. 
Methodology:  
Panel data; pooled tobit model.  
Model and findings:  
 Lintner’s (1956) partial adjustment model using firm-level data.  
 A modified Lintner model by adding dummy variables to capture the impact of 2008 Global 
Financial Crisis (GFC) on dividend stability.  
 The pooled tobit estimation is found to be more superior than random effects panel estimator as 
evidence by the likelihood Ratio test, which is insignificant (p-value = 1.00) and indicates the 
panel-level variance is unimportant. Hence, results are obtained using the pooled tobit models.  
 Results showed that the coefficients of earning per share and lagged dividends per share are both 
positive and highly significant (at the 1% level). However, although GFC dummies are, as 
expected, negative, they are not statistically significant.  
 The speed of adjustment estimate for Omani firms is 0.2572 and target payout ratio is 0.79.  
 
 
Result provided empirical evidence supporting 
the validity of Lintner’s original findings; 
Omani firms tend to adjust their dividend 
payments toward their target payout ratio 
gradually with, more interestingly, a relatively 
low speed of adjustment factor (0.2572) 
compared to other firms in developed and 
emerging economies. Furthermore, the 
evidence showed that the 2008 global 
financial crisis had no significant effect on 
dividend stability of Omani firms. 
Consequently, dividend signalling is an 
important concern since Omani firms attempt 
to smooth their dividend payment streams and 
follow stable dividend policies.  
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Table 2.11 Studies of the Agency Cost Theory in Developing Markets 
Researcher(s) Aim of the study Methodology (data sample and model) and main findings of the study  Hypotheses consistent with results 
 
 
La Porta, 
Lopez-De-
Silanes, Shleifer 
and Vishny 
(2000) 
 
Examining the agency 
approach to dividends 
on a cross-section 
sample from 33 
different countries 
around the world by 
using two alternative 
agency models of 
dividends; namely the 
outcome model and 
substitute model.  
Data sample:  
33 different countries around the world from 4,103 firms over the period 1989-1994. 
Methodology:  
Median comparison tests and country random effects regressions for the cross-section.  
Model and findings:  
 Dependent variables are dividend-to-cash flow, dividend-to-earnings and dividend-to-sales. 
 Independent variables are civil/common law country dummy, low/high investor protection 
dummy, growth sales, tax advantage on retain earnings, the interaction between growth sales 
and civil law origin, and the interaction between growth sales and low protection. 
 Common law countries, where investors have better protection, distribute higher dividends. 
 In common but not in civil law countries, high growth firms make lower payouts. 
 No tax effect found. 
 
Results showed support to the agency view of 
dividends, particularly consistent with the 
outcome agency model of dividends, which 
suggests that dividends are outcome of 
effective legal protection of shareholders. 
Further, firms in countries with better 
investors’ protection have higher payouts and 
in these countries fast growth firms pay lower 
dividends. Last, the study indicated no 
conclusive evidence on the effect of taxes on 
dividend policies.  
 
 
Faccio, Lang 
and Young 
(2001) 
 
Investigating how 
dividend behaviour is 
related to the structure 
of ownership and 
control of East Asian 
firms with a benchmark 
sample of West 
European firms. 
Data sample:  
5,897 firms from 5 West European and 9 East Asian countries over the period 1992-1996. 
Methodology:  
Mean comparison tests and cross-sectional OLS regressions. 
Model and findings: 
 Dependant variables are dividend/cash flows, dividend/earnings, dividend/sales and 
dividend/market capitalisations ratios. 
 Independent variables are group affiliation dummy, controlling shareholders ratio of ownership-
to-control rights, the European dummy, growth sales, multiple owners dummy, total debt/net 
assets, credit-rationing dummy, civil law dummy, the legal reserve variable and natural log of 
the book value of total assets. 
 Families are the predominant controlling shareholders in both Asia and Europe. 
 Results showed that expropriation exists within business groups and there are differences in 
expropriation between Europe and Asia. 
The predominant form of ownership in East 
Asia is control by a family, which often 
provides a top manager. In fact, this form is 
more pronounced in West Europe. Hence, the 
most salient agency problem is expropriation 
of outside shareholder by controlling families 
in both regions. Dividends exhibit evidence 
on this; group-affiliated firms in Europe pay 
higher dividends than in Asia, dampening 
insider expropriation. When multiple large 
owners exist, dividends are higher in Europe 
but lower in Asia, suggesting that they 
dampen expropriation in Europe but 
exacerbate it in Asia. 
 
 
Manos (2002) 
 
Investigating the agency 
theory of dividend 
policy in the context of 
an emerging economy, 
India, by using a 
modified version of 
Rozeff’s (1982) cost 
minimisation model.  
Data sample: 
India, 661 non-financial firms listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange in 2001. 
Methodology: 
Cross-sectional OLS, tobit model, Heckman’s two step and maximum likelihood procedure. 
Model and findings:  
 Payout ratio = α + β1 growth + β2 risk + β3 liquidity + β4 foreign ownership + β5 institutional 
ownership + β6 insider ownership + β7 ownership dispersion + β7 business group interaction 
term + β8 group affiliation dummy + β9 most liquidity dummy + β10 less liquidity dummy  + β11 
least liquidity dummy + ἐ 
 The transaction cost variables were negatively related, whereas the agency cost variables were 
generally positively related to the payout ratio. The positive relation for institutional and insider 
ownership was contrary with the expectations. 
 Group affiliation appeared to have a significant negative effect on the payout ratio. 
 
Consistent with the cost minimisation model 
and agency cost theory rationale for dividend 
policy in the context of an emerging market, 
India. Further, it is revealed that group 
affiliation appears to have a significant 
negative effect on the payout ratios and also 
has an important influence on the transaction 
cost structure as well as agency problems 
experienced by Indian companies. 
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Table 2.11 Studies of the Agency Cost Theory of Dividends in Developing Markets (continues) 
Researcher(s) Aim of the study Methodology (data sample and model) and main findings of the study Hypotheses consistent with results 
 
 
Chen, Cheung, 
Stouraitis and 
Wong  (2005) 
 
Examining whether 
concentrated family 
ownership affects firm 
performance, firm value 
and dividend policy in 
Hong Kong. 
Data sample:  
Hong Kong, 412 firms listed on the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong during 1995-1998. 
Methodology:  
Multivariate analyses by using pooled, industry fixed and firm fixed effects models. 
Model and findings:  
 Dependent variables: ROA, ROE, Tobin’s Q, dividend payout ratio and dividend yield. 
 Independent variables: Family ownership, CEO duality, number of directors, independent 
directors, audit committee, total assets, sales growth and debt-to-assets. 
 Results do not show a positive relation between family ownership and performance but little 
relationship between family ownership and dividend policy for only small firms.  
 
Only for small firms, there is a significant negative 
relation between payouts and family holdings up to 
10% and a positive relation for family ownership 
between 10 and 35%, suggesting that families in 
small firms are subject to less scrutiny by investors 
and may be using dividends to extract resources. 
Alternatively, results are also consistent with the 
conjecture that outside investors anticipate potential 
expropriation by families and demand higher 
dividends from firms with potentially the largest 
agency conflict.  
 
 
 
Kouki and 
Guizani (2009)  
 
Studying the agency 
cost theory explanation 
of the dividend policy 
by analysing the 
influence of shareholder 
ownership identity on 
dividends in Tunisia. 
Data sample:  
Tunisia, 29 firms listed on the Tunisian Stock Exchange over the period 1995-2001.  
Methodology:  
Panel data analysis by OLS. 
Model and findings:  
 Dividend per share = α + β1 free cash flow + β2 leverage + β3 Q ratio + β4 size + β5 institutional 
ownership + β6 state ownership + β7 dummies for ownership concentration + ἐ 
 Free cash flow coefficient is positive and significant at the 1% level in all models, whereas 
financial leverage is negatively related to dividend per share but only significant in one model 
at only the 10% level. Q ratio is positive and significant at the 1% level in all models, whereby 
firm size is negatively related to dividends and significant at the 1% level. The coefficients of 
institutional and state ownership are negative and significant, whereas ownership 
concentration is positively and significantly related to dividends.  
 
Ownership structure approach is highly relevant in 
explaining dividend policy in Tunisia. Institutional 
ownership and state ownership are both significant 
and negatively related to dividends. Further, 
existence of multiple large shareholders and free 
cash flow are positively related to dividends, 
whereas firm size has significantly negative effect 
on the level of dividends. Also, firms with better 
investment opportunities are likely to pay more 
dividends, while firms with high leverage tend to 
pay lower dividends. 
 
 
Wei, Wu, Li and 
Chen (2011) 
 
Testing the impact of 
family control, 
institutional 
environment and their 
interaction on the cash 
dividend policy of listed 
firms in China.  
Data sample:  
China, 1,486 firms listed on the Chinese A-share market for the period 2004-2008. 
Methodology:  
Group t-tests, logit and tobit regressions. 
Model and findings:  
 Dependent variables: Cash dividend dummy, payout ratio and dividend yield. 
 Independent variables: Family control, institutional environment, firm size, financial leverage, 
profitability, Tobin’s Q, cash, firm age, SOE regulations, year and industry dummies. 
 Family controlled firms have lower payouts and propensity to pay dividends than non-family 
firms. 
 Institutional environment has a significant effect on dividend policy of listed firms, which 
supports the outcome model of dividends proposed by La Porta et al. (2000).  
 
Family firms have lower payouts and lower 
tendencies to pay dividends than non-family firms. 
A favourable regional institutional environment has 
a significant positive effect on the cash dividends 
and the impact of the regional institutional 
environment on cash dividends is stronger in family 
firms than in non-family firms. Also, surprisingly, 
results showed that families in China tend to 
intensify Agency Problem I rather than Agency 
Problem II.  
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Table 2.11 Studies of the Agency Cost Theory of Dividends in Developing Markets (continues) 
Researcher(s) Aim of the study Methodology (data sample and model) and main findings of the study Hypotheses consistent with results 
 
 
 
Aguenaou, 
Farooq and Di 
(2013) 
 
 
Investigating the effect 
of ownership structure 
on dividend policies for 
Moroccan firms.   
 
 
Data sample:  
Morocco, firms listed on the Casablanca Stock Exchange during the period 2004-2010, 
totalling 200 firm-year observations.  
Methodology:  
Panel data analysis; fixed effects and random effects estimations. 
Model and findings:  
 Payout ratio = α + β1 institutional investor dummy + β2 industrial company dummy + β3 
government dummy + β4 family dummy + β5 foreign investor dummy + β6 size + β7 
leverage + β8 earnings per share + β9 year dummies + β10 industry dummies + ἐ 
 
 Results showed that two forms of ownership identity, namely family ownership and 
industrial company ownership, are negatively and significantly influencing the dividend 
policy of the firms listed on the Casablanca Stock Exchange.  
 
Family ownership negatively influences the level of 
distributed dividends; as for family ownership is a 
typical aspect of firms in the Moroccan market, the 
low dividend payout ratios are justified by high 
agency problems in family controlled firms. 
Because, family shareholders increase the cost for 
firms since their lack of diversification, the hiring 
of unskilled family members and the abuse of other 
shareholders’ rights, which all may result in poor 
transparency and absence of accountability. In 
addition, industrial company ownership also 
involves with lower dividend payouts, which may 
imply that industrial company ownership leads to 
additional monitoring on managerial discretion.  
 
 
 
Gonzalez, 
Guzman, Pombo 
and Trujillo 
(2014) 
 
Examining how family 
involvement influences 
agency problems 
between majority and 
minority shareholders 
and whether the level 
and likelihood of 
dividend payments 
serve as mitigating 
mechanisms.  
 
Data sample:  
Colombia, 458 Colombian firms over the period 1996-2006.  
Methodology:  
Panel random effects probit and classical tobit cross-section regressions.  
Model and findings:  
 Dependent variables are dividend payout ratio (dividends/total assets) and dividend 
dummy, which takes the value of 1 if the firm pays dividends, and zero otherwise.  
 Test variables are family CEO dummy, family ownership dummy, pyramidal family 
control and majority family board dummy. 
 Control variables are ROA, ROA(t-1), leverage, leverage(t-1), growth, size, age, group 
affiliation, group diversification, board size, non-family directors, board turnover, CEO 
board dummy, auditing firm and contestability index. 
 Also, year and industry dummies are included. 
 Results showed that family influence in relation to the level and likelihood of dividend 
payments differs considerably according to the type of family involvement. 
 
Colombian firms have high ownership 
concentration, family business groups and low 
investor protection. Furthermore, the relationship 
between family influence and dividends varies 
based on the type of family interaction. 
Specifically, family involvement in management 
does not affect dividend policy, whereas family 
involvement in both ownership and control through 
pyramidal structures has negative impacts but 
family involvement in control through 
disproportionate board representation has positive 
effect on dividend policies of Colombian 
companies. Therefore, family influence on agency 
problems, and hence on dividend policy as a 
mitigating device, varies depending on family 
involvement.  
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Table 2.12 Studies of the Determinants of Dividends in Developing Markets 
Researcher(s) Aim of the study Methodology (data sample and model) and main findings of the study  Hypotheses consistent with results 
 
 
Aivazian, Booth 
and Cleary 
(2003b) 
 
Examining dividend 
policy behaviour in 
different institutional 
environments; cross-
country comparisons 
from eight emerging 
markets and a control 
sample of US firms. 
 
Data sample:  
The largest firms from eight emerging markets (South Korea, Malaysia, Zimbabwe, India, Thailand, 
Turkey, Pakistan and Jordan) and 99 US firms over the period, 1981-1990. 
Methodology: 
Pooled OLS. 
Model and findings:  
 Dependent variable is dividends-to-total assets, whereas independent variables are business risk, 
size, tangibility of assets, ROE, market-to-book ratio, debt ratio and country dummies. 
 Dividends are negatively related to debt and positively related to ROE and the market-to-book 
ratio. Country dummies indicated significant differences exist among countries.  
 
 
Emerging markets showed dividend behaviour 
similar to US firms, which are explained by 
the profitability, debt and market-to-book 
ratio. Of course, their sensitivity to these 
variables vary across countries. Also, 
emerging market firms seemed to be more 
influenced by assets mix and country factors 
are as important in dividend policies as in 
capital structure decisions.  
 
 
Kirkulak and 
Kurt (2010)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Examining the dividend 
payment decisions of 
publicly listed firms in 
Turkey 
 
Data sample:  
Turkey, 2,326 firm-year observations of dividend and non-dividend payers and 732 firm-year   
observations of dividend reductions from the ISE listed firms during the period 1991-2006. 
Methodology:  
Logit regressions. 
Model and findings:  
 Dependent variables are the probability of paying dividends and the probability of reducing 
dividends, whereas independent variables are current net income, lagged net income, liability, 
growth, year dummies for 1997, 1998, 2001 and 2002. 
 
 Earnings are the most important determinant on both dividend and reduction decisions, similarly 
investment opportunities influences both. However, the debt level has no effect on dividend 
paying decisions but has a significant effect on dividend reductions. Also, financial crisis had a 
very clear impact on both. 
 
 
Firms with large current earnings tend to pay 
dividends, whereas dividend reductions are 
associated with low current earnings. The debt 
level has no effect on dividend decisions but it 
significantly affects reductions since higher 
levels of debt lowered dividends. Further, 
firms with low investment opportunities are 
more likely to reduce dividends, whereas high 
investment opportunities increase the dividend 
payments. Finally, the results showed that the 
financial crises had a very clear impact on 
both dividend payment and reduction 
decisions.  
 
 
Imran (2011)  
 
Examining the factors 
that determine the 
dividend payout 
decisions in the case of 
Pakistan’s engineering 
sector. 
 
Data sample:  
Pakistan, 36 engineering firms listed on the Karachi Stock Exchange from 1996 to 2008.  
Methodology:  
Panel data; pooled OLS, fixed effects and random effects estimations. 
Model and finding:  
 Dividend per share = α + β1 lagged dividend per share + β2 earnings per share + β3 profitability 
+ β4 cash flow + β5 sales growth + β6 firm size + β7 liquidity + ἐ 
 Results indicated that dividend per share is a positive function of previous year’s dividend per 
share, earning per share, profitability, sales growth and firm size, while it has a negative 
association with cash flow. However, liquidity of the firm has no effect on dividend policy 
decisions in the case of Pakistani engineering firms.  
 
Firms with higher sales and profitability tend 
to pay more dividends. Also, larger firms are 
more willing to increase the dividends. Firms 
are reluctant to cut their dividends and 
perform every task to meet or increase the 
payout ratio from its previous level. The 
negative association between dividends and 
cash flow suggests that firms plough back 
their extra cash. The liquidity of the firm has 
found unrelated to dividend. 
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Table 2.12 Studies of the Determinants of Dividends in Developing Markets (continues) 
Researcher(s) Aim of the study Methodology (data sample and model) and main findings of the study  Hypotheses consistent with results 
 
 
Mehta (2012) 
 
Investigating the most 
important factors which 
affect the dividend 
payout decisions of the 
firms in the United 
Arab Emirates (UAE). 
 
Data sample:  
UAE, 44 non-financial firms listed on the Abu Dhabi Stock Exchange during 2005-2009. 
Methodology:  
Correlation and backwards multiple linear regression models. 
Model and findings: 
 Dependent variable is dividend payout ratio, whereas independent variables are profitability, risk, 
liquidity, leverage and firm size. 
 
 Firm size, risk and profitability explained 42% of the total variations in the dividend payout 
policy; however, profitability is not always significant. Also, liquidity and leverage have no effect 
on dividends.  
 
 
Firm size and risk are the most important 
factors affecting dividend policy in the UAE; 
larger sized firms pay out more dividends and 
the higher the firm’s price-to-earnings ratio, 
the lower its risk and the higher is its payout 
ratio. Further, the study findings indicate that 
profitability, liquidity and leverage are 
insignificant in influencing the dividend 
payout decisions in the UAE.  
 
 
Kisman (2013) 
 
Examining factors that 
influence the 
probability corporate 
decisions to pay or not 
to pay dividends in 
Indonesia.   
 
Data sample:  
Indonesia, 34 firms listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange over the period, 2005-2011.  
Methodology:  
Panel data, logit regression models. 
Model and findings:  
 Probability of paying dividends (0/1) = α + β1 profitability + β2 agency cost (log of the number of 
common stockholders) + β3 investment opportunity + β4 solvency + β5 size + β6 liquidity + ἐ 
 
 Investment opportunity and solvency are negatively and significantly related at the 1% level, 
whereas size is positively and significantly correlated at the 1% level with the probability of 
paying dividends. 
 
 Profitability, agency costs and liquidity are not significant at any conventional significance level, 
hence they are not influential on Indonesian firms’ decisions to pay or not pay dividends.   
 
Profitability, agency cost and liquidity have no 
effect on the probability in paying dividends, 
suggesting that Indonesian firms are small 
with low profitability and investment 
opportunities are high, so even if they are 
highly liquid, firms retain earnings for 
investments. Also, agency cost variable is 
insignificant because these firms are generally 
controlled by families. Further, investment 
opportunity, solvency and size seem to have 
an effect on the probability of paying 
dividends in Indonesia.  
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3.1 Introduction 
This chapter investigates the firm-specific (financial) determinants of dividend policy in 
the emerging Turkish market, and whether the publicly-listed firms in Turkey follow the 
same firm-specific determinants of dividend policy as proposed by dividend theories 
and as suggested by empirical studies in developed markets, since the fiscal year 2003, 
when Turkey began to implement serious economic and structural reforms for a better 
working of the market economy, outward-orientation and globalisation, in other words 
for market integration.  
Accordingly, the main contribution of this chapter is that it is the first major research to 
our knowledge that examines the firm-specific determinants of dividend policy in 
Turkey, after the economic and structural reforms in 2003.  Particularly, the chapter 
helps in understanding the dividend policy behaviour of an emerging economy (a civil 
law originated country), which employed the common laws in order to integrate with 
world markets. In addition, unlike previous studies (Aivazian et al., 2003b; Kirkulak 
and Kurt, 2010), this chapter provides evidence regarding Turkey in the post 2003 
period (as it witnesses serious reforms) from a large-scale dataset that covers a more 
recent long period of time by considering a more comprehensive empirical model, 
employing richer regression techniques and using alternative dividend policy measures.  
Dividend policy literature contains various theories, hypotheses, and explanations for 
dividends. Although Miller and Modigliani’s (1961) dividend irrelevance theory is 
logical and consistent, under the circumstances of perfect capital market assumptions, 
once this idealised world is left and we return to the real markets, where various 
imperfections exist, this theory becomes highly debatable. Indeed, researchers proposed 
a range of leading dividend theories involved with the relaxation of M&M’s 
assumptions and dealt with dividends in the presence of the various market 
imperfections. For instance, the signalling theory (Lintner, 1956; Bhattacharya, 1979; 
John and Williams, 1985; Miller and Rock, 1985), agency cost theory (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Rozeff, 1982; Easterbrook, 1984), transaction cost theory (Higgins, 
1972; Fama 1974; Rozeff, 1982; Scholz, 1992), tax-related explanations (Brennan, 
1970; Elton and Gruber, 1970; Litzenberger and Ramaswamy, 1979),  bird-in-the-hand 
hypothesis (Graham and Dodd, 1951; Gordon and Shapiro, 1956; Gordon, 1959; 1963), 
pecking order theory (Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984), residual dividend theory 
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(Saxena, 1999; Lease et al., 2000), catering theory (Baker and Wurgler, 2004a; 2004b) 
and maturity hypothesis (Grullon et al., 2002). 
All these leading dividend policy theories are originally formulated, however, based on 
developed markets. In fact, earlier empirical research on dividend policy, in terms of 
developing theories and empirical tests, focused mainly on the US market, followed by 
the UK market. Therefore, less is known about dividend behaviour and the explanatory 
power of models for other countries, particularly developing (emerging) economies, 
where market imperfections are the norm rather than expectations and much stronger 
than in developed countries. Considering the growing importance of emerging markets 
in terms of global equity investments, these markets have recently started attracting 
considerable attention from international investors. Accordingly, emerging markets add 
more to the dividend puzzle, and researchers have started investigating the dividend 
behaviour of corporations in developing countries (Glen et al., 1995; Adaoglu, 2000).  
Even though the empirical studies in developing markets have contributed relatively 
little evidence compared to developed markets, researchers have nevertheless started 
examining the dividend policy behaviour in emerging economies, especially over the 
past two decades. The firm-specific determinants of dividend policy, in the context of 
developing markets, have been investigated by a number of studies. Aivazian et al. 
(2003b), who are well-known scholars of their research interest in emerging markets, 
investigated the dividend policy behaviour in eight emerging markets (South Korea, 
Malaysia, Zimbabwe, India, Thailand, Turkey, Pakistan and Jordan) and concluded that 
firms in emerging markets somehow follow the same firm-specific determinants (either 
the same or different signs) of dividend policy that are suggested by the developed 
markets. Studies from different developing countries such as Al-Najjar (2009), Kirkulak 
and Kurt (2010), Imran (2011), Mehta (2012) and Kisman (2013) reported evidence 
supporting this conclusion. However, as Aivazian et al. (2003b) stated that due to 
various differences between developed and developing markets, even among those 
developing economies, such as financial systems, ownership structures, laws and 
regulations, their sensitivity to these determinants vary across countries.  
Turkey had a very late start in the liberalisation of its economy and the establishment of 
its stock market, the Istanbul Stock Exchange, whose history only dating back to 1986, 
in comparison to the developed stock exchanges with hundreds of years of historical 
development (Adaoglu, 1999; 2000; Aksu and Kosedag, 2006). A number of studies 
Birkbeck University of London Page 152 
revealed that Turkey is a civil law country (La Porta et al., 1997), where corporate 
ownership structure is characterised by highly concentrated family ownership (Gursoy 
and Aydogan, 1999; Yurtoglu, 2003). It also has a history of poor structural and 
microeconomic policies, as well as a poor culture of corporate governance and 
transparency and disclosure practices (IIF, 2005; Aksu and Kosedag, 2006). With the 
rapid development since the establishment in 1986, the ISE became highly 
representative of a promising emerging market, with fast growth in terms of the number 
of listed firms, trading volume, market capitalisation and foreign investment (Adaoglu, 
2000), as well as indicating high volatility in returns, especially during the period 1990-
2000 (CMB, 2003). During this period, Turkish economy often experienced global 
effects from a number of geopolitical, financial and economic crises; for instance, by 
the Gulf War Crisis in 1991, 1997 Asia Crisis, 1998 Russia Crisis and 2000 Argentina 
Crisis. However, the major financial crisis that strongly affected the ISE was the 
systemic banking crisis that Turkish economy experienced in 2001 (BRSA, 2010), 
which resulted in substantial losses for shareholders, especially small Turkish investors 
who heavily invested in the ISE prior to economic crisis (Adaoglu, 2008). 
Having experienced the series of booms and busts during its liberalisation period of its 
economy, between the late 1980s and the early 2000s, the November 2002 elections 
resulted in a one-party (in other words non-coalition) government, and the political 
uncertainty, to some degree, faded away. The new Turkish government signed a standby 
agreement with the IMF and began to implement major economic programs and 
structural reforms for a better working of the market economy, outward-orientation and 
globalisation, starting March 2003 (CMB, 2003; Adaoglu, 2008; Birol, 2011).  Further, 
Turkey’s progress in achieving full membership of the EU in this period also provided 
the strongest motivation in establishing new reforms, rules and regulations in line with 
the EU directives and best-practice international standards, to improve corporate 
governance and transparency and disclosure practices; therefore, to integrate its 
economy with Europe and to harmonise its institutions with those of the EU (IIF, 2005; 
Aksu and Kosedag, 2006; Rawdanowicz, 2010).   
While examining the dividend policy behaviour in different emerging markets, 
researchers have not clearly stated or distinguished, as suggested by Bekaert and Harvey 
(2002), between the concepts of regulatory liberalisation or integration undertaken in 
those markets for their study sample periods. However, it can be argued that dividend 
policies of companies may significantly differ based on the process of financial 
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liberalisation or integration undertaken in the emerging market in which they operate. 
Accordingly, this doctoral thesis is motivated to carry the dividend debate into an 
emerging market but in a different way to prior research. It examines the dividend 
policy behaviour of a particular emerging market that implemented serious economic 
and structural reforms for the integration with world markets, and attempts to identify 
what behaviour the dividend policy of this emerging market shows thereafter. In this 
respect, Turkey and its stock market, the ISE, offer an ideal setting for the purpose of 
this thesis. It allows a study of the dividend behaviour of an emerging market which 
implemented major reforms, starting with the fiscal year 2003, in compliance with the 
IMF stand-by agreement, the EU directives and best-practice international standards for 
a better working of the economy, outward-orientation and globalisation.  
The transparency and disclosure practices of the ISE firms were not impressive. 
Particularly, the ISE’s financial reporting standards (the Turkish Code of Commerce 
dating back to 1957) were only based on the generally accepted principles of accounting 
and auditing and the concept of full and fair disclosure (Aksu and Kosedag, 2006). 
Although Turkey generally enjoyed an economic growth in 1990s, it was overall an 
economically unstable decade, with the experience of a number of financial crises and 
high inflation rates that surpassed 100% during the decade. Due to the inconsistent and 
unclear accounting practices and the absence of inflation accounting standards, the 
historical financial statements of the ISE firms lost their information value and 
misinformed investors (Ararat and Ugur, 2003; UNCTAD, 2008). However, the need 
for a global set of high-quality financial reporting standards has been especially 
important for developing countries and countries with economies in transition. These 
countries are eager for external capital, as their economies typically grow faster, so 
foreign and domestic investors can verify the underlying profitability of the firm and 
therefore the security of their investment with the help of comparable and consistent 
financial data (Aivazian et al., 2003a; UNCTAD, 2008).  
In this context, the CMB of Turkey attributed great importance to improve 
communications with investors, issuers and other institutions in 2003, to ensure that 
markets are functioning in a safer, more transparent and more efficient manner in 
accordance with regulations that were adopted in harmony with international norms and 
developments (CMB, 2003). Accordingly, one of the most important developments was 
that in line with the EU requirements, the CMB issued the Communiqué Serial: XI, No: 
25 entitled “Accounting Standards in Capital Markets”  in November 2003, adopting 
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International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and enforcing publicly owned and 
traded firms to use new rules. In addition, the CMB obliged the implementation of 
inflation-adjusted accounting at the same time (UNCTAD, 2008). This has resulted in a 
more transparent and more efficient worldwide financial reporting standards, providing 
comparable and consistent financial data for foreign and domestic investors, and other 
institutions. Likewise, the adoption of the IFRS and inflation accounting has given 
researchers a way better opportunity to study firm-specific characteristics of firms in the 
Turkish market.  
Empirical research, in developing markets, has contributed relatively little evidence 
compared to empirical evidence conducted in developed markets. A few empirical 
studies reviewed in Chapter 2 have provided some understanding about the 
determinants of dividend policy in a number of different emerging markets. It can be 
observed; however, very little evidence has emerged from a few studies about firm-
specific determinants of dividend policy in the emerging Turkish market. These are 
subjected to the following criticisms. First, even though they reported evidence from 
eight different emerging markets, Aivazian et al. (2003b) stated that their Turkish data 
includes a limited number of only largest listed companies; therefore, the results 
regarding Turkish market may be biased due to limited sample selection procedures. 
Second, Aivazian et al. (2003b) covered the period 1980-1990, which maybe 
considered as relatively old sample period. Kirkulak and Kurt (2010) examined the 
listed Turkish firms during 1991-2006, which may also imply that the evidence 
regarding the dividend policy of Turkish market may be outdated, and hence one can 
suggest that there is a need for evidence from more recent data. Third, Kirkulak and 
Kurt (2010) considered only a few firm-specific factors (earnings, debt and growth) 
while examining the determinants of dividend policy in Turkey. Even though Aivazian 
et al. (2003b) employed more variables (profitability, size, debt, risk, tangibility and 
growth), there are other potentially important firm-specific determinants (such as 
liquidity, free cash flow and firm age) that may significantly influence the dividend 
decisions of Turkish firms.  
Accordingly, the aim of this chapter is to empirically investigate what firm-specific 
(financial) determinants affect dividend policy decisions of the ISE firms, over a decade 
after Turkey implemented major reforms in the fiscal year 2003. More evidence will 
also be provided regarding this developing economy, by attempting to fill the gaps in 
the literature as pointed out in the above criticisms. This chapter specifically contributes 
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to the dividend literature in the following aspects. First, Turkey offers an ideal setting to 
study the dividend behaviour of an emerging market (a civil law originated country) 
which employed common laws in order to integrate with world markets. Hence, the 
chapter examines how the ISE-listed firms are influenced by the firm-specific 
determinants while setting their dividend policies and whether they follow the same 
firm-specific determinants of dividend policy as suggested by empirical studies from 
developed markets after the implementation of major reforms in 2003. Second, it uses a 
large-scale dataset that covers a more recent long period of time and considers a more 
comprehensive empirical model by estimating the effects of various financial 
determinants on dividend policy. Third, it employs richer research methodologies (the 
pooled and panel logit/probit and tobit regression analyses) and uses alternative 
dividend policy measures (the probability of paying dividends, dividend payout ratio 
and dividend yield). Finally, it attempts to answer the following research questions:  
 
1. What are the most important firm-specific determinants affecting the probability 
of paying dividends of Turkish firms?  
 
2. Do Turkish firms follow the same firm-specific determinants of dividend policy 
as suggested by the developed markets?  
 
3. Are the pooled logit models more favourable in estimating the probability of 
paying dividends of Turkish firms, or are the panel logit models more suitable than the 
pooled models?  
 
4. Are the firm-specific factors determining the probability of paying dividends and 
the intensity of paying dividends of Turkish firms different from each other or the same? 
 
5. Are the tobit regressions results, which are used to estimate the intensity of 
paying dividends of Turkish firms, consistent with the logit regressions results or 
significantly different?  
 
6. Are the pooled tobit models more favourable in estimating the intensity of 
paying dividends of Turkish firms, or the panel tobit models more suitable than the 
pooled models?  
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7. Do the tobit estimations provide the same or different results when the different 
measure of dividend policy, which stands for the intensity of paying dividends of 
Turkish firms, is applied?  
 
8. Is there any significant industry-effect for Turkish firms when industry dummies 
are included in the models?  
 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. The following section 3.2 reviews 
the firm-specific determinants of dividend policy and develops the corresponding 
research hypotheses. The methodology and data are explained in section 3.3. Section 3.4 
presents the empirical results, and section 3.5 summarises the conclusions of this 
chapter of the thesis. 
 
 
3.2 Firm-Specific Determinants of Dividend Policy and Research 
Hypotheses 
This section of the chapter reviews the firm-specific determinants of corporate dividend 
policy, reflecting on various theories and explanations, according to the related dividend 
literature, which might have also been important factors of dividend policy decisions in 
the emerging Turkish market. The section further illustrates the corresponding research 
hypotheses that are developed, based on the selected firm-specific determinants of 
dividend policy.  
3.2.1 Profitability  
The dividend policy literature suggests that firm’s profitability is one of the most 
important determinants affecting dividend policy. Since dividends are usually 
distributed from annual profits, it is argued that profitable firms tend to pay higher 
amounts of dividends. Therefore, a positive relationship is anticipated between firm’s 
profitability and dividend policy. Bhattacharya (1979), Miller and Rock (1985) and 
John and Williams (1985) interpreted large dividend payments as signals of future 
profitability; because, managers have superior information about their firms’ expected 
future profitability than outsiders and if managers are confident about the future 
prospects of their firms, then they distribute larger cash dividends as good signals for 
the investors. Furthermore, although Lintner (1956) and Benartzi et al. (1997) stated 
that dividend payments are used to signal current profitability, rather than future 
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profitability, they reported a positive correlation between profitability and dividends. 
Consequently, the signalling theory of dividend policy supports the argument that 
profitable firms pay larger dividends to signal their good financial performance.  
In fact, a number of studies conducted from different emerging markets (Aivazian et al., 
2003b; Al-Najjar, 2009; Kirkulak and Kurt, 2010 and Imran, 2011) reported evidence 
that there is a strong positive relationship between profitability and dividend payments. 
Similarly, this result is also supported by the residual dividend theory, suggesting that 
more profitable firms have more internally generated funds, and only after all positive 
NPV investments have been undertaken, they will distribute larger dividends than less 
profitable firms (Saxena, 1999; Lease et al., 2000). Moreover, Aivazian et al. (2003b) 
stated that high profitability tends to mean high dividend payments and concluded that 
this evidence also provides strong support for the residual dividend theory. In this 
respect, considering the context of emerging Turkish market, where asymmetric 
information is norm rather than expectations, and much stronger than developed 
markets, it is hypothesised that more profitable Turkish firms pay higher dividends in 
order to signal their good financial performance. Therefore:  
Hypothesis 1:  There is a positive relationship between profitability and the dividend 
payment decisions of Turkish firms.  
3.2.2 Investment Opportunities  
A firm’s funds requirements for investment purposes appear in the literature to 
influence firms’ dividend policy (Higgins, 1972; Fama, 1974). The transaction cost 
theory suggests that with high growth, there is more need for funds to finance 
investments; therefore, the more likely the firm is to preserve earnings for investments 
rather than paying dividends, because external finance is costly. Accordingly, Rozeff 
(1982) hypothesised that the relationship between anticipated investment opportunities 
and dividend payout ratio is negative since firms prefer to avoid transaction costs 
related to external financing. Evidence from various studies (Llyod et al., 1985; 
Schooley and Barney, 1994; Moh’d et al., 1995) supported this notion that firms 
distribute lower dividends when they are experiencing higher growth opportunities, 
because this growth seemingly involves higher investment expenditures. Further, the 
pecking order theory, proposed by Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984), argues 
that firms finance their investment activities according to a hierarchy: first with internal 
funds, second with debt financing and third with equity issuance. In this context, firms 
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with high growth opportunities tend to have high leverage (given that investment 
requires more than the internally generated funds) and these firms should pay out low 
dividends. Hence, the pecking order theory also predicts a negative relationship between 
dividend payments and investment opportunities.  
The negative relationship between dividends and investment opportunities is partially 
supported by the overinvestment hypothesis45 developed by Lang and Litzenberger 
(1989). According to the overinvestment hypothesis, a dividend payout 
increase/decrease by a value-maximising (Q>1) firm merely reflects optimal investment 
decision. However, a substantial increase in dividends by an overinvesting firm (Q<1) is 
a good indicator since it means smaller amount of cash spent on suboptimal 
investments. Contrarily, a mirror argument applies to substantial dividend decreases. In 
this respect, firms’ investment opportunities are negatively correlated with dividend 
payments. 
La Porta et al. (2000), however, stated that the relationship between dividend policy and 
investment opportunities may significantly differ in countries with poor shareholders 
protections. They proposed the substitute model of dividends, arguing that in countries 
with poor shareholders protections, firms have stronger incentives to establish a 
reputation of good treatment of minority shareholders since they come to the external 
capital markets for funds, at least occasionally. As a consequence, the need for 
dividends to establish a reputation is the greatest in such countries, which reduces what 
is left for expropriation. Accordingly, in this view, firms in weaker protection countries 
with better investment opportunity prospects also have stronger incentives to establish 
such reputations; in fact they have a much greater potential need for external finance. 
Therefore, other things being equal, firms with good investment opportunities should 
choose higher dividend payments than those with poor investment opportunities. 
Indeed, Aivazian et al. (2003b), Al-Najjar (2009), Kirkulak and Kurt (2010) and Imran 
(2011) reported a significant positive relationship between investment (growth) 
opportunities and dividend payments from different developing markets, whereas 
Kisman (2013) found a significant negative correlation between investment 
opportunities and dividend policy of Indonesian firms.  
                                                          
45
 Lang and Litzenberger (1989) employ the Tobin’s Q (market-to-book ratio) as a proxy for investment 
opportunity to distinguish between overinvestment (Q<1) and value-maximising (Q>1) firms. They argue 
that a firm with a Q ratio which exceeds 1 is a value-maximising firm, because the market value reflects 
the book value plus the positive NPV of the investment. Using the same rationale, a firm with a Q ratio is 
less than 1 indicates overinvestment, where the managements of those firms are involved in substantial 
free cash flows invested in negative NPV projects.   
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Combining the ideas from the transaction cost theory, pecking order theory, 
overinvestment hypothesis and substitute model of dividends that contradicts prior 
explanations and, due to the mixed evidence reported in different emerging markets by a 
number of studies, the following two competing hypotheses can be formulated:  
 
Hypothesis 2a: There is a negative relationship between investment opportunities and 
the dividend payment decisions of Turkish firms.  
Hypothesis 2b: There is a positive relationship between investment opportunities and 
the dividend payment decisions of Turkish firms.  
3.2.3 Business Risk 
“The higher the risk is, the more likely the firm will be bankrupt and hence the less the 
chance for firms to pay dividends” (Al-Najjar, 2009, p.193). Indeed, the transaction 
costs are directly related to firm’s risk. If a firm has higher operating and financial 
leverage, other things being equal, the firm’s dependence on external financing is 
increased due to the greater volatility in its earnings (Rozeff, 1982). Both these 
operating and financial leverages can be translated into a high total risk of the firm’s 
stock returns. High fixed operating costs or business risks tend to affect the firm’s 
dividend payout (Farinha, 2003). According to Holder et al. (1998), transaction costs of 
new issues in the form of under-writing fees are typically much larger for riskier firms. 
Further, Jensen et al. (1992), Manos (2002), Farinha (2003), Al-Najjar (2009) and 
Mehta (2012) reported a negative relation between business risk and dividend policy, 
which supports the notion that firms that have higher uncertainty about their earnings 
tend to distribute none or lower dividends.  
Emerging markets are characterised by high volatility and high average returns as 
evidenced by research on stock returns in these markets. In this respect, the ISE is 
highly representative of an emerging market since it is a highly volatile market with 
high returns in some years and considerably big losses in a number of occasions since 
the date if its establishment, including the sample period, 2003-2012 (CMB, 2003; 2012 
and Odabasi et al., 2004).  It is therefore hypothesised as below: 
 
Hypothesis 3: There is a negative relationship between business risk and the dividend 
payment decisions of Turkish firms. 
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3.2.4 Debt Policy 
A firm’s debt policy is considered to influence its dividend policy in the related 
literature. Jensen and Meckling (1979), Jensen (1986) and Crutchley and Hansen 
(1989), among many others, argued that debt and dividends are alternative mechanisms 
to control agency costs associated with free cash flow problems, which can be 
controlled by either issuing debt or distributing large dividends. Since they are 
alternative devices to fulfil the same purpose, then debt and dividends are conversely 
related. Moreover, debt implies an increase in both dependency on external financing 
and in the total risk of the firm’s stocks. Therefore, Manos (2002) suggested that debt 
leads to a dependency on external finance, because debt represents the fixed costs that 
firms have to repay, then increasing the need for re-financing. A higher level of debt is 
consequential to a higher level of fees, when external finance is raised. Accordingly, 
firms with high levels of debt tend to maintain their earnings in order to lower external 
financing costs, thus lowering its dividends.  
Aivazian et al. (2003b) reported that higher debt ratios are associated with lower 
dividend payments in emerging markets, suggesting that financial constrains affect 
dividend policy. Similarly, Al-Najjar (2009) in Jordan and Kisman (2013) in Indonesia 
found a significantly negative relationship between firm debt levels and dividend 
policies. Furthermore, Kirkulak and Kurt (2010) presented evidence that debt level has 
no effect on the probability of paying dividends, but significantly influences the 
dividend reductions, since an increased level of debt increases the dividend reductions 
in Turkey. Therefore:  
Hypothesis 4: There is a negative relationship between debt policy and the dividend 
payment decisions of Turkish firms.  
3.2.5 Free Cash Flow 
Jensen (1986) argues that cash dividend payments help control the agent-principal 
conflicts (Agency Problem I) by reducing large amount of excess cash, which he calls 
free cash flow, under managers’ discretion, since managers may act in ways not in the 
shareholders’ best interest. Instead of undertaking positive NPV investment projects 
with this cash, they might overinvest by accepting marginal investment projects with 
negative NPVs. However, substantial cash dividend payments would, all else being 
equal, lessen the amount of free cash flow that managers may misuse and also the scope 
of overinvestment; therefore, increase the market value of the firm. Conversely, a 
Birkbeck University of London Page 161 
dividend decrease would result in undertaking more negative NPV projects and 
decreasing the market value of the firm.  
On the other hand, Shleifer and Vishny (1997), La Porta et al. (1999; 2000) and Faccio 
and Lang (2002) argue that families and other types of blockholders potentially decrease 
Agency Problem I through their better monitoring over managers or direct involvement 
in managements, then they may make less use of dividends. Nevertheless, this can 
exacerbate concerning issues involved the principal-principal conflicts (Agency 
Problem II). When large shareholders gain nearly full control and if they do not 
distribute profits to all shareholders, then they may pay out cash flows for their own use 
or invest in unprofitable projects that provide private benefits for themselves (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1997). As emphasised by La Porta et al. (2000, p.2), “…….failure to 
disgorge cash leads to its diversion or waste, which is detrimental to outside 
shareholders’ interest” and they further suggested that dividends can reduce Agency 
Problem II as they promise a pro-rata payout to all shareholders and remote free cash 
from the controlling shareholders.  
In both cases, free cash flows are correlated with the high possibility of agency 
problems, which implies, if it is the case, higher dividend payments in order to 
overcome these free cash flow problems. Therefore: 
 
Hypothesis 5: There is a positive relationship between free cash flow and the dividend 
payment decisions of Turkish firms.  
3.2.6 Liquidity 
Darling (1957) suggested that a firm’s liquidity is one of the most important 
management goals in maintaining financial manoeuvrability of the firm, which is also 
crucial in determining its dividend policy within the capital budgeting process. Manos 
(2002) argued that liquidity is an inverse proxy for transaction costs and therefore has a 
positive impact on the dividend payments. Similarly, Ho (2003) found that more liquid 
firms, in other words firms with higher cash availability, pay higher dividends than 
others with insufficient cash availability. In fact, all previously mentioned researchers 
reported a positive correlation between liquidity and dividend policy. In view of that, 
higher liquidity indicates positive signals to the market that the firm is able to pay its 
obligations easily and thus involves lower risk of default (Gupta and Parua, 2012).  
Although Al-Najjar (2009), Mehta (2012) and Kisman (2013) reported that liquidity of 
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a firm does not have any effects on its dividend policy, they had predicted that liquidity 
would have a positive effect on the dividend payments. Therefore:  
 
Hypothesis 6: There is a positive relationship between firm liquidity and the dividend 
payment decisions of Turkish firms.  
3.2.7 Tangibility of Assets  
There is evidence provided (Aivazian et al., 2003b; Al-Najjar, 2009) of the role of asset 
tangibility in setting dividend policies of firms in emerging markets. Aivazian et al. 
(2003, p.381) argued that asset tangibility has an inverse relationship with the dividend 
payments, especially in developing economies, and they attempted to explain this 
negative correlation by stating that “A possible explanation for this is that when the 
assets are more tangible, fewer short-term assets are available for banks to lend 
against. This imposes financial constraints on firms operating in more primitive 
financial systems, where the main source of debt is short-term bank financing.” 
Similarly, Al-Najjar (2009, p.193) also reported a negative relationship between 
tangibility of assets and dividend policy in the emerging Jordan market and stated that 
“…..the more the collateralized assets in the firm, the fewer the short-term assets to be 
used as collateral for short-term loans. Therefore, firms will rely on their retained 
earnings, which will reduce the chance to pay dividends.” Hence: 
 
Hypothesis 7: There is a negative relationship between asset tangibility and the 
dividend payment decisions of Turkish firms.  
3.2.8 Firm Age 
A relatively recent explanation of dividends has attempted to link firm age with 
dividend policy. Grullon et al. (2002) proposed an alternative explanation to Jensen’s 
(1986) free cash flow hypothesis, known as the maturity hypothesis,46 which suggests 
that higher dividend increases are a sign of change in a firm’s life cycle, particularly in a 
firm’s transition from growth phase to a more mature phase. Since a firm gets older in 
                                                          
46
 According to this explanation, in a growth stage a firm typically has many positive NPV projects and it 
probably earns large economic profits with high level of capital expenditure. Such firms are likely to be 
left with low free cash flows and experience rapid growth in their earnings. As the firm continues to 
grow, competitors enter the industry and cannibalize the firm’s market share, and eventually reduce the 
firm’s economic profits. In this transition phase, the firm’s investment opportunity begins shrinking, its 
growth becomes slow, capital expenditures decline, and the firm starts generating larger amounts of free 
cash flows. Ultimately, the firm enters into maturity phase in which the return on investments is close to 
the cost of capital and free cash flows are high. Consequently, these mature firms are now able to pay 
higher dividends (Grullon et al., 2002).  
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terms of age, its investment opportunities decline. This leads to slower growth rates, and 
therefore, reduces the fund’s requirements of capital expenditure. However, mature 
firms tend to have steady earnings with high excess to external capital markets and they 
are able to preserve a good level of funds, which allows them to pay higher dividends. 
Based on the above discussion, the following hypothesis is proposed:  
Hypothesis 8: There is a positive relationship between firm age and the dividend 
payment decisions of Turkish firms.  
3.2.9 Firm Size 
A firm’s size is another factor that anticipates describing firm’s dividend policy in 
dividend literature.  This is because firm size can be an important determinant for both 
agency cost and transaction cost arguments. Lloyd et al. (1985) argued that larger firms 
are likely to have more dispersed ownership structures and, in this context, face higher 
potential agency costs. Besides, larger firms are more likely to be mature and have 
easier access to capital markets to raise external finance at lower costs. Hence, the lower 
transaction costs and higher potential for agency problems, suggest a positive 
relationship between firm size and dividend payments as a control mechanism. 
Similarly, Fama and French (2001) observed that growth firms are mostly smaller and 
are likely to find dividend payments more costly, compared to larger firms. Because, the 
costs of external finance are likely to be higher for smaller firms, in comparison to 
larger, well-established firms with much easier access to capital markets. This supports 
the conclusions that firm size is positively related to dividend payout. This positive 
relationship is also reported by Gaver and Gaver (1993), Moh’d et al. (1995), Redding 
(1997) and Farinha (2002).  
Likewise, Al-Najjar (2009), Imran (2011), Mehta (2012) and Kisman (2013) have all 
found that firm size is significantly and positively related to the dividend policies of the 
firms in different developing countries, suggesting that larger firms pay out more 
dividends, compared to smaller-sized firms in emerging markets. This is consistent with 
the prior literature. Therefore, the hypothesis regarding the firm size is as follows:  
Hypothesis 9: There is a positive relationship between firm size and the dividend 
payment decisions of Turkish firms.  
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3.3 Methodology  
The following sub-sections describe the methodology used in this chapter of the 
research. First, the sample data is explained, followed by the variables and the models 
illustrated, which are employed in order to test the research hypotheses.  
3.3.1 Sample Data 
The purpose of this chapter is to empirically investigate what firm-specific determinants 
affect dividend policy decisions of companies after the implementation of major 
economic and structural reforms, starting with the fiscal year 2003 in the emerging 
Turkish market. The data sample is therefore drawn from the Istanbul Stock Exchange 
(ISE) according to the following criteria:  
1. First, all companies listed on the ISE, during the period 2003-2012, are 
considered.  A long panel dataset allows understanding of the determinants of dividend 
policy in a way that cannot be achieved using cross-sectional data.  
 
2.   Second, financial sector (banks, insurers, pension funds, investment trusts) 
companies and utilities (gas, electric, water) are excluded, since they are governed by 
different regulations and follow arguably different investment and dividend polices. 
After these exclusions, a number of all non-financial and non-regulated corporations 
remain.  
 
3.       Accounting and financial data for this research is obtained from DATASTREAM, 
whereas companies’ incorporation dates are compiled from the annual reports published 
in the Public Disclosure Platform of the Istanbul Stock Exchange (KAP) 
(http://kap.gov.tr/en/companies/traded-companies/all-companies.aspx) and companies’ 
official websites. The validity of the data is also cross checked with OSIRIS. The Stock 
Exchange Daily Official List (SEDOL) codes and International Security Identification 
Numbers (ISIN) of the companies are used to match companies between different 
databases.  
 
The sample selection criteria result in a panel dataset of total 264 non-financial and non-
utility companies listed on the ISE during the period 2003-2012, as summarised in 
Panel A in Table 3.1 below. In order to minimise possible survivorship bias, both 
companies that delisted, due to the mergers and acquisitions, business failure or any 
other process leading to delisting, and companies listed in the different times during the 
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period 2003-2012 are all considered and included in the sample. As illustrated by Panel 
B in Table 3.1, the listed companies of the ISE are increasing every year because of the 
new listed firms. Due to the delisted and newly listed companies, the sample is not the 
same for every year but rather it increases during the ten-year period from 2003 to 2012, 
hence this type of panel is called unbalanced panel data.47  
 
Panel C in Table 3.1 presents the distribution of the sampled Turkish companies across 
industries. The sample is classified into 14 different industries based on ICB codes. 
However, the sample has a majority of companies in only four different industries, 
namely personal & household goods, industrial goods & services, construction & 
materials and food & beverage (18.6%, 17.4%, 13.3% and 11.7% respectively), which 
are all making up to 61% of all companies in the sample.  
 
                                                          
47
 The panel data can be a balanced panel that it has all its observations, where the variables are observed 
for each entity and each time period. However, a panel that has some missing values for at least one time 
period for at least one entity is called an unbalanced panel (Stock and Watson, 2003). The methods used 
in this study can be used with both a balanced and an unbalanced panel data. 
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Table 3.1 Selection Criteria and Distributions of the Sample across Time and Industries 
Panel A illustrates criteria for inclusion in the sample of the ISE listed companies. Panel B illustrates the distribution of the final sample 
across time during the period of 2003-2012, whereas Panel C illustrates the distribution of the final sample across industries for which 
relevant data is available from Datastream. ICB code provides Industry Classification Benchmark code for industries.  
 
Panel A 
 
Panel B 
 
Panel C 
  
Selection Criteria for the Sample 
 Distribution of the 
Sample across Time 
 
Distribution of the Sample across Industries 
  
Criterion 
 Number 
of Firms 
 
Years 
 Number 
of Firms 
 
Industry  
ICB 
Code 
Sample 
(%)     
            
All firms listed on the  
380 
 2003  157  Oil & Gas   500 1.5 
ISE during 2003-2012  2004  164  Chemicals  1300 5.7 
    2005  199  Basic Resources  1700 5.7 
Financial Firms  111  2006  211  Construction & Materials  2300 13.3 
Utilities     5  2007  214  Industrial Goods & Services 2700 17.4 
    2008  215  Automobiles & Parts 3300 4.2 
Final Sample  264  2009  218  Food & Beverage 3500 11.7 
(Excluding financials   2010  226  Personal & Household Goods 3700 18.6 
& utilities)   2011  249  Health Care 4500 1.5 
    2012  259  Retail 5300 5.7 
        Media  5500 2.6 
        Travel & Leisure  5700 6.4 
        Telecommunications  6500 0.8 
        Technology  9500 4.9 
            
        Total   100% 
        Number of Firms   264 
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Table 3.2 on the next page, reports the descriptive statistics for the firm’s characteristics 
for the sampled Turkish companies during the period 2003-2012. In order to prevent the 
inflation effect over the period, all aggregate variables are measured in real terms and 
normalised by the consumer price index (CPI) deflator, using 2003 as a base year. The 
CPI deflator data is taken from the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT) 
database.  
Three measures of firm size are illustrated; sales, total capital and market value (on 
average for the entire time period, 812.1 million TL, 505.1 million TL and 656.7 million 
TL respectively), which are all showing an increased pattern with, of course, some 
fluctuations over the period. Furthermore, net income of the sample increased to 69.7 
million TL in 2012 from 33.8 million TL in 2003, whereas cash dividends paid by the 
sampled firms increased to 27.2 million TL in 2012 from 3.9 million TL in 2003. 
However, both net income and cash dividends figures show some major fluctuations 
over the period, as can be observed from the table. When looking at the descriptive 
statistics of the debt level of the sample, it is observed that Turkish firms make about 
25% of debt usage for their capital budgeting on average for the entire time period. The 
debt level is found to be fluctuated around 20% from 2003 to 2007 but it dramatically 
rose to 27.2% in 2008, perhaps reflecting the global financial crisis in 2008. It then 
reached to approximately 30% at the end of the period 2012.  
3.3.2 Variables and Models  
3.3.2.1 Variable Descriptions  
This chapter of the thesis employs two variables to proxy for the dependent variable, 
namely the probability of paying dividends and the intensity of paying dividends. The 
probability of paying dividends is observed as the binary variable, which indicates that 
such a firm did (DPAY=1) or did not (DPAY=0) pay dividends in any given year during 
the period 2003-2012. The intensity of paying dividends (the payout level decisions), 
DPOUT, represents the actual dividend payout ratio made by a firm, which is measured 
as the dividend per share is divided by the earnings per share, in a given year during the 
period 2003-2012. The variable takes a positive value if such a firm paid dividends and 
it takes on a value of zero if the firm did not.  
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Table 3.2 Firm Characteristics for the Sampled Turkish Companies 
Sample includes 264 firms (non-financial and non-utility) listed on the ISE during 2003-2012 for which relevant data is available from Datastream. Sales represent 
annual gross sales and other operating revenue. Total capital represents the total annual investment in the company that is the sum of common equity, preferred 
stocks, minority interest, long-term debt, non-equity reserves and deferred tax liability in untaxed reserves. Market value equals the share price multiplied by the 
number of ordinary shares in issue. Net income represents annual income after all operating and non-operating income and expenses, reserves, income taxes, minority 
interest and extraordinary items. Cash dividends equal the total annual common and preferred dividends paid in cash to shareholders of the firm. Debt level is 
measured annually as total debt divided by total assets of a firm. In order to remove the inflation effect, variables are measured in real terms and normalised by the 
consumer price index (CPI) deflator using 2003 as a base year. The CPI deflator data is taken from the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT) database.  
Years     2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012  Overall 
Number of Firms  157 164 199 211 214 215 218 226 249 259  264 
Sales                 
 Mean (million TL)  463.4 584.8 567.9 688.1 735.6 895.2 848.8 898.5 1,064.1 1,101.6  812.10 
 Median (million TL)  112.4 132.7 115.2 127.0 143.0 138.7 139.5 149.8 174.3 171.6  139.84 
 St. Deviation  1,237.8 1,458.5 1,606.5 1,945.7 2,063.7 2,635.2 2,199.3 2,398.7 3,227.1 3,473.6  2,424.6 
Total Capital                
 Mean (million TL)  293.7 350.0 334.1 377.0 426.5 519.7 567.6 619.4 672.6 707.1  505.13 
 Median (million TL)  71.0 101.8 81.1 89.4 108.0 112.0 121.8 136.5 138.2 137.5  106.47 
 St. Deviation  661.4 738.8 784.0 894.3 1,018.9 1,239.2 1,343.9 1,449.1 1,662.3 1,798.4  1,273.5 
Market Value                
 Mean (million TL)  434.5 397.2 475.6 493.3 676.3 398.4 727.6 948.5 781.8 991.5  656.68 
 Median (million TL)  68.5 88.9 105.4 106.8 125.3 57.5 120.9 174.4 136.3 134.9  100.44 
 St. Deviation  1,389.5 1,157.2 1,284.6 1,349.4 2,313.0 1,534.9 2,188.8 2,503.0 2,285.5 2,765.0  2,028.7 
Net Income                
 Mean (million TL)  33.84 34.38 30.74 41.99 54.46 38.12 45.88 61.19 46.45 69.70  46.98 
 Median (million TL)  5.31 5.56 3.25 5.31 7.89 0.56 3.52 4.70 4.54 5.17  4.56 
 St. Deviation  112.77 103.44 106.10 131.79 166.26 211.62 190.13 217.22 219.89 248.51  184.40 
Cash Dividends                
 Mean (million TL)  3.90 7.24 13.70 15.48 17.75 31.57 23.53 26.71 25.32 27.10  20.30 
 Median (million TL)  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 
 St. Deviation  17.84 31.09 56.53 55.23 64.44 188.91 129.23 129.01 148.52 132.11  114.11 
Debt Level                
 Mean   0.234 0.191 0.201 0.216 0.203 0.272 0.260 0.283 0.294 0.297  0.249 
 Median   0.144 0.119 0.135 0.150 0.121 0.181 0.183 0.183 0.190 0.188  0.159 
 St. Deviation  0.373 0.311 0.296 0.310 0.279 0.423 0.402 0.761 0.762 0.828  0.542 
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The following explanatory variables are used in the multivariate analyses of this part of 
the study. Return on assets, ROA, is adopted to account for the firm’s profitability. 
Following Jensen et al. (1992), Fama and French (2001), Farinha (2003), Ferris et al. 
(2006) and Mehta (2013), it is defined as the ratio of net earnings to total assets 
measured annually in any given year over the period 2003-2012. Further, the proxy 
employed for the firm’s investment opportunities is the firm’s market-to-book ratio 
(M/B), which has often appeared in the literature and used by researchers to reflect 
investment opportunities of the firm (Lang and Litzenberger, 1989; Fama and French, 
2001; Farinha, 2003; Ferris et al., 2006; Aivazian et al., 2003b; Al-Najjar, 2009). Stock 
returns volatility of the firm (RISK), which is calculated as a mean variance of a firm’s 
weekly stock returns over a year for the period 2003-2012, is used to reflect the 
business risk of the sampled firms in line with Manos (2002) and Farinha (2003). The 
variable DEBT, a ratio of total debt to total assets of the firm annually calculated over 
the period 2003-2012, is included as per Jensen et al. (1992), Farinha (2003), Aivazian 
et al. (2003b) and Al-Najjar (2009), to proxy for firms’ debt policy. Following 
arguments by Jensen (1986), Shleifer and Vishny (1997), La Porta et al. (1999; 2000) 
and Faccio and Lang (2002) regarding firms’ free cash flows and agency problems 
associated with them, the variable FCF, which is measured as the ratio of the firm’s free 
cash flow per share for a given year over the period 2003-2012, is implemented.  
The variable LIQ, current ratio (Al-Najjar, 2009; Imran, 2011; Gupta and Parua, 2012; 
Mehta, 2012; Kisman, 2013), measures the firm’s liquidity, whether such a firm can 
easily pay its obligations, and, if so faces a lower risk of default. It is defined as the ratio 
of the firm’s current ratio, in other words the current assets divided by current liabilities, 
in a given year over the period 2003-2012. Moreover, the tangibility of a firm’s assets 
(TANG) is defined as the fixed assets of a firm divided by its total assets, which is 
consistent with prior studies (Aivazian et al., 2003b; Ho, 2003 and Al-Najjar, 2009). 
Firm age, AGE, is adopted in the same manner of studies including Setia-Atmaja et al. 
(2009), Schmid et al. (2010) and Wei et al. (2011) and is measured as the natural 
logarithm of the total number of years since the firm’s incorporation date, until a given 
year over the period 2003-2012. Furthermore, firm size proxy, SIZE, is measured as the 
natural logarithm of the CPI adjusted market capitalisation of the firm in a given year, 
during the period 2003-2012 (Farinha, 2003; Ho, 2003 and Kisman, 2013).  
In addition, since the sample covers a relatively long time period, year dummies 
(YEAR) are added in all regression models to control for unobserved time-varying 
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factors effect, such as the regulatory changes, stages of the economic cycle, and 
macroeconomic dynamics, on dividend policy (Chen et al., 2005; Setia-Atmaja et al., 
2009; Wei et al., 2011). The importance of industrial classification to the dividend 
policy has been argued, because firms in different industries may work under different 
set of regulations and often have different levels of risk and growth potential (Baker et 
al., 1985 and Moh’d et al., 1995). Considering the sample is drawn from 14 different 
industries, industry dummies (INDUSTRY) are employed to detect whether there is any 
significant industry effect for Turkish firms. Table 3.3 demonstrates the summary 
descriptions of the research variables used in the empirical analyses. 
Table 3.3 Variables and Definitions 
The table shows the research variables, proxy for the dividend policy and determinants of dividend 
policy, their symbols and definitions used in the multivariate analyses of this chapter of the study.  
 
Variables   Symbols  Definitions  
Dependent Variables  
       
Probability of Paying 
Dividends  
DPAY 
 A binary variable, which equals to 1 if firm i pays 
dividends at year t during the period 2003-2012, and 
0 otherwise. 
 
 
Dividend Payout Ratio 
 
 
DPOUT 
 
 
 
The ratio of dividend per share to earnings per share 
of firm i at year t during the period 2003-2012. 
 
 
Independent Variables  
Return on Assets  ROA 
 
 
The ratio of net earnings to total assets of firm i at 
year t over the period 2003-2012.  
 
Market-to-book Value  
 
M/B 
 
 
The market-to-book value ratio of firm i at year t over 
the period 2003-2012.   
 
Business Risk  
 
RISK 
 
 
Stock returns volatility, the mean variance of firm i at 
year t over the period 2003-2012.   
 
Debt Policy  
 
DEBT 
 
 
The ratio of total debt to total assets of firm i at year t 
over the period 2003-2012.   
 
Free Cash Flow  
 
FCF 
 
 
Free cash flow per share of firm i at year t over the 
period 2003-2012.  
 
Liquidity  
 
LIQ 
 
 
The current ratio, measured as current assets dividend 
by current liabilities, of firm i at year t over the period 
2003-2012. 
 
 
Tangibility of Assets  
 
TANG 
 
 
The ratio of fixed assets to total assets of firms i at 
year t over the period 2003-2012.  
 
Firm Age  
 
AGE 
 
 
The natural logarithm of the total number of years 
since the firm i’s incorporation date until year t over 
the period 2003-2012.  
 
 
Firm Size  
 
SIZE 
 
 
The natural logarithm of the inflation (CPI) adjusted 
market capitalisation of firm i at year t over the year 
2003-2012.   
 
 
Time Effect  
 
YEAR 
 
 
Yearly dummies for the years from 2003 to 2012, 
which take a value of 1 for the specific year and 0 
otherwise.  
 
Industry Effect  
 
INDUSTRY 
 
 
Industry dummies using 14 different industry 
classifications of the firms, according to Datastream’s 
Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) codes.  
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3.3.2.2 Research Design and Models  
The research is aimed to provide an empirical examination on the firm-specific 
determinants, affecting dividend policy decisions in the emerging Turkish market, by 
creating a large-scale panel dataset that covers a relatively recent long time period. 
Accordingly, the research sample contains a panel dataset of 264 non-financial and non-
utility companies listed on the ISE over a ten-year period of 2003-2012.  
The panel data can be balanced panel in that it has all its observations, where the 
variables are observed for each entity and each time period. However, a panel that has 
missing values for at least one time period, for at least one entity, is called an 
unbalanced panel (Stock and Watson, 2003). Due to missing observations, because of 
newly listed and delisted companies, the study sample is not the same for every year 
during the period 2003-2012, and therefore the study provides an unbalanced panel data 
set for the relevant period. It should be noted that employing a long panel dataset allows 
understanding of dividends policy in a way that cannot be achieved using cross-
sectional or time-series data.48
 
This chapter uses pooled and panel logit and tobit regressions in its multivariate 
analyses to test the research hypotheses, constructed from prior literature, regarding 
firm-specific determinants of dividend policy in Turkey. The nature of the dependent 
variable defines the appropriate estimation method. Furthermore, one-year lag values of 
independent variables are used in all estimations of this chapter, in order to mitigate the 
problem of endogeneity. In simultaneous equation models, the endogeneity problem 
may occur in two ways. First is the reverse causality, which means that the dependent 
variable (Y) might impact the one or more independent variables (Xk’s) instead of 
                                                          
48
 Panel data may be also called as pooled data, pooling of time series and cross-sectional observations, or 
longitudinal data, a study over a time of variable or group of subjects (Hsiao, 1986 and Gujarati, 2003). 
The analysis of panel data is the focus of the one of the most dynamic and innovative bodies of literature 
in economies since panel data provide such a rich environment for the development of estimation 
methods and theoretical results (Greene, 2003).  
 
Baltagi (2002) states the following advantages of using panel data over cross-section or time series data:  
 
1. The techniques of panel data consider heterogeneity explicitly by taking individual-specific variables 
into account.  
 
2. By combining both cross-sectional and time series observations, panel data offer more information, 
more variability and less collinearity among variables. 
 
3. By studying the repeated cross-sectional of observations, panel data are more suitable to study the 
dynamics of change and it enables to study more complicated behavioural models. 
 
4. Panel data sets are better able to discover and estimate effects that cannot simply be detected in pure 
cross-sections or pure time-series data.  
 
5. Panel data can help to minimise the bias that might occur if firms are aggregated into broad 
aggregates. 
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independent variables have impacts on the dependent variable. The other reason is that 
the correlation of independent variables with the error term, Corr (Xk, Ɛi) ≠ 0 (Gujarati, 
2003; Wooldridge, 2010). However, using the lag values of independent variables helps 
prevent both these problems, since the current dependent variable does not impact the 
lag values of independent variables, and the lag values of independent variables may 
naturally highly correlated with the current independent variables, but not with the 
current error term (Ozdemir, 2014). Accordingly, one-year lagged values of 
independent variables are used in all estimations to prevent the endogeneity problems 
consistent with the econometric point of view (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; 
Abdullah, 2007; Yoshikawa and Rasheed, 2010; Ozdemir, 2014). 
When the dependent variable is the probability of paying dividends, which is a binary 
variable that equals to 1 if a firm pays dividends and zero otherwise, logit estimations49 
are appropriate (Greene, 2003). Accordingly, the following logit models, where the 
dependent variable (DPAY) is the binary variable and the independent variables have 
the same previous definitions, are developed:  
Model 1:    Logit (DPAY)i,t = α + β1ROAi,t-1 + β2M/Bi,t-1 + β3RISKi,t-1 + β4DEBTi,t-1 + 
β5FCFi,t-1 + β6LIQi,t-1 + β7TANGi,t-1 + β8AGEi,t-1 + β9SIZEi,t-1 +       βtYEARi,t  + Ɛi,t-1 
Next, INDUSTRY variable, which represents industry dummies, is included in the 
regression model in order to control for the impact of different industries, as follows:  
                                                          
49
 If the dependent variable is binary variable, which takes value of 0 or 1, the logit estimation can be 
employed. The logit model uses the logistic distribution and assumes that the response probability, which 
can be presented as follows:  
 
 
 
Where Xi
Tβ is a matrix of unknown parameters and the equation above demonstrates the logistic 
distribution function. Xi
Tβ varies from -∞ to +∞, Pi takes the values of 0 or 1. Furthermore, Pi is nonlinear 
related to Xi
Tβ. If Pi is the probability of a firm to pay dividends, then (1- Pi) is the probability of not 
paying dividends and expressed as:  
 
 
 
We know that  Pi /(1-Pi) is the odds ratio in favour of paying dividends, in other words the ratio of the 
probability of a firm to pay dividends to the probability of it to not pay dividends. When taking the 
natural log if this ratio Li = ln (Pi /1-Pi ) = Xi
Tβ, where Li is called the logit, and therefore this model is 
called the logit model. In order to estimate the model, the following equation is used (Gujarati, 2003):  
 
 
 
Where, the dependent variable is dummy variable that takes 1 or zero, Xi
T
 is a matrix of independent 
variables and Ɛi is the error term.  
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Model 2:    Logit (DPAY)i,t = α + β1ROAi,t-1 + β2M/Bi,t-1 + β3RISKi,t-1 + β4DEBTi,t-1 + 
β5FCFi,t-1 + β6LIQi,t-1 + β7TANGi,t-1 + β8AGEi,t-1 + β9SIZEi,t-1 +       βtYEARi,t + 
      βj INDUSTRYj,i,t  +  Ɛi,t-1 
Furthermore, this chapter also uses a continuous dependent variable, dividend payout 
ratio that is denoted as DPOUT, to indentify the most important determinants while 
Turkish firms set their actual level of payout ratios, and hence to provide more robust 
empirical results. When the dependent variable is the intensity of paying dividends, 
which is left censored at zero, and the distribution of the sample is a mixture of discrete 
and continuous variables, a tobit estimation50 is appropriate (Greene, 2003). 
Accordingly, the corresponding tobit models are constructed as below:  
Model 1:    Tobit (DPOUT)i,t = α + β1ROAi,t-1 + β2M/Bi,t-1 + β3RISKi,t-1 + β4DEBTi,t-1 + 
β5FCFi,t-1 + β6LIQi,t-1 + β7TANGi,t-1 + β8AGEi,t-1 + β9SIZEi,t-1 +       βtYEARi,t +  Ɛi,t-1 
When the INDUSTRY variable is added into the model:  
Model 2:   Tobit (DPOUT)i,t = α + β1ROAi,t-1 + β2M/Bi,t-1 + β3RISKi,t-1 + β4DEBTi,t-1 + 
β5FCFi,t-1 + β6LIQi,t-1 + β7TANGi,t-1 + β8AGEi,t-1 + β9SIZEi,t-1 +       βtYEARi,t + 
      βj INDUSTRYj,i,t  +  Ɛi,t-1 
                                                          
50
 A tobit model can be applicable where a dependent variable is censored within certain ranges (Greene, 
2003; Wooldridge, 2010). In the case of dividend modelling in this study, the dependant variable 
(dividend payout ratio) is bounded at zero; there is no implicit continuum of the dependent variable below 
0 if none dividends distributed. Otherwise, it is always non-zero, in other words taking positive values. 
Therefore, the study employs the tobit model as follows: 
 
 
 
              0                                       if yi* ≤0         
 yi    
              βxi + ui, ui ~ N (0, σ2)       if yi* > 0  
 
In the model, the data are censored at zero, T = 0 and the likelihood function for the censored normal 
distribution of dividend per share is:  
 
 
 
Setting T = 0 and parameterizing μ as Xiβ provides the likelihood function for the tobit model. Hence:  
 
 
 
The tobit model has the log-likelihood function, which is made up of two parts. The first part estimates 
the classical regression for the uncensored observations, whereas the second part estimates the relevant 
probabilty that an observation is censored (Greene, 2003; Wooldridge, 2010) as presentes below:  
 
 
 
When the dividend payout ratio of the firm is used a dependent variable, which is left censored at zero, 
then the tobit model is more favourable than the ordinary least squares appraoch related to our data 
characteristics.  
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3.3.2.3 Descriptive Statistics of the Variables  
Table 3.4 below presents the descriptive statistics (mean, median, standard deviation, 
maximum and minimum values, skewness and kurtosis) for the research variables used 
in the multivariate analyses of this chapter of the study. The panel dataset (unbalanced) 
includes 264 Turkish firms (non-financial and non-utility) listed on the Istanbul Stock 
Exchange (ISE) with 2,112 firm-year observations51 over the period 2003-2012.  
Table 3.4 Descriptive Statistics of the Research Variables 
The table reports the descriptive statistics for the research variables used in the multivariate 
analyses of this part of the study. The unbalanced panel dataset includes 264 firms (non-financial 
& non-utility) listed on the ISE with 2,112 firm-year observations over the period 2003-2012.  
 
Variables  Mean Median S.D. Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
 
 
DPAY 0.339 0.000 0.473 0.000 1.000 0.682 1.465 
 
 
DPOUT 0.243 0.000 0.911 0.000 21.05 14.34 287.9 
 
 
ROA 0.021 0.030 0.185 -5.120 1.059 -11.41 295.9 
 
 
M/B 1.508 1.162 1.322 0.284 18.66 5.304 43.01 
 
 
RISK 0.457 0.420 0.196   0.017 2.868 2.746 22.96 
 
 
DEBT 0.249 0.158 0.542 0.000 10.76 12.77 221.2 
 
 
FCF 0.078 0.042 1.340 -19.18 13.58 -0.683 45.15 
 
LIQ 3.014 1.561 9.099 0.005 263.6 16.49 378.0 
 
TANG 0.490 0.497 0.215 0.001 0.991 -0.068 2.390 
 
AGE 3.445 3.555 0.499 1.098 4.477 -1.002 4.296 
 
SIZE 4.863 4.704 1.712 0.513 10.16 0.427 2.792 
        
 
At first glance, the mean of DPAY is 0.339, indicating that in almost 34 % of the total 
2,112 firm-year observations; Turkish firms paid dividends, whereas in the rest of the 
66% of the total observations, they did not.  On average, DPOUT reveals that the 
sampled Turkish firms had the dividend payout ratio of 24.3% over the entire period.  
Furthermore, the statistics (DEBT and ROA) report that on average firms make about 
25% debt financing in their capital structure and had only approximately 2% of the 
returns on their total assets invested over the period. LIQ variable demonstrates a high 
mean current ratio of 3:1, which suggests that Turkish firms are on average capable of 
paying their obligations. Moreover, the descriptive statistics of the other variables can 
be observed from the table.  
                                                          
51
 Each research variable has 2,112 firm-year observations, except dividend payout ratio (DPOUT), which 
has 2,066 firm-year observations.  When the firm makes losses, its earnings per share becomes negative 
and although that firm pays some amount of dividends, its dividend payout ratio will be negative since 
payout ratio is calculated as dividend per share divided by earnings per share. However, a firm’s dividend 
payout ratio cannot be negative; therefore such observations are excluded while measuring the DPOUT 
variable.  
Birkbeck University of London Page 175 
3.3.2.4 Correlation Matrix and VIF Values of the Independent Variables  
Table 3.5 demonstrates the correlation matrix and the Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) 
of the independent variables included in the multivariate analyses.  
Table 3.5 Correlation Matrix & VIF Values of Independent Variables 
 
 
 
ROA 
 
M/B 
 
RISK 
 
DEBT 
 
FCF 
 
LIQ 
   
  TANG 
 
AGE 
 
SIZE 
 
VIF 
 
1/VIF 
 
 
ROA 
  
1.000         
 
1.56 
 
0.641 
 
 
M/B 
 
-0.144 
  
1.000        
 
1.51 
 
0.662 
 
 
RISK 
 
-0.132 
  
0.171 
 
 1.000       
 
1.14 
 
0.877 
 
 
DEBT 
 
-0.498 
 
 0.458 
  
 0.073 
 
1.000      
 
1.77 
 
0.565 
 
 
FCF 
  
0.276 
   
 - 0.042 
   
  -0.027 
 
-0.104 
 
1.000     
 
1.09 
 
0.917 
 
 
LIQ 
 
 0.111 
 
0.052 
   
  -0.012 
 
-0.093 
 
0.056 
 
1.000    
 
1.03 
 
0.970 
 
 
TANG 
 
-0.145 
   
-0.000 
 
0.024 
 
0.082 
 
-0.111 
 
-0.058 
 
1.000   
 
1.06 
 
0.943 
 
 
AGE 
 
-0.005 
   
-0.091 
   
  -0.071 
  
0.035 
 
0.044 
 
-0.049 
 
0.088 
 
1.000  
 
1.06 
 
0.943 
 
 
SIZE 
  
 0.301 
  
0.152 
   
  -0.247 
 
-0.157 
 
0.103 
 
0.011 
 
0.094 
 
0.146 
 
1.000 
 
1.03 
 
0.970 
 
 
Although a few variables are moderately correlated, there does not appear to be high 
correlation between any two of the variables.  Furthermore, to determine more directly 
if multicollinearity exists between independent variables, the VIF statistics are used. As 
a rule of thumb, the values of VIF larger than 10 are generally regarded as suggesting 
multicollinearity. Tolerance, calculated as 1/VIF, is also used to check the degree of 
multicollinearity; if a tolerance value is lower than 0.1, corresponding to a VIF value of 
10, it implies multicollinearity. As reported in the table, none of the VIF values exceed 
10, nor the tolerance values smaller than 0.1, the results therefore suggest that there is 
no multicollinearity. 
 
3.4 Empirical Results  
The effects of firm-specific factors on dividend policy in Turkey are analysed in two 
steps: (1) decisions to pay or not to pay and (2) how much dividends to pay. The nature 
of the dependent variable defines the appropriate estimation method. When the 
dependent variable is the probability of paying dividends, which is a binary variable that 
equals to 1 if a firm pays dividends and zero otherwise, logit estimations are used. 
When the dependent variable is the intensity of paying dividends, which is left censored 
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at zero, and the distribution of the sample is a mixture of discrete and continuous 
variables, tobit estimations are employed.  
In order to provide further interpretations of the estimation coefficients, the marginal 
effects of the independent variables in logit and tobit models are also calculated. The 
marginal effects show the marginal impact of each independent variable on the 
dependent variable at the mean values of other independent variables.52 The marginal 
effects are provided in the same tables next to the coefficient estimations columns for 
each regression models, illustrating the marginal effects of the independent variables on 
the probability of paying dividends (in logit models), as well as showing their marginal 
influences on setting the actual level of payout ratios (in the tobit models). The results 
of the logit and tobit estimates are summarised in Table 3.6 and Table 3.7 respectively. 
Also, in order to control for heteroscadasticity, the pooled models are tested using 
White’s corrected hetereoscadasticity robust regressions. Hence, the models in this 
chapter do not suffer from heteroscadasticity. This section reports and discusses the 
results of the empirical analyses.  
3.4.1 Results of the Logit Estimations  
Table 3.6 on the next page reports the results of logit estimations53 on the probability of 
Turkish firms to pay dividends based on 1,846 firm-year observations from 264 ISE-
listed firms over the period 2003-2012. The dependent variable is a binary variable 
taking 1 if the firm pays dividends and 0 otherwise. Whereas Model 1 includes the set 
of all independent variables that are employed according to research hypotheses as 
previously explained, and Model 2 expands the regression model by adding industry 
dummies (INDUSTRY) to control for different industry classifications effect of the 
sample.  
 
                                                          
52
 Marginal Effects at the Means (MEMs) are computed by setting the values of independent variables 
(X) at their means, and then seeing the effect of a one-unit change in one of the independent variables 
(Xk) on the dependent variable, P(Y=1). For categorical variables, the effects of discrete changes are 
computed; the marginal effects for categorical variables show how P(Y=1) is predicted to change as Xk 
changes from 0 to 1, holding all other independent variables at their means. This can be quite useful, 
informative, and easy to understand. For continuous independent variables, the marginal effect measures 
the instantaneous rate of change. If the instantaneous rate of change is similar to the change in P(Y=1) as 
Xk increases by one unit while holding all other X variables at their means, this too can be quite useful 
and informative (Long, 1997; Long and Freese, 2006).  
 
53
 It is worth noting that this chapter of the study also employs probit estimations on the probability of 
paying dividends. The corresponding pooled and panel (random effects) probit models provide very 
similar findings with the logit estimations. The results are reported in Table 3.10 in Appendix II.  
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Table 3.6 Results of the Logit Estimations on Probability of Paying Dividends 
Model Variables  
PANEL A: Pooled Logit PANEL B: Random Effects Logit 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Dependent Variable:  Cash Dividends Paid (0/1) Cash Dividends Paid (0/1) Cash Dividends Paid (0/1) Cash Dividends Paid (0/1) 
Independent Variables:  
Coefficient 
Estimates 
Marginal 
Effects 
Coefficient 
Estimates 
Marginal 
Effects 
Coefficient 
Estimates 
Marginal 
Effects 
Coefficient 
Estimates 
Marginal 
Effects 
ROA 
9.7822*** 
(8.11) 
1.7237*** 
(8.52) 
10.335*** 
(8.51) 
1.7231*** 
(9.27) 
11.442*** 
(7.66) 
1.1173*** 
(8.29) 
11.486*** 
(7.76) 
1.1043*** 
(8.32) 
M/B 
-0.1316* 
(-1.72) 
-0.0231* 
(-1.74) 
-0.1722** 
(-2.00) 
-0.0287** 
(-2.04) 
-0.3532*** 
(-2.92) 
-0.0344*** 
(-2.97) 
-0.3572*** 
(-2.94) 
-0.0343*** 
(-2.99) 
RISK 
-2.1788*** 
(-3.28) 
-0.3839*** 
(-3.38) 
-1.7869*** 
(-2.65) 
-0.2979*** 
(-2.71) 
-0.9195 
(-1.34) 
-0.0897 
(-1.35) 
-0.7864 
(-1.16) 
-0.0756 
(-1.16) 
DEBT 
-2.6984*** 
(-8.07) 
-0.4755*** 
(-8.69) 
-2.5176*** 
(-6.74) 
-0.4197*** 
(-7.29) 
-4.1406*** 
(-5.00) 
-0.4043*** 
(-5.04) 
-3.9045*** 
(-4.82) 
-0.3753*** 
(-4.91) 
FCF 
0.0745 
(1.38) 
0.0131 
(1.38) 
0.0695 
(1.37) 
0.0116 
(1.36) 
0.0773 
(0.99) 
0.0075 
(0.99) 
0.0813 
(1.05) 
0.0078 
(1.05) 
LIQ 
0.0070 
(1.52) 
0.0012 
(1.52) 
0.0140** 
(2.44) 
0.0023** 
(2.47) 
0.0044 
(0.35) 
0.0004 
(0.35) 
0.0058 
(0.46) 
0.0005 
(0.46) 
TANG 
-0.2556 
(-0.80) 
-0.0432 
(-0.80) 
-0.1407 
(-0.43) 
-0.0234 
(-0.43) 
-0.7583 
(-0.98) 
-0.0740 
(-0.98) 
-0.4694 
(-0.59) 
-0.0451 
(-0.59) 
AGE 
0.4827*** 
(3.46) 
0.0850*** 
(3.47) 
0.4536*** 
(3.26) 
0.0756*** 
(3.26) 
0.8141** 
(2.20) 
0.0795** 
(2.23) 
0.7665* 
(1.93) 
0.0736* 
(1.95) 
SIZE 
0.6480*** 
(13.62) 
0.1141*** 
(12.80) 
0.6869*** 
(12.86) 
0.1145*** 
(12.47) 
1.1582*** 
(8.65) 
0.1131*** 
(12.20) 
1.1052*** 
(7.84) 
0.1062*** 
(9.70) 
Constant  
-4.4080*** 
(-6.40) 
 
-3.9670*** 
(-5.83) 
 
-8.6138*** 
(-5.33) 
 
-7.2745*** 
(-4.78) 
 
YEAR Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
INDUSTRY  - - Yes  Yes  - - Yes  Yes   
Number of Observations 1,846 1,846 1,846 1,846 1,846 1,846 1,846 1,846 
Wald X2 409.70***  418.14***  196.46***  198.06***  
Pseudo R2  36.32%  37.92%  -  -  
Rho Value      0.6343  0.6148  
Likelihood Ratio Test     311.84***  268.41***  
                      
                        The table reports the logit estimations and z-statistics in the parentheses. ***, ** and * stand for significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
                        Independent variables are one-year lagged. The pooled models are tested using White’s corrected heteroscadasticity robust regressions.  
Birkbeck University of London Page 178 
In order to identify the most important financial determinants that influence the 
probability of paying dividends in the emerging Turkish market, pooled and panel 
(random effects) logit regressions estimations are applied. It is argued that a random 
effects logit (panel) model, which uses both within and between (group) possible 
variations, is more favourable than a pooled logit model (ignoring the firms effects) in 
its estimating power, since it allows the derivation of more efficient estimators 
(Gujarati, 2003). Therefore, both types of models are employed to find out whether they 
provide similar or significantly different results, and more importantly, to identify 
which one is more favourable in order to investigate the dividend puzzle in the context 
of developing Turkish economy. Accordingly, Panel A in Table 3.6 in the previous page 
displays the results of pooled logit estimation coefficients and marginal effects, whereas 
Panel B in the same table shows the results of random effects (panel) logit estimation 
coefficients and marginal effects of the independent variables on the probability of 
paying dividends for Model 1 and Model 2. The following conclusions can be drawn 
from the table.  
1. When Model 1 and Model 2 are estimated by the pooled logit regressions, they 
are overall statistically significant at the 1% level as evidence by the Wald X
2 
tests. 
Also, the Pseudo R
2 
values for the models (36.32% and 37.92% respectively) suggest a 
good indication as to the prediction power of the models. Similarly, the random effects 
logit (panel) regressions estimate that the models (1 and 2) are also, overall, statistically 
significant at the 1% level as reported by the Wald X
2
 tests. Further, the Likelihood-
ratio tests are statistically significant at the 1% for both Model 1 and 2, indicating that 
the proportion of the total variance, contributed by the panel-level variance component, 
rho, values54 are significantly different from zero (0.6343 and 0.6148 respectively). 
Therefore, this suggests that panel models are more favourable than pooled models. 
Hence, the following results are reported based on the random effects logit models 
(Panel B).   
                                                          
54
 A likelihood-ratio test formally compares the panel estimator with the pooled estimator for probit, logit 
and tobit models. As a rule of thumb, when rho, also known as the intraclass correlation coefficient, 
which is the proportion contribution to the total variance of the panel-level components, is zero, then the 
panel-level variance component is not important; therefore, the panel estimator is not different from the 
pooled estimator.  
 
H0 : Ѳ  = 0 
H1 : Ѳ ≠ 0 
 
Where, the null hypothesis is that rho is zero, in other words no significant panel effect. This means the 
null hypothesis states that the pooled probit/logit/tobit is more appropriate rather than the random effects 
probit/logit/tobit model, if it holds true. However, if the null hypothesis is rejected, that means that there 
is a significant panel effect and the random effects model is appropriate (Frain, 2008; Cameron and 
Trivedi, 2010).  
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2. The probability of a Turkish firm paying dividends is significantly and 
positively affected by the ROA variable (profitability). The coefficients of the variable 
are statistically significant and positive at the 1% level in both Model 1 and Model 2 
(when the industry effect is controlled). Moreover, the results of the marginal effects of 
ROA show that it has the largest impact on the probability of paying dividends among 
all the significant variables. The marginal effects of this variable are found to be 
positively significant at the 1% level in the models (+1.1173 and +1.1043 when the 
industry dummies are included), illustrating that one unit of increase in ROA will 
increase the probability of a Turkish firm to pay dividends by about 100% for an 
average firm. Therefore, this result is consistent with the signalling theory of dividend 
policy, arguing that profitable firms are more likely to pay dividends to signal their 
good financial performance (Lintner, 1956; Bhattacharya, 1979; Miller and Rock, 1985; 
John and Williams, 1985; Benartzi et al., 1997). Similarly, Aivazian et al. (2003b) from 
eight different emerging markets, Al-Najjar (2009) from Jordan, Kirkulak and Kurt 
(2010) from Turkey and Imran (2011) from Pakistan reported evidence that there is a 
strong positive relationship between profitability and dividend payments. Moreover, 
Aivazian et al. (2003b) stated that high profitability tends to mean high dividend 
payments, and they concluded that this evidence also provides strong support for the 
residual dividend theory. Since more profitable firms have more internally generated 
funds, only after all positive NPV investments have been undertaken, they are more 
likely to distribute cash dividends than less profitable firms (Saxena, 1999; Lease et al., 
2000).  
 
3. The probability of a Turkish firm paying dividends is significantly and 
negatively affected by the M/B variable (investment opportunities). The coefficients of 
the variable are statistically significant and negative at the 1% level in both Model 1 and 
Model 2 (when the industry effect is controlled). Moreover, the marginal effects of this 
variable are found to be significantly negative at the 1% level in the models (-0.0344 
and -0.0343 when the industry dummies are included), implying that one unit of 
increase in M/B will decrease the probability of a Turkish firm to pay dividends by 
about 3.4% for an average firm. Accordingly, this finding is consistent with the prior 
literature from developed markets, arguing that the higher the investment opportunities, 
the more need for funds to finance investments, therefore the more likely the firm is to 
preserve earnings for investments rather than paying dividends, by the transaction costs 
theory (Rozeff, 1982; Llyod et al. 1985; Schooley and Barney, 1994; Moh’d et al., 
1995), pecking order theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984) and overinvestment hypothesis 
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(Lang and Litzenberger, 1989). Likewise, Kisman (2013) found a significant negative 
correlation between investment opportunity and dividend policy in the emerging 
Indonesian market. 
 
4. The probability of a Turkish firm paying dividends is statistically and negatively 
affected by the DEBT variable (debt policy). The coefficients of the variable are 
statistically significant and negative at the 1% level in both Model 1 and Model 2 (when 
the industry effect is controlled). Furthermore, the results of the marginal effects of 
DEBT display that it has the second largest impact on the probability of paying 
dividends among all the significant variables. The marginal effects of this variable are 
found to be negatively significant at the 1% level in the models (-0.4043 and -0.3753 
when the industry dummies are included), revealing that one unit of increase in DEBT 
will decrease the probability of a Turkish firms to pay dividends by around 40% and 
37.5% if the industry effect is controlled for an average firm. Hence, this evidence is 
consistent with the notion that debt and dividends are alternative mechanisms to control 
agency costs associated with the free cash flow problems, and since they are alternative 
devices to fulfil the same purpose, debt and dividends are conversely related (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1979; Jensen, 1986; Crutchley and Hansen, 1989). Further, the evidence 
is also consistent with studies including Aivazian et al. (2003b), who reported that 
higher debt ratios consequence none or lower dividend payments in emerging markets, 
Al-Najjar (2009) in Jordan and Kisman (2013) in Indonesia, who found a significantly 
negative relationship between firm debt levels and dividend policies. Similarly, 
Kirkulak and Kurt (2010) presented evidence that debt level significantly influences the 
dividend reductions since an increased level of debt increases the dividend reductions in 
Turkey. 
 
5. The probability of a Turkish firm paying dividends is significantly and 
positively affected by the AGE variable (firm age). The coefficients of the variable are 
statistically significant and positive at the 5% level in Model 1 but only at the 10% level 
in Model 2, when the industry effect is controlled. Further, the marginal effects of AGE 
are also found to be positively significant at the 5% level in Model 1, but only 
significant at the 10% level in Model 2 (+0.0795 and +0.0736 respectively), suggesting 
that one unit of increase in AGE will increase the probability of a Turkish firm to pay 
dividends by about 7-8% for an average firm. Accordingly, this result is consistent with 
the maturity hypothesis proposed by Grullon et al. (2002), arguing that since a firm gets 
older in terms of age, its investment opportunities decline, which leads to slower growth 
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rates and therefore reducing the fund’s requirements of capital expenditure. Hence, 
mature firms tend to have steady earnings with high excess to external capital markets 
and they are able to preserve a good level of funds, which allow them to pay higher 
dividends.  
 
6. The probability of a Turkish firm paying dividends is statistically and positively 
affected by the SIZE variable (firm size). The coefficients of the variable are highly 
significant and positive at the 1% level in both Model 1 and Model 2 (when the industry 
effect is controlled). Moreover, the marginal effects of SIZE are also found to be 
positively significant at the 1% level in the models (+0.1131 and +0.1062 when the 
industry dummies are added), indicating that one unit of increase in SIZE will increase 
the probability of a Turkish firm to pay dividends by approximately 11% for an average 
firm. This result is supported by the agency costs and transactions costs theory of 
dividends (Lloyd et al., 1985; Gaver and Gaver, 1993; Moh’d et al., 1995; Redding, 
1997; Fama and French, 2001; Farinha, 2002), suggesting a positive relationship 
between firm size and dividend policy as a control mechanism. Similarly, the evidence 
is also consistent with studies, including Al-Najjar (2009), Imran (2011), Mehta (2012) 
and Kisman (2013), which reported that firm size significantly and positively related to 
the dividend policies of the firms in different developing countries.  
 
7. The random effects (panel) logit estimations report no significant relations 
between the RISK (business risk), FCF (free cash flow), LIQ (assets liquidity) and 
TANG (assets tangibility) variables, and the probability of a Turkish firm to pay 
dividends. The empirical results indicate that there is a negative correlation between 
business risk and dividend policy, in line with studies including Jensen et al. (1992), 
Manos (2002), Farinha (2003), Al-Najjar (2009) and Mehta (2012). However, this 
negative correlation is found to be insignificant. Moreover, the analyses show no 
significant impact of firms’ free cash flow on dividend payment decisions, which is 
inconsistent with the arguments related to the agency cost theory (Jensen, 1986; Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1997; La Porta et al., 1999; 2000). Consistent with Al-Najjar (2009), 
Mehta (2012) and Kisman (2013) who reported that assets liquidity does not have any 
effects on dividend policy in different emerging markets, the evidence reveals no 
significant relationship between liquidity and dividend policy in Turkish market. 
Finally, although the results show a negative association between assets tangibility and 
dependent variable, as suggested by Aivazian et al. (2003b) and Al-Najjar (2009), this 
negative association is found to be insignificant.  
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8. In order to test for industry-specific effect, 14 different industries classification 
dummies are added in the multivariate tests. The empirical results report that the 
inclusion of industry dummies does not change the significance levels of the 
coefficients of significant variables and results in slightly different marginal effects of 
the variables (only in one case, the coefficient of AGE is found to be positively 
significant at the 5% level but when the industry effect is controlled, it is observed to be 
positively significant at the 10% level) Therefore, there is no considerable impact of the 
industry-specific effect detected.  
3.4.2 Results of the Tobit Estimations  
This part of the study also uses a continuous dependent variable, dividend payout ratio 
that is denoted as DPOUT, to indentify the most important firm-specific determinants, 
while Turkish firms set their actual level of payout ratios, and hence to provide more 
robust empirical results. When the dependent variable is the intensity of paying 
dividends, which is left censored at zero, and the distribution of the sample is a mixture 
of discrete and continuous variables, a tobit estimation is appropriate (Greene, 2003). 
The tobit model has the log-likelihood function, which is made up of two parts. The first 
part estimates the classical regression for uncensored observations, whereas the second 
part estimates the relevant probability that an observation is censored. Therefore, when 
the dividend payout ratio is used as a dependent variable, which is left censored at zero 
and includes discrete and continuous variables, then the tobit model is more favourable 
and informative than the probit/logit and the ordinary least squares approach (Greene, 
2003; Wooldridge, 2010).  
Accordingly, Panel A in Table 3.7 on the next page reports the results of pooled tobit 
estimation coefficients and marginal effects. Panel B, in the same table, illustrates the 
results of the random effects (panel) tobit estimation coefficients and marginal effects of 
the independent variables on the dividend payout levels for Model 1 and Model 2, in 
order to identify the most important financial determinants, while Turkish firms set their 
actual level of payout ratios based on 1,800 firm-year observations from 264 firms 
listed on the ISE over the period 2003-2012. From the tobit estimation results displayed 
in Table 3.7, the following conclusions are made.  
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Table 3.7 Results of the Tobit Estimations on Dividend Payout Ratio 
Model Variables  
PANEL A: Pooled Tobit PANEL B: Random Effects Tobit 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Dependent Variable:  Dividend Payout Ratio Dividend Payout Ratio Dividend Payout Ratio Dividend Payout Ratio 
Independent Variables:  
Coefficient 
Estimates 
Marginal 
Effects 
Coefficient 
Estimates 
Marginal 
Effects 
Coefficient 
Estimates 
Marginal 
Effects 
Coefficient 
Estimates 
Marginal 
Effects 
ROA 
5.8711*** 
(5.99) 
1.2586*** 
(6.13) 
6.5323*** 
(6.34) 
1.3668*** 
(6.56) 
5.9435*** 
(7.46) 
0.7435*** 
(7.74) 
6.1409*** 
(7.65) 
0.7719*** 
(7.86) 
M/B 
-0.1261** 
(-2.27) 
-0.0270** 
(-2.29) 
-0.1142** 
(-2.29) 
-0.0239** 
(-2.31) 
-0.1919*** 
(-2.80) 
-0.0240*** 
(-2.82) 
-0.1920*** 
(-2.84) 
-0.0241*** 
(-2.87) 
RISK 
-1.6801*** 
(-2.82) 
-0.3601*** 
(-2.85) 
-1.5357*** 
(-2.73) 
-0.3213*** 
(-2.75) 
-1.1392 
(-1.35) 
-0.1425 
(-1.35) 
-1.0497 
(-1.17) 
-0.1319 
(-1.17) 
DEBT 
-1.7269*** 
(-5.88) 
-0.3702*** 
(-6.03) 
-1.4729*** 
(-5.07) 
-0.3082*** 
(-5.18) 
-1.6751*** 
(-3.48) 
-0.2095*** 
(-3.50) 
-1.4614*** 
(-3.11) 
-0.1837*** 
(-3.12) 
FCF 
0.0185 
(0.65) 
0.0039 
(0.65) 
0.0183 
(0.67) 
0.0038 
(0.67) 
0.0013 
(0.04) 
0.0002 
(0.04) 
0.0016 
(0.04) 
0.0002 
(0.04) 
LIQ 
0.0022 
(1.08) 
0.0004 
(1.08) 
0.0012 
(0.45) 
0.0002 
(0.45) 
0.0023 
(0.01) 
0.0004 
(0.01) 
0.0013 
(0.02) 
0.0001 
(0.02) 
TANG 
-0.3886 
(-1.39) 
-0.0833 
(-1.39) 
-0.1298 
(-0.46) 
-0.0271 
(-0.46) 
-0.8068 
(-1.56) 
-0.1009 
(-1.57) 
-0.6026 
(-1.28) 
-0.0757 
(-1.28) 
AGE 
0.4648*** 
(3.71) 
0.0996*** 
(3.75) 
0.2613** 
(2.12) 
0.0546** 
(2.13) 
0.4491** 
(2.24) 
0.0561** 
(2.24) 
0.2765** 
(2.29) 
0.0347** 
(2.31) 
SIZE 
0.4026*** 
(5.43) 
0.0863*** 
(5.52) 
0.4194*** 
(5.54) 
0.0877*** 
(5.65) 
0.5384*** 
(7.61) 
0.0673*** 
(8.68) 
0.5371*** 
(7.04) 
0.0675*** 
(7.72) 
Constant  
-3.6945*** 
(-4.51) 
 
-2.9303*** 
(-4.17) 
 
-4.6148*** 
(-5.57) 
 
-3.7642*** 
(-4.45) 
 
YEAR Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  Yes  
INDUSTRY  - - Yes  Yes  - - Yes  Yes  
Number of Observations 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800 
F Test  5.77***  5.38***      
Wald X2     198.49***  213.21***  
Pseudo R2  14.23%  15.59%      
Rho Value      0.3670  0.3411  
Likelihood Ratio Test     154.75***  121.47***  
                         The table reports the tobit estimations and t/z-statistics in the parentheses. ***, ** and * stand for significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
                       Independent variables are one-year lagged. The pooled models are tested using White’s corrected heteroscadasticity robust regressions.  
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1. When Model 1 and 2 are estimated by the pooled tobit regressions, they are 
overall statistically significant at the 1% level, as evidence by the F test values. Also, 
the random effects tobit (panel) regressions estimate that Model 1 and 2 are also overall 
statistically significant at the 1% level, as reported by the Wald X
2
 tests.  However, the 
Likelihood-ratio tests are statistically significant at the 1% for both models, indicating 
that the proportion of the total variance contributed by the panel-level variance 
component, rho, values are significantly different from zero (0.3670 and 0.3411 
respectively); therefore, the panel models are more favourable than pooled models. 
Hence, the following results are reported based on the random effects tobit models 
(Panel B) and also compared with the prior results, to see whether they produce similar 
or different findings. 
 
2 The results indicate that the dividend payout ratio of a Turkish firm is 
significantly and positively affected by the ROA variable (profitability), which is 
consistent with the logit estimations. The coefficients and marginal effects of the 
variable are statistically significant and positive at the 1% level in both Model 1 and 2. 
Moreover, the results of the marginal effects of ROA show that it has the largest impact 
(positive) among all the significant variables, illustrating that one unit of increase in 
ROA will increase the amount of payout ratio by about 74-77% for an average firm. 
Therefore, this evidence suggests that we can accept Hypothesis 1 that there is a 
positive relationship between profitability and the dividend payment decisions of 
Turkish firms.  
 
3 The results show that the dividend payout ratio of a Turkish firm is significantly 
and negatively affected by the M/B variable (investment opportunities), which is 
consistent with the logit estimations. The coefficients and marginal effects of the 
variable are statistically significant and negative at the 1% level in both Model 1 and 2. 
Further, the marginal effects of M/B reveal that one unit of increase in M/B will 
decrease the amount of dividend payout ratio by about 2.4% for an average firm. Hence, 
the findings provide evidence that we can accept Hypothesis 2a that there is a negative 
relationship between investment opportunities and the dividend payment decisions of 
Turkish firms.  
 
4 The results indicate that the dividend payout ratio of a Turkish firm is 
significantly and negatively affected by the DEBT variable (debt level), which is 
consistent with the logit estimations. The coefficients and marginal effects of this 
Birkbeck University of London Page 185 
variable are highly significant and negative at the 1% level in both Model 1 and 2. 
Moreover, the results of the marginal effects of DEBT show that it has the second 
largest impact (negative) among all the significant variables, suggesting that one unit of 
increase in DEBT will reduce the amount of dividend payout ratio by about 18-21% for 
an average firm. Accordingly, the empirical evidence supports Hypothesis 4 that there 
is a negative relationship between debt policy and the dividend payment decisions of 
Turkish firms.  
 
5 The results show that the dividend payout ratio of a Turkish firm is significantly 
and positively affected by the AGE variable (firm age), which is consistent with the 
logit estimations. The coefficients and marginal effects of this variable are statistically 
significant and positive at the 5% level in both Model 1 and 2. Further, the results of the 
marginal effects of AGE reveal that one unit of increase in AGE will increase the 
amount of dividend payout ratio by about 3.5-5.5% for an average firm. Therefore, this 
evidence suggests that we can accept Hypothesis 8 that there is a positive relationship 
between firm age and the dividend payment decisions of Turkish firms.  
 
6 The results indicate that the dividend payout ratio of a Turkish firm is 
significantly and positively affected by the SIZE variable (firm size), which is 
consistent with the logit estimations. The coefficients and marginal effects of this 
variable are highly significant and positive at the 1% level in both Model 1 and 2. 
Moreover, the results of the marginal effects of SIZE show that one unit of increase in 
SIZE will increase the amount of dividend payout ratio by almost 7% for an average 
firm. Hence, the findings support Hypothesis 9 that there is a positive relationship 
between firm size and the dividend payment decisions of Turkish firms.  
 
7 The random effects (panel) tobit estimations report no statistically significant 
coefficients and marginal effects of the RISK (business risk), FCF (free cash flow), LIQ 
(assets liquidity) and TANG (assets tangibility) variables, which is consistent with the 
logit estimations. Accordingly, the empirical results suggest no evidence of 
relationships between business risk, free cash flow, assets liquidity and assets tangibility 
and dividend payout ratios of Turkish firms and therefore they are not considered as 
important firm-specific determinants when Turkish firms set their dividend policies. 
Hence, Hypothesis 3, 5, 6 and 7 are not supported.  
 
8 In line with the prior results, the panel tobit estimations find no considerable 
industry impact when the industry dummies are included in the equation.  
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9 Consequently, the results of the panel tobit estimations are consistent with the 
panel logit estimations. Particularly, there is strong and consistent evidence that ROA 
(profitability), AGE (firm age) and SIZE (firm size) have significantly positive effects, 
whereas M/B (investment opportunities) and DEBT (debt policy) have significantly 
negative impact on the dividend policy decisions of Turkish firms.  
3.4.3 Further Analyses 
In this sub-section, additional tests are conducted in order to confirm the primary 
findings. This is done by employing an alternative dividend policy measure, namely 
dividend yield.55 Since dividend yield (DYIELD) is a continuous variable, which is left 
censored at zero and the distribution of the sample is a mixture of discrete and 
continuous variables, a tobit estimation is appropriate. Therefore, dividend yield is 
substituted for dividend payout ratio56 as the dependent variable, to further examine the 
most important firm-specific determinants affecting the dividend policy decisions of 
Turkish firms regarding how much dividends to pay, and to check the robustness of the 
primary findings from tobit estimations. Accordingly, Panel A in Table 3.8 on the next 
page reports the results of pooled tobit estimation coefficients and marginal effects, 
whereas Panel B in the same table shows the results of random effects (panel) tobit 
estimation coefficients and marginal effects of the independent variables on the levels of 
dividend yield of Turkish firms for Model 1 and 2. 
                                                          
55
 Dividend yield variable (denoted as DYIELD) is measured as the ratio of dividend per share to price 
per share of firm i at year t during the period, 2003-2012. The descriptive statistics of DYIELD are 
illustrated below. As can be seen that the mean ratio of the dividend yield is 0.0185, indicating that the 
sampled Turkish firms had the dividend yield of just below 2% over the entire period.  
 
Variable Observations Mean Median Std Dev. Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
DYIELD 2,112 0.0185 0.000 0.0403 0.000 0.6630 4.5661 44.418 
 
56
 Although the most commonly used dividend measure is dividend payout ratio in the literature; there are 
certain instances that the measurement of dividend payout ratios can be problematic. First, if a firm’s net 
earnings are negative, although the firm pays some amount of dividends - even large amounts, the payout 
ratio will be negative, which implies incorrectly that the firm’s payout ratio is minus and such 
observations should be excluded from samples since the payout ratios cannot be minus. Second, if a firm 
has a “small non-negative net earnings” in a given year and even though the firm only maintains its stable 
dividend level, the payout ratio will be extremely high in terms of percentages (Rozeff, 1982). However, 
using the dividend yield as a dependent variable avoids problems that arise as a result of negative payout 
ratios occurred for firms whose net income is negative or extremely high percentages of payout ratios 
observed for firms whose net income is close to zero (Schooley and Barney, 1994).  
 
Furthermore, dividend yield variable has associated with the problem that its behaviour is to great extent 
not controllable by managers since it is a market measure, whereas dividend payout ratio can be more 
directly influenced by managerial choice (Farinha, 1999). After all,  it is worth noting that using the 
dividend yield, which is a market measure (dividends per share to share price per share) rather than the 
dividend payout ratio, which is an accounting measure (dividends per share to earning per share), will 
provide more evidence  from a different perspective regarding dividend puzzle.  
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Table 3.8 Results of the Tobit Estimations on Dividend Yield 
Model Variables  
PANEL A: Pooled Tobit PANEL B: Random Effects Tobit 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Dependent Variable:  Dividend Yield Dividend Yield Dividend Yield Dividend Yield 
Independent Variables:  
Coefficient 
Estimates 
Marginal 
Effects 
Coefficient 
Estimates 
Marginal 
Effects 
Coefficient 
Estimates 
Marginal 
Effects 
Coefficient 
Estimates 
Marginal 
Effects 
ROA 
0.3280*** 
(7.81) 
1.3871*** 
(10.45) 
0.3435*** 
(8.12) 
1.4373*** 
(10.31) 
0.3034*** 
(12.77) 
1.1603*** 
(13.07) 
0.3047*** 
(12.71) 
1.1510*** 
(12.91) 
M/B 
-0.0094*** 
(-3.56) 
-0.0398*** 
(-3.81) 
-0.0096*** 
(-3.65) 
-0.0403*** 
(-4.02) 
-0.0088*** 
(-4.12) 
-0.0339*** 
(-4.12) 
-0.0088*** 
(-4.06) 
-0.0335*** 
(-4.05) 
RISK 
-0.0463** 
(-2.40) 
-0.1958** 
(-2.36) 
-0.0418** 
(-2.21) 
-0.1752** 
(-2.17) 
-0.0188 
(-1.50) 
-0.0721 
(-1.50) 
-0.0164 
(-1.31) 
-0.0620 
(-1.31) 
DEBT 
-0.0915*** 
(-7.57) 
-0.3869*** 
(-9.16) 
-0.0825*** 
(-6.23) 
-0.3455*** 
(-7.59) 
-0.0819*** 
(-5.46) 
-0.3131*** 
(-5.47) 
-0.0778*** 
(-5.18) 
-0.2938*** 
(-5.17) 
FCF 
0.0003 
(0.23) 
0.0013 
(0.23) 
0.0001 
(0.14) 
0.0001 
(0.15) 
0.0001 
(0.14) 
0.0006 
(0.14) 
0.0001 
(0.16) 
0.0006 
(0.16) 
LIQ 
0.0002 
(0.30) 
0.0001 
(0.30) 
0.0001 
(1.05) 
0.0005 
(1.03) 
0.0001 
(1.00) 
0.0006 
(1.01) 
0.0001 
(0.99) 
0.0006 
(0.99) 
TANG 
-0.0177* 
(-1.79) 
-0.0752* 
(-1.89) 
-0.0132 
(-1.15) 
-0.0552 
(-1.20) 
-0.0376 
(-1.48) 
-0.1439 
(-1.49) 
-0.0368 
(-1.33) 
-0.1391 
(-1.34) 
AGE 
0.0232*** 
(5.23) 
0.0981*** 
(6.14) 
0.0186*** 
(3.66) 
0.0780*** 
(4.24) 
0.0240*** 
(3.23) 
0.0919*** 
(3.26) 
0.0220*** 
(2.68) 
0.0833*** 
(2.70) 
SIZE 
0.0159*** 
(10..37) 
0.0676*** 
(13.78) 
0.0160*** 
(9.25) 
0.0671*** 
(12.52) 
0.0189*** 
(7.75) 
0.0724*** 
(8.72) 
0.0177*** 
(6.58) 
0.0670*** 
(7.02) 
Constant  
-0.1510*** 
(-6.16) 
 
-0.1246*** 
(-4.89) 
 
-0.1819*** 
(-6.18) 
 
-0.1569*** 
(-5.03) 
 
YEAR Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
INDUSTRY  - - Yes  Yes  - - Yes  Yes  
Number of Observations 1,846 1,846 1,846 1,846 1,846 1,846 1,846 1,846 
F Test  15.10***  11.98***      
Wald X2     372.96***  377.75***  
Pseudo R2  14.52%  15.11%      
Rho Value      0.5338  0.5253  
Likelihood Ratio Test     342.00***  315.86***  
                      
                       The table reports the tobit estimations and t/z-statistics in the parentheses. ***, ** and * stand for significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
                        Independent variables are one-year lagged. The pooled models are tested using White’s corrected heteroscadasticity robust regressions. 
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At first glance, the results in Table 3.8 display that both pooled tobit and panel tobit 
models are overall statistically significant at the 1% level. However, the Likelihood-
ratio tests are statistically significant at the 1% for both Model 1 and 2, indicating that 
the proportion of the total variance, contributed by the panel-level variance component, 
rho, values, are significantly different from zero (0.5338 and 0.5253 respectively); 
therefore, as in case of the prior results, this suggests that panel tobit models are more 
favourable than pooled tobit models. Hence, the results are drawn from the random 
effects tobit models (Panel B). 
The empirical results show that the random effects tobit estimations, when the dividend 
yield is used as the dependent variable, provide very similar findings consistent with the 
previous results regarding the dividend payout ratio. Although the marginal effects are 
found to be different, the amounts of the dividend yield of Turkish firms are 
significantly affected by the same variables with the same significance levels and the 
same directional impacts as in the case of their dividend payout ratio levels. 
Particularly, the amount of dividend yield is significantly and positively affected by 
ROA, AGE and SIZE, whereas it is significantly and negatively influenced by M/B and 
DEBT. Moreover, the results show no significant relation between RISK, FCF, LIQ and 
TANG and the amounts of dividend yield of Turkish firms. Also, inclusion of 
INDUSTRY (industry dummies) into the equation shows no considerable industy effect. 
Consequently, when the panel tobit regression estimates are used to examine the firm-
specific determinants of Turkish firms’ dividend policy decisions of how much 
dividends to pay, by employing an alternative dependent variable, namely dividend 
yield, the results show a very similar evidence confirming the robustness of the primary 
findings from the panel tobit regressions performed on the dividend payout ratios of the 
Turkish firms.  
The summary of the empirical results for the research hypotheses is illustrated in Table 
3.9 below. 
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Table 3.9 Summary of Estimations Results for the Research Hypotheses 
 
Variables 
Predicted 
Sign 
Realised 
Sign 
Findings 
Justification of the 
Hypotheses 
ROA (+) (+) 
Profitability has a significantly positive effect on the dividend policy decisions of Turkish 
firms. The evidence is consistent with Aivazian et al. (2003b), Al-Najjar (2009), Kirkulak and 
Kurt (2010) and Imran (2011), providing support for the signalling theory of dividends and the 
residual dividend theory.  
Hypothesis 1 is supported. 
M/B (+) or (-) (-) 
Investment opportunities have a significantly negative effect on the dividend policy decisions 
of Turkish firms, contrary to studies (Aivazian et al., 2003b; Al-Najjar, 2009; Kirkulak and 
Kurt, 2010; Imran, 2011) reported a positive relation. This is consistent with Kisman (2013), 
suggesting evidence for the transaction cost theory, the pecking order theory and the 
overinvestment hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2a is supported. 
RISK  (-) (-) 
There is a negative correlation between business risk and dividend policy but this negative 
correlation is statistically insignificant. Therefore, the evidence suggests that business risk is 
not one of the most important determinants of the dividend policy decisions of Turkish firms. 
Hypothesis 3 is not supported. 
DEBT (-) (-) 
Debt policy has a significantly negative effect on the dividends policy decisions of Turkish 
firms. The evidence is consistent with Aivazian et al. (2003b), Al-Najjar (2009) and Kisman 
(2013), providing support for the agency cost theory of dividends. 
Hypothesis 4 is supported. 
FCF (+) (+) 
There is a positive correlation between free cash flow and dividend policy but this positive 
correlation is statistically insignificant. Hence, the evidence suggests that free cash flow is not 
one of the most important determinants of the dividend policy decisions of Turkish firms. 
Hypothesis 5 is not supported. 
LIQ (+) (+) 
There is a positive correlation between firm liquidity and dividend policy but this positive 
correlation is statistically insignificant. Therefore, the evidence suggests that firm liquidity is 
not one of the most important determinants of the dividend policy decisions of Turkish firms.  
Hypothesis 6 is not supported. 
TANG (-) (-) 
There is a negative correlation between assets tangibility and dividend policy but this negative 
correlation is statistically insignificant. Hence, the evidence suggests that assets tangibility is 
not one of the most important determinants of the dividend policy decisions of Turkish firms. 
Hypothesis 7 is not supported. 
AGE (+) (+) 
Firm age has a significantly positive effect on the dividend policy decisions of Turkish firms, 
which is consistent with the maturity hypothesis proposed by Grullon et al. (2002).  
Hypothesis 8 is supported. 
SIZE (+) (+) 
Firm size has a significantly positive effect on the dividend policy decisions of Turkish firms. 
The evidence is consistent with Al-Najjar (2009), Imran (2011), Mehta (2012) and Kisman 
(2013), providing support for the agency cost theory and the transaction costs theory of 
dividends. 
Hypothesis 9 is supported. 
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3.5 Conclusions  
This chapter of the thesis investigates the firm-specific (financial) determinants of 
dividend policy decisions after the implementation of major economic and structural 
reforms starting with the fiscal year 2003 in the Turkish market, where an ideal setting 
is provided to study the dividend behaviour of an emerging economy (a civil law 
originated country), which employed the common laws in order to integrate with world 
markets. Therefore, the study focuses on a recent large panel dataset of 264 corporations 
(non-financial and non-utility) listed on the ISE, over a ten-year period 2003-2012, 
including 1,846 firm-year observations in logit models and 1,800 firm-year observations 
in tobit models. Particularly, empirical examinations establish how the ISE-listed firms 
are affected by the firm-specific determinants while setting their dividend policies, and 
whether they follow the same firm-specific determinants of dividend policy as 
suggested by empirical studies from developed markets during the research period. In 
addition, it considers a more comprehensive empirical model by estimating the effects 
of various firm-specific determinants on dividend policy, employs richer regression 
techniques (the pooled and panel logit/probit and tobit estimations) and uses alternative 
dividend policy measures (the probability of paying dividends, dividend payout ratio 
and dividend yield) in order to provide more valid, consistent and robust results.  
The dividend policy of Turkish firms is analysed in two steps: (1) decisions to pay or 
not pay and (2) how much dividends to pay. The results indicate that profitability, debt 
policy, firm size, investment opportunities and firm age are the determinants primarily 
affecting the dividend policy decisions of Turkish firms.  
The positive association between firm profitability and dividend policy is consistent 
with the signalling hypothesis, arguing that profitable firms pay larger dividends to 
signal their good financial performance. This positive relation also may be due to the 
residual dividend theory, proposing that more profitable firms have more internally 
generated funds and, only after all positive net NPV investments have been undertaken, 
hence they will distribute larger dividends than less profitable firms. Furthermore, the 
negative relationship between debt ratio and dividend policy supports the view that debt 
and dividends may be alternative mechanisms to control the problems associated with 
agency problems and, since they are alternative devices to fulfil the same purpose, debt 
and dividends are conversely related. It may also be that debt implies an increase in both 
dependency on external financing, and in the total risk of the firm’s stocks, because debt 
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represents the fixed costs that firms have to repay, increasing the need for re-financing. 
Accordingly, higher level of debt consequences a higher level of fees when external 
finance is raised. Hence, firms with high levels of debt tend to maintain their earnings in 
order to lower external financing costs, thus lowering its dividends.  
The study findings further indicate the positive relationship between firm size and 
dividend policy, suggesting that larger firms are more likely to have more dispersed 
ownership structures and, in this context, face higher potential agency costs.  Also, 
larger firms are more likely to be mature and have easier access to capital markets to 
raise external finance at lower costs. Hence, the lower transaction costs and higher 
potential for agency problems, suggest a positive relationship between firm size and 
dividend payments as a control mechanism. Moreover, the level of investment 
opportunities is another firm-specific determinant that negatively influences dividend 
policies of the firms. This negative influence implies that firms with better investment 
opportunities choose lower dividend payments, which is consistent with the transaction 
cost, pecking order and agency cost theories; the higher the growth, the more is the need 
for funds to finance investments. Therefore, the more likely the firm is to preserve 
earnings rather than paying dividends because external finance is costly.  
The results show that more mature firms, in terms of age, distribute higher dividends, 
consistent with the maturity hypothesis, suggesting that since a firm gets older its 
investment opportunities decline, which leads to slower growth rates and therefore 
reducing the fund’s requirements of capital expenditure. Thus, mature firms tend to 
have steady earnings with high excess to external capital markets, and they can be able 
to preserve a good level of funds, which allow them to pay higher dividends. 
Furthermore, the study presents no evidence of a significant relationship between 
dividend policy and business risk, free cash flow, assets liquidity and assets tangibility, 
and therefore they are not considered as the important firm-specific determinants while 
the ISE firms set their dividend policies. Finally, the analyses indicate no considerable 
industry effect on the dividend policies of Turkish firms.  
Aivazian et al. (2003b) report that the dividend policies of firms in emerging markets 
are affected by the same firm-specific determinants as their counterparts in the US; 
however, emerging market firms may be more sensitive to some of these determinants 
and may react differently, indicating the greater financial constrains in different 
countries under which they operate. Consequently, the study results are consistent with 
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the findings of Aivazian et al.’s (2003b) research and suggest that Turkish firms follow 
the same firm-specific determinants of dividend policy as proposed by dividend 
theories, and as suggested by empirical studies conducted in developed markets, after 
Turkey implemented major reforms in the fiscal year 2003. Particularly, the primary 
firm-specific determinants of dividend policy are profitability, debt level, firm size, 
investment opportunities and firm age in the context of emerging Turkish market.  
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Although probit and logit estimations provide qualitatively similar results, the main 
difference between them is that the probit model57 uses the normal distribution, whereas 
the logit model uses the logistic distribution (Gujarati, 2003). In this context, the 
corresponding probit models, where the dependent variable is the binary variable and 
the independent variables have the same previous definitions, are developed to examine 
the most important firm-specific determinants affecting the probability of paying 
dividends in the Turkish market, and to check whether they confirm similar results as 
reported by the logit estimations. Accordingly, Panel A in Table 3.10 on the following 
page displays the results of pooled probit estimation coefficients and marginal effects, 
whereas Panel B in the same table shows the results of random effects (panel) probit 
estimation coefficients and marginal effects of the independent variables on the 
probability of paying dividends for Model 1 and 2.  
The results illustrate that both pooled and panel probit models are overall statistically 
significant at the 1% level. However, the Likelihood-ratio tests are statistically 
significant at the 1% level for both Model 1 and 2, indicating that the proportion of the 
total variance, contributed by the panel-level variance component, rho, values, are 
significantly different from zero (0.6443 and 0.6255 respectively). Hence, as in the case 
of logit estimations, this suggests that panel probit models are more favourable than 
pooled probit models.  
The results of the random effects probit models (Panel B) report almost the same results 
(the same levels of significance of the coefficients and very similar marginal effects) as 
reported by the random effects logit estimations. Particularly, the probability of a 
Turkish firm paying dividends is significantly and positively affected by ROA, AGE 
and SIZE, whereas it is significantly and negatively influenced by M/B and DEBT. 
Further, the results show no significant relation between RISK, FCF, LIQ and TANG 
and the probability of paying dividends. Finally, there is no considerable industry 
impact found when the industry dummies are included in the equation. Consequently, 
the results of the probit models are consistent, compared to the results of logit models, 
confirming very similar findings regarding the decisions of Turkish firms on whether to 
pay cash dividends or not.  
                                                          
57
 The probit model uses the normal distribution and the probability function in this estimation model can 
be presented as follows:  
 
Prob (Y=1 | x) = φ (X',β)  
Prob (Y=0 | x) = 1 – F(X',β) 
 
Where, φ is the cumulative distribution function of the normal distribution. β presents the impact of the 
change on X on the probability (Greene, 2003). 
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Table 3.10 Results of the Probit Estimations on Probability of Paying Dividends 
Model Variables  
PANEL A: Pooled Probit PANEL B: Random Effects Probit 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Dependent Variable:  Cash Dividends Paid (0/1) Cash Dividends Paid (0/1) Cash Dividends Paid (0/1) Cash Dividends Paid (0/1) 
Independent Variables:  
Coefficient 
Estimates 
Marginal 
Effects 
Coefficient 
Estimates 
Marginal 
Effects 
Coefficient 
Estimates 
Marginal 
Effects 
Coefficient 
Estimates 
Marginal 
Effects 
ROA 
5.1449*** 
(7.57) 
1.6111*** 
(7.89) 
5.4502*** 
(7.87) 
1.6602*** 
(8.43) 
6.4087*** 
(7.94) 
1.1191*** 
(8.61) 
6.4341*** 
(8.05) 
1.1042*** 
(8.63) 
M/B 
-0.0703** 
(-2.04) 
-0.0220** 
(-2.07) 
-0.0878** 
(-2.51) 
-0.0267** 
(-2.53) 
-0.1988*** 
(-3.01) 
-0.0347*** 
(-3.05) 
-0.2011*** 
(-3.02) 
-0.0345*** 
(-3.06) 
RISK 
-1.0971*** 
(-2.83) 
-0.3435*** 
(-2.87) 
-0.9250** 
(-2.54) 
-0.2817** 
(-2.56) 
-0.5091 
(-1.43) 
-0.0889 
(-1.44) 
-0.4402 
(-1.24) 
-0.0755 
(-1.24) 
DEBT 
-1.5486*** 
(-7.93) 
-0.4849*** 
(-8.39) 
-1.4002*** 
(-6.97) 
-0.4265*** 
(-7.42) 
-2.3097*** 
(-5.04) 
-0.4033*** 
(-5.07) 
-2.1830*** 
(-4.85) 
-0.3746*** 
(-4.92) 
FCF 
0.0467 
(1.53) 
0.0146 
(1.52) 
0.0441 
(1.50) 
0.0134 
(1.49) 
0.0371 
(0.85) 
0.0064 
(0.85) 
0.0393 
(0.91) 
0.0067 
(0.91) 
LIQ 
0.0043 
(1.51) 
0.0013 
(1.51) 
0.0073** 
(2.18) 
0.0022** 
(2.20) 
0.0026 
(0.36) 
0.0004 
(0.36) 
0.0033 
(0.46) 
0.0005 
(0.46) 
TANG 
-0.1380 
(-0.79) 
-0.0432 
(-0.79) 
-0.1098 
(-0.58) 
-0.0334 
(-0.58) 
-0.3810 
(-0.89) 
-0.0665 
(-0.88) 
-0.2240 
(-0.50) 
-0.0384 
(-0.50) 
AGE 
0.2874*** 
(3.65) 
0.0900*** 
(3.66) 
0.2677*** 
(3.31) 
0.0815*** 
(3.30) 
0.4595** 
(2.22) 
0.0802** 
(2.25) 
0.4337* 
(1.93) 
0.0744* 
(1.95) 
SIZE 
0.3888*** 
(14.44) 
0.1217*** 
(13.81) 
0.4032*** 
(13.49) 
0.1228*** 
(13.21) 
0.6474*** 
(8.83) 
0.1130*** 
(12.22) 
0.6191*** 
(7.99) 
0.1062*** 
(9.78) 
Constant  
-2.7600*** 
(-7.02) 
 
-2.4586*** 
(-6.46) 
 
-4.8706*** 
(-5.95) 
 
-4.1053*** 
(-4.85) 
 
YEAR Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
INDUSTRY  - - Yes  Yes  - - Yes  Yes  
Number of Observations 1,846 1,846 1,846 1,846 1,846 1,846 1,846 1,846 
Wald X2 503.23***  515.45***  218.91***  220.22***  
Pseudo R2  36.09%  37.56%      
Rho Value      0.6443  0.6255  
Likelihood Ratio Test     318.28***  277.89***  
                      
                       The table reports the probit estimations and z-statistics in the parentheses. ***, ** and * stand for significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
                        Independent variables are one-year lagged. The pooled models are tested using White’s corrected heteroscadasticity robust regressions. 
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4.1 Introduction  
The aim of this chapter is to investigate whether the ISE-listed firms adopt deliberate 
cash dividend policies to signal information to investors, and whether they follow stable 
cash dividend payments as in developed markets by using Lintner’s (1956) partial 
adjustment model, and several extensions of this model, since the fiscal year 2003 when 
Turkey began to implement serious economic and structural reforms for a better 
working of the market economy, outward-orientation and globalisation, in other words 
for market integration.  
Accordingly, the chapter contributes to the literature in several ways. First of all, it is 
the first major research to our knowledge that examines the information content of cash 
dividend payments and dividend smoothing over time in Turkey (during its market 
integration process in the post 2003 period), using Lintner’s (1956) partial adjustment 
model.  Second, unlike previous studies (Adaoglu, 2000; Aivazian et al., 2003a), this 
chapter provides a large-scale dataset that covers a more recent long period of time. 
Third, it further pursues several extensions of the Lintner model by adding additional 
explanatory variables (lagged earnings, external finance and year dummies to capture 
the effect of 2008 global financial crisis).  
Dividend policy has attracted a great deal of attention from financial economists in 
corporate finance literature. Questions such as why firms pay dividends, why investors 
care, and to what extent dividend policy may affect firm’s market value have been 
subject to a long-standing argument (Baker and Powell, 1999). Miller and Modigliani 
(1961) assert that, under the circumstance of a perfect capital market with rational 
investors and perfect certainty, a managed dividend policy does not affect the firm value 
and therefore it is irrelevant. Under such circumstances, the valuation of the firm 
depends on the productivity of the firm’s assets, not the type of dividend payout. 
However, real world capital markets are subject to various market imperfections, such 
as information asymmetries, differential taxes, transaction costs and agency problems. 
These imperfections have led to the development of many competing theories of 
dividend policy in order to explain why companies pay, or not pay dividends (Lease et 
al., 2000).  
Lintner (1956) was the first researcher to investigate the information content of 
dividends, and he found that US firms follow extremely deliberate dividend payout 
policies, contrary to M&M’s (1961) prediction. In his pioneering study in 1956, Lintner 
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showed that US firms tend to smooth dividends relative to earnings; they only increase 
dividend payments when they believe that earnings can sustain higher dividend levels 
permanently. They were also reluctant to cut dividends unless adverse circumstances are 
likely to persist, since dividend cuts are bad signals to the market. Lintner (1956) 
concluded that US firms have target payout ratios and make partial adjustments toward 
their target ratios to smooth dividend payment streams in the short-run and therefore 
they pursue stable dividend policies.  
Various studies from developed countries have been strongly supportive of Lintner’s 
(1956) findings and reported consistency of results across many studies and different 
periods of time, including Darling (1957), Brittain (1964; 1966), Fama and Babiak 
(1968), McDonald et al. (1975), Chateau (1979), Dewenter and Warther (1998), Baker 
et al. (1985), Baker et al. (2002), Brav et al. (2005) and Chemmanur et al. (2010). 
Further, Baker et al. (1985, p. 83) stated that “……the results show that the major 
determinants of dividend payments today appear strikingly similar to Lintner’s 
behavioural model developed during the mid-1950’s.” Similarly, Benartzi et al. (1997) 
and Baker and Powell (1999) concluded that Lintner’s model of dividends has been the 
best description of the dividend setting process available even after all these years.  
Several empirical studies have examined the information content of dividends as 
proposed by Lintner (1956) in emerging stock markets and have reported mixed 
evidence in these developing markets. Aivaizan et al. (2003a) compared the dividend 
policy behaviour of firms operating in eight different emerging economies with the 
dividend policies of US firms, and they reported that the Lintner basic model still works 
for US firms but it does not work very well for emerging firms, since current dividends 
are much less sensitive to past dividends in these markets. However, Mookerje (1992) 
in India, Pandey (2001) in Malaysia, Al-Najjar (2009) in Jordan, Chemmanur et al. 
(2010) in Hong Kong, Al-Ajmi and Abo Hussain (2011) in Saudi Arabia and Al-
Malkawi (2014) in Oman found evidence supporting the Lintner model in explaining 
dividend behaviour in these emerging markets, but they generally have higher 
adjustment factors, hence lower smoothing and less stable dividend policies compared 
to developed countries. Contrarily, Adaoglu (2000) found inconsistent results with the 
Lintner argument in the Turkish market and reported that Turkish firms follow unstable 
dividends policies. 
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The main motivation of this thesis is to carry the dividend debate into an emerging 
market but, in a different way from prior research, it examines the dividend policy 
behaviour of a particular emerging market that implemented serious economic and 
structural reforms for the integration with world markets, and attempts to identify what 
behaviour of the dividend policy of this emerging market shows afterwards. In this 
respect, Turkey and its stock market (the ISE) offer ideal setting for the purpose of this 
thesis by allowing to study the dividend behaviour of an emerging market which 
implemented major reforms starting with the fiscal year 2003 in compliance with the 
IMF stand-by agreement, the EU directives and best-practice international standards for 
a better working of the economy, outward-orientation and globalisation.  
Financial markets in Turkey were strictly regulated until a financial liberalisation 
programme was implemented in 1980. After the adoption of related regulations enacted 
and launched in the subsequent years, the Istanbul Stock Exchange was officially 
established in December 1985 and commenced its operations on January 3, 1986 (CMB, 
2003). A number of studies revealed that Turkey has a bank-based financial system 
(Aivazian et al., 2003a; 2003b) where private sector banks dominate the market and are 
mainly part of a bigger family-owned commercial corporations (Erturk, 2003). Indeed, 
Turkish firms generally have the concentrated and pyramidal ownership structures 
dominated by families who generally own business groups, including banks, businesses 
and subsidiaries in the same group.  As a result of this infrastructure, families have 
control over many banks that belong to their business groups, and the banks’ lending 
decisions. This has led to business groups obtaining much of their finance from their 
own banks, in other words allowing non-arm’s length party transactions (Yurtoglu, 
2003; IIF, 2005; Aksu and Kosedag, 2006).  
In this context, Aivazian et al. (2003a; 2003b) argue that dividend policy may be a more 
useful pre-commitment and signalling device in markets that are greatly dependent on 
arm’s length transactions. However, the financial systems in emerging markets like 
Turkey are generally characterised by closely held bank-financed companies in where 
the direct interactions between shareholders and corporate creditors, who have access to 
private information, reduce the need for dividends as a signal and therefore make 
dividend stability less important. Similarly, Dewenter and Warther (1998) suggest that 
stable dividend policy may not be important for firms that rely on bank debt due to the 
close ties between managers and lenders.  
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Dividend policy decisions are not always solely dependent on managers’ judgement, 
since factors such as regulations, financial crisis and trends in macro-economy might 
also have implications for firms’ dividend policies (Kirkulak and Kurt, 2010). The 
evidence from cross-country studies (La Porta et al., 2000; Aivazian et al., 2003a) has 
revealed that there are regulatory differences related to the dividend policy making 
process forced by governments throughout the world. The civil law countries, typically 
emerging economies, generally have weaker laws in terms of protecting minority 
shareholders’ rights, relative to the rich common law countries (La Porta et al., 1999; 
2000) and hence these emerging markets are likely to enforce constrains on dividend 
policy in order to protect both minority shareholders and creditors (Glen et al., 1995).   
Public corporations listed on the ISE are subject to the regulatory policies put into effect 
by the CMB of Turkey. Indeed, the dividend policy in the ISE was heavily regulated 
when it first started to operate in 1986. For the fiscal years 1985-1994, the first 
mandatory dividend policy was implemented by the enactment of Capital Markets Law 
in 1982 and, according to the first regulation on dividend payments, the ISE-listed firms 
were obliged to distribute at least 50% of their distributable income as a cash dividend, 
which was known as “first dividend” in the Turkish capital market. Without paying the 
“first dividend”, all other dividend payments, such as the payments to employers or 
maintaining it as retained earnings, were not legally possible (Adaoglu, 1999; 2000). 
The main purpose of this mandatory dividend payment regulation was to protect 
minority shareholders rights by providing them satisfactory levels of dividends since the 
liquidity in the stock capital markets was almost non-existent. There was no stock 
exchange before 1986 and the only source of income for minority shareholders was the 
dividend income (Aytac, 1998).  
The limited research (Adaoglu, 2000; Aivazian et al., 2003a) conducted in the emerging 
Turkish market showed that the Lintner model did not work well in explaining dividend 
behaviour in Turkey; the ISE-listed firms followed unstable cash dividend payments 
and the level of current earnings of firms in a given year were the main determinant 
affecting the firms’ cash dividend payments. However, Adaoglu (2000) and Aivazian et 
al. (2003a) examined the dividend behaviour of Turkish firms for the period while the 
dividend payments of the ISE listed firms were heavily regulated due to the first 
mandatory dividend policy (they were obliged to pay at least 50% of their distributable 
income as cash dividends) imposed by the CMB, which did not provide much flexibility 
to the managers of these firms in choosing their own dividend policies. Therefore, one 
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can expect that cash dividend payments were solely dependent on the firms’ current 
year earnings, as forced by regulations, and any variability in earnings of the firms was 
directly reflected in the level of cash dividends. In this period, Turkey also had issues 
with insider lending, in other words non-arm’s length transactions, within business 
groups owned by families, which reduced the need for dividend signalling and stability 
for the ISE firms, as suggested by Aivazian et al. (2003a; 2003b) and Dewenter and 
Warther (1998).  
Following the November 2002 elections which resulted in one-party government 
(whereby political uncertainty, to some degree, diminished), the new Turkish 
government signed a standby agreement with the IMF and began to implement major 
economic programs and structural reforms for a better working of the market economy, 
outward-orientation and globalisation in March 2003 (CMB, 2003; Adaoglu, 2008; 
Birol, 2011). Turkey’s progress in achieving full membership of the EU in this period 
also provided a strong motivation in establishing new reforms, rules and regulations to 
improve corporate governance and transparency and disclosure practices; therefore, to 
integrate its economy with Europe and to harmonise its institutions with those of the EU 
(IIF, 2005; Aksu and Kosedag, 2006). Accordingly, there are reasons that may suggest 
the ISE-listed firms may adopt dividend smoothing and follow stable dividend policies 
as in developed markets after the implementation of major reforms in 2003.  
Along with many other regulations and reforms, the CMB of Turkey made many 
amendments to improve the transparency and quality of the banking sector and adopted 
“The Banking Sector Restructuring Program” in May 2001 for restructuring the public 
banks, rehabilitating the private banking system, and strengthening surveillance and 
supervision frame to increase efficiency in the sector (BRSA, 2010). Moreover, with the 
introduction of “Regulation on Establishment and Operations of Banks” in July 2001, 
the risk group definition and calculation of loan limits for a single business group 
(including banks, businesses and subsidiaries in the same group), considering direct and 
connected lending, were established to prevent insider lending (non-arm’s length 
transactions) as a source of financing. Therefore, the ISE firms turned to the equity 
market with a greater incentive for more transparent financing (IIF, 2005).  
Another reason that might suggest the ISE firms may smooth their dividends relates to 
the much more flexible mandatory dividend policy regulations imposed by the CMB 
after the implementation of major reforms in 2003. The CMB replaced the second 
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mandatory dividend policy that forced the ISE firms to pay at least 20% of their 
distributable income as the “first dividend”. However, in a more flexible way from the 
first mandatory dividend payment policy between 1985 and 1994, the listed firms did 
not have to pay the “first dividend” solely in cash but had the option of distributing it in 
cash dividends or stock dividends or a mixture of both, which was subject to the board 
of directors’ decision. The total payment could not, however, be less than 20% of the 
distributable income for the fiscal year 2003. Further, for the fiscal year 2004, the CMB 
increased the minimum percentage of mandatory dividend payments for the ISE-listed 
firms from 20% to 30%, which also stayed at this level for the fiscal year 2005. Then, 
the minimum percentage of mandatory dividend payment level was again reduced to 
20% in the fiscal year 2006 and remained at this level for the fiscal years 2007 and 
2008. Nevertheless, from the fiscal year 2009 and onwards (2010, 2011 and 2012), the 
CMB decided to not determine a minimum dividend payout ratio and abolished 
mandatory minimum dividend payment distribution requirement for the ISE firms, 
which provided total freedom for the ISE-listed firms to make their own dividend policy 
decisions (Adaoglu, 2008; Kirkulak and Kurt, 2010). 
Empirical research in developing markets contributed relatively little evidence 
compared to the empirical evidence conducted in developed markets. A few empirical 
studies reviewed in Chapter 2 have provided some evidence as to whether managers are 
concerned about dividend smoothing over time in a number of different emerging 
markets, as proposed by Lintner (1956). However, it can be observed that there is only 
narrow evidence from the Turkish market, which is subjected to following issues. First, 
applying Lintner’s (1956) model, Adaoglu (2000) examined the dividend policy of 
Turkish firms for the period 1985-1997 and Aivazian et al. (2003a) covered the period 
1983-1990. It is certain that the results from these two studies are relatively old and 
perhaps outdated. Hence, one can suggest that there is need for evidence from recent 
data. Second, unlike the results of Adaoglu (2000) and Aivazian et al. (2003a), the ISE 
firms may adopt deliberate cash dividend policies to signal information to investors 
during the period, when the mandatory dividend policy is considerably relaxed and the 
insider lending (non-arm’s length transactions) is prevented as a source of financing, 
following the implementation of major reforms in 2003. Third, Adaoglu’s (2000) data 
sample included only the ISE listed firms with at least 5 years of nonzero cash 
dividends. Therefore one can argue that the study may be biased due to the sample 
selection errors, since only analysing regular or frequent dividend-paying companies 
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may lead to different results and these results may not represent dividend policy 
behaviour of the market as a whole. Likewise, although Aivazian et al. (2003a) reported 
evidence from eight different markets, they stated that their Turkish data included a 
limited number of only largest listed firms. Hence, the results regarding the Turkish 
market may be biased due to limited sample selection procedures. 
Accordingly, the aim of this chapter is to empirically investigate the information content 
of cash dividends as proposed by Lintner (1956) over a decade after the implementation 
of major economic and structural reforms, starting with the fiscal year 2003, in the 
Turkish market, and to also provide more evidence on this developing country, by 
attempting to fill the gaps in the literature, as pointed out in the above criticisms. In 
particular, the chapter contributes to the dividend literature in the following aspects. 
First, Turkey offers an ideal setting to study the dividend behaviour of an emerging 
market (a civil law originated country) which employed the common laws in order to 
integrate with world markets. Therefore, the chapter examines how the ISE-listed firms 
set their cash dividend payments and whether they follow stable dividend policies, as in 
developed markets, after the implementation of major reforms in 2003. Second, it uses a 
large-scale dataset that covers a more recent long period of time. Third, it employs 
richer research methodologies (the pooled OLS, random effects, fixed effects and 
system GMM analyses). Finally, it attempts to answer the following research questions:  
1. Does Lintner’s (1956) partial adjustment model work to explain dividend policy 
behaviour in the emerging Turkish market? Do results show support to the dividend 
signalling hypothesis? 
 
2. What are the implications of the Lintner’s coefficients (the speed of adjustment 
and target payout ratio) in the Turkish market? Do the ISE-listed firms smooth their 
dividend payments and follow stable dividend policies?  
 
3. Is the pooled OLS more suitable to investigate the Lintner’s model in the 
Turkish market or are the panel models (random effects and fixed effects) more 
favourable than pooled OLS?  
 
4. Does the system GMM estimation provide consistent results with the 
preliminary findings from the pooled OLS or the panel models, or does it provide 
significantly different results?  
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5. When adding other variables such as lagged earnings, external finance and year 
dummies (to capture the effect of the 2008 global financial crisis) into the basic Lintner 
model, does the model work better in explaining dividend behaviour in Turkey?  
 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. The following section 4.2 reviews 
the previous studies and develops the research hypotheses. The methodology and data 
are explained in section 4.3. Section 4.4 presents the empirical results, whereas section 
4.5 summarises the conclusions of this chapter of the study.  
 
4.2 Previous Studies and Research Hypotheses  
In a pioneering study of dividend policy behaviour, Lintner (1956) developed a 
mathematical model, after an extensive field research of US companies, to test for the 
stability of cash dividend payments, where he suggests that each firm has a target 
dividend level in a given year, which is a function of earnings in that year and its target 
payout rate, as illustrated below:  
Dit
* 
= ri Eit                                                                                                                    (4.1) 
Where Dit
*
 is the target dividend payment for firm i in year t, ri  is the target payout ratio 
for firm i and Eit is the net earnings in year t for firm i. Lintner (1956) further argues that 
the firm will only adjust dividends partially toward the target dividend level in any 
given year. Hence, the actual difference in dividend payments from year t-1 to year t 
can be given by:  
Dit  – Di(t-1) = αi + ci (Dit
* − Di(t-1)) + uit                                                                      (4.2) 
Where αi is the intercept term, ci is the speed of adjustment coefficient for firm i, uit is 
the error term, Dit is the actual dividend payment for firm i in year t and Di(t-1) is the 
previous year’s (t-1) dividend payment for firm i. By substituting ri Eit for the target 
dividend payment (Dit
*
) in the model and rearranging Equation 4.2, the following 
empirically testable equation can be equivalently obtained:  
Dit = αi + β1Eit + β2Di(t-1) + uit                                                                                   (4.3) 
Where β1 = ci ri and β2 = (1−ci). According to Lintner (1956), the constant term (αi) is 
expected to have a positive sign to reflect management’s reluctance to reduce dividends, 
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and the speed of adjustment coefficient (ci) shows the stability in dividend payment 
changes and calculates the speed of adjustment toward the target payout ratio (ri) in 
response to earnings changes. Hence, the value ci reflects the dividend smoothing 
behaviour of the firm i to changes in the level of earnings; a higher value of ci implies 
less dividend smoothing, in other words unstable dividend policy, and vice-versa. 
Consequently, Lintner (1956) suggests that firms set their dividends in line with their 
current earnings and their previous year dividends, and they make partial adjustments to 
a target payout ratio and do not correspond immediately with the changes in earnings. 
Empirical support of Lintner’s (1956) model of dividends was provided by early 
studies. Darling (1957), Brittain (1964; 1966) and Fama and Babiak (1968) re-evaluated 
and extended the Lintner model by adding other variables, or undertaking more 
comprehensive approaches, and they all confirmed the original findings of Lintner that 
US companies follow stable dividend policies. Similarly, several empirical studies 
examined corporate dividend policy behaviour in different developed markets and 
showed support to Lintner’s (1956) argument. McDonald et al. (1975) examined the 
dividend, investment and financing decisions of French firms, and reported that 
dividends of French firms are well explained by profit and lagged dividends in the 
dividend model of Lintner (1956), whereas investment and financing variables were 
insignificant in the dividend equation. Chateau (1979) tested the partial adjustment 
model on large Canadian manufacturing firms. The study findings revealed that 
Canadian corporations follow stable dividend policies. Especially, they are relatively 
more conservative compared to American firms when it comes to short-term dividend 
strategies even though they have a higher average payout ratio. Further, Dewenter and 
Warther (1998) compared dividend polices of US and Japanese firms, and found that 
the speed-of-adjustment estimates from Lintner (1956) model confirm that US 
dividends are smoother than Japanese dividends and Japanese firms reduce dividends in 
response to poor performance more quickly than US firms.  
Survey researchers have taken another path to study the actual behaviour of 
corporations in setting their dividend policies. Instead of using secondary data, they 
have asked corporate managers about their perceptions of dividends. Despite survey 
responses possibly suffering from non-response and incorrect response bias, they 
supplement methods of inferring management motives by providing direct evidence 
about managerial attitudes (Baker et al., 2002). Numerous researchers surveyed chief 
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financial officers of US firms regarding their dividend policy decisions, including Baker 
et al. (1985), Baker and Farrelly (1988), Pruitt and Gitman (1991), Baker and Powell 
(1999), Baker et al. (2002) and Brav et al. (2005). In general, evidence from survey 
research suggested that the major determinants of dividend policy decisions are still 
strikingly similar to Lintner’s (1956) findings and managers tend to avoid spectacular 
changes in dividend rates that may soon need to be reversed, have a target payout ratio 
and periodically adjust their dividends toward the target. Benartzi et al. (1997, p.1032) 
concluded that “…..Lintner’s model of dividends remains the best description of the 
dividend setting process available.” 
A number of studies investigated dividend policy behaviour in different developing 
countries by using Lintner’s (1956) model. For instance, Mookerjee (1992) applied the 
Lintner model to firms in the private sector in a developing country, India. The results 
showed that the basic Lintner model performs well in explaining dividend payout 
behaviour during the period 1950-1981 in India. However, the explanatory power of the 
model was significantly increased by the inclusion of external finance as an additional 
explanatory variable in the dividend model. In Turkey, Adaoglu (2000) found that the 
main factor that determined the cash dividend payments was the current earnings. Also, 
Lintner’s speed of adjustment factor was found to be 1.00, which was at the maximum 
level, meaning that the ISE firms did not smooth the dividends during the period 1985-
1997. Until 1995, the ISE firms were regulated to pay 50% of their distributable income 
as cash dividends. Because of this regulation of compulsory distribution of profits, the 
firms followed earnings-oriented dividend policies and any variability in the earnings of 
the firm was directly reflected in the level of cash dividends. Even though 1995 
regulatory change provided greater flexibility to the ISE firms in choosing their own 
dividend policies, they continued to follow unstable dividend policies during the period 
1995-1997.  
Pandey’s (2001) empirical study showed support for the Lintner model in the emerging 
Malaysian market, revealing that Malaysian firms relied both on past dividends and 
current earnings in setting the current period’s dividend payments during the period 
1993-2000. Nevertheless, they had lower payout ratios and higher adjustment factors, 
pointing out that the Malaysian firms have low smoothing and less stable dividend 
policies. Furthermore, in their famous study regarding dividend policy behaviour in 
emerging markets, Aivazian et al. (2003a) compared the dividend behaviour of firms 
operating in developing countries with the dividend policies of US firms. Their sample 
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consisted of the largest firms from eight emerging markets (South Korea, Malaysia, 
Zimbabwe, India, Thailand, Turkey, Pakistan and Jordan) and 100 US firms over the 
period 1980-1990. The study results showed that current dividends in developing 
countries were much less sensitive to lagged dividends than the US control sample of 
companies and the Lintner model indeed still worked well for the US firms, whereas it 
did not work very well for the emerging market companies. Aivazian et al. (2003a) 
concluded that the institutional structures of developing countries compose corporate 
dividend policy a less feasible mechanism for signalling or for reducing agency costs 
than for US firms operating in capital markets with arm’s length transactions.  
In another study, Al-Najjar (2009) used the Lintner model to investigate dividend 
smoothing and stability of Jordanian firms during the period 1994-2003. The study 
findings reported that the Lintner model successfully explains Jordanian markets' 
dividend behaviour and further suggested that the Jordanian firms have target payout 
ratios. They slowly adjust dividends to their target but relatively faster than those in US 
(developed) market. Chemmanur et al. (2010) compared corporate dividend policies in 
Hong Kong and the US from 1984 to 2002. Their analysis of the Lintner model revealed 
that dividend payout in Hong Kong is more closely related to current year earnings and 
therefore the extent of dividend smoothing by firms in Hong Kong is considerably less 
than those in the US.  
Al-Ajmi and Abo Hussain (2011) studied the stability of dividend policy in the 
emerging Saudi Arabian market for the period 1990-2006. The empirical results showed 
that lagged dividends and current earnings have the expected signs and are statistically 
significant as proposed by Lintner (1956). Further, Saudi firms have more flexible 
dividend policies since they act quickly to increase dividend payments and are willing 
to cut or skip dividends when earnings decline. More recently, Al-Malkawi et al. (2014) 
examined dividend smoothing of Omani companies using Lintner’s (1956) partial 
adjustment model and the extended version covering the period 2001-2010. Their 
results provided empirical evidence supporting the validity of Lintner’s original 
findings; Omani companies seem to adjust their dividends toward the target payout ratio 
gradually, more interestingly with a relatively low speed of adjustment, as compared to 
other firms in developed and emerging economies. In addition, the empirical evidence 
also suggested that the 2008 global financial crisis had no significant impact on 
dividend stability of Omani corporations.  
Birkbeck University of London Page 208 
Financial markets in Turkey were strictly regulated until a financial liberalisation 
programme was implemented in 1980. After the adoption of related regulations enacted 
and launched in the subsequent years, the Istanbul Stock Exchange was officially 
established in December 1985 and commenced its operations on January 3, 1986 (CMB, 
2003). A number of studies revealed that Turkey is a civil law country (La Porta et al., 
1997) where corporate ownership structure is characterised by highly concentrated 
family ownership (Gursoy and Aydogan, 1999 and Yurtoglu, 2003), and has a bank-
based financial system (Aivazian et al., 2003a; 2003b) where private sector banks 
dominate the market and are mainly part of bigger family-owned business groups; 
including banks, businesses and subsidiaries in the same group (Erturk, 2003). As a 
result of this infrastructure, families have control over many banks that belong to their 
business groups and the banks’ lending decisions, which led to business groups 
obtaining much of their finance from their own banks, in other words allowing non-
arm’s length party transactions (Yurtoglu, 2003; IIF, 2005; Aksu and Kosedag, 2006). 
Dividend policy in the ISE was heavily regulated when it first started to operate in 
1986. For the fiscal years 1985-1994, the first mandatory dividend policy was 
implemented by the enactment of Capital Markets Law in 1982 and, according to the 
first regulation on dividend payments, the ISE-listed firms were obliged to distribute at 
least 50% of their distributable income as a cash dividend, which was known as “first 
dividend” in the Turkish capital market. Without paying the “first dividend”, all other 
dividend payments such as the payments to employers or maintaining it as retained 
earnings, were not legally possible (Adaoglu, 1999; 2000). The main purpose of this 
mandatory dividend payment regulation was to protect minority shareholders rights by 
providing them satisfactory levels of dividends, since the liquidity in the stock capital 
markets was almost non-existent, as there was no stock exchange before 1986 and the 
only source of income for minority shareholders was the dividend income (Aytac, 
1998).  
Lintner’s (1956) famous classic study revealed that managers are concerned about 
dividend signalling over time and indeed various studies to date in developed as well as 
emerging markets have shown consistent results. Contrarily, the limited research 
(Adaoglu, 2000; Aivazian et al., 2003a) conducted in Turkey reported that the Lintner 
model did not work well explaining dividend behaviour in Turkey; the ISE-listed firms 
followed unstable cash dividend payments and the level of current earnings of firms in a 
given year was the main determinant affecting the firms’ cash dividend payments. 
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However, Adaoglu (2000) and Aivazian et al. (2003a) examined the dividend behaviour 
of Turkish firms for the period while the dividend payments of the ISE listed firms were 
heavily regulated due to the first mandatory dividend policy (they were obliged to pay 
at least 50% of their distributable income as cash dividends) imposed by the CMB, 
which did not provide much flexibility to the managers of these firms to choose their 
own dividend policies. Therefore, one can expect that cash dividend payments were 
solely dependent on the firms’ current year earnings, as forced by regulations, and any 
variability in earnings of the firms was directly reflected in the level of cash dividends. 
In this period, Turkey also had issues with insider lending, in other words non-arm’s 
length transactions, within business groups owned by families, which reduced the need 
for dividend signalling and stability for the ISE firms, as suggested by Aivazian et al. 
(2003a; 2003b) and Dewenter and Warther (1998).  
Following the November 2002 elections which resulted in one-party, the new Turkish 
government signed a standby agreement with the IMF and began to implement major 
economic programs and structural reforms for a better working of the market economy, 
outward-orientation and globalisation in March 2003 (CMB, 2003; Adaoglu, 2008; 
Birol, 2011). Further, Turkey’s progress in achieving full membership of the EU in this 
period also provided the strongest motivation in establishing new reforms, rules and 
regulations to improve corporate governance and transparency and disclosure practices; 
therefore, to integrate its economy with Europe and to harmonise its institutions with 
those of the EU (IIF, 2005; Aksu and Kosedag, 2006). Accordingly, there are reasons 
that may suggest the ISE-listed firms may adopt dividend smoothing and follow stable 
dividend policies as in developed markets after the implementation of major reforms in 
2003.  
Along with many other regulations and reforms, the CMB of Turkey made many 
amendments to improve the transparency and quality of the banking sector and adopted 
“The Banking Sector Restructuring Program” in May 2001 for restructuring the public 
banks, rehabilitation of private banking system, strengthening of surveillance and 
supervision frame to increase efficiency in the sector (BRSA, 2010). Moreover, with the 
introduction of “Regulation on Establishment and Operations of Banks” in July 2001, 
the risk group definition and calculation of loan limits for a single business group 
(including banks, businesses and subsidiaries in the same group), considering direct and 
connected lending, were established to prevent insider lending (non-arm’s length 
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transactions) as a source of financing. Therefore, the ISE firms have turned to the equity 
market with a greater incentive for more transparent financing (IIF, 2005).  
Another reason that might suggest the ISE firms may smooth their dividends relates to 
the much more flexible mandatory dividend policy regulations imposed by the CMB 
after the implementation of major reforms in 2003. The CMB replaced the second 
mandatory dividend policy that forced the ISE firms to pay at least 20% of their 
distributable income as the “first dividend”. However, in a more flexible way from the 
first mandatory dividend payment policy between 1985 and 1994, the listed firms did 
not have to pay the “first dividend” all in cash. They had the option to distribute it in 
cash dividends or stock dividends or both, which was subject to the board of directors’ 
decision but the total payment could not be less than 20% of the distributable income 
for the fiscal year 2003. Further, for the fiscal year 2004, the CMB increased the 
minimum percentage of mandatory dividend payments for the ISE-listed firms from 
20% to 30%, which remained at this level for the fiscal year 2005. Then, the minimum 
percentage of mandatory dividend payment level was reduced to 20% again, in the 
fiscal year 2006, and stayed at this level for the fiscal years 2007 and 2008. 
Nevertheless, from the fiscal year 2009 and onwards (2010, 2011 and 2012), the CMB 
decided to not determine a minimum dividend payout ratio, and abolished mandatory 
minimum dividend payment distribution requirement for the ISE firms, which provided 
total freedom for the ISE-listed firms in making their own dividend policy decisions, 
allowing investors to interpret dividend policies of firms efficiently in reflecting their 
judgements in the share prices (Adaoglu, 2008; Kirkulak and Kurt, 2010). 
In this context, the ISE firms may adopt deliberate cash dividend policies to signal 
information to investors during the period, when the mandatory dividend policy is 
considerably relaxed and the insider lending (non-arm’s length transactions) is 
prevented as a source of financing, following the implementation of major reforms in 
2003. Additionally, the evidence conducted by a number of researchers (Mookerje, 
1992; Pandey, 2001; Al-Najjar, 2009; Chemmanur et al., 2010; Al-Ajmi and Abo 
Hussain, 2011; Al-Malkawi et al., 2014) showed support of the Lintner model in 
explaining dividend behaviour in different emerging markets but generally reported 
higher adjustment factors, hence lower smoothing and less stable dividend policies 
compared to developed countries. Yet, it is hypothesised that the ISE firms also have 
dividend behaviour consistent with the Lintner model and they have their target payout 
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ratio and adjust their dividends by dividend smoothing at a degree that may be different 
to the developed markets. Therefore: 
Hypothesis 1: Cash dividend payments are the functions of the level of net earnings and 
the pattern of dividends paid in the previous year in the Turkish market. 
Although various studies to date have been strongly supportive of Lintner’s (1956) 
findings, reporting consistency in results across different periods of time, his model 
has also been criticised for not considering other factors that may possibly affect 
dividend policy. Some researchers (Darling, 1957; Brittain, 1964; 1966; Fama and 
Babiak, 1968 and Mookerjee, 1992) have attempted to modify and extend Lintner’s 
partial adjustment model in order to indentify the best-fit dividend behaviour model. 
Accordingly, this chapter of the study further pursues several extensions of Lintner’s 
(1956) partial adjustment model by including additional regressors as explanatory 
variables that are observed in the literature, and considered to be possibly influencing 
dividend policies of the firms in the emerging Turkish market, especially during the 
study sample period, 2003-2012. Therefore, the following aspects are discussed and 
the corresponding hypotheses are developed.  
Since emerging markets are generally characterised by higher volatility and are more 
risky, compared to the developed markets (Odabasi et al., 2004), corporations in 
these markets might have more cyclical and impermanent earnings, which would 
result in fluctuated dividend changes if those corporations do not carefully evaluate 
the changes in the levels of earnings and adjust their dividend policies consequently 
(Adaoglu, 2000). Therefore, lagged earnings patterns are important to indicate a 
record of positive or negative earnings and the persistent earnings problems 
(Kirkulak and Kurt, 2010). Indeed, Fama and Babiak (1968) emphasised the 
importance of the lagged earnings in determining cash dividend payments of a firm 
and re-evaluated the Lintner model by adding the lagged earnings as an explanatory 
variable. Fama and Babiak (1968, p.1160) further concluded that “…..The two-
variable Lintner model, including a constant term, Dt-1 and Et , performs well relative 
to other models; in general, however, deleting the constant and adding the lagged 
profits variable Et-1 leads to a slight improvement in predictive power of the model.” 
Accordingly, the following hypothesis is developed to test the effect of adding the 
lagged earnings variable into the basic Lintner model in the Turkish market.  
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Hypothesis 2: Cash dividend payments are the functions of the level of net earnings 
and lagged net earnings, and the pattern of dividends paid in the previous year in the 
Turkish market.  
Mookerjee (1992) attempted to examine whether the basic Lintner model explains 
dividend payout behaviour in the emerging Indian market, and more interestingly, 
drew attention to the importance of the viability of external finance in the context of 
developing countries, where the financial and institutional environments, within 
which firms operate, are different than those from developed countries. Moreover, 
the empirical findings showed that the Lintner model performed well in explaining 
dividend behaviour in India over the period 1950-1981, but the inclusion of the 
external finance into the model as an explanatory variable significantly improved the 
predictive power of the model, which revealed that firms in India used external 
finance to augment cash dividend payments. Mookerjee (1992) suggested that this 
finding was a reflection of the availability of bank loans provided to Indian firms, 
which were legally allowed to use external finance to augment dividend payments, at 
subsidised rates. Hence, the viability of external finance might also be an important 
determinant of dividend payments. 
Dividend policy may be a more useful pre-commitment and signalling device in 
markets that are greatly dependent on arm’s length transactions (Aivazian et al., 2003a; 
2003b). As previously mentioned, Turkey had issues with insider lending (non-arm’s 
length transactions) within business groups owned by families who have control over 
many banks, whereby they belong to their business groups, and the banks’ lending 
decisions, which may lead to business groups obtaining much of their finance from their 
own banks, reducing the need for dividend signalling and stability for the ISE firms. 
However, the CMB of Turkey made many amendments to improve the transparency and 
quality of the banking sector and adopted related regulations to prevent insider lending 
(non-arm’s length transactions) as a source of financing in 2001. Therefore, the ISE 
firms have turned to the equity market with a greater incentive for more transparent 
financing. This may imply that external financing may have significant effects on cash 
dividend payments of the ISE firms, since external financing that they now obtain from 
arm’s length parties can be more costly – in fact, a significantly negative effect of debt 
on dividend policy decisions of the ISE-listed firms is reported in the previous empirical 
chapter. Accordingly, the following hypothesis is formulated to test the effect of adding 
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the external finance (current and lagged level of external financing) variable into the 
basic Lintner model in the Turkish market.   
Hypothesis 3: Cash dividend payments are the functions of the level of net earnings, the 
pattern of dividends paid in the previous year and the level of current and lagged 
external finance in the Turkish market.  
Turkish economy has often experienced global effects from a number of geopolitical, 
financial and economic crises, including the Gulf War Crisis in 1991, the Asia Crisis 
in 1997, the Russian Crisis in 1998 and the Argentinean Crisis in 2000. It also 
suffered from the big financial shock due to the depreciation of Turkish Lira in 1994, 
experienced heavy turmoil from the failure of the Turkish disinflation program in 
1999 and had gone through a rigorous banking crisis that resulted in substantial loses 
for shareholders, and many corporations declared bankruptcy in 2001 (Adaoglu, 
2008; BRSA, 2010; Kirkulak and Kurt, 2010). However, each crisis did not have 
obvious impacts for the dividend policies of the ISE-listed firms. For instance, the 
economic crisis in 1994, due to the depreciation of the Turkish Lira, did not affect 
dividend payment decisions very much, whereas the severe banking crisis in 2001 
had an extensive negative effect on dividend payments of the ISE firms (Adaoglu, 
2008; Kirkulak and Kurt, 2010). In this respect, Kirkulak and Kurt (2010) examined 
dividend policy of the ISE firms from 1991 through 2006, the period that 
experienced several financial crises. They used yearly dummies for the years from 
1997 to 2002 to capture possible effects of the financial crises on dividend payment 
decisions in the Turkish market. The results showed that the crises in 1997 and 1998 
did not have any significant effects on dividend policies but the banking crisis in 
2001 and its extensive impact in 2002 had significantly negative effects forcing the 
ISE firms to reduce or not to pay dividends.  
Following the series of geopolitical, financial and economic crises between the early 
1990’s and the early 2000s, Turkish economy bounced back and enjoyed a strong 
uninterrupted growth until 2007 (Adaoglu, 2008; CMB, 2012). This improvement 
was perhaps reflecting a more efficient process since the new Turkish government 
signed a standby agreement with the IMF, as well as attempting to integrate its 
economy with the EU and began to implement major economic programs and serious 
structural reforms in the fiscal year 2003. However, the September 2008 global crisis 
also markedly hit Turkey and abruptly interrupted the recent expansion of its 
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economy (Rawdanowicz, 2010; Yorukoglu and Atasoy, 2010; Birol, 2011). 
Accordingly, it is worth investigating whether the September 2008 global crisis 
affected the dividend payment decisions of the ISE-listed firms, since this study 
covers the period 2003-2012. Therefore, the following hypothesis is developed to test 
the effect of adding the yearly dummies, which reflect the 2008 global crisis and its 
effects in the subsequent years, into the basic Lintner model.  
Hypothesis 4: Cash dividend payments are the functions of the level of net earnings 
and the pattern of dividends paid in the previous year and are negatively affected by 
the 2008 global crisis in the Turkish market. 
 
4.3 Methodology  
The following sub-sections describe the methodology used in this chapter of the study. 
First, the sample data is explained, followed by the variables and models are presented, 
which are employed in order to test the research hypotheses.  
4.3.1 Sample Data 
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the information content of cash dividend 
payments after the implementation of major economic and structural reforms starting 
with the fiscal year 2003, in the emerging Turkish market, by applying the Linter’s 
(1956) model, examining how the Turkish firms set their cash dividends, and whether 
they prefer stable divided policies as in developed markets. Therefore, the data sample 
is drawn from the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) according to the subsequent criteria:  
1. First, all companies listed on the ISE during the period 2003-2012 are 
considered, unlike some studies (Dewenter and Warther, 1998; Adaoglu, 2000; Baker et 
al., 2002; 2006; 2008) that restrict their sample to dividend paying companies.58 A long 
panel data set allows testing the degree of dividend smoothing and dividend stability in 
a way that cannot be achieved using cross-sectional data.  
                                                          
58
 For instance, Dewenter and Warther’s (1998) and Adaoglu’s (2000) studies included only the firms 
with at least 5 years of nonzero cash dividend, which may be biased due to the sample selection errors 
since only analysing regular or frequent dividend-paying companies may lead to different results and 
these results may not represent dividend policy behaviour of the market as a whole. Because, some 
companies might not distribute cash dividends as often as regular dividend-payers or they may make 
dividends payments regardless of dividend smoothing and dividend stability considerations, whereas 
others might tend to avoid such payments in the context of emerging markets but zero cash dividend 
payment may still be a dividend policy itself. Therefore, this study includes all companies in order to 
prevent the sample selection bias and to obtain results that present dividend policy behaviour of the 
Turkish market as a whole during the period 2003-2012. 
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2. Second, financial sector (banks, insurers, pension funds, investment trusts) 
companies and utilities (gas, electric, water) are excluded, since they are governed by 
different regulations and follow arguably different investment and dividend policies. 
After these exclusions, a number of all non-financial and non-regulated corporations 
remain. 
 
3. Third, accounting and financial data for this research is obtained from 
DATASTREAM and the validity of the data is also cross checked with OSIRIS. The 
Stock Exchange Daily Official List (SEDOL) codes and International Security 
Identification Numbers (ISIN) of the companies are used to match companies between 
different databases.  
The sample selection criteria result a panel data set of total 264 non-financial and non-
utility firms listed on the ISE from 14 different industries during the period 2003-2012. 
In order to minimise possible survivorship bias, both companies that delisted, due to the 
mergers and acquisitions, business failure or any other process leading to delisting, and 
companies that listed in the different times during the period 2003-2012, are all 
considered and included in the sample. Therefore, due to the presence of delisted and 
newly listed companies, the sample is not the same for every year; rather it increases 
during the ten-year period from 2003 to 2012, which is known as unbalanced panel 
data. Furthermore, the selection criteria and distribution of the sample across time and 
industries in Table 3.1, and the descriptive statistics for the firm’s characteristics of the 
sampled Turkish companies in Table 3.2 are presented in Chapter 3.  
Moreover, Table 4.1 on the next page reports the descriptive statistics for the firm’s 
dividend policy characteristics from the sampled 264 ISE-listed companies with 2,112 
firm-year observations, over the period 2003-2012. Panel A in the table presents the 
mandatory dividend payout ratio that was imposed by the CMB, the number of the 
sampled firms on the ISE, the percentage of the dividend-paying firms, the average 
dividend payout and dividend yield ratios of the firms, across time.  
After the implementation of major reforms in 2003, the CMB also re-introduced the 
mandatory dividend policy starting in the same year. With the replacement of the 
second mandatory dividend policy, the ISE-listed firms were obliged to pay at least 
20% of their distributable income as dividends. For the fiscal year 2004, the CMB 
increased the minimum percentage of mandatory dividend payments for the ISE-listed 
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firms to 30% from 20%, which remained at this level for the fiscal year 2005. The 
minimum percentage of mandatory dividend payment level was then reduced to 20% 
again in the fiscal year 2006 and remained at this level for the fiscal years 2007 and 
2008. Nevertheless, from the fiscal year 2009 and onwards (2010, 2011 and 2012), the 
CMB decided to not determine a minimum dividend payout ratio and to abolished 
mandatory minimum dividend payment distribution requirement.59 
Table 4.1 Dividend Policy Characteristics for the Sampled Turkish Companies 
Sample includes 264 firms (non-financial and non-utility) listed on the ISE with 2,112 firm-year 
observations during the period 2003-2012. Panel A illustrates the mandatory dividend payout 
policy imposed by the CMB, the number of the sampled firms, percentage of the dividend-paying 
firms, average payout ratio and average dividend yield ratio for the sampled Turkish firms across 
years during the period 2003-2012. Panel B illustrates annual earnings and corresponding cash 
dividend changes of the sample over the relevant time period. 
 
Panel A: Mandatory Payout Ratio, Average Payout Ratio and Dividend Yield of the Sample 
 Fiscal 
 Year 
Mandatory 
Dividend 
Payout Ratio 
Number 
of 
Firms 
Percentage of 
the Dividend 
Paying Firms 
Average Dividend 
Payout Ratio of  
the Firms 
Average Dividend 
Yield Ratio of 
the Firms 
      
2003 20% 157 20% 15% 1.60% 
2004 30% 164 24% 11% 1.63% 
2005 30% 199 36% 20% 1.88% 
2006 20% 211 40% 18% 1.74% 
2007 20% 214 40% 38% 2.51% 
2008 20% 215 38% 45% 2.92% 
2009 0% 218 33% 24% 1.84% 
2010 0% 226 34% 21% 1.55% 
2011 0% 249 34% 18% 1.26% 
2012 0% 259 34% 28% 1.64% 
      
Overall 12% 264 34% 24% 1.85% 
      
 
Panel B: Earnings and Cash Dividend Changes for the Sample  
Earnings Changes  Percentage of Cases in which the ISE Firms 
 
Percentage 
  of Cases 
Increased 
Dividends 
Decreased 
Dividends 
Initiated 
Dividends 
Omitted 
Dividends 
Continued 
Omissions 
Total 
 
Earnings > 0 
 
       
  Increases  39% 21% 13% 10% 6% 50% 100% 
         
  Decreases  31% 21% 20% 7% 28% 24% 100% 
         
Earnings < 0 30% 2% 2% 3% 15% 78% 100% 
         
 Total 100% 15% 12% 7% 15% 51% 100% 
         
 
                                                          
59
 The second mandatory dividend policy replaced by the CMB in 2003 was much more flexible 
compared to the first mandatory dividends policy imposed between 1985 and 1994, since the first 
mandatory dividend policy required the firms to pay at least 50% of their profit as cash dividends. The 
second mandatory dividend policy gave the firms the opportunity to distribute dividends as cash 
dividends, stock dividends or a mixture of both, which was subject to the board of directors’ decision. 
The total payment, however, could not be less than 20% of the distributable income for the fiscal year 
2003. Also, they were given a right to distribute stock dividends with the requirement that the amount of 
stock dividends added to the paid-in capital.  
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As can be observed from Panel A in Table 4.1, the number of firms in the sample 
consistently increased from 157 in 2003 to 259 in 2012. Among those ISE-listed firms, 
20% of them paid cash dividends in 2003 and the percentage of dividend payers 
increased, reaching its peak at 40% in 2006 and 2007. However, the dividend-paying 
firms slightly dropped to 38% in 2008, followed by a further decline, and stayed at the 
level of 33-34% in the subsequent years. Similarly, the average dividend payout ratio 
and dividend yield ratio of the sampled Turkish firms showed similar patterns that 
increased and reached their peak in 2008, experiencing a decrease in the following 
years. This may be the negative consequences of the 2008 global financial crisis, which 
occurred during this period.  
Panel B in Table 4.1 demonstrates the analysis performed to monitor the cash dividend 
policy responses of Turkish firms to earnings changes for 2,112 firm-year observations 
over the period 2003-2012. The annual changes in earnings are categorised as earnings 
increases and decreases when there is profit (earnings > 0), and the third category stands 
for when annual earnings are negative (earnings < 0). The annual changes in dividends 
are categorised as dividend increases, decreases, dividend initiations, dividend 
omissions and continued omissions, then corresponding dividend responses to earnings 
changes are calculated.  
When the earnings increased, the Turkish firms increased their cash dividend payments 
in 21% of all cases, and they started paying cash dividends in 10% of them, whereas the 
firms decreased their cash dividends in 13% of all observations and they stopped 
distributing cash dividends in 6% of them. Even though earnings increased, non-
dividend paying Turkish firms continued not to pay cash dividends in 50% of all 
observations. In the case of earnings decreases, the Turkish firms omitted paying cash 
dividends in 28% of all observations and continued not to distribute dividends in 24% 
of them, whereas the firms decreased their cash dividend payments in 20% of all cases. 
Although earnings declined, the Turkish firms still increased their cash dividends in 
21% of all cases and some of them initiated dividend payments in 7% of all 
observations. When earnings are negative, there is a comparatively different distribution 
of dividend changes responses by the Turkish firms. Not surprisingly, the firms 
decreased (2%), omitted (15%) or kept omitting cash dividends (78%) in total of 95% of 
all observations.  
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4.3.2 Variables and Models  
4.3.2.1 Variable Descriptions  
This study employs the current cash dividend payments for firm i at time t as the 
dependent variable, which is denoted as Divi,t and is measured as the total cash common 
and preferred dividends paid to shareholders of the firm during the period 2003-2012.  
The following two explanatory variables are used in the basic Lintner model, namely 
the current net earnings for firm i at time t and the lagged cash dividend payments for 
firm i that distributed in the year t-1. The current net earnings (Earningsi,t ) is the net 
income after all operating and non-operating income and expense, reserves, income 
taxes, minority interest and extraordinary items of the firm during the period 2003-
2012. The second variable is symbolised as Divi,(t-1) and it is the previous year’s cash 
dividend payments of the firm in the relevant time interval.  
While testing several extensions of Lintner’s (1956) model, the following additional 
explanatory variables are further included. The lagged net earnings is denoted as 
Earningsi,(t-1) and is the previous year’s net earnings of the firm i (at time t-1) over the 
period 2003-2012. Further, the current external finance is defined as the total debt, 
which is the sum of long and short term debt, of the firm i at time t and symbolised as   
Debti,t, whereas the lagged external finance (Debti,(t-1)) is the previous year’s total debt 
of the firm i (at time t-1) during the period 2003-2012. In order to capture the effect of 
the 2008 global financial crisis and its impact on the cash dividend payments of the ISE 
firms in the following years covered by the sample period, yearly dummies for the years 
2008 to 2012, which they take a value of 1 for the year in question and 0 otherwise, are 
included on the right hand side of the Lintner (1956) model.  
Finally, the importance of industrial classification to the dividend policy has been 
argued (Baker et al., 1985 and Moh’d et al., 1995), since firms in different industries 
work under different set of regulations and often have different levels of risk and growth 
potential. Accordingly, INDUSTRY, which represents industry dummies using 
Datastream’s ICB (Industry Classification Benchmark) Codes, is included as a control 
variable in regression models.  
Table 4.2 on the following page demonstrates the summary descriptions of the research 
variables used in the empirical analyses. 
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Table 4.2 Variables and Definitions 
The table illustrates the research variables, their symbols and definitions used for the partial 
adjustment models in the empirical analyses of this chapter of the study. 
 
Variables   Symbols  Definitions  
Dependent Variable 
Current Cash Dividend 
Payments  
Divi,t 
 
The total cash dividends paid to shareholders of firm i 
at year t during the period 2003-2012. 
 
 
Independent Variables  
 
Current Net Earnings 
 
Earningsi,t  
  
The net earnings after all operating and non-operating 
income and expense, reserves, taxes, minority 
interests and extraordinary items of the firm i at year t 
during the period 2003-2012.  
 
 
 
Lagged Net Earnings  
 
Earningsi,(t-1) 
  
The previous year’s (at year t-1) net earnings of the 
firm i during the period 2003-2012. 
 
 
Lagged Cash Dividend 
Payments  
 
 
 
Divi,(t-1) 
  
The previous year’s (at year t-1) total cash dividends 
paid to shareholders of the firm i during the period 
2003-2012. 
 
 
Current External  
Finance 
Debti,t  
  
The total debt, which is the sum of long and short 
term debt, for firm i at year t during the period 2003-
2012. 
 
 
Lagged External  
Finance  
 
Debtt,(t-1) 
  
The previous year’s (at year t-1) total debt for firm i 
during the period 2003-2012. 
 
 
 
Year Effects 
 
 
Year2008 
Year2009 
Year2010 
Year2011 
Year2012 
  
Yearly dummies for the years from 2008 to 2012, 
which they take a value of 1 for the year in question 
and 0 otherwise, to capture the effect of the 2008 
global financial crisis and its impact in the following 
years covered by the sample period.  
 
 
 
Industry Effect  
 
INDUSTRY 
  
Industry dummies using 14 different industry 
classifications of the firms, according to Datastream’s 
Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) codes.  
 
 
     
          
 
4.3.2.2 Research Design and Models  
The research is aimed to provide an empirical examination on the signalling theory 
explanation, applying Lintner’s (1956) partial adjustment model in order to identify 
whether the publicly-listed companies adopt stable dividend policies using dividend 
smoothing as proposed by Lintner (1956) in the emerging Turkish market, after the 
implementation of major reforms in 2003. Accordingly, a large-scale panel dataset that 
covers a relatively recent long time period is created, which allows for testing the 
degree of dividend smoothing and dividend stability in this study; the research sample 
contains a panel dataset of 264 non-financial and non-utility firms listed on the ISE over 
a ten-year period 2003-2012. 
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This chapter of the study uses pooled OLS60 and two types of panel data models, namely 
fixed effects61 and random effects62 estimations in order to test the research hypotheses 
and to obtain comparable and more valid results. Due to missing observations, because 
of newly listed and delisted companies, the sample is not the same for every year over 
                                                          
60
 The basic model using pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) is as follows:  
Yit  = α + β X’it  + uit    
It has double subscripts, where i denotes for cross-sectional entities in the sample (i = 1,…,N) and t 
stands for time period (t = 1,….,T). Yit is the dependant variable and X’it  is a K-dimensional  vector of the 
explanatory variables. Further, α is the intercept, β is the slope of the coefficients of the explanatory 
variables and uit is the error term. This pooled OLS approach takes that the intercept, α, and the slope 
coefficients in β are identical for all entities and time periods. Similarly, the error term, uit,, is based on the 
assumption of  independent and identically distributed over entities and time and (Verbeek, 2008).  
61
 Fixed effects approach (also known as the Least-Squares Dummy Variable model) takes that the slope 
of coefficients are constant but the intercept varies between entities to control for omitted variables in 
panel data while omitted variables vary across entities but do not change over time (Stock and Watson, 
2003). In this case, the model is as follows:  
Yit  = αi + β X’it  + uit    
Where, αi  has subscript i (i = 1,…,N) to illustrate that the intercept for each entity may be different and 
they are fixed unknown constants that are measured along with β, where error term is typically assumed 
to be independent and identically distributed over entities and time. In short, all intercept term α is 
omitted since it is subsumed by the individual intercept αi. The fixed effects capture all (un)observable 
time-invariant differences across entities (Verbeek, 2008). As dummy variables are used to estimate fixed 
effects, in the literature this model is also called as the least-squares dummy variable (LSDV) model 
(Gujarati, 2003). Moreover, Gujarati (2003) states that fixed effects model allows to differ among 
individuals in detection of the fact that each individual, or cross-sectional, entity might have some special 
characteristics of its own. Hence, fixed effects model is suitable in situations where the individual-
specific intercept might be correlated with one or more regressors. However, a disadvantage of the model 
is that it consumes a lot of degrees of the freedom when the sample, N, is very large, in which case N 
dummies have to be introduced in the regression. Also, fixed effects model may not be able to estimate 
the impact of time-invariant explanatory variables (such as sex, colour or ethnicity) since they do not 
change over time.  
62
 In the random effects model (also referred as Error Components Model), the intercept αi is treated as a 
random variable rather than fixed constant. The αi is assumed to be independent of errors uit and also 
mutually independent. Then, the intercept for each firm can be expressed as:  αi = α + ui , where α is the 
random variable with a mean value of intercept and uit  is a random error. Thus, the random effects model 
can be written as follows:  
Yit  = α + β X’it  + ui + μit      
Or  it can be expressed as:   
 Yit  = α + β X’it  + wit  
Where, wit = ui + μit , which is called the composite error term that consists of two components, ui is the 
cross-section or individual-specific error component and μit is the combined time series and cross-section 
error component. The term error components model (ECM) derives its name because the composite error 
term wit contains of two error components. The random effects model assumes that the intercept of an 
individual entity is a random drawing from a much larger population with a constant mean value. The 
individual intercept is therefore expressed as a deviation from this constant mean value. The main 
advantage of the random effects over fixed effects is that it is efficient in terms of degrees of freedom 
since N cross-sectional intercepts do not have to be estimated (only the mean value of the  intercept and 
its variance need to be estimated). The random effects model is suitable in situations where the random 
intercept of each cross-sectional entity is uncorrelated with the regressors (Maddala, 2001; Gujarati, 
2003). 
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the period 2003-2012, and hence the study provides an unbalanced panel dataset for the 
relevant period. However, the methods used in this study can be used with both a 
balanced and unbalanced panel data. 
Lintner (1956) used aggregate data to explain dividend decisions of individual firms. 
Accordingly, the basic Lintner model of aggregate corporate dividend behaviour is 
applied by controlling for industry effect on the Turkish panel dataset, which is 
specified as below:  
Model 1:     Divi,t = αi + β1Earningsi,t + β2Divi,(t-1) +  
 
   βj INDUSTRYj,i,t + ui,t  
Furthermore, this chapter also pursues several extensions of Lintner’s (1956) partial 
adjustment model by including additional regressors as explanatory variables on the 
right hand side of the equation. First, the effect of adding the lagged earnings variable 
into the basic Lintner model is tested by using the following corresponding model:  
Model 2:  Divi,t = αi + β1Earningsi,t + β2Earningsi,(t-1) + β3Divi,(t-1) +   
 
   βj 
INDUSTRYj,i,t + ui,t  
Second, the current and lagged total debt variables are included into the Lintner model 
to test the effect of the external finance. Therefore, the related model is as follows:  
Model 3:    Divi,t = αi + β1Earningsi,t + β2Divi,(t-1) + β3Debti,t  + β4Debti,(t-1) +   
 
   βj 
INDUSTRYj,i,t + ui,t  
Moreover, the effect of adding yearly dummies for the years from 2008 to 2012 
(reflecting the 2008 global crisis and its impact in the subsequent years) into the basic 
Lintner model is tested by the corresponding model below:  
Model 4:   Divi,t = αi + β1Earningsi,t + β2Divi,(t-1) + β3Year2008 + β4Year2009 +  
β5Year2010 + β6Year2011 + β7Year2012 +   
 
   βj INDUSTRYj,i,t + ui,t   
 
4.3.2.3 Descriptive Statistics of the Variables  
Table 4.3 below displays the descriptive statistics (mean, median, standard deviation, 
maximum and minimum values, skewness and kurtosis) for the research variables used 
in the empirical analyses. The panel dataset (unbalanced) includes 264 Turkish firms 
(non-financial and non-utility) listed on the ISE with 2,112 firm year observations 
during the period, 2003-2012. Further, in order to remove the inflation effect over the 
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period, all research variables are measured in real terms and normalised by the 
consumer price index (CPI) deflator using 2003 as a base year. The CPI deflator data is 
taken from the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT) database.  
However, it should be noted that the inflation adjusted descriptive statistics for the 
lagged versions of research variables are based on 1,846 firm-year observations. In 
addition, all figures of the research variables summarised in the table are in millions of 
Turkish Lira (TL).  
Table 4.3 Inflation Adjusted Descriptive Statistics of the Research Variables 
The table reports the descriptive statistics for the research variables. The unbalanced panel 
dataset includes 264 firms (non-financial & non-utility) listed on the ISE with 2,112 firm-year 
observations over the period 2003-2012. It is worth noting that the descriptive statistics for the 
lagged versions of the variables are based on 1,846 firm-year observations. 
 
 
Variables  
 
 Mean 
 
 
Median 
 
   S.D. 
 
   Min 
 
  Max 
 
Skewness 
 
 
Kurtosis 
 
 
 
Divi,t 
 
20.30 0.000 114.1 0.000 2484 12.97 215.4 
 
 
Divi,(t-1) 
 
19.42 0.000 111.6 0.000 2484 13.55 236.9 
 
 
Earningsi,t 
 
46.98 4.556 184.4  -1123 2422     6.541 63.09 
 
 
Earningsi,(t-1) 
 
43.98 4.446 173.7  -1123 2257 6.383 62.69 
 
 
Debti,t 
 
196.9 24.99 602.7  0.000 7987 5.838 48.05 
 
 
Debti,(t-1) 
 
181.6 24.37 554.2 0.000 7581 5.739 46.31 
 
 
 
       
 
4.3.2.4 Correlation Matrix and VIF Values of the Independent Variables  
Table 4.4 below presents the correlation matrix and the Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) 
of the independent variables.   
Table 4.4 Correlation Matrix & VIF Values of Independent Variables 
 
 Divi,(t-1) 
 
Earningsi,t 
 
Earningsi,(t-1) 
 
Debti,t 
 
Debti,(t-1) 
 
VIF 
 
1/VIF 
 
Divi,(t-1) 
 
1.000     2.38 0.420 
 
Earningsi,t 
 
0.715 1.000    3.87 0.258 
 
Earningsi,(t-1) 
 
0.734 0.830 1.000   3.85 0.259 
 
Debti,t -0.479 -0.567 -0.551 1.000  7.82 0.127 
 
Debti,(t-1) 
 
-0.448 -0.573 -0.516 0.939 1.000 7.73 0.129 
 
There seems to be a high correlation between the current and lagged values of the 
variables. However, to identify more directly if multicollinearity exists between 
independent variables, the VIF statistics are used. As a rule of thumb, the VIF values 
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larger than 10 generally suggest multicollinearity. Tolerance, calculated as 1/VIF, is 
also used to check the degree of multicollinearity, if a tolerance value is lower than 0.1, 
which corresponds to a VIF value of 10, it implies multicollinearity. As observed from 
the table, none of the VIF values exceed 10, nor are the tolerance values smaller than 
0.1, the results therefore suggest that there is no serious multicollineariy.   
 
4.4 Empirical Results  
The estimation results for the research models using the pooled OLS, random effects, 
fixed effects and robustness check (the system GMM) regressions are summarised in 
Table 4.5, Table 4.7, Table 4.8 and Table 4.9. The regression estimates are collected 
from a large panel dataset of 264 Turkish firms listed on the ISE over the period 2003-
2012. It is noted that the number of the firm-year observations is 1,846 in the different 
model specifications.  
In order to control for heteroscadasticity, the pooled OLS and fixed effects models are 
tested using White’s corrected hetereoscadasticity robust regressions. Hence, the models 
in this chapter do not suffer from hetereoscadasticity. This section reports and discusses 
the results of the empirical analyses.  
4.4.1 The Lintner (1956) Model Analyses  
Table 4.5 below reports the results of pooled OLS, panel models (random effects and 
fixed effects) and robustness check (the system GMM) estimations applying the Lintner 
(1956) model (Model 1). The following conclusions can be drawn from the table.  
1. The overall pooled OLS model is significant at the 1% level as evidenced by F-
statistic. Similarly, panel models (the random effects model at the 1% level as 
evidenced by the Wald X
2
 and the fixed effects model at the 5% level as evidence by the 
F-statistic) are overall significant.  
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Table 4.5 Results of the Lintner (1956) Model applied on the Turkish Firms 
 
Dependent Variable: Cash Dividends(t)  
 
Pooled 
OLS 
Panel Models 
 
  Robustness Check 
 Random 
Effects 
 Fixed 
Effects 
The System 
        GMM Independent Variables: 
Earnings(t) 0.146*** 0.164***  0.089*** 0.133*** 
 (4.01) (4.05)  (2.71) (3.52) 
      
Cash Dividends(t-1) 0.658*** 0.646***  0.212 0.690*** 
 (6.41) (6.27)  (1.39) (9.10) 
      
Constant  3.816 1.394  12.79*** 3.102 
 (1.24) (0.44)  (3.25) (1.17) 
      
 
Industry dummies  
 
  Yes   Yes       -   Yes  
      
The target payout ratio (r) 0.427 0.463  0.113 0.429 
The speed of adjustment (c) 0.342 0.354  0.788 0.310 
 
Number of Observations  
 
1,846 
 
1,846  
 
1.846 
 
1,846 
F-Statistic 34.27***     -  3.73** 219.36*** 
Wald X
2
     -   493.19***      -           - 
      
R-Squared 81.4% 81.2%  80.2%           - 
      
Lagrange Multiplier Test  1.80  
F-Test  1.09  
Hausman Test
† 
 -  
      
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1)     Pr > z = 0.033 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2)     Pr > z = 0.307 
Hansen overidentifying test     Pr > chi2 = 0.216 
Number of instruments     59 
      
Notes: Table reports coefficients and t/z-statistics in the parenthesis. The pooled OLS and fixed effects 
models are tested using White’s corrected heteroscedasticity robust regressions. Robustness Check 
analysis is estimated using Blundell and Bond’s (1998) the system GMM. The two-step, robust (standard 
error correction), small (corrections that result in t instead of z test statistic for the coefficients and F 
instead of Wald X
2
 test for overall fit) and orthogonal (maximising sample size in panels with gaps) 
commands are used to make the estimations even more robust. ***, ** and * stand for significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
†
Since the pooled OLS model is found to be more favourable, 
Hausman specification test, which compares the fixed and random effects models, is not needed.  
 
2. The Lagrange Multiplier test statistic is 1.80 (p = 0.179) and not statistically 
significant, which means that the pooled OLS model is more appropriate than the 
random effects model.63 Further, the F-test value is found to be 1.09 (p = 0.364) and not 
statistically significant. Therefore, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that no fixed 
effects (group and time) are needed; hence, the pooled OLS is favoured over the fixed 
                                                          
63
 Breusch and Pagan (1980) have developed a Lagrange multiplier test for the random effects model 
based on the OLS residuals, which helps to determine between random effects and pooled OLS 
regressions.  
 
H0 :  ơit 
2
 = 0 
H1 :  ơit 
2
 ≠ 0 
 
Where, the null hypothesis is that variances across entities are zero, in other words no significant 
difference across entities, hence no panel effect. This means that the null hypothesis states that the pooled 
OLS is appropriate rather than the random effects, if it holds. Nevertheless, if the null hypothesis is 
rejected, that means that there is panel effect and the random effects model is appropriate (Greene, 2003).  
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effects model as well.64 Since both null hypothesis of Lagrange Multiplier test and F-test 
are not rejected, the pooled OLS is consequently the most appropriate model and 
therefore the following results regarding the Lintner (1956) model are reported, based 
on the pooled OLS estimations. This is consistent with Al-Najjar (2009), who found the 
pooled OLS model is more favourable than panel models. Aivazian et al. (2003a) too 
obtained their estimations by the pooled OLS regressions. However, Adaoglu (2000) 
reported that the random effects model is more suitable to examine dividend behaviour 
of Turkish firms during the period 1985-1997 by applying the Lintner model. In 
addition, it is worth noting that, the Hausman65 specification test compares fixed and 
random effects models in order to decide which one is more favourable. Nevertheless, 
as the pooled OLS model is found to be more appropriate than the panel models in this 
study, the Hausman specification test is not needed.  
 
3. The R-squared value of 81.4 is very high and suggests that the model is able to 
explain about 81% of the variation in cash dividend payments in the ISE-listed firms. 
This is consistent with Lintner’s (1956) original study that reported the R-squared value 
of 85% in the US, Adaoglu’s (2000) research that found the adjusted R-squared value of 
89% in Turkey, Al-Najjar’s (2009) empirical work that showed the R-squared value of 
80% in Jordan, and Chemmanur et al. (2010) who reported the adjusted R-squared 
values of 84% in the US and 86% in Hong Kong in their study.  
 
4. Lintner (1956) found that the regression constant was significant and positive in 
his original model. He interpreted this finding as the indication that US managers are 
reluctant to avoid dividend cuts even when earnings decrease, unless adverse 
circumstances are likely to persist. The regression constant for the ISE-listed firms is 
found also to be positive (3.8 million TL) but not significant, suggesting that there is a 
                                                          
64 The F-test compares a fixed effect model with a pooled OLS model. In a regression model of that Yit = 
α + μi + Xit
 ′β+ Ɛit, the null hypothesis is that all dummy parameters except for one for the dropped are all 
zero;  
 
H0 = μ1 =.…. = μn-1 = 0 
 
The alternative hypothesis is that at least one dummy parameter is not zero. If the null hypothesis rejected 
(at least one group/time specific intercept is not zero), it may be concluded that there is a significant fixed 
effect; therefore, the fixed effects model is better than the pooled OLS (Park, 2011).  
 
65
 Hausman (1978) proposed a test based on the difference between the random effects and fixed effects 
estimates by testing the correlation between the explanatory variables (X) and the individual random 
errors (ui). Since the fixed effects model is consistent when ui and Xit are correlated but the random effects 
model is inconsistent, a statistically significant difference is interpreted as evidence against the random 
effects assumptions. Hausman test checks for strict exogeneity, if no correlation is detected then the 
random effects should be employed. Further, the test implements the null hypothesis that the random 
effects estimator is more efficient than the fixed effects estimator (Wooldridge, 2010).  
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tendency for the Turkish firms to not decrease their cash dividends, but they are not as 
reluctant as the US companies. 
 
5. The empirical results show that current earnings and lagged cash dividend 
payments are positively significant factors in determining current cash dividend 
payments of the listed Turkish firms, since the regressions coefficients of earnings and 
lagged cash dividends are found to be positive and significant at the 1% significance 
level. This indicates that the Lintner’s (1956) partial adjustment model works well for 
explaining cash dividend policy behaviour of the ISE firms during the period 2003-
2012, after Turkey implemented major economic and structural reforms in 2003 as well 
as adopting more flexible mandatory dividend policy regulations and attempting to 
prevent insider lending (non-arm’s length transactions). This is inconsistent with earlier 
research (Adaoglu, 2000; Aivazian, 2003a), which showed no support to the validity of 
the Lintner model in the Turkish market; possibly due to the relatively much poorer 
structural and microeconomic policies, poorer culture of corporate governance, 
transparency and disclosure practices, with weaker minority investors protections and 
the presence of rigid mandatory dividend policy imposed to the ISE firms during the 
earlier periods. Therefore, we can accept Hypothesis 1 that cash dividend payments are 
the functions of the level of net earnings and the pattern of dividends paid in the 
previous year in the Turkish market.  
4.4.2 Robustness Check for the Lintner (1956) Model 
One of the major advantages of panel data is the ability to model individual dynamics. 
A dynamic model can be estimated on an individual level by including one or more 
lagged values of the dependent variable among its explanatory variables (Baltagi, 2002). 
Indeed, Lintner’s (1956) partial adjustment model suggests that the current behaviour of 
cash dividend payments depends upon the past behaviour of cash dividends along with 
the current level of earnings.  
Although Gujarati (2003) argues that the partial adjustment model can be consistently 
estimated by the OLS,66 adding a lagged dependent variable in the right-hand side of the 
                                                          
66
 The partial adjustment model (PAM) or also called the stock adjustment model, provided by Marc 
Nerlove, is examined with regard to the lagged dependent variable and stochastic term. The model 
considers that there is equilibrium, optimal, desired or long-term amount of capital stock needed to 
provide a given output under the given state of interest. For simplicity let this desired level of capital (Y
*
) 
be a linear function of output X as follows (Gujarati, 2003):  
 
Yt 
* = α + β1 Xt +ut   
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equation may complicate the estimation and, if the lagged dependent variable is 
correlated with the error term, then the OLS estimation results become inconsistent and 
biased (Greene, 2003).67 Accordingly, a more advanced method, namely the “System 
Generalised Method of Moments (GMM)" is also employed to estimate the Lintner 
(1956) model on the Turkish sample, to provide more robust results, and to find out 
whether the pooled OLS model findings are consistent compared to the system GMM 
specification results.   
                                                                                                                                                                          
Since the desired level of capital (Yt
*
) is not directly observable, Nerlove develops the following 
proposition, as the partial adjustment hypothesis:  
 
Yt  - Yt-1 = δ (Yt
*
 - Yt-1)  
 
Where, δ is known as the coefficient of adjustment, or speed of adjustment, and varies between zero and a 
unit (0 < δ ≤ 1). Further, Yt  - Yt-1  is the actual change and (Yt
* 
- Yt-1) is the desired change. As the change 
in capital stock between two periods is nothing but investment, then it can be written as:  
 
It  = δ (Yt
*
 - Yt-1)  
 
Where, It is the investment at time t. Hence, the equation suggests that the actual change in investment in 
any given time is some fraction speed of adjustment, δ, of the desired change for that time period. If δ = 1, 
it means that the actual stock of capital is equal to the desired stock in where the actual stock adjusts to 
the desired stock immediately in the same time period. On the other hand, if δ = 0, it means that nothing 
changes since the actual stock in period t is the same as in the previous time period. Further, the 
adjustment mechanism can also be expressed as follows:  
 
Yt  = δYt
*
 + (1-δ)Yt-1  
 
Indicating that the actual capital stock at period t is a weighted average of the desired capital stock and at 
that period and the lagged capital stock, and δ and (1-δ) are being the weights. Now substitution of the 
adjustment mechanism into the linear model gives:  
 
Yt  = δα + δβ1 Xt + (1-δ)Yt-1 + δut  
 
This final form of the model is called the partial adjustment model. In this equation, once the speed of 
adjustment coefficient, δ, is estimated (from the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable, which 
would be β2 = 1-δ), the long-run function can be easily derived by basically dividing δα and δβ1 by δ and 
omitting the lagged dependent variable (Gujarati, 2003).  
 
In short, if an explanatory variable in a regression model is correlated with the stochastic disturbance 
term, the OLS estimators are biased and inconsistent, even the sample size is increased indefinitely, the 
estimators do not approximate their true population values (in the case of distributed-lag model, where the 
current and lagged values of explanatory variables in the regression). However, the partial adjustment 
model is different and it can be consistently estimated by OLS despite the presence of the lagged 
dependant variable. Because, in the partial adjustment model, disturbance term is δut , where 0 < δ ≤ 1 and 
although the lagged dependent variable, Yt-1, depends on ut-1 and all the previous disturbance terms, it is 
not related to current error term, ut . Hence, as long as ut is serially independent, Yt-1 will also be 
independent or at least uncorrelated with ut , then satisfying an important assumption of OLS that is non-
correlation between explanatory variables and stochastic disturbance term (Gujarati, 2003).  
 
67
 Similarly, substantial complications may also arise in estimation of such a model in both fixed effects 
and random effects setting when a lagged dependent variable appears as an explanatory variable and is 
correlated with the error term(s). If the individual effects are treated as fixed, then the number of 
individual specific parameters increases with the number of cross-sectional units, N, but over only a short 
period of time in where the fixed effects formulation is no longer consistent in that case. Further, when 
the individual specific effects are treated as random and the lagged dependent variable is correlated with 
the compound disturbance in the model, the problem is more obvious since the same individual specific 
effects enter the equation for every observation (Hsiao, 1986; Greene, 2003).  
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Arellano and Bond (1991) suggest a GMM estimator based on a first-differenced 
equation in order to deal with the dynamic panel model, where the differences are 
instrumented by lagged levels of the regressors, providing heteroscadasticity-consistent 
and asymptotically correct standard errors for statistical inferences. Nevertheless, the 
first-differenced GMM method has some econometric weaknesses. For instance, 
Blundell and Bond (1998) show that when the explanatory variables are persistent over 
time, the lagged levels of these variables are weak instruments for the regression model 
expressed in first-differences. Second, the coefficients of time invariant explanatory 
variables, such as industry dummies, cannot be estimated, since the first-differencing 
transformation eliminates these variables from the equation (Ngobo et al., 2012). 
Moreover, Blundell and Bond (1998) develop another estimator – the System GMM – 
derived from a system of two simultaneous equations; one in levels with lagged first 
differences as instruments, and the other in first differences with lagged levels as 
instruments (Presbitero, 2006). The system GMM estimation technique can significantly 
improve efficiency as well as preventing the weak instruments problem in the first-
differenced GMM estimator, allowing for time-invariant variables that would be 
eliminated in a difference GMM (Blundell and Bond, 1998; Roodman, 2006; 2009). 
Therefore, the Lintner (1956) partial adjustment model based on 1,846 firm-year 
observations from 264 firms listed on the ISE over the period 2003-2012 is also re-
estimated by using the system GMM estimator in order to deal with the dynamic panel 
model where a lagged dependent variable is included in the right hand-side of the 
equation as an explanatory variable (consistent with a number of studies such as 
Presbitero, 2006; Antonios et al., 2006; Ngobo et al., 2012; He, 2012; Caixe and 
Krauter, 2013).  
In using the system GMM on estimating the Lintner model, the lagged cash dividend 
payments variable is treated as predetermined, whereas the current year earnings and 
industry dummies are defined as exogenous in the equation. Furthermore, the two-step 
system GMM estimator that uses one-step residuals to build the asymptotically optimal 
weighting matrix is applied, since it is more efficient than the one-step estimators in 
presence of heteroscedasticity and serial correlation (Davidson and MacKinnon, 2004). 
Although asymptotically more efficient, the two-step GMM shows estimates of the 
standard errors that may be severely downward biased, but this problem can be solved 
using Windmeijer (2005) standard error correction, which employs finite-sample 
correction to the two-step covariance matrix (Roodman, 2006). Hence, the two-step 
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robust system GMM is applied to estimate the model. In addition, small-sample 
adjustments (corrections that result in t instead of z test statistic for the coefficients and 
F instead of Wald X
2
 test for overall fit) and orthogonal deviations (maximising sample 
size in panels with gaps) are used to make the estimations even more robust, as 
suggested by Roodman (2006; 2009). The system GMM estimation results are 
presented in the last column of Table 4.5 and the following conclusions can be drawn.  
1. The overall system GMM regression model is significant at the 1% level as 
evidenced by F-statistic. However, the validity of the results also depends on the 
adequacy of the model for the assumptions in the system GMM. Arellano-Bond (1991) 
test checks for serial correlation; if the model is well specified, then we expect to reject 
the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation of the first order (AR(1)), and to accept the 
null hypothesis of no autocorrelation of the second order (AR(2)). Accordingly, as can 
be observed from Table 4.5, the Arellano-Bond first-order and second-order tests for 
autocorrelation in the residuals rejected and accepted, respectively, the null hypothesis 
of no autocorrelation for the model, as required by Arellano and Bond (1991), which 
support the model specification.  
 
2. Furthermore, the Hansen’s (1982) overidentification test (J statistic) checks for 
the validity of instruments, where non-rejection of the null hypothesis suggests that the 
instrument set can be considered valid, which means that a higher p-value of the Hansen 
statistic is better (a perfect p-value of Hansen statistic would be 1.00). In this context, 
the system GMM specification of the Lintner model applied on the Turkish sample 
passes the Hansen J statistic test (corresponding p-value of 0.216) for overidentifying 
restrictions, confirming that the instruments are valid in the model, since it did not reject 
the null hypothesis for the conventional significance levels (1%, 5% and 10%).68 It is 
worth noting that Roodman (2006; 2009) emphasises to mind and report the instrument 
count. As a rule of thumb, the number of instruments should not exceed the number of 
N (cross-sectional units - firms in this study); otherwise, too many instruments can 
overfit endogenous variables and fail to expunge their endogenous components, which 
consequently weaken the power of the Hansen test. However, the quantity of the 
instruments used in the model (59) is considerably lower than the number of firms 
(264), suggesting the robustness of the results. 
                                                          
68
 However, Roodman (2009) suggests that not only the conventional significance levels (1%, 5% and 
10%) but also higher significance levels, such as the 25%, should be considered while checking a Hansen 
test p-value and any values below the 25% level may be seen as potential signs of trouble.  
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3. The regression constant is positive but not significant, as in the pooled OLS 
model. 
 
4. The estimated coefficients on the lagged cash dividend and current earnings are 
both positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, indicating that the Lintner’s 
(1956) partial adjustment model works well for explaining cash dividend policy 
behaviour of the ISE-listed firms during the period 2003-2012. Consequently, one can 
observe that the system GMM estimations are very similar to those in pooled OLS 
regression model; therefore, this confirms more valid, robust and reliable results from 
both estimation methods.  
4.4.3 Implications of the Linter (1956) Model in the Turkish Market 
The model developed by Lintner (1956) suggests that all companies have a target 
payout ratio r (hereafter TPR) and companies do not move immediately to the target 
dividend payments, but instead, smooth out changes in their dividends by moving part 
of the way to the target dividend payments each year. The speed with which companies 
adjust their cash dividends is defined by the speed of adjustment c (hereafter SOA) 
parameter shows how responsive a company’s cash dividends are to changes in 
earnings. A lower value of c indicates a slower adjustment, while a higher value of c 
indicates speedier adjustment (0 < c ≤ 1). Accordingly, the SOA parameter of 1.00 is at 
its maximum level, implying that the companies do not adjust or smooth their cash 
dividends; they basically rely on their long-run target payout ratios. Then, a reverse 
argument is valid for the SOA values that are close to zero, meaning that those 
companies smooth their cash dividend payments and slowly adjust to their TPRs. 
As Table 4.5 presents the TPR (r) is 42.7% (0.146/0.342) and the SOA (c) parameter is 
0.342 (1-0.658) for the ISE-listed firms based on the pooled OLS estimations (because 
it is found to be more favourable than the panel models). Further, the system GMM 
estimation results confirm very similar TPR, r = 42.9% (0.133/0.310) and SOA 
parameter, c = 0.310 (1-0.690) for the firms in Turkish market, consistent with the 
pooled OLS model, which suggest that ISE-listed firms adjust their cash dividend 
payments towards their target payout ratios and that Turkish firms smooth their 
dividends and therefore follow stable cash dividend policies over the period 2003-2012.  
Adaoglu (2000) found the SOA factor was 1.00, which was at its maximum level and 
means that the ISE-listed firms did not smooth their cash dividends during the earlier 
years between 1985 and 1997, while they were obliged to pay at least 50% of their 
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distributable profit as cash dividends by the first mandatory dividend policy imposed by 
the CMB. During this period, he also found that the TPR was 51.7%, which was 
consistent with the mandatory dividend policy requirement. Therefore, not surprisingly, 
the main factor determined the cash dividend payments was the level of current earnings 
in a given year, and any variability in the earnings of the firm was directly reflected in 
the level of cash dividends. Consequently, the Turkish firms followed unstable dividend 
policies. The empirical results in this chapter, however, are contradictory to Adaoglu’s 
(2000) findings and indicate that the ISE firms do indeed adjust their cash dividend 
payments toward their target payout ratios by smoothing their dividends and employing 
stable cash dividend policies over the period 2003-2012.   
Various studies have examined corporate dividend behaviour using the Lintner model in 
developed and emerging markets. Table 4.6, on the next page, reports the estimates of 
the Lintner parameters, namely the SOA and TPR, from the present, and a number of 
previous empirical studies conducted in different markets or time periods for 
comparison purposes. The SOA obtained in the current study (0.34 based on the pooled 
OLS and 0.31 based on the system GMM) is very close to the value of 0.30 obtained by 
Lintner (1956) and relatively lower than the value of 0.45 reported by Fama and Babiak 
(1968) for US companies. Moreover, Brav et al. (2005) found that the SOA estimates of 
US firms are 0.66, 0.35 and 0.22 for the periods 1950-1964, 1965-1983 and 1984-2002 
respectively. The present study estimate is lower than that for the first period and close 
to the one in the second period, but higher than the estimate provided for the third 
period. Recently, Chemmanur et al. (2010) reported SOA estimate of 0.28 for US 
companies, which is slightly lower than that of the current study for ISE firms. 
However, Dewenter and Warther (1998) found much smoother SOA estimates of 0.06 
and 0.09 for US and Japanese firms respectively over the period 1983-2002.  
Compared to the other emerging markets, the SOA of the current research is much 
lower than that found by Mookerjee (1992) for India (c = 0.73), Al-Najjar (2009) for 
Jordan (c = 0.43), Chemmanur et al. (2010) for Hong Kong (c = 0.68) and Al-Ajmi and 
Abo Hussain (2011) for Saudi Arabia (c = 0.71) but slightly higher than that 
documented by Al-Malkawi et al. (2014) for Oman (c = 0.26). Therefore, it can be 
concluded that the ISE-listed firms generally have lower speed of adjustment factors, 
hence higher smoothing and more stable dividend policies compared to the other 
emerging markets, and they now smooth their dividend payments as their counterparts 
in the developed US market. 
Birkbeck University of London Page 232 
Table 4.6 Summary of Empirical Studies on Lintner's (1956) Parameters 
The table illustrates the estimates of the Lintner parameters, namely the speed of adjustment and 
target payout ratio, from the present and a number of previous empirical studies conducted in 
different time periods or markets.  
 
Study    Market Period SOA TPR 
     
Lintner (1956)  USA 1918-1953 0.30 0.50 
     
Fama & Babiak (1968)  USA 1946-1964 0.45 0.33 
     
Mookerjee (1992) India 1950-1981 0.73 0.85 
     
Dewenter & Warther (1998)  USA 1983-1992 0.06 - 
 Japan 1983-1992 0.09 - 
     
Adaoglu (2000) Turkey 1985-1997 1.00 0.52 
     
Pandey (2001)
a  
Malaysia  1993-2000 0.20 to 0.63 0.12 to 0.76 
     
Brav et al. (2005)  USA  1950-1964 0.66 0.35 
  1965-1983 0.35 0.24 
  1984-2002 0.22 0.11 
     
Al-Najjar (2009) Jordan 1994-2003 0.43 0.48 
     
Chemmanur et al. (2010) USA 1984-2002 0.28 - 
 Hong Kong 1984-2002 0.68 - 
     
Al-Ajmi & Abo Hussain (2011)  Saudi Arabia 1990-2006 0.71 0.43 
     
Al-Malkawi et al. (2014)  Oman 2001-2010 0.26 0.79 
     
Present Study – by the pooled OLS Turkey  2003-2012 0.34 0.43 
Present Study – by the system GMM Turkey  2003-2012 0.31 0.43 
     
Notes: SOA= Speed of adjustment, TPR = Target payout ratio. 
a 
The study used the Lintner model to test 
the stability of the Malaysian firms in six different industrial sectors and reported the SOA and TPR 
values that vary considerably across the industrial sectors.  
 
Another parameter of interest is whether the ISE firms have a TPR or not. Lintner 
(1956) argues that companies set a long-term target payout ratio and adjust gradually 
toward the target. Accordingly, the TPR of 43% (based on both the pooled OLS and 
system GMM), reported in the present study is comparatively higher than the observed 
mean payout ratio of 24% (see Table 4.1), which suggests that the ISE firms do have 
long-term target payout ratios and set binding long-term target payout ratios by moving 
gradually to their target, consistent with Lintner’s prediction.  
4.4.4 Further Analyses  
This part presents the empirical results from several extensions of Lintner’s (1956) 
partial adjustment model by including additional explanatory variables into the model. 
These variables are observed in the literature and considered to be possibly influencing 
the dividend policy of the firms in the emerging Turkish market, especially during the 
study sample period 2003-2012.  
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4.4.4.1 The Effect of Adding Lagged Earnings in the Lintner (1956) Model  
Table 4.7 below reports the results of pooled OLS, panel models (random effects and 
fixed effects) and robustness check (the system GMM) estimations for the analyses 
when the lagged earnings variable is included into the basic Lintner model as an 
explanatory variable (Model 2). The following results are drawn from the table.  
 
Table 4.7 Results of adding Lagged Earnings in the Lintner (1956) Model 
 
Dependent Variable: Cash Dividends(t)  
 
Pooled 
OLS 
Panel Models 
 
  Robustness Check 
 Random 
Effects 
 Fixed 
Effects 
The System 
GMM Independent Variables: 
Earnings(t) 0.059*** 0.055***  0.060*** 0.057*** 
 (4.98) (3.81)  (3.14) (3.88) 
      
Earnings(t-1) 0.189*** 0.221***  0.228*** 0.187*** 
 (3.62) (3.61)  (3.44) (3.11) 
      
Cash Dividends(t-1) 0.594*** 0.577***  0.142 0.615*** 
 (6.74) (6.72)  (1.25)             (8.10) 
      
Constant  -0.818 -1.619  5.523            -1.619 
 (-0.92) (-0.75)   (1.50)            (-1.41) 
      
 
Industry dummies  
 
 
  Yes  
 
  Yes  
 
     - 
 
 Yes  
 
The target payout ratio (r)69     -     -      -    - 
The speed of adjustment (c)  0.406  0.423  0.858 0.385 
      
Number of Observations  1,846 1,846  1,846            1,846 
F-Statistic 43.55***        -  6.41***           115.31*** 
Wald X
2
      -  579.29***      -    - 
      
R-Squared 83.7% 83.3%  76.7%                 - 
      
Lagrange Multiplier Test  0.95  
F-Test  1.38  
Hausman Test
†
  -  
      
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1)     Pr > z = 0.073 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2)     Pr > z = 0.142 
Hansen overidentifying test       Pr > chi2 = 0.258 
Number of instruments     60 
      
Notes: Table reports coefficients and t/z-statistics in the parenthesis. The pooled OLS and fixed effects 
models are corrected using White’s corrected heteroscedasticity robust regressions. Robustness Check 
analysis is estimated using Blundell and Bond’s (1998) the system GMM. The two-step, robust (standard 
error correction), small (corrections that result in t instead of z test statistic for the coefficients and F 
instead of Wald X
2
 test for overall fit) and orthogonal (maximising sample size in panels with gaps) 
commands are used to make the estimations even more robust. ***, ** and * stand for significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
†
Since the pooled OLS model is found to be more favourable, 
Hausman specification test, which compares the fixed and random effects models, is not needed.  
                                                          
69
 Since the lagged earnings variable is added into the model, the target payout ratio cannot be calculated 
as proposed by the Lintner (1956) model.  
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1. The overall pooled OLS model is significant at the 1% level as evidenced by the 
F-statistic. Similarly, panel models (the random effects model at the 1% level as 
evidenced by the Wald X
2
 and the fixed effects model at the 1% level as evidence by the 
F-statistic) are overall significant. However, the Lagrange Multiplier test statistic of 
0.95 (p = 0.329) and the F-test value of 1.38 (p = 0.202) are both not statistically 
significant. This suggests that the pooled OLS model is more appropriate than the panel 
models and therefore the following results are reported based on the pooled OLS 
estimations. 
 
2. When the lagged net earnings variable is added on the right-hand side of the 
basic Lintner model, the R-squared value of the model increases to 83.7% from 81.4%, 
which is consistent with Fama and Babiak’s (1968) study.70  
 
3. The results show that the current and lagged earnings, and lagged cash dividends 
variables are all found to be positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, as 
suggested by Fama and Babiak (1968). Therefore, we can accept Hypothesis 2 that cash 
dividend payments are the functions of the level of net earnings and lagged net 
earnings, and the pattern of dividends paid in the previous year in the Turkish market. 
 
4. The coefficients of both current and lagged earnings are significantly positive 
but the coefficient of lagged net earnings (0.189) is considerably much bigger than the 
current net earnings (0.059). This suggests that current earnings encourage firms to 
increase/decrease their cash dividends, but the levels of lagged earnings are the 
dominant component in terms of net earnings numbers, while the ISE firms make their 
dividend policy decisions in order to avoid spectacular and frequent changes. Then 
again, this finding is inconsistent with Adaoglu (2000), who reported the main factor 
that determined the amount of cash dividends was the net earnings of the ISE firms in 
that year over the period 1985-1997. Also, the positive and highly significant lagged 
cash dividends coefficient of 0.594 with a speed of adjustment factor of 0.406 (1-0.594) 
reveals that the ISE firms follows stable cash dividend policies.  
 
5. Moreover, the system GMM estimation is employed to check the robustness of 
the pooled OLS results. The overall system GMM model is significant at the 1% level 
                                                          
70
 Fama and Babiak (1968) found that the basic Lintner model, including a constant term, current net 
earnings and lagged dividends, generally performs well relative to other models; nevertheless, deleting 
the constant term and adding the lagged earnings leads to a slight improvement in the predictive power of 
the model. In the case of this study, if the constant term is also deleted as well as adding the lagged 
earnings into the basic Lintner model, the R-squared value increases to 84.3%, which is slightly better 
than 83.7%.  
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as evidenced by the F-statistic.  The Arellano and Bond (1991) first-order and second-
order tests for autocorrelation in the residuals are rejected (at the 10% level) and 
accepted, respectively, the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation for the model, which 
show support to the model specification. Further, Hansen’s overidentification test (J 
statistic) confirms that the instruments are valid in the model, since it did not reject the 
null hypothesis (corresponding p-value of 0.258) for both the conventional significance 
levels (1%, 5% and 10%) and 25% level suggested by Roodman (2006; 2009). In 
addition, the quantity of the instruments used in this model (60) is significantly lower 
than the number of firms (264), suggesting the robustness of the results. Consequently, 
the system GMM model also reports that the current earnings, lagged earnings and 
lagged cash dividends variables are all positive and statistically significant at the 1% 
level. Therefore, it can be said that the system GMM estimations provide consistent and 
robust results with the pooled OLS estimations.  
 
 
4.4.4.2 The Effect of Adding External Finance (Debt) in the Lintner (1956) Model 
Table 4.8 on the following page reports the results of pooled OLS, panel models 
(random effects and fixed effects) and robustness check (the system GMM) estimations 
for the analyses, when the current and lagged total debt variables (reflecting external 
finance) are added into the basic Lintner model as additional explanatory variables 
(Model 3). The following results are drawn from the table.  
1. The overall pooled OLS model is significant at the 1% level as evidenced by the 
F-statistic. Likewise, the random effects model at the 1% level as evidenced by the 
Wald X
2
 and the fixed effects model at the 1% level as evidence by the F-statistic are 
overall significant. However, the Lagrange Multiplier test statistic of 1.60 (p = 0.205) 
and the F-test value of 0.90 (p = 0.512) are both not statistically significant; therefore, 
the pooled OLS model is more appropriate than the panel models. Accordingly, the 
following results are reported based on the pooled OLS estimations. 
 
2. Following Mookeerje (1992), the current total debt and lagged total debt of the 
firms are included in the basic Lintner (1956) model as explanatory variables. The R-
squared value of 82.2%, which is slightly higher than the R-squared value of 81.4% 
obtained by the basic Lintner model, suggesting that the modified model is able to 
explain about 82% of the variation in cash dividend payments of the ISE firms. 
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Table 4.8 Results of adding External Finance in the Lintner (1956) Model 
 
Dependent Variable: Cash Dividends(t)  
 
Pooled 
OLS 
Panel Models 
 
  Robustness Check 
 Random 
Effects 
 Fixed 
Effects 
The System 
GMM Independent Variables: 
Earnings(t) 0.162*** 0.187***  0.107** 0.153*** 
 (4.09) (4.22)  (2.55) (4.22) 
      
Cash Dividends(t-1) 0.642*** 0.630***  0.182 0.663*** 
 (6.52) (6.43)  (1.16) (10.28) 
      
Debt(t) -0.043** -0.044**  -0.051** -0.042** 
 (-2.24) (-2.14)  (-2.05) (-2.18) 
      
Debt(t-1) -0.053** -0.057**  -0.047** -0.052** 
 (-2.57) (-2.51)  (-1.98) (-2.41) 
      
Constant  0.141 -2.249  10.43***  0.622 
 (0.01) (-0.22)  (3.99)  (0.53) 
      
 
Industry dummies  
 
 Yes    Yes       -    Yes  
      
The target payout ratio (r) 0.452 0.505  0.130  0.454 
The speed of adjustment (c) 0.358 0.370  0.818  0.337 
      
Number of Observations  1,846 1,846  1,846  1,846 
F-Statistic 32.56***     -  4.54***  124.14*** 
Wald X
2
     -  531.28***      -     - 
      
R-Squared 82.2% 82.1%  77.2%                  - 
      
Lagrange Multiplier Test  1.60  
F-Test  0.90  
Hausman Test
†
  -  
      
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1)     
 
Pr > z = 0.020 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2)     Pr > z = 0.355 
Hansen overidentifying test      Pr > chi2 = 0.260 
Number of instruments     120 
      
Notes: Table reports coefficients and t/z-statistics in the parenthesis. The pooled OLS and fixed effects 
models are corrected using White’s corrected heteroscedasticity robust regressions. Robustness Check 
analysis is estimated using Blundell and Bond’s (1998) the system GMM. The two-step, robust 
(standard error correction), small (corrections that result in t instead of z test statistic for the coefficients 
and F instead of Wald X
2
 test for overall fit) and orthogonal (maximising sample size in panels with 
gaps) commands are used to make the estimations even more robust. ***, ** and * stand for 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
†
Since the pooled OLS model is found to be 
more favourable, Hausman specification test, which compares the fixed and random effects models, is 
not needed. 
 
3. The table demonstrates that the current earnings and lagged cash dividends are 
positive and highly significant at the 1% level, whereas the current and lagged total debt 
are also statistically significant at 5% level but negatively correlated with the cash 
dividend payments. Therefore, we can accept Hypothesis 3 that cash dividend payments 
are the functions of the level of net earnings, the pattern of dividends paid in the 
previous year and the level of current and lagged external finance in the Turkish 
market. This significant negative relationship is contrary to Mookerjee’s (1992) study, 
which revealed that Indian firms used external finance to augment cash dividend 
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payments over the period 1950-1981, since the availability of bank loans were provided 
to Indian firms at subsidized rates during that time. On the other hand, the CMB 
attempted to prevent insider lending, in other words non-arm’s length transactions, as a 
source of financing with the introduction of “Regulation on Establishment and 
Operations of Banks” in July 2001, especially for the ISE firms, which generally belong 
to business group companies (including banks, businesses and subsidiaries in the same 
group) and obtained much of their finance from their own group banks. Consequently, 
the ISE firms turned to the capital markets with a greater incentive for more transparent 
financing. Therefore, the significant negative correlation between the cash dividends 
and both the current and lagged level of total debt possibly reflects that the ISE 
corporations find external financing that they now obtain from arm’s length parties are 
more costly.  
 
4. Moreover, the robustness check column of the table shows that the overall 
system GMM model is significant at the 1% level as evidenced by the F-statistic.  The 
Arellano and Bond (1991) first-order and second-order tests for autocorrelation in the 
residuals are rejected (at the 5% level) and accepted, respectively, the null hypothesis of 
no autocorrelation for the model, which show support to the model specification. 
Further, Hansen’s overidentification test (J statistic) confirms that the instruments are 
valid in the model, since it did not reject the null hypothesis (corresponding p-value of 
0.260). Also, the quantity of the instruments used in this model (120) is significantly 
lower than the number of firms (264), suggesting the robustness of the results. The 
system GMM model also estimates that the current earnings and lagged dividends are 
positive and highly significant at the 1% level, whereas the current and lagged total debt 
are also statistically significant at the 5% level but negatively related to the current year 
cash dividend payments. Consequently, the system GMM estimations provide 
consistent and robust results with the pooled OLS estimations.  
4.4.4.3 The Effect of Adding Year Dummies in the Lintner (1956) Model  
Table 4.9 on the next page reports the results of pooled OLS, panel models (random 
effects and fixed effects) and robustness check (the system GMM) estimations for the 
analyses, when the yearly dummies from 2008 to 2012, reflecting the 2008 global crisis 
and its impact in the subsequent years, are added into the basic Lintner model (Model 
4). The following results are drawn from the table.  
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Table 4.9 Results of adding Year Dummies in the Lintner (1956) Model 
 
Dependent Variable: Cash Dividends(t)  
 
Pooled 
OLS 
Panel Models 
 
 Robustness Check 
 Random 
Effects 
 Fixed 
Effects 
The System 
GMM Independent Variables: 
Earnings(t) 0.146*** 0.163***  0.087** 0.135*** 
 (4.01) (4.03)  (2.61) (3.47) 
      
Cash Dividends(t-1) 0.659*** 0.647***  0.207 0.688*** 
 (6.44) (6.31)  (1.35) (9.02) 
      
Year2008 2.871 3.646  6.294 2.338 
 (0.97) (0.75)  (1.29) (1.26) 
      
Year2009 -4.921 -7.922  0.568 -3.444* 
 (-1.51) (-1.48)  (0.23) (-1.83) 
      
Year2010 1.587 2.651  4.580 0.438 
 (0.39) (0.40)  (1.22) (0.18) 
      
Year2011 1.718 1.334  6.229 0.402 
 (0.33) (0.15)  (1.20) (0.13) 
      
Year2012 0.151 0.078  6.642 0.026 
 (0.06) (0.02)  (1.49) (0.01) 
      
Constant  0.352 1.374  9.997*** 0.194 
 (0.04) (0.53)  (3.11) (0.17) 
      
 
Industry dummies  
¤  
 Yes   Yes        -   Yes  
      
The target payout ratio (r) 0.428 0.461  0.109 0.432 
The speed of adjustment (c) 0.341 0.353  0.793 0.312 
      
Number of Observations  1,846 1,846  1,846 1,846 
F-Statistic 27.52***   7.42*** 301.22*** 
Wald X
2
    -   537.31***      -      - 
      
R-Squared 81.4% 81.2%  79.8%    - 
      
Lagrange Multiplier Test  1.00  
F-Test  0.73  
Hausman Test
†
  -  
      
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1)     
 
Pr > z = 0.032 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2)       Pr > z = 0.305 
Hansen overidentifying test      Pr > chi2 = 0.116 
Number of instruments       64 
      
Notes: Table reports coefficients and t/z-statistics in the parenthesis. The pooled OLS and fixed effects 
models are corrected using White’s corrected heteroscedasticity robust regressions. Robustness Check 
analysis is estimated using Blundell and Bond’s (1998) the system GMM. The two-step, robust 
(standard error correction), small (corrections that result in t instead of z test statistic for the coefficients 
and F instead of Wald X
2
 test for overall fit) and orthogonal (maximising sample size in panels with 
gaps) commands are used to make the estimations even more robust. ***, ** and * stand for 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
†
Since the pooled OLS model is found to be 
more favourable, Hausman specification test, which compares the fixed and random effects models, is 
not needed. 
 
1. The pooled OLS, random effects and fixed effects models are all overall 
statistically significant at the 1% level, but the Lagrange Multiplier test statistic of 1.00 
(p = 0.317) and the F-test value of 0.73 (p = 0.603) are not statistically significant at all, 
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indicating that  the pooled OLS model is more favourable than the panel models. 
Therefore, the following results are reported based on the pooled OLS estimations.  
 
2. When the year dummies (from 2008 to 2012) are included into the basic Lintner 
model, the R-squared value remains the same as in the basic Lintner model, which is 
found to be 81.4, suggesting that the model explains around 81% of the variations in 
cash dividend payments of the ISE firms. 
 
3. The pooled OLS estimations show that the current earnings and lagged cash 
dividends variables are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, whereas the 
coefficients of the 2008, 2010, 2011 and 2012 year dummies have all positive signs with 
the exception of the 2009 dummy, which is found to be negative; however, none of the 
coefficients of the year dummies are statistically significant. This suggests that although 
the September 2008 global crisis markedly hit Turkey in various aspects71 and abruptly 
interrupted the recent expansion of its economy as in many other world markets, 
including both developed and developing countries, it did not significantly affect cash 
dividend payments decisions of the ISE firms. Also, despite the global crisis, the ISE 
firms continue to follow stable dividend policies, possibly to signal the market about 
their good performance. This result is consistent with Al-Malkawi et al.’s (2014) 
finding, that the 2008 global crisis had no significant effect on dividend policy and 
dividend stability of Omani firms, and they even kept paying high dividends after the 
outbreak of the financial crisis. Indeed, the Turkish economy quickly started recovering 
from the global crisis starting the second quarter of 2009 by possessing challenges for 
fiscal and monetary policy, which required a careful balance between supporting the 
recovery and sustaining macroeconomic stability over the longer term (Rawdanowicz, 
2010). They praised in having this swift recovery without aid from the IMF (Birol, 
2011). Accordingly, the negative coefficient of the 2009 dummy possibly reflects the 
tendency of the ISE firms reducing their cash dividends as an initial reaction to the 
shocking global financial crisis experienced in late 2008.  Since the Turkish economy 
swiftly started to recover from the crisis, the coefficients of the following year dummies 
are again found to be positive. However, the year dummies are not statistically 
                                                          
71
 The September 2008 global financial crisis led to a rapid contraction in the world economy and 
financial markets and a deceleration in trade volume. Further, the global crisis significantly affected the 
Turkish economy mostly through four aspects. The first was the trading aspect with exports declined 
dramatically. The second was the expectation aspect as the household expectations worsened and hence 
reducing their consumption due to the financial turmoil. The foreign capital flows were the third aspect 
and cross-border lending was decreased during the crisis period. The last one was the credit supply since 
banks cut their lending during the crisis, which resulted in a sharp decline in economic activity and an 
increase in unemployment (Yorukoglu and Atasoy, 2010).  
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significant in any cases. Nor are they affecting the validity of the basic Lintner model, 
or the stability of the ISE firms’ dividend policies. Therefore, we cannot accept 
Hypothesis 4.  
 
4. Furthermore, the robustness check column of the table shows that the overall 
system GMM model is significant at the 1% level as evidenced by the F-statistic.  The 
Arellano and Bond (1991) first-order and second-order tests for autocorrelation in the 
residuals are rejected (at the 5% level) and accepted, respectively, the null hypothesis of 
no autocorrelation for the model, which show support to the model specification. 
Further, Hansen’s overidentification test (J statistic) confirms that the instruments are 
valid in the model, since it did not reject the null hypothesis (corresponding p-value of 
0.116). Also, the quantity of the instruments used in this model (64) is significantly 
lower than the number of firms (264), suggesting the robustness of the results. The 
system GMM model also estimates that the current earnings and lagged dividends are 
positive and highly significant at the 1% level, whereas the coefficients of the 2008, 
2010, 2011 and 2012 year dummies have all positive signs but are insignificant, with 
the exception of the 2009 dummy, which is found to be negative and even slightly 
significant (at the 10% level). Therefore, the system GMM estimations provide 
consistent and robust results in line with the pooled OLS estimations. 
 
4.5 Conclusions 
This chapter of the study investigates the information content of cash dividend 
payments after the implementation of major economic and structural reforms, starting 
with the fiscal year 2003 in the Turkish market. Turkey offers an ideal setting to study 
the dividend behaviour of an emerging economy (a civil law originated country), which 
employed the common laws in order to integrate with world markets. Therefore, the 
study focuses on a recent panel dataset of 264 companies (non-financial and non-utility) 
listed on the ISE, over a ten-year period 2003-2012, including 1,846 firm-year 
observations. In particular, it empirically examines whether the ISE-listed firms adopt 
deliberate dividend policies to signal information to investors and whether they follow 
stable dividend policies, as in developed markets, by using Lintner’s (1956) partial 
adjustment model over a decade after the mandatory dividend policy regulations are 
considerably relaxed and insider lending (non-arm’s length transactions) is prevented as 
a source of financing, along with the implementation of major reforms in 2003. Further, 
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the study also considers several extensions of Lintner’s (1956) partial adjustment model 
by including additional regressors as explanatory variables that are observed in the 
literature and thought to be possibly influencing the dividend policy of the ISE firms 
during the study sample period. In addition, it employs richer research models (the 
pooled OLS, random effects, fixed effects and system GMM) in order to provide more 
valid, consistent and robust results.  
The empirical results show that current earnings and lagged cash dividend payments are 
positively significant factors in determining current cash dividend payments of the listed 
Turkish firms. This indicates that the Lintner’s (1956) partial adjustment model works 
well for explaining cash dividend policy behaviour of the ISE firms during the period 
2003-2012, after Turkey implemented major economic and structural reforms in 2003, 
as well as adopting more flexible mandatory dividend policy regulations and attempting 
to prevent insider lending (non-arm’s length transactions). This is contrary to earlier 
research (Adaoglu, 2000; Aivazian, 2003a) that showed no support to the validity of the 
Lintner model in the Turkish market; possibly due to the relatively much poorer 
structural and microeconomic policies, poorer culture of corporate governance, 
transparency and disclosure practices with weaker minority investors protections and 
the presence of rigid mandatory dividend policy imposed to the ISE firms during earlier 
periods.  
Furthermore, the results reveal that ISE firms now adjust their cash dividends by a 
serious degree of smoothing (0.342 based on the pooled OLS and 0.310 based on the 
system GMM), which is generally much lower (hence higher smoothing and more 
stable dividend policies) compared to other emerging markets, and is almost as smooth 
as their counterparts in the developed US market. Then again, this finding is 
inconsistent with Adaoglu (2000) who reported a speed of adjustment factor of 1.00, 
implying that the ISE firms did not smooth their cash dividends during the earlier years 
between 1985 and 1997. It is also found that the target payout ratio of the ISE firms is 
43% (based on both the pooled OLS and system GMM), which is comparatively higher 
than the observed average payout ratio of 24% for the listed firms. This suggests that 
the ISE companies do have long-term payout ratios and adjust gradually to their target, 
consistent with the Lintner’s (1956) prediction, over the period 2003-2012.  
Moreover, the empirical results from several extensions of Lintner’s (1956) partial 
adjustment model show some important facts regarding the Turkish market over the 
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period that is under investigation. First, adding the lagged net earnings into the basic 
Lintner equation increases the predictive power of the model, as suggested by Fama and 
Babiak (1968), and suggests that current earnings encourage firms to increase/decrease 
their cash dividends. However, the levels of lagged earnings are the dominant 
component in terms of net earnings numbers while the ISE-listed firms make their 
dividend policy decisions in order to avoid spectacular and frequent changes, which is 
in line with Lintner’s (1956) argument. Second, when external finance (current and 
lagged total debt) is included into the Lintner model, significantly negative correlations 
between the cash dividends and both the current and lagged level of total debt are found, 
which possibly reflects that the ISE corporations find external finance that they now 
obtain from arm’s length parties more costly. This is because the CMB of Turkey 
attempted to prevent insider lending, in other words non-arm’s length transactions, as a 
source of financing for business group companies. Third, yearly dummies from year 
2008 to 2012 are added into the partial adjustment model in order to identify the effect 
of the 2008 global crisis and its impact in the following years. It is found that although 
the September 2008 global crisis markedly hit Turkey in various aspects and abruptly 
interrupted the recent expansion of its economy, as in many other world markets 
including both developed and developing countries, it did not significantly affect cash 
dividend payments decisions of the ISE firms, as well as their preferences of following 
stable dividend policies.  
Consequently, the empirical findings suggest that implementing major economic and 
structural reforms, as well adopting more flexible mandatory dividend policy 
regulations and attempting to prevent insider lending (non-arm’s length transactions), 
lead the ISE firms to follow the same determinants as suggested by Lintner (1956) and 
as followed by the US (developed) companies. Particularly, dividend payments of the 
ISE firms seem to be affected by previous dividend levels and current earnings. 
Furthermore, they attempt to adjust partially their dividends towards their target payout 
ratio, more interestingly with a relatively low speed of adjustment as their counterparts 
in developed markets. This implies that Turkish companies tend to smooth their 
dividends, and adopt stable dividend policies, and therefore it can be concluded that 
Turkish corporations have been using cash dividends as a signalling mechanism since 
2003 with the implementation of severe economic and structural reforms.  
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5.1 Introduction 
This chapter investigates the link between ownership structure and dividend policy 
based on the agency cost theory of dividends for the ISE-listed firms since the fiscal 
year 2003, when Turkey began to implement serious economic and structural reforms 
for a better working of the market economy, outward-orientation and globalisation, in 
other words for market integration.  
To the best of our knowledge, this chapter is the first to examine the impact of 
ownership structure on dividend policy in the emerging Turkish market. In particular, 
the chapter attempts to uncover the effects of family involvement (through ownership 
and board representation), non-family blockholders (foreign investors, domestic 
financial institutions and the state), and minority shareholders on dividend payment 
decisions of the ISE-listed firms related to the agency cost theory argument, after 
Turkey implemented major economic and structural reforms in 2003.  
In their classic study, Berle and Means (1932) drew attention to the prevalence of 
widely held corporations in which ownership structure of firms is dispersed among 
small shareholders but the control is concentrated in the hands of managers. The Berle 
and Means widely held corporation is extensively accepted in finance literature as a 
common organisational form for large firms in the richest common law countries such 
as the US, the UK, Canada, and Australia. In this respect, one of the most widely studied 
explanations for why firms pay dividends is the agency cost theory, which derives from 
the problems associated with the separation of management (the agent) and ownership 
(the principal), and the differences in managerial and shareholder priorities, also known 
as the principal-agent conflict (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This theory argues that 
cash dividends can be used to mitigate agency problems in a company by reducing free 
cash flow and forcing management to enter the capital market for financing, hence 
leading to induce monitoring by the market (Rozeff, 1982; Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 
1986).  
Prior research has paid extensive amounts of attention to the principal-agency conflict72 
and mostly focused on the developed countries, where financial markets are well-
regulated and relatively transparent; mostly contain the publicly-held firms with 
dispersed ownership and the control is in the hands of professional managers. In 
                                                          
72
 The traditional agency cost theory that drives from the owner (the principal)-manager (the agent) 
conflict is also referred to as Agency Problem I in this study like prior studies.  
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contrast, outside the developed countries, particularly emerging economies with poorer 
shareholder protection, the prevalence of the Berle and Means dispersed ownership 
structure is not representative for corporations in these markets. Indeed, various 
researchers reported that ownership is heavily concentrated at the hands of large 
controlling shareholders in developing economies across the world. For instance, La 
Porta et al. (1999) examined the ownership structures of large firms in 27 different 
countries and they reported that relatively few of these firms are widely held; rather they 
are heavily concentrated and are commonly controlled by families or the states. A 
majority of the developing economies in South America are governed by family-owned 
firms, according to Shleifer and Vishny (1997). Furthermore, Claessens et al. (2000) 
reported that single shareholder controls more than two-thirds of publicly-listed East 
Asian firms and about 40% of all listed companies are dominated by families. Similarly, 
Faccio et al. (2001) found that the predominant form of ownership in East Asia is 
family-control and this form is even more pronounced in West Europe, whereas 
Yurtoglu (2003) documented that families ultimately own 80% of all firms listed on the 
ISE in Turkey. In short, increasing evidence reveals that family firms are widespread 
around the world and occupy a growing importance in the economic globe. 
Accordingly, Daily et al. (2003) suggested that agency cost theory may function 
differently in family-controlled publicly listed firms and prior findings from widely held 
companies may not readily generalise into this setting. In the firms with significant 
family ownership and family control, the salient agency problem may be the 
expropriation of the wealth from minority owners by the controlling owners, also known 
as the principal-principal conflict.73  
Moreover, a number of researchers have recently emphasised that it is extremely 
important to consider ownership structure of companies in emerging markets in 
understanding dividend policy related to the agency problems in these markets. For 
instance, Manos (2002) in India, Chen et al. (2005) in Hong Kong, Kouki and Guizani 
(2009) in Tunisia, Ramli (2010) in Malaysia, Wei et al. (2011) in China, Ullah et al. 
(2012) in Pakistan, Huda and Abdullah (2013) in Bangladesh, Aguenaou et al. (2013) in 
Morocco, Thanatawee (2013) in Thailand and Gonzalez et al. (2014) in Colombia have 
all indicated that ownership structure approach is highly relevant in explaining dividend 
policy based on agency cost theory. Consequently, agency cost theory of dividends 
needs to be uniquely investigated in emerging markets and, more importantly, the 
                                                          
73
 The potential problems stem from the controlling and minority shareholders (the principal-principal 
conflict) is also referred to as Agency Problems II here like previous studies.  
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ownership structure of the firms in these markets should specifically be taken into 
account while identifying the proxies for agency cost variables.  
As is the case in many other emerging markets, the concentrated ownership by large 
controlling shareholders is the dominant form of ownership structure in Turkey, where 
corporate ownership is characterised by highly concentrated family ownership with the 
existence of other large shareholders such as foreign, institutional and state ownerships 
(Gursoy and Aydogan, 1999; Yurtoglu, 2003; IIF, 2005; Sevil et al., 2012). Further, 
Ararat and Ugur (2003) pointed out the specific corporate governance problems and the 
lack of efficient transparency and disclosure practices experienced by Turkish firms, 
possibly due to the concentrated and pyramidal ownership structures dominated by 
families who generally own business groups, including banks, businesses and 
subsidiaries in the same group (IIF, 2005; Aksu and Kosedag, 2005), and the 
inconsistent and unclear accounting and tax regulations, and the investors 
misinformation faced by the absence of inflation and consolidation accounting 
standards. As a result of this infrastructure, Ararat and Ugur (2003) suggested that 
agency problems are concentrated on asymmetric information, weak minority 
shareholders protection, inconsistent and unclear disclosure policies and convergence of 
ownership and management, which create an environment that may foster corruption, 
share dilution, asset stripping, tunnelling, insider trading and market manipulation.  
Indeed, during the late 1990s, a considerably long list of cases in tunnelling took place 
in the Turkish public. Majority of these cases were simple resource transfers of 
controlling shareholders from their firms in the form of outright theft or fraud, whereas a 
number of listed firms’ minority shareholders were harmed by these events; a bigger 
proportion represented wealth transfers from state banks to controlling owners of 
unlisted firms, involving in many cases the visible hands of politicians (Yurtoglu, 2003). 
Likewise, a number of well-publicised cases revealed that unfair treatment of minority 
shareholders was a serious corporate governance problem in Turkey since controlling 
families had the opportunities to expropriate profits from them, typically through the use 
of company assets or non-arm’s length related party transactions (IIF, 2005).  
However, Turkey signed a standby agreement with the IMF and began to implement 
major economic programs and structural reforms for a better working of the market 
economy, outward-orientation and globalisation, starting March 2003 (CMB, 2003; 
Adaoglu, 2008; Birol, 2011). Furthermore, Turkey’s progress in achieving full 
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membership of the EU in this period also provided the strongest motivation in 
establishing new reforms, rules and regulations in line with the EU directives and best-
practice international standards to improve corporate governance and transparency and 
disclosure practices; therefore, to integrate its economy with Europe and to harmonise 
its institutions with those of the EU (IIF, 2005; Aksu and Kosedag, 2006; Rawdanowicz, 
2010). In this context, the CMB of Turkey attributed great importance to improve 
communications with investors, issuers and other institutions in order to ensure that 
markets are functioning in a safer, more transparent and more efficient manner in 
accordance with regulations that were adopted in harmony with international norms and 
developments (CMB, 2003). Accordingly, one of the most important developments was 
that in cooperation with the World Bank and the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), the CMB published its Corporate Governance 
Principles74 in 2003, which was aimed to improve the ISE-listed firms’ corporate 
governance practices (CMB, 2003; Caliskan and Icke, 2011).  
Since the CMB Principles were published in 2003, many areas in terms of the legal and 
institutional environment for corporate governance and transparency and disclosure 
practices in Turkey have been improved. Turkish government and the CMB, together 
with some private sector organisations, such as the Turkish Industrialists and 
Businessmen’s Association (TUSIAD), the Corporate Governance Forum of Turkey 
(CGFT), the Corporate Governance Association (KYD) and the Foreign Investors 
Association (YASED), have performed hard to improve the rules for corporate 
governance and transparency and disclosure (IIF, 2005; Caliskan and Icke, 2011). 
However, it is not realistic to expect an immediate effect of these performances and 
changes of laws and regulations to move towards much stronger minority shareholder 
rights. As Odabasi et al. (2004) stated, each country has its own history and contributors 
with their distinctive psycho-physical characteristics, and all of these characteristics are 
likely to influence the nature and the speed of evolution of the regulatory reforms.  
                                                          
74
 The CMB Principles consisted of four major parts. The first part discussed shareholders’ rights and 
their equal treatments involved with issues such as right to obtain and evaluate information, right to vote, 
right to join the general shareholders meeting, and more minority rights detailed in this part. The second 
part included principles related to the disclosure and transparency for establishing information policies in 
firms with respect to shareholders and the adherence of firms to these policies. The third part was 
concerned about firms’ obligations for their stakeholders, including their workers, creditors, customers, 
suppliers, institutions, non-governmental organisations, the government and potential investors who may 
think of investing in these firms, in order to regulate the relationship between the firms and their 
stakeholders. The fourth part discussed the functions, duties, obligations, operations and the structure of 
the board of directors as well as the committees to be created to support the board operations and 
executives (CMB, 2003; 2004; Caliskan and Icke, 2011).  
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Yet the concept and implementation of corporate governance practices are rather new in 
Turkey. However, considering the various major economic and structural reforms 
carried out for a better working of the market economy, outward-orientation and 
globalisation, the prospect for integration with the EU and the competition of emerging 
markets to attract global foreign direct investment, corporate governance is the hot topic 
in Turkey as is the case in the world. Accordingly, Turkey’s corporate governance 
practices could promptly improve toward a better legal framework and stronger minority 
shareholders rights in order to be more competitive and able to access capital from 
international markets (IIF, 2005; Caliskan and Icke, 2011).  
Empirical research related to agency cost theory of dividends is extensive in developed 
markets but they generally assume that firms in these markets are widely held and the 
control is concentrated in the hands of managers, the principal-managers conflict, while 
examining whether dividends are used to reduce agency problems. However, a growing 
number of researchers have recently emphasised that it is extremely important to 
consider ownership structure of companies in developing markets, in understanding 
dividend policy related to the agency problems in these markets, since they have 
provided evidence that the ownership structures of companies in developing economies 
are not widely held. In fact, they have concentrated ownership structures, generally 
dominated by families. Therefore, in developing markets, the most salient agency 
problem is expropriation of the wealth of minority owners by the controlling 
shareholders, in other words the principal-principal conflict, so called Agency Problem 
II. Several studies have examined the relationship between family-control and dividend 
policy in emerging markets from Agency Problem II perspective but there has not yet 
been any research conducted examining the effect of families on dividend policy 
decisions in the emerging Turkish market, despite the fact that Turkish companies are 
mainly family-controlled.  
Accordingly, the aim of this chapter of the thesis is to empirically investigate the link 
between ownership structure and dividend policy, which is still unexplored in the 
emerging Turkish market, over a decade after Turkey implemented major economic and 
structural reforms as well as the publication of the CMB’s Corporate Governance 
Principles in 2003. Particularly, this chapter contributes to the dividend literature in the 
following aspects. First, Turkey offers an ideal setting to study the dividend behaviour 
of an emerging market (a civil law originated country), which employed the common 
laws in order to integrate with world markets. Second, it examines the relationship 
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between family ownership and dividend policy from the principal-principal conflict 
perspective to identify whether families tend to expropriate the wealth from minority 
investors through dividends after the implementation of major reforms, starting with the 
fiscal year 2003. Third, it also focuses on investigating the effects of non-family 
blockholders, such as foreign investors, domestic financial corporations and the state, on 
dividend policy of Turkish firms over the relevant period. Fourth, it further attempts to 
detect the relationship between minority shareholders and dividend policy in the Turkish 
market. (v) Fifth, it uses a large-scale dataset that relatively covers a more recent long 
time period, employs richer research methodologies (the pooled and panel logit/probit 
and tobit regression analyses) and uses alternative dividend policy measures (the 
probability of paying dividends, dividend payout ratio and dividend yield). Finally, it 
attempts to answer the following research questions:  
1. Do families prefer higher/lower cash dividend payments in order to 
mitigate/exacerbate the wealth expropriation from outside shareholders in Turkey?  
 
2. What are the impacts of non-family blockholders (foreign investors, domestic 
financial corporations and the state) on dividend policy of Turkish firms?  
 
3. What is the attitude of minority shareholders toward cash dividend payments in 
the Turkish stock market?  
 
4. Is there any significant industry-effect for Turkish firms when industry dummies 
are included in the models?  
 
5. Are the pooled logit models more favourable to estimate the probability of 
paying dividends of Turkish firms or are the panel logit models more suitable rather 
than pooled models?  
 
6. Is the effect of ownership structure on the probability of paying dividends and 
the intensity of paying dividends of Turkish firms different from each other or the same? 
 
7. Are the tobit regressions results, which are used to estimate the intensity of 
paying dividends of Turkish firms, consistent with the logit regression results or 
significantly different? Are the pooled tobit models more favourable to estimate the 
intensity of paying dividends of Turkish firms, or are the panel tobit models more 
suitable rather than the pooled models?  
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8. Do the tobit estimations provide the same or different results when the different 
measure of dividend policy, which stands for the intensity of paying dividends of 
Turkish firms, is applied?  
 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. The following section 5.2 reviews 
the previous studies and develops the research hypotheses. The methodology and data 
are explained in section 5.3. Section 5.4 presents the empirical results, whereas section 
5.5 summarises the conclusions of this chapter of the study.  
 
5.2 Previous Studies and Research Hypotheses  
5.2.1 Agency Problems and Dividend Policy  
In the corporate dividend policy literature, researchers focus on two kinds of agency 
problems. Following Berle and Means’ (1932) analysis of the modern corporation, 
where ownership of capital is dispersed among small shareholders but control is 
concentrated in the hands of managers, the traditional agency cost theory (Agency 
Problem I) has stemmed from the conflict of interest between shareholders (the 
principal) and management (the agent) and the need has emerged for shareholders to 
monitor management behaviour. A relatively large number of studies have researched 
this type of managerial agency cost theory, which was developed by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), Rozeff (1982) and Easterbrook (1984). Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
identified three components of agency costs: monitoring expenditures,75 bonding 
expenditures76 and residual loss,77 respectively. Easterbrook (1984) argued that dividend 
payments are used to take away the free cash from the managers’ control and pay it to 
shareholders. Paying larger dividends decreases the internal cash flow subject to 
                                                          
75 Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that dividend payments force managers to raise external finance 
more frequently than they would without paying dividends and this allows outside professionals, such as 
investment banks, regulators, lawyers, public accountants and potential investors to scrutinize the firm 
and monitor its managers’ activities. This capital market monitoring decreases the agency cost and 
increases the market value of the firm.  
 
76
 Bonding expenditures are associated with the amount of cash flow at managers’ disposal. Dividend 
payments would reduce the agency costs by controlling and improving the forms of incentives that 
managers create for themselves and reducing the amount of cash that they may misuse for their own 
consumption.  
 
77
 Residual loss implies that managers with large balances of excess cash, so called free cash flows, may 
not use this cash in profitable ways that shareholders desire; for instance, investing in negative NPV 
projects or unwise acquisitions. However, dividends reduce the amount of excess cash that managers can 
overinvest or misuse.  
Birkbeck University of London Page 251 
management discretion and forces the company to approach the capital market in order 
to meet the funding needs for new projects. Increase of costly outside capital subjects to 
the company to the scrutiny of the capital market for new funds and decreases the 
chance of suboptimal investment. The efficient monitoring of capital markets also 
assists to ensure that managers perform in the best interests of shareholders. Thereby, 
dividend payments might serve as a means of monitoring and bonding management 
performance. Similarly, Jensen (1986) suggested that shareholders use dividends as a 
device to reduce overinvestment by managers. The managers control the company and 
they may use free cash to invest in projects with negative NPVs, but a dividend 
payment reduces this free cash flow and the scope of overinvestment.  
Although large dividend payments may reduce agency costs, they lead a firm to raise 
external finance, which may be associated with increased transaction costs. In this 
context, Rozeff (1982) introduced the cost minimisation model, which combines 
transaction costs and agency costs to an optimal dividend policy that is the outcome of a 
trade-off between equity agency costs and transaction costs. Optimal dividend payments 
have the benefit of reducing equity agency costs as well as balancing against an increase 
in transaction costs. In fact, various studies based on Rozeff’s (1982) specification to 
explain dividend policy, including Llyod et al. (1985), Schooley and Barney (1994), 
Moh’d et al. (1995) and Farinha (2003), have found results consistent with Rozeff’s 
original findings and indicated a relationship between dividend policy and agency cost 
variables. In short, the traditional agency theory of dividend policy, therefore, 
emphasises the principal-agent conflict and seeks to answer its research questions 
related to firms with dispersed ownership in only a few countries, such as the US and 
the UK, consistent with the Berle and Means paradigm (1932).  
Recent cross-country studies, nevertheless, have provided evidence that concentrated 
ownership, by large controlling shareholders, is the dominant form of the ownership 
structure in most developing economies, in contrast with the Berle and Means image of 
the widely-held corporation (La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2000; Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1986). La Porta et al. (1999) examined the ownership structures of large firms 
in 27 different countries and suggested that relatively a few of these firms are widely 
held; rather they are heavily concentrated and are commonly controlled by families or 
the states. Furthermore, Claessens et al. (2000) reported that single shareholder controls 
more than two-thirds of publicly listed East Asian firms and families dominate about 
40% of all listed companies. Faccio et al. (2001) examined 5,897 companies from West 
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European and East Asian countries and found that families, which often supplied a top 
manager, are the predominant form of ownership in East Asia. In fact, this form of 
ownership was actually more pronounced in Western Europe. According to Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997), family-owned firms govern a majority of the developing economies in 
South America. Consequently, increasing evidence reveals that family firms are 
widespread around the world and occupy a growing importance in the economic globe.  
Moreover, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argued that when large shareholders, including 
family shareholders, hold almost full control, they tend to generate private benefits of 
control that are not shared with minority shareholders. Controlling shareholders can 
expend the companies’ cash flows and implement policies that benefit themselves in 
such ways as paying themselves extreme salaries, and providing top managerial 
positions and board seats to their family members even though they are not capable. In 
these cases, the salient agency problem is therefore expropriation of the wealth of 
minority owners by the controlling shareholders, which is the conflict of interest 
between controlling and minority shareholders (the principal-principal conflict). 
Similarly, La Porta et al. (1999) stated that families are almost always involved in the 
management of their firms, which highly provides greater alignment between the 
interests of shareholders and managers; therefore, family control is one of the most 
efficient forms of organisational governance of monitoring managers and may bring 
more effective management and supervision, which leads to zero or lower owner-
manager agency cost (Agency Problem I), than other large shareholders or dispersed 
corporations (La Porta et al., 1999; Ang et al., 2000; Anderson and Reeb, 2003).  
On the other hand, family control increases the moral risks arising from the abuse of 
control rights and families might have powerful incentives to expropriate wealth from 
minority shareholder. Faccio et al. (2001) argued that families are likely to expropriate 
wealth when their control rights are greater than their cash flow rights. Further, Shleifer 
and Vishny (1997) indicated that in the existence of highly concentrated ownership 
structures, expropriation by large shareholders has become a prominent agency 
problem. Villalonga and Amit (2006) suggested that families have a greater incentive to 
expropriate wealth from minority shareholders than other controlling large shareholders. 
Likewise, Anderson and Reeb (2004) emphasised that founding families might involve 
self-dealing by lessening firm risk, enriching themselves at the expense of minority 
owners, engaging in non-profit maximising projects, misusing firm’s resources or 
generally holding their interests over the other investors of the firm. Therefore, evidence 
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from various studies indicates that the principal-principal conflict, in other words 
Agency Problem II, is more prevalent in family-controlled publicly listed firms. In this 
respect, Daily et al. (2003) suggested that agency cost theory may function differently 
in family-controlled publicly listed firms, and that prior findings from widely held 
corporations may not readily generalise into this setting.   
5.2.2 Family Control and Dividend Policy  
In most emerging economies, companies usually have controlling shareholders that own 
significant fractions of equity, typically founding families. With regard to Agency 
Problem I, it is widely assumed that family ownership leads to a better governance in 
order to monitor and control the managers, due to their direct involvement in the 
management of the firms and greater controlling rights, therefore zero or lower owner-
manager agency cost (La Porta et al., 1999). Nevertheless, due to lack of effective 
monitoring, family shareholders, as the insiders in the company, may have increased 
access to the use of corporate funds that may increase agency costs. Therefore, some 
researchers argue that families have powerful motivations to expropriate wealth from 
minority shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Anderson and Reeb, 2004; 
Villalonga and Amit, 2006).  
Based on the argument of Agency Problem II, family owners may use their controlling 
power to exacerbate the principal-principal conflicts in various ways. For instance, 
Morck and Yeung (2003) identified the “other people’s money” problem, which 
involves the situation in which families have significant control over a firm, with very 
little investment in that firm. Indeed, by the separation between cash flow and control 
rights through pyramidal company structures or multiple classes of voting power of 
shares, controlling shareholders can divert resources to themselves and obtain “private 
benefits of control”, such as paying themselves extreme salaries and providing top 
managerial positions and board seats to their family members even though they are not 
capable (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Another common form of expropriation of wealth 
from minority owners is referred to as “tunnelling”.78 This is defined as the transfer of 
assets and profits, within a family-owned business group. In this case, the controlling 
family transfer assets and profits to firms in which they have higher ownership, from 
                                                          
78
 Johnson et al. (2000) argued that the controlling shareholders have strong motivations to drain 
resources off the firm to increase their wealth through the pyramidal business group structure and coined 
the term “tunnelling”, suggesting that tunnelling may take many forms, including the form of outright 
theft or fraud, more subtle legal forms such as dilutive share issues that discriminate against minority 
shareholders and mergers between affiliated companies to transfer resources out of the bidder. 
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firms with lower ownership, through non-market prices (Johnson et al, 2000). In short, 
Agency Problem II is the salient agency problem and may seriously harm the interests 
of minority shareholders in family-controlled firms.  
Another major way in which families can exercise control is through board 
representation. In fact, top executives almost always come from the controlling family 
(La Porta et al., 1999; Faccio et al., 2001; Yoshikawa and Rasheed, 2010). The 
corporate governance literature suggests that a firm’s board of directors can play an 
important role in mitigating agency problems, particularly by monitoring executive 
management (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Farinha, 2003). However, controlling-family 
members sitting on the boards can reduce the effectiveness of the board of directors as a 
monitoring mechanism by executing policies that benefit themselves and hence can 
increase the costs of potential expropriation of minority shareholders’ wealth in the firm 
(La Porta et al., 1999; Leng, 2008; Huda and Abdullah, 2013). If this is the case, then 
who monitors the family-directors’ decisions on the boards?  
The answer to this question could be the existence of independent non-executive 
directors on the board. Indeed, independent directors are considered as a useful 
mechanism in monitoring executive directors’ actions and thus reducing agency conflict 
of interest within a firm (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1993). Since governance 
tools in family firms are limited, minority shareholders generally rely on the boards to 
scrutinize and control the possible opportunistic behaviour of families, and the interests 
of minority shareholders are best protected when independent directors have power on 
family blockholders (Westphal, 1998; Anderson and Reeb, 2004). Nevertheless, family 
firms are not likely to appoint boards that may limit their control over their firms’ 
resources and hence have a significant negative impact on the independence of board, 
which means that they tend to have none or lower proportions of independent directors 
on the board and a tendency to exacerbate agency problems (Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009).  
La Porta et al. (2000) suggested that one of the main remedies to these types of agency 
problems is the law. Corporate law and legal environment can supply outside investors 
and existing shareholders, including non-family and minority shareholders, specific 
powers79 to protect their wealth against expropriation by controlling families. Moreover, 
                                                          
79
 These powers could vary from the right to vote on important corporate matters, to the right to sue the 
firm for damages, to the right to receive the same per share dividends as the controlling owners, which are 
the legal protections that explains why becoming a minority shareholders is a reasonable investment 
strategy, rather than just being a complete giveaway of funds to others who are under a few, if any, 
obligations to return (La Porta et al, 2000).  
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La Porta et al. (2000) argued that dividends are the substitutes for legal protection of 
minority shareholders in the countries with weak legal protections. A reputation for 
good treatment of shareholders is worth the most in economies with poor legal 
protection of minority shareholders, who have little else to rely on. By paying 
dividends, controlling shareholders return profits to investors, which reduce the 
possibility of expropriation of wealth from others, therefore establishing a good 
reputation.80  
It is difficult to judge whether families either mitigate or exacerbate Agency Problem II 
and how family control affects corporate dividend policy. A few recent studies have 
investigated and reported mixed evidence concerning family-controlled companies’ 
dividend policy behaviour. Faccio et al. (2001) investigated how dividend behaviour is 
related to the structure of ownership and control of East Asian firms, with a benchmark 
sample of West European firms during the period 1992-1996. Their analysis showed 
that the salient agency problem in both regions is expropriation of wealth from outside 
shareholders by controlling shareholders, which are predominantly the families. 
Especially, this type of expropriation is more likely to arise when the corporation is 
affiliated to a group of corporations that are all controlled by the same shareholder, 
which was found to be the case for about half of the firms in Western Europe, as well as 
in East Asia. Particularly, they found that group-affiliated firms in Europe paid 
significantly higher dividends than in Asia, dampening insider expropriation. 
Additionally, the presence of multiple large shareholders increased dividend rates in 
Western Europe but decreased in East Asia, suggesting that other large owners tend to 
help reduce the controlling shareholder’s expropriation of minority owners in Europe, 
whereas they appear to exacerbate it in Asia.  
                                                          
80
 La Porta et al. (2000) proposed two alternative agency models based on the legal environment and 
dividends as “the outcome model” and “the substitute model”. According to first view, dividends are an 
outcome of an effective system of legal protection of shareholders. Under an effective system with strong 
protections, minorities use their legal powers to force firms to disgorge cash in the form of dividends, 
hence preventing controlling owners to expropriate corporate wealth. However, “the substitute model” 
posits that dividends are substitutes for legal protection in the countries with poor shareholders protection. 
Further, companies with weak shareholders protection need to establish a reputation for good treatment of 
minority investors. Accordingly, paying dividends will establish a reputation for preventing expropriation 
of wealth from minority shareholders.  
 
The outcome model predicts that dividend payments are higher in countries with effective shareholder 
protection. Contrarily, the substitute model argues that in countries with effective shareholder protection, 
however, the need for a reputation mechanism is weaker, therefore so is the need to distribute dividends, 
then suggesting, ceteris paribus, that dividend ratios should be higher in countries with poor legal 
protection of shareholders than in countries with strong protections. Moreover, the outcome model also 
states that firms with better investment opportunities should have lower payout ratios in economies with 
good shareholder protections. On the other hand, the substitute model predicts that in markets with poor 
legal environment, firms with better investment opportunities may pay out more to maintain their 
reputations (La Porta et al, 2000).  
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Chen et al. (2005) analysed a sample of 412 Hong Kong firms during 1995-1998 and 
they found that, for only small firms, there was a significant negative relationship 
between dividend payouts and family ownership of up to 10% of the firm’s 
shareholdings and a positive relationship for family ownership between 10% and 35%. 
Chen et al (2005) interpreted their findings as dividend payouts are potentially used by 
controlling families in smaller Hong Kong companies as a tool of extracting resources 
out of the firms they control. When their shareholdings increase, family managers may 
care more about their dividend income compared to their cash salary, since on average 
their cash salary is much lower than their dividend income. However, it may also be the 
case that other shareholders foresee the potential expropriation by the families and 
require higher payouts from firms with potentially the largest agency conflicts.  
Moreover, using a data sample of 1,486 Chinese A-share listed firms for the period 
2004-2008, Wei et al. (2011) found that families have lower cash dividend payouts and 
lower tendencies to distribute dividends than non-family firms in China, and a 
favourable regional institutional environment has a significant positive effect on the 
payout ratios and the tendency to pay dividends of listed companies. The results also 
showed that the impact of the regional institutional environment on cash dividends is 
stronger in family controlled firms than in non-family firms. Having interpreted their 
results, Wei et al. (2011) suggested that controlling family shareholders in China 
seemed to increase Agency Problem I, rather than Agency Problem II, which has a 
significant negative impact on cash dividend policy due to a lack of effective 
supervision, and the occupation of leading positions by incapable family members 
usually reduces corporate efficiency. Then, a favourable regional institutional 
environment takes a positive corporate governance role by helping to lessen Agency 
Problem I and encouraging family firms to distribute cash dividends. Accordingly, they 
further suggested that a high cash dividend payout is more likely to be the consequences 
of the outcome model of dividends, which is proposed by La Porta et al. (2000), by a 
favourable regional institutional environment. 
More recently, Aguenaou et al. (2013) investigated the effect of ownership structure on 
dividend policies for firms listed on the Casablanca Stock Exchange during the period 
2004-2010. The study results revealed that family ownership negatively influences the 
level of distributed dividends. Aguenaou et al. (2013) suggested that family ownership 
is a typical aspect of firms in the Moroccan market and the low dividend payout ratios 
are justified by high agency problems in family-controlled firms. Because, family 
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shareholders increase the cost for firms since their lack of diversification, the hiring of 
unskilled family members and the abuse of other shareholders’ rights, which all may 
result in poor transparency and absence of accountability. Furthermore, using a database 
of 458 Colombian companies over the period 1996-2006, Gonzalez et al. (2014) 
examined the effects of family involvement on dividend policy and how family 
involvement influences agency problems between majority and minority shareholders. 
Their results showed that family influence in relation to the level and likelihood of 
dividend payments differs considerably according to the type of family involvement. 
Specifically, family involvement in management does not affect dividend policy, 
whereas family involvement in both ownership and control through pyramidal 
structures has a negative impact. Family involvement in control through 
disproportionate board representation has a positive effect on dividend policies of 
Colombian companies. Therefore, family influence on agency problems, and hence on 
dividend policy as a mitigating device, varies depending on family involvement.  
5.2.3 Other Large Shareholders, Monitoring and Dividend Policy  
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) suggested that if legal protection does not provide enough 
control rights to small investors, perhaps large shareholders might mitigate the 
shareholders conflict by an efficient monitoring of the management. According to 
Grossman and Hart (1980), managements of the companies should be monitored, which 
must be effectively done by larger shareholders. The existence of such large 
shareholders can mitigate the free rider problem of monitoring managers and therefore 
reducing agency costs. Similarly, Yoshikawa and Rasheed (2010) pointed out that 
publicly listed family-owned companies have also other types of outside shareholders 
who might expose the possibility that the family firm is subject to outside influence. 
When such outside shareholders are large, they may have some ability to affect 
managerial decisions and actions of family-owned companies, hence lessening the 
likelihood of expropriation.  
Large shareholders may take several distinct forms depending on the proportion of 
shares held and the type of legal owners, such as management or board ownership, 
family and foreign shareholders, the state and financial institutions ownerships (La 
Porta et al., 1999; Huda and Abdullah, 2013). The identity of controlling shareholder 
can be an important factor in determining financial polices of corporations.  
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5.2.3.1 Foreign Ownership and Dividend Policy  
Most industrial country investors often hold stocks of developing markets for their long-
run growth potential, not for the short-term cash dividend income they will generate, 
which suggests a negative correlation between foreign ownership and dividend 
payments (Glen et al., 1995). Foreign investors who own large shareholdings in 
emerging markets may serve as effective monitors of these companies due to their 
implementation of more established global standards and practices stemming from their 
affirmed preference of a longer-run investment philosophy (Jeon et al., 2011). Further, 
foreign ownership increases foreign analysts’ interests in these firms and it is true that 
foreign analysts generally ask managements to disclose their financial policies, 
providing more monitoring on the managements’ activities and hence with less need for 
the dividend-induced monitoring device (Glen et al., 1995; Manos, 2002). This also 
suggests a negative relationship between foreign ownership and dividend payments. 
Although foreign investors generally have significant global investment experiences 
using well-developed technology, which implies they are in a stronger position to assess 
a firm’s performance, it is however disputed whether foreign investors have information 
disadvantages in trading local stocks, since they may have inferior information due to 
geological, cultural and political differences. Therefore, the task of monitoring 
managements in emerging markets could be more difficult and costly for foreign 
investors, which suggests the importance of and the need for the dividend-induced 
capital market monitoring increase, with the increase in the percentage of foreign 
shareholdings, leading to a positive impact of foreign ownership on dividend policy 
(Manos, 2002; Jeon et al., 2011).  
There is limited evidence in understanding the impact of foreign investors on dividend 
policy of firms in emerging markets. By examining 661 non-financial firms listed on the 
Bombay Stock Exchange in 2001, Manos (2002) reported a significant positive relation 
between foreign ownership and dividend policy of Indian firms; the greater the 
percentage owned by foreign investors, the greater the need for dividend-induced capital 
market monitoring, consistent with the view that it may be more difficult for overseas 
investors to monitor firms and their managements in emerging market, therefore they 
tend to use higher dividend payments to enhance better managerial monitoring. 
Moreover, Lin and Shiu (2003) investigated foreign ownership in the Taiwan stock 
market from 1996 to 2000. Based on a complete panel data for 245 firms for the 
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duration of the study period, their analysis showed that foreign investors are likely to 
hold shares with low dividend yields, possibly reflecting their tax considerations due to 
the different taxation on capital gains and dividends in Taiwan. Since foreign investors 
had to pay a 25% withholding tax for dividends paid from earnings, but capital gains 
were tax-free in that period, the empirical results suggested that foreign investors 
avoided holding shares with higher dividend yields to mitigate the negative impact of 
disharmonious taxation. The evidence for this claim, however, was mixed and weak.  
Jeon et al. (2011) studied the relation between foreign ownership and the decisions on 
payout policy in the Korean stock exchange by using a sample of 5,583 firm-year 
observations from 1994 to 2004. Their research revealed that foreign investors show a 
preference for firms pay dividends and when they have substantial ownership, foreign 
shareholders lead firms to distribute more dividends. The results were driven by the fact 
that most of the foreign investors in Korea were institutional investors who had 
institutional charters, prudent-man rule restrictions and relative tax advantages on 
dividends. By investing in firms paying larger dividends, they also aimed to reduce the 
cost due to their information disadvantage, as well as continue to promote higher levels 
of cash payouts in order to minimise agency costs. Therefore, foreign investors had both 
dividend clienteles and dividend-induced monitoring incentives in the Korean stock 
market. Likewise, Ullah et al. (2012) reported that foreign ownership has a positive 
impact on the dividend payout ratios of Pakistani firms based on their analysis from 70 
randomly selected companies listed on the Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE) 100 Index 
over the period 2003-2010. They suggested that the reason for this positive impact is 
because foreign investors cannot directly observe the activities of managers, thus they 
use higher dividend payments as a tool of monitoring and disciplining device. However, 
by examining a sample of 1,927 firm-year observations from 287 firms listed on the 
Stock Exchange of Thailand during the period 2002-2010, Thanatawee (2013) found 
that foreign equity ownership has no significant effect on dividend payouts of Thai 
firms.  
5.2.3.2 Institutional Ownership and Dividend Policy 
Dividend payments force firms to go to the external capital markets for additional 
funding and therefore undergo monitoring by the capital market (Rozeff, 1982; 
Easterbrook, 1984). However, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Shleifer and Vishny 
(1986) argued that institutional blockholders, such as pension funds, insurance 
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companies, investment and unit trusts, and banks, may act as a monitoring mechanism 
on the firm’s management, consequently reducing in general the need for high dividend 
payouts. In this respect, Manos (2002) noted that institutional investors have more 
incentives to spend resources for monitoring the firm and its management compared to 
other investors, due to their expertise and better capability to scrutinize management 
activities at relatively low cost. Since their percentage ownership is generally 
comparatively large, institutions also tend to benefit from monitoring. Further, 
institutional shareholders are in a better position to take over inefficient firms and hence 
this threat is another aspect that forces managements to act more efficiently. 
Subsequently, institutional ownership has commonly been considered as a solution to 
the free rider problem, which suggests that the larger the proportion owned by 
institutions, the less is the need for dividend-induced monitoring.  
Nevertheless, Zeckhauser and Pound (1990) argued that institutional shareholders are 
unlikely to provide direct monitoring themselves, due to the arm’s length perspective of 
investment accepted by many institutional investors, along with the incentives to free 
ride with regard to monitoring activities. In fact, institutions generally prefer to force 
firms to increase their dividends, and so they are consequently forced to the external 
capital market for future funds. Likewise, Farinha (2003) suggested that institutions 
might force companies to pay higher dividends to enhance better managerial monitoring 
by external capital markets, especially when they think that their own direct monitoring 
efforts are inefficient or too costly. In this case, a positive relationship between 
institutional ownership and dividend payout ratio is expected.  
A number of studies investigated the impact of institutional investors on dividend 
policies of firms listed in emerging markets. Manos (2002) found that the impact of 
institutional ownership on the payout ratios of Indian firms was positive, which is 
inconsistent with the argument that the ability of institutions in terms of more effective 
monitoring reduces the need for the dividend-induced mechanism. Indeed, this was 
consistent with the dividend-induced monitoring preferences of institutions in India, 
reflecting that greater agency conflicts in the emerging Indian market, hence the level of 
direct institutional monitoring was inefficient. Contrarily, having analysed the influence 
of shareholder ownership identity on dividend policy for a panel of 29 Tunisian firms 
from 1995 to 2001, Kouki and Guizani (2009) reported that Tunisian firms paid out 
lower dividends when they had higher institutional ownership, in line with the effective 
monitoring role of institutional investors.   
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More evidence regarding the relationship between institutional ownership and dividend 
policy provided by Ullah et al. (2012) from Pakistan. They found that institutional 
shareholding has a positive impact on the dividend payout ratio, and increases in the 
percentage of institutional ownership lead to increases in dividend payments in the 
Pakistani market, where the poor legal protection given to the investors failed 
institutions to directly monitor the managements. Hence, institutional investors prefer to 
have dividends in order to reduce the opportunistic behaviour of managers. Similarly, 
Thanatawee (2013) showed evidence that Thai firms are more likely to pay dividends 
and have a tendency to pay higher dividends when they have higher institutional share 
ownership, consistent with the argument that institutional investors prefer dividend-
induced monitoring and force managers to distribute more dividends. On the other hand, 
Huda and Abdullah (2013) reported that institutional shareholders have a significant but 
negative effect on the dividend per share in Bangladesh, by examining 21 highly traded 
blue-chip companies listed on the Chittagong Stock Exchange (CSE) 30 Index during 
the period 2006-2010. This implied that institutions do not monitor or control 
managerial activities through dividends; rather the Bangladeshi firms, where the 
institutional ownership is large, tend to pay lower dividends.  
5.2.3.3 State Ownership and Dividend Policy  
State ownership is another common form of concentrated control in some countries, 
particularly in countries with poor shareholder protection (La Porta et al., 1999). It is a 
fact that state firms are generally extremely inefficient, since they tend to use firms to 
pursue political objectives and their losses result in huge deficiencies of their 
economies, which is inconsistent with the efficiency justification for their existence 
(Kikeri et al., 1992; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Further, state-controlled corporations 
can be seen as manager-controlled firms in which a double principal-agent problem yet 
exists; although the ultimate owners of these companies are the citizens, they do not 
control them directly, but their elected representatives should do. However, politicians 
may not actively or accurately monitor the companies that the state owns and this leads 
to even greater principal-agent conflicts between managers and the citizen owners of the 
state-owned corporations. In this respect, elected politicians are held responsible for all 
government activities and therefore they may be expected to have a particularly strong 
preference in seeing a steady flow of dividends from a state-owned company, since 
dividends may be good enough to convince citizens that the company performs well, as 
well as reduce the free cash flow in the hands of managers (Gugler, 2003).  
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Moreover, the recognition of enormous inefficiency of state companies and the 
pressures on public’ budgets have recently created a popular response around the world, 
so called “privatisation” that replaces political control with private control by outside 
investors in most cases. Also, privatisation in most countries generates concentrated 
private cash flow ownership in addition to the control. Privatisation generally provides 
relatively more efficient ownership structures and a significant improvement in 
performance of privatised firms (Megginson et al., 1994; Lopez-de-Silanes, 1994). 
However, it is possible that privatisation does not work as well as intended; for instance, 
when firms are privatised without the creation of large investors, which provides 
managers with more discretion. In these cases, agency costs of managerial control may 
increase, even though the costs of political control decreases and the problems of 
managerial discretion can be almost as serious as the prior problems of political control 
in these companies (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  
A few studies showed evidence that firms with high state ownership are characterised 
by high dividend payouts. Gugler (2003) investigated the relationship between 
dividends, ownership and control structure of the firm for a panel of 214 Austrian 
companies over the period 1991-1999, and found that principal-agent conflict is more 
severe in state-controlled firms. In particular, the study results showed that state 
ownership and control have a positive impact on target payout ratios, and state-
controlled firms in Austria are more reluctant to cut dividends, which is consistent with 
the managerial agency cost explanation. Using 3,994 observations of Chinese firms 
from 1995 to 2001, Wei et al. (2004) also reported that there is a significantly positive 
relationship between the state ownership and cash dividends. Wang et al. (2011), 
analysing 13,116 firm-year observations over the period 1998-2008, and Lam et al. 
(2012), examining 7,519 firm-year observations during the period 2001-2006, provided 
more evidence from China. The results of both studies similarly showed that Chinese 
firms with higher state ownership are likely to pay higher cash dividends. However, 
Kouki and Guizani (2009) found a significantly negative relationship between dividend 
per share and the state ownership in the context of emerging Tunisian market in contrast 
with the evidence of previously mentioned studies.   
5.2.4 Minority Shareholders and Dividend Policy  
Conflicts of interest between corporate insiders such as managers or ultimate controlling 
shareholders and outside investors, specifically minority shareholders, have been crucial 
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to the analysis of modern corporations (Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). Insiders may vary from country to country. For instance, in the US, the UK or 
Canada, where companies are relatively dispersed, typically their managers are in the 
controlling positions, whereas in most other countries - especially in emerging markets, 
companies are generally controlled by large shareholders, such as founding families (La 
Porta et al., 1999). The insiders who control the corporate assets can use these funds for 
their own purposes without benefiting minority shareholders through various formats 
such as outright theft, misusing firms’ resources, excessive salaries, asset sales (selling 
other companies that they control at favourable prices) to themselves and so on (Jensen, 
1986; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Johnson et al., 2000). This is consistent with 
DeAngelo et al.’s (2008, p.218) statement that “There is much yet to be learned about 
the nature and scope of minority stockholder exploitation.” Nevertheless, regardless of 
the identity of controlling shareholders, the victims are always the minority investors 
(La Porta et al., 2000).  
Even though minority shareholders have stronger protections in countries such as the 
US and the UK, researchers hypothesised and found a positive relationship between 
dispersion of ownership among outside shareholders and dividend payout. The 
existence of large number of small investors leads to a low level of ownership 
concentration, which increases the potential agency costs given the free-rider problem 
associated with higher ownership diffusion and the need for outside monitoring. 
Therefore, Rozeff (1982) and Easterbrook (1984) hypothesised that minority 
shareholders seek greater dividend payout, as they perceive their level of control to 
diminish. Indeed, a string of studies that followed Rozeff’s (1982) work reported a 
positive relationship between ownership dispersion and dividend payments in developed 
markets, including Schooley and Barney (1994), Moh’d et al. (1995) and Farinha 
(2003).  
Moreover, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argued that, in countries where minority 
investors do not have much protection rights, large investors generally in the form of 
families, the states or banks may control managers, but it still leaves existing and 
potential minority investors unprotected. In this case, La Porta et al. (2000) suggested 
that these minority shareholders would typically desire for dividends, which reduce 
what is left for expropriation. They further stated that, “A reputation for good treatment 
of shareholders is worth the most in countries with weak legal protection of minority 
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shareholders, who have little else to rely on. As a consequence, the need for dividends 
to establish a reputation is the greatest in such countries” (La Porta et al., 2000, p.7).  
In the context of emerging Indian market, Manos (2002) indeed found that investors 
with the smaller percentage of shareholdings have a taste for cash dividends, in order to 
reduce the collective action of monitoring problem by dividend-induced capital market 
monitoring, therefore preferring higher dividend payments.  However, in the emerging 
markets such as China, where dividends are taxed as ordinary income but capital gains 
are not, small investors may have preference for capital gains over dividends (Wang et 
al., 2011). According to Wei et al. (2004), small investors in China are too poorly 
informed for even the rights they actually have, hence they have neither the incentive 
nor the ability to collect information and monitor the managements. They 
characteristically care about the appreciation or depreciation of shares they hold, and 
depend on short-run capital gains rather than cash dividend income. In this respect, an 
inverse relationship can be expected between the proportion of small investors’ 
shareholdings and dividend payout ratio. In fact, Lam et al. (2012) reported that 
Chinese firms with higher public (small) ownership tend to pay lower cash dividends, 
reflecting the preference of small investors for capital gains over dividends, due to the 
advantageous tax treatment of capital gains and the weak legal protections for minority 
shareholders in China. 
5.2.5 Research Context in Turkey and Hypotheses Development  
As is the case in many other emerging markets, the concentrated ownership by large 
controlling shareholders is the dominant form of the ownership structure in Turkey. 
Corporate ownership is characterised by highly concentrated family ownership, with the 
existence of other large shareholders such as foreign, institutional and state ownerships 
(Gursoy and Aydogan, 1999; Yurtoglu, 2003; IIF, 2005; Sevil et al., 2012), in contrast 
with the Berle and Means image of the widely held corporation in which ownership 
structure of firm is dispersed among small shareholders but the control is concentrated 
in the hands of managers.  
Accordingly, it is crucial to consider ownership structure of companies in Turkey in 
understanding dividend policy related to the agency problems, since the most salient 
agency problem maybe the expropriation of the wealth of minority owners by the 
controlling shareholders, namely the principal-principal conflict. Indeed, during the late 
1990’s, a considerably long list of cases of corruption, share dilution, asset stripping, 
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tunnelling, insider trading and market manipulation took place in the Turkish public, 
and a number of listed firms’ minority shareholders were harmed by these events 
(Ararat and Ugur, 2003; Yurtoglu, 2003; IIF, 2005). Following the November 2002 
elections, which resulted in one-party government, the economic programs and 
structural reforms were jointly carried out by the government and the IMF for a better 
working of the market economy, outward-orientation and globalisation, starting in 
March 2003 (CMB, 2003). Further, Turkey’s progress in achieving full membership of 
the EU in this period also provided the strongest motivation in establishing new 
reforms, rules and regulations to improve corporate governance and transparency and 
disclosure practices; therefore, to integrate its economy with Europe and to harmonise 
its institutions with those of the EU (IIF, 2005; Aksu and Kosedag, 2006).  
The CMB of Turkey attributed great importance to improve communications with 
investors, issuers and other institutions in order to ensure that markets are functioning in 
a safer, more transparent and more efficient manner in accordance with regulations that 
were adopted in harmony with international norms and developments (CMB, 2003). 
Accordingly, one of the most important developments was that, in cooperation with the 
World Bank and the OECD, the CMB published its Corporate Governance Principles in 
2003, which was aimed to improve the ISE listed firms corporate governance practices 
(CMB, 2003; Caliskan and Icke, 2011). Considering the implementation of various 
major economic and structural reforms starting with the fiscal year 2003, and with many 
areas improved in Turkish corporate governance practices, its capital market is still 
heavily concentrated and characterised by high family ownership (IIF, 2005; Caliskan 
and Icke, 2011). Cash dividends can be used to either reduce or exacerbate the 
principal-principal conflict, since dividends are the substitutes for legal protection of 
minority shareholders in the countries with weak legal protections. By paying 
dividends, controlling shareholders return profits to investors, which reduce the 
possibility of expropriation of wealth from others (La Porta et al., 2000). Therefore, this 
chapter of the thesis focuses on the effect of ownership structure, including families, 
foreign investors, domestic institutional corporations, the state and minority investors, 
on dividend policy behaviour in Turkey based on the principal-principal conflict 
perspective of agency cost theory over a decade after Turkey implemented major 
reforms, including the publication of the CMB’s Corporate Governance Principles, 
starting with the fiscal year 2003.  
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Moreover, the tax factor may also play an important role in understanding the attitude of 
investors towards cash dividends in Turkey. Under the current Turkish tax system, cash 
dividends and capital gains are taxed differently. Table 5.1 below illustrates a summary 
of the Turkish tax regime on capital gains and cash dividends for the investors. Before 
2006, a 15% withholding tax used to be imposed on all kinds of investment instruments 
(deposits, equities, bonds, mutual funds) regardless of the type of the investor 
(resident/non-resident, individual/corporate), but the Turkish tax regime on investment 
instruments changed significantly at the beginning of 2006 (TSPAKB, 2007).  
Table 5.1 Taxation of Capital Gains and Dividends on Equities in Turkey 
The table presents a summary of the Turkish tax regime of capital gains and dividends on equity 
investments for the investors (resident/non-resident, individual/corporate) since 2006.  
 
Investment  
Individuals Corporations 
Residents Non-residents Residents Non-residents 
 
 
 
 
 
Capital Gains 
on Equities  
 
Capital gains 
derived from 
shares subject to 
0% withholding 
tax. However, the 
shares of 
investment trusts 
and exchange 
traded funds are 
subject to 10% 
withholding tax, if 
held for less than a 
year. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0% withholding 
tax. 
 
Capital gains 
derived from 
shares subject to 
0% withholding 
tax. However, the 
shares of 
investment trusts 
and exchange 
traded funds are 
subject to 10% 
withholding tax, if 
held for less than a 
year. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0% withholding 
tax. 
 
 
 
 
Dividends on 
Equities 
 
 
 
15% withholding 
tax is applied by 
the corporation 
distributing 
dividends. 
 
 
 
15% withholding 
tax is applied by 
the corporation 
distributing 
dividends. 
 
Not subject to 
dividend 
withholding tax. 
Dividends 
received from 
resident 
incorporations are 
exempt from 
corporate tax.  
 
 
 
 
15% withholding 
tax is applied by 
the corporation 
distributing 
dividends.  
Source: Compiled from TSPAKB (2007; 2008; 2012)      
        
As illustrated in the table, foreign investors, both individuals and corporations, are not 
subject to any taxes for capital gains derived from shares, whereas they are taxed with a 
15% withholding tax rate for their cash dividends distributed on the shares they held. 
Similarly, domestic individual investors are not subject to any taxes for capital gains but 
they are subject to a 15% withholding tax for their cash dividend income. However, 
domestic corporations’ taxation relatively differs from the other types of investors. 
Domestic corporations are not subject to any taxes for both capital gains and cash 
dividends that derived on equities of resident incorporations. It is also important to note 
Birkbeck University of London Page 267 
that, even though domestic investors, both individuals and corporations, are exempt 
from taxation on capital gains, they are subject to 10% withholding tax for capital gains 
on the shares of investment trusts and exchange traded funds, if held less than one year, 
implying that the Turkish tax system encourages domestic investors to hold these type 
of shares for longer period. 
Corporate dividend literature argues that uneven tax treatment of dividends and capital 
gains may affect investors’ preferences and therefore dividend policy decisions of firms.  
For instance, the tax preference theory (Brennan, 1970; Elton and Gruber, 1970; 
Litzenberger and Ramaswamy, 1979) proposes that investors who receive favourable 
tax treatment on capital gains (lower taxes on capital gains than dividends) might prefer 
shares with none or low dividend payouts, since the income tax on dividends is greater 
and hence the high dividend payments will increase shareholders’ tax burden. However, 
the tax clientele theory (Miller and Modigliani, 1961; Black and Scholes, 1974; Miller 
and Scholes, 1978) argues that each investor has their own implied calculations of 
choosing between high or low cash dividends and selecting dividend policies according 
to their tax category circumstances, and since there are enough companies to provide 
these different dividend policies, investors will invest in only companies with policies 
best fit their tax position. Therefore, in equilibrium, no firm can increase its value by 
reducing taxes through its dividend policy; in fact, this may cause a change in clientele 
and could be costly because of trading costs. Consequently, due to the uneven taxation 
of capital gains and cash dividends in Turkey, the tax factor may also play a role in 
understanding the relationship between ownership structure of the firms, in other words 
various types of investors holding shares of the firms, and cash dividend policy in the 
emerging Turkish market.  
Furthermore, the principal-principal conflict (Agency Problem II), which is based on the 
expropriation argument, suggests that families prefer lower dividend payments to 
maintain cash flows that they can potentially expropriate (Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009; 
Yoshikawa and Rasheed, 2010). However, it is difficult to judge whether families either 
mitigate or exacerbate Agency Problem II and how family control affects corporate 
dividend policy in emerging markets. Although a few recent studies (Faccio et al., 
2001; Chen et al., 2005; Wei et al., 2011; Aguenaou et al., 2013; Gonzalez et al., 2014) 
investigated and reported mixed evidence concerning the effect of family involvement 
on dividend policy, they generally found a negative relationship between family control 
and dividend payout ratio. In this respect, Turkey, where corporate ownership structure 
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is characterised by highly concentrated family ownership,81 offers an ideal setting to 
investigate the relationship between family ownership and cash dividends in the context 
of an emerging market. 
Even though some aspects of the family-owned firm structure sharply contrast with the 
basic concepts of corporate governance, other aspects of it may be advantageous in 
many cases. In family-owned companies, management and ownership are not separated, 
and Turks highly value close family ties. These ties, or sense of belonging to a larger 
social group, have done well in motivating manager employees to work hard for the 
well being of the company. Therefore, overlapping ownership and management may 
help to minimise the managerial agency problems (Izmen, 2003). However, by 
maintaining tight control, family members have in some instances obtained well-paid 
jobs and perks from the company, even if they are not capable. Moreover, controlling 
families have had the opportunities to expropriate profits from minority investors, 
typically through the use of company assets or non-arm’s length related party 
transactions (IIF, 2005). Further, Turkish families mostly generate the control through 
the presence of business groups, which are affiliations of industrial and financial 
companies, organised under the legal form of a “holding company” (Yurtoglu, 2003).82 
In this case, the controlling families may have strong initiatives to expropriate wealth of 
minority shareholders, which may exacerbate Agency Problem II. As previously 
mentioned, during the late 1990’s, a considerably long list of cases of corruption, share 
dilution, asset stripping, tunnelling, insider trading and market manipulation took place 
in the Turkish public, and a number of listed firms’ minority shareholders were harmed 
by these events (Ararat and Ugur, 2003; Yurtoglu, 2003; IIF, 2005). 
Along with the major economic and structural reforms implemented in 2003, the CMB 
of Turkey published its Corporate Governance Principles in cooperation with the World 
                                                          
81
 The largest domestically owned Turkish corporations are mainly family-controlled. One shareholder 
generally controls more than 50% of voting rights in 45 % of the firms listed on the ISE. It is also 
reported that at least three-fourths of all corporations are owned by families or a holding company 
controlled by a family (IIF, 2005). A study done by Gursoy and Aydogan (1999) revealed that around 
44% of companies on the ISE belonged to a family or a small group of families and other 30% of them 
were controlled by holding companies, showing predominant family involvement in approximately 74% 
of all companies between 1992 and 1998. Similarly, Yurtoglu (2003) indicated that business groups are 
the dominant forms in Turkish corporate governance and business groups in Turkey are a set of industrial 
and financial corporations organised under a legal structure of a holding company, which is commonly 
controlled by a single family or sometimes a partnership of a few families. In fact families ultimately 
owned 80% of all firms listed on the ISE. 
 
82
 Yurtoglu (2003) reported that holding companies are the most frequently observed form of direct 
ownership by families who organise a large number of firms under a pyramidal ownership structure or 
even through more complicated web of inter-corporate equity linkages  in the Turkish capital market. 
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Bank and the OECD in the same year. Since then, many areas in terms of the legal and 
institutional environment for corporate governance and transparency, and disclosure 
practices in Turkey have been improved. However, it is not realistic to expect an 
immediate effect of these performances and changes of laws and regulations, to move 
toward much stronger minority shareholder rights. In fact, the acceptance and 
application of the CMB Principles have been relatively slow among the ISE-listed 
firms, since the majority of companies are dominated by a single family as the 
controlling shareholder and many family-owned firms, by no means all, tend to avoid 
carrying out key governance provisions that might constrain family control (IIF, 2005; 
Caliskan and Icke, 2011).  This suggests that unfair treatment of minority shareholders 
may still be a serious problem in Turkey. Therefore, if it holds true, families prefer 
lower dividend payments to maintain cash flows that they can potentially expropriate, 
which implies a negative relationship between family ownership and dividend payout in 
the Turkish market.  
Moreover, La Porta et al. (2000) proposed two alternative agency models based on the 
legal environment and dividends as the outcome model and the substitute model. 
According to first view, dividends are an outcome of an effective system of legal 
protection of shareholders. Under an effective system with strong protections, 
minorities use their legal powers to force firms to disgorge cash in the form of 
dividends, hence preventing controlling owners of expropriating corporate wealth. 
However, the substitute model posits that dividends are substitutes for legal protection 
in the countries with poor shareholders protection. Further, companies with weak 
shareholders protection need to establish a reputation for good treatment of minority 
investors; because such a reputation will enable companies to access equity markets in 
the future. Accordingly, paying dividends will establish a good reputation for 
preventing expropriating of minority shareholders. If this is the case, families should 
pay higher dividends regardless of whether or not the major reforms implemented in 
2003 have led to a better legal and institutional environment for corporate governance 
and transparency, and disclosure practices in Turkey, which implies a positive 
relationship between family ownership and dividend payout.  
However, the outcome model further predicts that, in countries with good shareholder 
protection, other things being equal, firms with better investment opportunities should 
have lower payout ratios. Contrarily, the substitute model does not make this prediction, 
arguing that, in countries with poor shareholder protection, firms with better investment 
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opportunities should still pay higher dividends to maintain their reputations. In this 
respect, based on the outcome model, if the legal and institutional environments for 
corporate governance, transparency and disclosure practices are improved, leading to a 
better shareholder protection since 2003 in Turkey, then as a promising emerging 
market with fast growth, investors (including all types) may in general have a tendency 
to prefer long-term growth potential of the stocks they own, not for the short-term 
dividend income, which is involved with lower dividend payments.  
Additionally, tax considerations may also have an effect on families’ attitudes towards 
cash dividends. In Turkey, domestic individual shareholders and foreign investors (both 
individuals and corporations) have tax advantages on capital gains over cash dividends; 
hence, they may prefer capital gains based on the tax preference theory and impose 
families to pay none or lower dividends, which implies a negative relationship between 
family ownership and dividend payout. On the other hand, uneven tax treatment may 
not be a concern for families, due to different clienteles with their own tax category 
circumstances consistent with the tax clientele theory. For instance, domestic Turkish 
corporations (both financial and non-financial corporation) generally have a neutral tax-
treatment with respect to cash dividends and capital gains. Combining the ideas from 
the principal-principal conflict (Agency Problem II) based on the expropriation 
argument, outcome and substitute model of dividends and tax considerations, as well as 
the negative relationship generally reported from other emerging markets reported by a 
few studies, the following hypothesis can be formulated:  
Hypothesis 1: There is a negative relationship between family ownership and the 
dividend payment decisions of Turkish firms.  
Another basic characteristic of Turkish firms are insider boards in addition to 
concentrated family ownership. Owner families govern the boards of Turkish-listed 
firms and the boards are generally used as an internal mechanism of control by the 
controlling families (Yurtoglu, 2003; Caliskan and Icke, 2011). Further, Yurtoglu 
(2003) reported that at least half of the board directors are also members of the owner 
family in the family-controlled Turkish companies. According to the IIF (2005) report, 
80% of listed companies in Turkey had at least one board member who was from the 
controlling family and more than one-third of the board directors were, on average, the 
members of the controlling family based only on having the same family name, not 
even considering in-laws or other kinships.  
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The CMB of Turkey Principles published in 2003 emphasised the importance for the 
independence of the board of directors and further recommended that one-third of the 
board should consist of non-executive directors, of which at least two of them should be 
independent members (IIF, 2005; Caliskan and Icke, 2011). However, as is often the 
case in other emerging markets, listed-firms in Turkey generally tend to not require 
supermajorities, and particularly the boards of the family-owned companies often act 
mostly as rubber stamps for decisions made by the majority shareholder. Even though 
many family-controlled company boards have non-executive directors, they are likely to 
form small minorities, playing little role in the board, and they also tend to serve 
generally on the board of subsidiaries, which minimises their influence. In addition, the 
existence of the independent members on the boards is very limited (IIF, 2005; Ararat et 
al., 2011; Caliskan and Icke, 2011). In this respect, the CMB of Turkey revised its 
corporate governance principles and issued a new set of mandatory principles83 for the 
ISE-listed firms, convened no later than 30 June 2012. According to the new 
communiqué, among the non-executive directors, the board shall compulsorily include 
independent members, where the number of independent directors shall not be less than 
one-third of the board, and in any case, at least two independent directors have to be on 
the boards (Berispek, 2012).  
Accordingly, it can be said that families generally dominated the boards of the ISE-
listed firms they control by their direct involvement in many cases, and easily 
influenced managerial decisions over the period 2003-2012, except the year 2012 due to 
the compulsory corporate governance principles imposed by the CMB. Consistent with 
the negative relationship between family ownership and dividend policy anticipated 
from the previous discussion, it is also predicted that family control through the board 
negatively affects dividend policy decisions. Therefore, the following hypothesis is 
formulated:  
Hypothesis 2: There is a negative relationship between the number of family members 
on the board and the dividend payment decisions of Turkish firms.  
From the agency cost perspective, the size of a board can play a significant role in 
monitoring executive management. Larger boards can provide greater expertise and 
diversity of specialisation as well as outside contacts that a firm may lack internally, and 
hence more efficient monitoring (Fiegener et al., 2000; Klein, 2002; Gabrielsson, 2007). 
                                                          
83
 The Communiqué issued by the CMB Serial: IV, No: 57 published in the Official Gazette dated: 
11/02/2012 and No: 28201. 
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However, Jensen (1993) argued that large boards may be less efficient than smaller 
boards, since it can be more difficult to coordinate between large numbers, and if it is 
sufficiently small but with enough independent directors, a board can monitor its 
executive managers more closely. As explained in the above discussion, Turkish 
families are unlikely to appoint boards that will limit their control over their firm’s 
resources and therefore regardless of the size of boards, smaller or larger, it is expected 
that owner families have direct influence on the composition and characteristics of 
boards.  
Alternatively, it is also argued that there is a positive relationship between firm size and 
the size of the board (Fiegener et al., 2000; Gabrielsson, 2007; Huda and Abdullah, 
2013). In this respect, board size may indeed be reflecting the firm size in the Turkish 
market rather than a proxy for monitoring mechanism due to the mentioned reasons. 
Since the results reported in Chapter 3 indicate a positive relationship between firm size 
and dividend policy, it is anticipated that larger firms have larger size of boards and 
therefore the larger the board is the more likelihood that the firm pays higher dividends. 
Hence, the following hypothesis is formulated: 
Hypothesis 3: There is a positive relationship between the board size and the dividend 
payment decisions of Turkish firms. 
Since Turkey has a liberal foreign policy, there are no constraints on foreign 
investments, repatriation of capital and profits. Foreign investors (both individuals and 
corporations) can freely buy and sell all types of securities and other capital market 
instruments (TSPAKB, 2007; 2012). After the implementation of major reforms in 
2003, the Turkish stock market generally had a rapid growth in terms of the number of 
listed firms, trading volume, market capitalisation, and attracted a significant amount of 
foreign investment during the period 2003-2012 (CMB, 2003; 2012; Adaoglu, 2008). 
Indeed, this period was greatly attracted to foreign investors. The ratio of stocks owned 
by foreign investors to total stocks in the ISE was 51.5% by the end of 2003 and 
steadily increased to 72.3% by the end of 2007. Probably, due to the 2008 global crisis, 
this ratio decreased to 67.5% in 2008 and showed a further slightly declining pattern in 
the following years to 65.8% by the end of 2012, which still revealed a serious 
contribution from foreign investors, holding about two-thirds of the total equities in 
custody in the ISE (CMB, 2012). Accordingly, such a big foreign stock-ownership 
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might possibly have some important implications for the Turkish capital market (Sevil 
et al., 2012) and therefore its firms, while setting their dividend policies.  
The empirical evidence regarding the relationship between foreign ownership and 
dividend policy in emerging markets is limited and mixed. For instance, Manos (2002) 
in India, Jeon et al. (2011) in Korea and Ullah et al. (2012) in Pakistan found evidence 
that foreign ownership has a positive impact on dividend payout ratio, consistent with 
the notion that it is more difficult for overseas investors to monitor firms and their 
managements in emerging market, therefore the need for the dividend-induced capital 
market monitoring, and they tend to use higher dividend payments to enhance better 
managerial monitoring. Additionally, Jeon et al. (2011) further suggested that the 
relative tax advantages of most foreign investors on dividends in Korea was another 
reason for their preference for higher cash dividends. However, Lin and Shiu (2003) 
reported an inverse correlation between foreign ownership and dividend payout policy. 
They concluded that this may be due to the different taxation on capital gains and cash 
dividends in Taiwan, where foreign investors had to pay a 25% withholding tax for cash 
dividends, but capital gains were tax-free, thus foreign investors avoided holding shares 
with higher dividend yields to mitigate the negative impact of disharmonious taxation.  
In Turkey, foreign investors have to use a Turkish intermediary for their capital market 
activities such as purchasing or selling shares, repo, portfolio management, investment 
consultancy, underwriting, and so on (TSPAKB, 2012). After the implementation of the 
various major economic and structural reforms, including the publication of the CMB 
Principles of corporate governance in 2003, significant improvements have been 
observed in many areas in terms of the legal and institutional environment for corporate 
governance and transparency and disclosure practices in Turkey (IIF, 2005; Caliskan 
and Icke, 2011). In addition, the big Turkish financial intermediaries may help prevent 
the information asymmetry that foreign investors suffer, while they are investing in this 
market. Since the Turkish stock market became a promising emerging market with a 
fast growth, it has attracted a significant amount of foreign investment during the period 
2003-2012 (CMB, 2003; 2012; Adaoglu, 2008). This may indicate that foreign investors 
invest for stocks in Turkish market for their long-run growth potential, not for the short-
term cash dividend income, consistent with Glen et al.’s (1995) statement. Moreover, 
the uneven tax treatment between capital gains and cash dividends, imposed by the 
Turkish tax regime, which provides foreign shareholders with tax advantages for capital 
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gains over dividends,84 also implies that foreign investors possibly prefer none or lower 
dividend payouts in order to reduce their tax burden on cash dividends. Therefore: 
Hypothesis 4: There is a negative relationship between foreign ownership and the 
dividend payment decisions of Turkish firms.  
Greater attention has been paid to the monitoring role of institutional investors in 
dividend policy literature. A number of studies investigated the impact of institutional 
investors on dividend policies of firms listed in emerging markets; however, they 
generally reported evidence supporting two opposing arguments. A few researchers 
(Manos, 2002; Ullah et al., 2012; Thanatawee, 2013) found that institutional 
shareholding has a positive impact on the dividend policy, consistent with the argument 
that greater agency conflicts and poor legal protection given to the investors in 
emerging markets mean institutional investors fail to directly monitor management, 
hence they prefer dividend-induced capital market monitoring. Contrarily, other 
researchers (Kouki and Guizani, 2009; Huda and Abdullah, 2013) reported that there is 
a negative relationship between institutional ownership and dividend payout ratio, 
which is in line with the argument that institutional investors act as a monitoring 
mechanism on the firm’s management, consequently reducing, in general, the need for 
high dividend payouts.  
In Turkey, two legal entities, which have rather unusual ownership structures, namely 
Turkiye Is Bankasi and OYAK Group, are the most common domestic financial 
institutions controlling a number of ISE-listed companies (Yurtoglu, 2003).85 Apart 
from these two corporations, the role of institutional investors in corporate governance 
is still a new issue and the sector is underdeveloped (IIF, 2005; OECD, 2006). 
However, the CBM of Turkey implemented “Individual Retirement Savings and 
Investments System” in 2003 in the hope of creating pension and mutual funds that 
                                                          
84
 Foreign share owners, both individuals and corporations, are not subject to any taxes for capital gains 
derived from shares, whereas they are taxed with a 15% withholding tax rate for their cash dividends 
distributed on the shares they held. 
 
85
 Turkiye Is Bankasi is a quasi-private bank founded in 1924 that has an unusual ownership structure. 
The Republican People’s Party (CHP) is the testamentary heir to the shares initially held by Ataturk 
(founder of Isbank). Under the Ataturk’s will, CHP only has the voting right of the shares but if there are 
any dividends on the shares; dividends are equally paid to the Turkish Linguistic Society and the Turkish 
Historical Society. Also, active and retired bank employees have shares in the bank’s capital. Moreover, 
OYAK Group is, also known as Turkish Armed Forces Assistance Fund, a quasi-private group of 
companies, which is founded in 1961 by a special law as a social security organisation for the members of 
the Turkish army. OYAK operates as an insurance company and also as a financial institution that 
provides its members with the financial support in the form of credit products that point their particular 
needs at different stages of their life. 
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were expected to serve as institutional investors and increase monitoring in public firms 
(CMB, 2003; Aksu and Kosedag, 2006). Although the CMB-regulated pension and 
mutual funds were relatively small at first, they have been growing. Supposedly, as their 
assets under management increase, they could become an important market player if 
they have the right incentives to contribute actively in the governance of the firms in 
which they invest (OECD, 2006). Accordingly, this implies that institutional investors 
may act as a monitoring mechanism on the firm’s management in Turkey, consequently 
reducing, in general, the need for high dividend payouts. Therefore, the following 
hypothesis is formulated:  
Hypothesis 5: There is a negative relationship between domestic institutional ownership 
and the dividend payment decisions of Turkish firms. 
From its early days to 1980s, when an export-led stabilisation and structural adjustment 
policy that included the liberalisation of the capital market was implemented in Turkey, 
the state was the major player, both as an owner of large industrial companies, and in 
assigning resources to the private sector. A large number of state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) were founded and managed by the state during this time period (Kepenek and 
Yenturk, 1996; Yurtoglu, 2003). However, the adoption of privatisation as one of the 
essential tools of the market economy was started in Turkey, from 1986 onwards, in the 
hope of reducing the size of the government and public spending, and increasing private 
sector involvement and foreign direct investment (Karatas, 2009).  
Furthermore, along with the implementation of major reforms, starting with the fiscal 
year 2003, the new Turkish government accelerated the privatisation programme, which 
included the divestiture of considerably large SOEs. The new stage of privatisation 
process attracted a great amount of FDI to Turkey and foreign corporations, partnering 
with powerful domestic collaborators, managed to obtain the ownership of these large 
SOEs. As a result, together with the elimination of legal barriers to market entry, a 
substantial reduction in the state’s direct involvement in the economy, increasing 
private sector, and FDI involvement and ownership may also indicate a better corporate 
governance and transparency and disclosure practices environment in Turkey (IIF, 
2005; Aksu and Kosedag, 2006; Karatas, 2009).  
Privatisation generally provides relatively more efficient ownership structures and a 
significant improvement in performance of privatised firms (Megginson et al., 1994; 
Lopez-de-Silanes, 1994). However, it is also possible that privatisation may not work as 
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well as intended and may lead to increases in agency costs of managerial control that 
can be almost as serious as the political control in these companies (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997). Indeed, the important aspect determining the efficiency of an enterprise 
is not whether it is state-owned or privately owned, but how it is managed (Cook and 
Kirkpatrick, 1988). In this context, a few researchers (Wei et al., 2004; Wang et al., 
2011; Lam et al., 2012) reported a positive relationship from China, whereas Kouki and 
Guizani (2009) found a negative relationship in Tunisia, between state ownership and 
dividend payout policy. Therefore, the following opposing hypotheses can be 
formulated:  
Hypothesis 6a: There is a negative relationship between state ownership and the 
dividend payment decisions of Turkish firms.  
Hypothesis 6b: There is a positive relationship between state ownership and the 
dividend payment decisions of Turkish firms. 
At the beginning of 2006 the Turkish tax regime changed significantly, as explained 
previously, providing a favourable tax treatment on capital gains over dividends for 
investors in general (except domestic corporations, who are not subject to any taxes 
both for capital gains and cash dividends). In this respect, small shareholders may have 
preferences for capital gains over cash dividends to avoid tax burden and hence it 
suggests an inverse relationship between minority owners and payout policy, consistent 
with the Lam et al. (2012). However, Turkey has a history of poor structural and 
microeconomic policies, as well as poor culture of corporate governance and 
transparency and disclosure practices, therefore poorer minority investor protection and 
relatively more corruption (IIF, 2005; Aksu and Kosedag, 2006).  
Indeed, during the late 1990s, a long list of cases in tunnelling took place in the Turkish 
public. A Majority of these cases were simple resource transfers of controlling 
shareholders, from their firms, in the form of outright theft or fraud. A number of listed 
firms’ minority shareholders were harmed by these events; a bigger proportion 
represented wealth transfers from state banks to controlling owners of unlisted firms, 
involving, in many cases, the visible hands of politicians (Yurtoglu, 2003). Likewise, a 
number of well-publicised cases revealed that the unfair treatment of minority 
shareholders was a serious corporate governance problem in Turkey, since controlling 
families had the opportunities to expropriate profits from them, typically through the 
use of company assets or non-arm’s length related party transactions (IIF, 2005). In the 
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following period, in early 2000s, the Turkish economy experienced a systematic 
banking crisis, and this strongly affected the ISE, resulting in substantial losses for 
shareholders, especially small Turkish investors who heavily invested in the ISE prior to 
the economic crisis (Adaoglu, 2008; BRSA, 2010). 
Accordingly, the CMB of Turkey re-introduced the mandatory dividend policy starting 
with the fiscal year 2003 until 2008 (however, it was much more flexible than the first 
mandatory dividend policy that imposed to pay 50% of distributable earnings as cash 
dividends in the earlier years). The purpose for re-introducing the mandatory dividend 
policy was to protect minority shareholders rights against the controlling shareholders, 
since Turkish firms are highly dominated by families and generally attached to a group 
of companies, where the controlling shareholders, typically families, often use a 
pyramidal structures or dual-class shares to augment control of their firms (Kirkulak 
and Kurt, 2010). From this perspective, it implies that minority shareholders in Turkey 
might have a taste for higher dividends, to reduce the risk of expropriation of their 
wealth by controlling shareholders, as proposed by La Porta et al. (2000) and therefore 
increasing outside monitoring through cash dividend payments, consistent with a 
number of studies (Rozeff, 1982; Schooley and Barney, 1994; Moh’d et al., 1995; 
Manos, 2002; Farinha, 2003) reported a positive relationship between minority owners 
and payout policy. Therefore:  
Hypothesis 7: There is a positive relationship between minority shareholders ownership 
and dividend payment decisions of Turkish firms.  
 
5.3 Methodology  
The following sub-sections describe the methodology used in this chapter of the 
research. First, the sample data is explained, followed by the variables and models are 
presented, which are employed in order to test the research hypotheses.  
5.3.1 Sample Data  
The purpose of this chapter is to empirically investigate the effects of family 
involvement, through ownership and board representation, non-family blockholders, 
such as foreign investors, domestic financial institutions and the state, and minority 
shareholders on dividend policy related to the agency cost theory argument, after the 
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implementation of major economic and structural reforms, starting with the fiscal year 
2003 in the Turkish market. Therefore, the data sample is drawn from the Istanbul Stock 
Exchange (ISE) according to the following criteria:  
1. First, all companies listed on the ISE, during the period 2003-2012 are 
considered. A long panel dataset allows understanding the effect of ownership structure 
on dividend policy in a way that cannot be achieved using cross-sectional data. 
 
2. Second, financial sector (banks, insurers, pension funds, investment trusts) 
companies and utilities (gas, electric, water) are excluded since they are governed by 
different regulations and follow arguably different investment and dividend policies. 
After these exclusions, a number of all non-financial and non-regulated corporations 
remain.  
 
3. Third, accounting and financial data for this research is obtained from 
DATASTREAM, whereas companies’ ownership data and incorporation dates are 
compiled from the annual reports published in the Public Disclosure Platform of the 
Istanbul Stock Exchange (KAP) (http://kap.gov.tr/en/companies/traded-companies/all-
companies.aspx) and companies’ official websites. The validity of the data is also cross 
checked with OSIRIS. The Stock Exchange Daily Official List (SEDOL) codes and 
International Security Identification Numbers (ISIN) of the companies are used to match 
companies between different databases.  
 
The sample selection criteria result a panel data set of total 264 non-financial and non-
utility firms listed on the ISE from 14 different industries during the period 2003-2012. 
In order to minimise possible survivorship bias, both companies that delisted, due to the 
mergers and acquisitions, business failure or any other process leading to delisting, and 
companies that listed in different times during the period 2003-2012, are all considered 
and included in the sample. Therefore, due to the presence of delisted and newly listed 
companies, the sample is not the same for every year, but rather it increases during the 
ten-year period from 2003 to 2012. Furthermore, it is worth noting that the selection 
criteria and distributions of the sample across time and industries in Table 3.1 and the 
descriptive statistics for the firm’s characteristics in Table 3.2 in Chapter 3, and the 
dividend policy characteristics for the sampled Turkish companies in Table 4.1 in 
Chapter 4 are presented.  
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Table 5.2 on the next page presents the descriptive statistics of the distribution for 
ownership structure, according to the identity of the shareholders and dividend payment 
groups from the sampled 264 Turkish firms with 2,112 firm-year observations during 
the period 2003-2012. The shareholders are categorised into six types; family ownership 
includes family managers, family members and family-controlled holdings share-
ownership, whereas foreign ownership represents the shares held by foreign companies, 
foreign financial institutions and foreign individuals. Further, domestic institutional 
ownership measures the percentage of shares owned by Turkish financial institutions 
such as banks, pension funds, investment trusts and insurers, while organisations such as 
cooperatives, voting trusts, and a company or a group with no single controlling investor 
are categorised as miscellaneous. The column named “Dispersed” shows the distribution 
of the percentage of the outstanding equity held by minority (small) investors, which are 
defined as the shareholders who own less than 5% of a listed firm’s equity.86 In addition, 
the last two columns of the table show the statistics for the board size and the number of 
controlling family members on the board. 
 
 
                                                          
86
 Under Turkish mandatory provisions and the CMB Principles, all types of shareholders, who own more 
than 5% of any listed company’s capital, either directly or indirectly should be disclosed to the public 
(CMB, 2003; 2012). Therefore, shareholders who hold less than 5% are categorised as small investors.  
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Table 5.2 Summary Statistics for Ownership Structure by Dividend Payment Groups 
   Sample includes 264 firms (non-financial and non-utility) listed on the ISE with 2,112 firm-year observations during the period 2003-2012.  
 
Variables 
Family 
Ownership 
(%) 
Foreign 
Ownership 
(%) 
Domestic 
Institutional 
 Ownership (%) 
State 
Ownership 
(%) 
 
Miscellaneous 
(%) 
 
Dispersed 
(%) 
 
Board 
Size 
Family 
Directors 
Panel A: Non-Dividend Paying Firms – 126 Firms with 852 firm-year observations during 2003-2012 
Mean 46.08 7.93 1.45 1.68 2.18 40.68  5.60 1.87 
Median 51.75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 37.11  5.00 2.00 
S.D. 27.69 22.77 10.21 6.16 10.78 20.94  1.80 1.56 
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.46  3.00 0.00 
Max 96.34 97.54 82.50 82.77 86.00 100.00  14.00 6.00 
Panel B: Less Frequent Dividend Paying Firms – 49 Firms with 451 firm-year observations during 2003-2012 
Mean  32.34 14.49 3.97 2.39 12.02 34.79  6.87 1.24 
Median 38.80 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 31.99  7.00 1.00 
S.D. 30.85 30.25 16.17 17.90 22.33 21.53  1.83 1.50 
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.83  3.00 0.00 
Max 94.52 96.98 89.70 98.17 83.85 100.00  13.00 5.00 
Panel C: Frequent Dividend Paying Firms – 89 Firms with 809 firm-year observations during 2003-2012 
Mean  36.23 16.85 6.88 2.04 6.75 31.25  7.56 1.39 
Median 42.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 28.48  7.00 1.00 
S.D. 30.16 28.12 19.65 11.13 17.29 17.17  1.97 1.72 
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.54  4.00 0.00 
Max 96.92 99.46 97.30 84.58 85.00 94.18  14.00 7.00 
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The sample is grouped based on cash dividend payments. Panel A in the Table 5.2 
presents the distribution of ownership structure for the “non-dividend paying” firms 
which did not pay cash dividends during 2003-2012, and Panel B covers the “less 
frequent dividend paying” firms which paid cash dividends at least one year, but the 
total number of the dividend-distributed years are less than the half of a firm’s total 
number of operating years, since the firm was listed during the research period. Panel C 
shows the statistics for the “frequent dividend paying” firms, which paid cash dividends 
more often (the total number of the dividend-distributed years are equal or more than the 
half of a firm’s total number of operating years, since the firm was listed during the 
sample period). Accordingly, the sample has 126 non-dividend payers with 852 firm-
year observations, 49 less frequent dividend payers with 451 firm-year observations and 
89 frequent dividend payers with 809 firm-year observations in total.  
As Table 5.2 illustrates, Turkish companies show highly concentrated and centralised 
ownership structures. On average, families own about 46% of total equity in non-
dividend paying firms, 32% in less-frequent dividend payers and 36% in firms that 
frequently paid cash dividends, which is consistent with previous studies that confirmed 
high family ownership in the Turkish market (Gursoy and Aydogan, 1999; Yurtoglu, 
2003; IIF, 2005).  Foreign investors are the second largest blockholders but their share 
holdings vary between the three groups (around 8%, 14% and 17% in non-dividend 
payers, less-frequent and frequent dividend payers, respectively). Further, minority 
investors have, on average, almost 41% of the total equity of non-dividend payers, 
whereas their fractions are nearly 35% in less-frequent and about 31% in frequent 
dividend paying companies. Yurtoglu (2003) found that owner families dominated the 
boards of Turkish companies and the boards are used as an internal mechanism of 
control, affirming the owner’s influence on the company, by families. Similarly, the 
median board size and the median controlling family members on the board in the last 
two columns of the table illustrate that two family directors are on the boards, which are 
generally sized on five executives in non-dividend paying firms, while one family 
director takes a place among seven boards of directors in dividend paying (both less-
frequent and frequent) firms.87 Indeed, family members take the top positions such as 
chairman and vice chairman, indicating a solid family control through the boards as 
well.  
                                                          
87
 These statistics may even understate the true extent of the family control in boards since the study 
relied on a comparison of family names (surnames) in collecting the information regarding family 
members on boards.  
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5.3.2 Variables and Models   
5.3.2.1 Variable Descriptions  
This chapter of the study employs two variables to proxy for the dependent variable, 
namely the probability of paying dividends and the intensity of paying dividends. The 
probability of paying dividends is observed as the binary variable, which indicates that 
such a firm did (DPAY=1) or did not (DPAY=0) pay dividends in any given year during 
the period 2003-2012. The intensity of paying dividends (the payout level decisions), 
DPOUT, represent the actual dividend payout ratio made by a firm, which is measured, 
as the dividend per share is divided by the earnings per share in a given year, during the 
period 2003-2012. The variable takes a positive value if such a firm paid dividends and 
takes on a value of zero if the firm did not.  
The following explanatory variables are used as the test variables in the multivariate 
analyses. Two variables are employed to assess the impact of family control. Family 
ownership, FAMILY, is measured as the percentage of total outstanding shares of the 
firm held by families including family members, family managers and family-controlled 
holding companies, in any given year over the period 2003-2012, in line with prior 
studies such as Chen et al. (2005), Setia-Atmaja et al. (2009), Yoshikawa and Rasheed 
(2010), Wei et al. (2011) and Gonzalez et al. (2014). Family control through the board 
is denoted as FAMBOARD, which is defined as the number of family directors on the 
board based on surnames of the founding families (Yoshikawa and Rasheed, 2010; Wei  
et al., 2011). Further, the variable BOARD, board size (Chen et al., 2005; Setia-Atmaja 
et al., 2009; Huda and Abdullah, 2013), is measured as the number of directors on the 
board.  
Moreover, the foreign ownership (FOREIGN) is adopted in the same manner of studies 
including Manos (2002), Lin and Shiu (2003), Jeon et al. (2011), Ullah et al. (2012) and 
Thanatawee (2013), and it is measured as the percentage of shares of the firm held by 
foreign corporations, foreign financial institutions and foreign nationals in a given year 
during the research period. Domestic institutional ownership (INST) refers to the sum of 
percentage of Turkish financial institutions such as banks, pension funds, investment 
trusts and insurers out of total capital shares of the firm (Manos, 2002; Kouki and 
Guizani, 2009; Ullah et al., 2012; Thanatawee, 2013; Huda and Abdullah, 2013). 
Following Wei et al. (2004), Kouki and Guizani (2009), Wang et al. (2011) and Lam et 
al. (2012), state ownership (STATE) is measured as the percentage of shares of the firm 
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held by the central government and its wholly owned enterprises in a fiscal year over 
the period 2003-2012. The last proxy for ownership structure, DISP, represents stock 
ownership dispersion (Rozeff, 1982; Schooley and Barney, 1994 and Moh’d et al., 
1995) and it is measured in a similar manner to Manos (2002) and Farinha (2003), 
which is the total percentage of shares owned by a large number of small (minority) 
shareholders, who held less than 5% of the outstanding shares of the firm.  
The following firm-specific variables are the control variables that have been observed 
in the literature to influence dividend policy and they are indeed found to be significant 
determinants on the dividend policy decisions of Turkish firms in Chapter 3. 
Particularly, return on assets (ROA), the firm’s market-to-book ratio (M/B), debt policy 
(DEBT), firm age (AGE) and firm size (SIZE). It is worth noting that the analyses in 
Chapter 3 showed that return on assets, firm age and firm size have a positive impact, 
whereas market-to-book ratio and debt have a negative effect on the cash dividend 
payments of ISE-listed firms.  
Finally, since the sample covers a relatively long time period, year dummies (YEAR) 
are added in all regression models to control for unobserved time-varying factors effect, 
such as the regulatory changes, stages of the economic cycle, and macroeconomic 
dynamics, on dividend policy (Chen et al., 2005; Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009; Wei et al., 
2011). The importance of industrial classification to the dividend policy has been 
argued, because firms in different industries may work under different set of regulations 
and often have different levels of risk and growth potential (Baker et al., 1985 and 
Moh’d et al., 1995). Considering the sample is drawn from 14 different industries, 
industry dummies (INDUSTRY) are employed to detect whether there is any significant 
industry effect for Turkish firms.  
Table 5.3 on the following page demonstrates the summary descriptions of the research 
variables used in the empirical analyses. 
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Table 5.3 Variables and Definitions 
The table presents the research variables, proxy for the dividend policy, the test and the control 
variables, their symbols and definitions used in the multivariate analyses of this chapter of the study. 
 
Variables   Symbols   Definitions  
Dependent Variables      
    
    
Probability of Paying 
Dividends  
 DPAY  A binary variable, which equals to 1 if firm i pays 
dividends at year t during the period 2003-2012, and 
0 otherwise. 
    
 
Dividend Payout Ratio  DPOUT 
 
 The ratio of dividend per share to earnings per share 
of firm i at year t during the period 2003-2012. 
 
       
Test Variables    
     
 
 
Family Ownership  FAMILY  The percentage of shares of firm i held by families at 
year t over the period 2003-2012. 
     
 
 
Family Directors   FAMBOARD The number of family directors on the board of firm i 
at year t over the period 2003-2012. 
     
 
 
Board Size  BOARD  The number of directors on the board of firm i at year 
t over the period 2003-2012. 
     
 
 
Foreign Ownership   FOREIGN  The percentage of shares of firm i held by foreign 
investors at year t over the period 2003-2012. 
     
 
 
Domestic Institutional 
Ownership 
 INST  The percentage of shares of firm i held by domestic 
financial institutions at year t over the period 2003-
2012.  
     
 
 
State Ownership   STATE  The percentage of shares of firm i held by the state at 
year t over the period 2003-2012.  
     
 
 
Ownership Dispersion  DISP  The percentage of shares of firm i held by a large 
number of minority (small) shareholders who own 
less than 5% of the outstanding shares of the firm at 
year t over the period 2003-2012.  
 
       
Control Variables     
     
 
 
Return on Assets   ROA  The ratio of net earnings to total assets of firm i at 
year t over the period 2003-2012.  
       
Market-to-Book Value  M/V  The market-to-book value ratio of firm i at year t over 
the period 2003-2012. 
       
Debt Policy  DEBT  The ratio of total debt to total assets of firm i at year t 
over the period 2003-2012. 
      
 
Firm Age  AGE  The natural logarithm of the total number of years 
since the firm i’s incorporation date until year t over 
the period 2003-2012.  
      
 
Firm Size  SIZE  The natural logarithm of the inflation (CPI) adjusted 
market capitalisation of firm i at year t over the 
period 2003-2012.  
      
 
Time Effect  YEAR   Yearly dummies for the years from 2003 to 2012, 
which take a value of 1 for the specific year and 0 
otherwise. 
 
Industry Effect  INDUSTRY  Industry dummies using 14 different industry 
classifications of the firms, according to Datastream’s 
Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) codes. 
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5.3.2.2 Research Design and Models  
The research aims to provide an empirical examination on the agency cost theory 
explanation of dividend policy, using the ownership structure approach in the emerging 
Turkish market, after the implementation of major reforms starting with the fiscal year 
2003. Accordingly, a large-scale panel dataset is created, which covers a relatively 
recent long time period and contains the data of 264 firms (non-financial and non-
utility) listed on the ISE, over a ten-year period 2003-2012.88 
This chapter uses pooled and panel logit and tobit regressions in its multivariate 
analyses to test the research hypotheses. The nature of the dependent variable defines 
the appropriate estimation method. When the dependent variable is the probability of 
paying dividends, which is a binary variable that equals to 1 if the firm pays cash 
dividends and zero otherwise, then logit estimation is appropriate. Moreover, one-year 
lag values of the independent variables are used in all estimations of this part of the 
study (as in Chapter 3) in order to mitigate the problem of endogeneity. Accordingly, 
the following logit models, where the dependent variable (DPAY) is the binary variable 
and the independent variables have the same previous definitions, are developed:  
Model 1:          Logit (DPAY)i,t  = α + β1FAMILYi,t-1 + β2FAMBOARDi,t-1 + β3BOARDi,t-1 
+ β4FOREIGNi,t-1 + β5INSTi,t-1 + β6STATEi,t-1 + β7DISPi,t-1 + β8ROAi,t-1 + β9M/Bi,t-1 + 
β10DEBTi,t-1 + β11AGEi,t-1 + β12SIZEi,t-1 +       βtYEARi,t  + Ɛi,t-1  
Next, INDUSTRY variable, which represents industry dummies, is included in the 
regression model in order to control for the impact of different industries, as follows:  
Model 2:          Logit (DPAY)i,t  = α + β1FAMILYi,t-1 + β2FAMBOARDi,t-1 + β3BOARDi,t-1 
+ β4FOREIGNi,t-1 + β5INSTi,t-1 + β6STATEi,t-1 + β7DISPi,t-1 + β8ROAi,t-1 + β9M/Bi,t-1 + 
β10DEBTi,t-1 + β11AGEi,t-1 + β12SIZEi,t-1 +       βtYEARi,t +  
 
   βjINDUSTRYj,i,t + Ɛi,t-1  
Furthermore, this chapter also uses a continuous dependent variable, dividend payout 
ratio that is denoted as DPOUT, to indentify the impact of the ownership variables 
while Turkish firms set their actual level of payout ratios, and hence to provide more 
robust empirical results. When the dependent variable is the ratio of dividend payout, 
which is left censored at zero and the distribution of the sample is a mixture of discrete 
and continuous variables, a tobit estimation is appropriate.  
                                                          
88
 Due to missing observations because of newly listed and delisted companies, the sample is not the same 
for every year during the study period and therefore the study provides an unbalanced panel dataset.  
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Accordingly, the corresponding tobit models are constructed as below:  
Model 1:       Tobit (DPOUT)i,t  = α + β1FAMILYi,t-1 + β2FAMBOARDi,t-1 + β3BOARDi,t-1 
+ β4FOREIGNi,t-1 + β5INSTi,t-1 + β6STATEi,t-1 + β7DISPi,t-1 + β8ROAi,t-1 + β9M/Bi,t-1 + 
β10DEBTi,t-1 + β11AGEi,t-1 + β12SIZEi,t-1 +       βtYEARi,t  + Ɛi,t-1  
When the INDUSTRY variable is added into the model:  
Model 2:       Tobit (DPOUT)i,t  = α + β1FAMILYi,t-1 + β2FAMBOARDi,t-1 + β3BOARDi,t-1 
+ β4FOREIGNi,t-1 + β5INSTi,t-1 + β6STATEi,t-1 + β7DISPi,t-1 + β8ROAi,t-1 + β9M/Bi,t-1 + 
β10DEBTi,t-1 + β11AGEi,t-1 + β12SIZEi,t-1 +       βtYEARi,t +  
 
   βjINDUSTRYj,i,t + Ɛi,t-1  
5.3.2.3 Descriptive Statistics of the Variables  
Table 5.4 shows the descriptive statistics (mean, median, standard deviation, minimum 
and maximum values, skewness and kurtosis) for the research variables used in the 
multivariate analyses. The panel dataset (unbalanced) includes 264 Turkish firms (non-
financial and non-utility) listed on the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) with 2,112 firm-
year observations (except dividend payout ratio, DPOUT, which has 2,066 
observations) over the period 2003-2012.  
Table 5.4 Descriptive Statistics of the Research Variables 
The table reports the descriptive statistics for the research variables used in the multivariate 
analyses of this part of the study. The unbalanced panel dataset includes 264 firms (non-financial 
& non-utility) listed on the ISE with 2,112 firm-year observations over the period 2003-2012.  
 
Variables  Mean Median S.D. Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
 
 
DPAY  0.339 0.000 0.473 0.000 1.000 0.682 1.465 
 
 
DPOUT 0.243 0.000 0.911 0.000 21.05 14.34 287.9 
 
 
FAMILY 0.394 0.444 0.298 0.000 0.969 -0.171 1.616 
 
 
FAMBOARD 1.551 1.000 1.634 0.000 7.000 0.837 2.868 
 
 
BOARD 6.622 7.000 2.070 3.000 14.00 0.601 3.214 
 
 
FOREIGN 0.127 0.000 0.268 0.000 0.995 2.047 5.873 
 
 
INST 0.041 0.000 0.158 0.000 0.973 3.865 16.76 
 
STATE 0.016 0.000 0.096 0.000 0.981 7.020 54.51 
        
DISP 0.358 0.327 0.201 0.005 1.000 0.784 3.534 
 
 
ROA 0.021 0.030 0.185 -5.120 1.059 -11.41 295.9 
 
 
M/B 1.508 1.162 1.322 0.284 18.66 5.304 43.01 
 
 
DEBT 0.249 0.158 0.542 0.000 10.76 12.77 221.2 
 
AGE 3.445 3.555 0.499 1.098 4.477 -1.002 4.296 
 
SIZE 4.863 4.704 1.712 0.513 10.16  0.427 2.792 
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As the table illustrates, the mean of DPAY is 0.339, indicating that in almost 34 % of 
the total 2,112 firm-year observations, Turkish firms paid dividends, whereas in the rest 
of the 66% of the total observations, they did not.  On average, DPOUT reveals that the 
sampled Turkish firms had the dividend payout ratio of 24.3% over the entire period. 
With regard to ownership structure, Turkish firms are highly concentrated in the hands 
of families (39.4%) followed by foreign investors (12.7%).  Other blockholders show 
relatively lower shareholdings on average; domestic financial institutions hold about 
4.1% and the state owns only around 1.6%, possibly reflecting the accelerated 
privatisation programme imposed by the government over the research period, whereas 
minority shareholders hold almost 36% of the outstanding shares of the Turkish 
companies. Furthermore, it is found that at least one family member is on the board, 
which are generally sized of seven directors on average. The statistics (DEBT and 
ROA) report that firms make about 25% debt financing in their capital structure and 
they had only approximately 2% of the returns on their total assets invested over the 
period. The M/B variable demonstrates a mean market-to-book ratio of 1.508, which is 
higher than 1, suggesting that Turkish firms have, on average, a good prospect of 
expected growth opportunities.  
5.3.2.4 Correlation Matrix and VIF Values of the Independent Variables  
Table 5.5 demonstrates the correlation matrix and the Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) 
of the independent variables included in the multivariate analyses.  
Table 5.5 Correlation Matrix & VIF Values of Independent Variables 
 
 Family Famboard Board Foreign Inst State Disp Roa M/B Debt Age Size VIF 1/VIF 
 Family 1.000            4.42 0.226 
 Famboard 0.568 1.000           1.63 0.613 
 Board  -0.063 0.045 1.000          1.53 0.653 
 Foreign  -0.448 -0.321 0.063 1.000         3.46 0.289 
 Inst  -0.316 -0.242 0.040 -0.144   1.000        1.87 0.535 
 State  -0.207 -0.151 0.032 -0.038  -0.034 1.000       1.36 0.735 
 Disp     -0.249 0.057  -0.126 -0.419  -0.077 -0.046  1.000      2.88 0.347 
 Roa  -0.021 -0.020 0.211 0.049  0.021  0.015 -0.123 1.000     1.46 0.684 
 M/B  -0.108 -0.072 -0.018 0.125  0.081  0.010  0.122 -0.144   1.000    1.46 0.684 
 Debt 0.027 0.041  -0.170 -0.057  0.058 -0.035  0.037 -0.498 0.458 1.000   1.76 0.568 
 Age 0.023 0.042 0.122 0.080  0.116  0.066 -0.144 -0.005 -0.091  0.035 1.000  1.11 0.900 
 Size  -0.071 -0.088 0.538 0.217  0.139  0.153 -0.340  0.301 0.152 -0.157 0.146 1.000 1.86 0.537 
               
 
Although a few variables are moderately correlated, there does not appear to be high 
correlation between any two of the variables. However, to detect more directly whether 
multicollinearity exists between independent variables, the VIF statistics are used. As a 
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rule of thumb, the values of VIF larger than 10 are generally regarded as suggesting 
multicollinearity. Tolerance, calculated as 1/VIF, is also used to check the degree of 
multicollinearity; if a tolerance value is lower than 0.1, which corresponding to a VIF 
value of 10, it implies multicollinearity. As reported in the table, none of the VIF values 
exceed 10, nor are the tolerance values smaller than 0.1, the results hence suggest that 
there is no multicollinearity. 
 
5.4 Empirical Results  
The impact of ownership structure on dividend policy in Turkey are analysed in two 
steps: (1) decision to pay or not to pay and (2) how much dividends to pay. The nature 
of the dependent variable defines the appropriate estimation method. When the 
dependent variable is the probability of paying dividends, which is a binary variable that 
equals to 1 if a firm pays dividends and zero otherwise, logit estimations are used. 
When the dependent variable is the intensity of paying dividends, which is left censored 
at zero, and the distribution of the sample is a mixture of discrete and continuous 
variables, tobit estimations are employed. Additionally, the marginal effects of the 
independent variables in logit and tobit models are also calculated to provide further 
interpretations of the estimation coefficients and they are illustrated in the same tables 
next to the coefficient estimations columns for each regression models, showing the 
marginal impact of each independent variable on the dependent variable at the mean 
values of other independent variables.  
Also, in order to control for heteroscadasticity, the pooled models are tested using 
White’s corrected hetereoscadasticity robust regressions. Hence, the models in this 
chapter do not suffer from heteroscadasticity. This section reports and discusses the 
results of the empirical analyses.  
5.4.1 Results of the Logit Estimations  
Table 5.6 on the next page reports the results of the logit estimations on the probability 
of Turkish firms to pay dividends based on 1,846 firm-year observations from 264 ISE-
listed firms over the period 2003-2012. The dependent variable is a binary variable 
(0/1), whereas Model 1 includes the set of all independent variables as previously 
explained and Model 2 expands the model by adding industry dummies (INDUSTRY) 
to control for different industry classifications effect of the sample. 
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Table 5.6 Results of the Logit Estimations on Probability of Paying Dividends 
Model Variables  
PANEL A: Pooled Logit PANEL B: Random Effects Logit 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Dependent Variable:  Cash Dividends Paid (0/1) Cash Dividends Paid (0/1) Cash Dividends Paid (0/1) Cash Dividends Paid (0/1) 
Independent Variables: 
Coefficient 
Estimates 
Marginal 
Effects 
Coefficient 
Estimates 
Marginal 
Effects 
Coefficient 
Estimates 
Marginal 
Effects 
Coefficient 
Estimates 
Marginal 
Effects 
FAMILY  -0.3520 -0.0624 -0.3428 -0.0572 -1.1327 -0.1051 -1.1118 -0.1003 
  (-0.65) (-0.65) (-0.65) (-0.64) (-0.99) (-1.00) (-0.95) (-0.96) 
FAMBOARD  -0.0288 -0.0051 -0.0397 -0.0066 -0.0268 -0.0024 -0.0189 -0.0017 
  (-0.61) (-0.61) (-0.77) (-0.78) (-0.20) (-0.20) (-0.14) (-0.14) 
BOARD  0.1013*** 0.0179*** 0.1451*** 0.0242*** 0.2721*** 0.0252*** 0.2925*** 0.0264*** 
  (2.84) (2.85) (3.81) (3.81) (2.87) (2.95) (3.09) (3.19) 
FOREIGN   -0.4589 -0.0813 -0.9341* -0.1560* -1.9033* -0.1766* -2.3554** -0.2125** 
  (-0.88) (-0.87) (-1.82) (-1.80) (1.69) (-1.73) (-2.05) (-2.10) 
INST  -0.1540 -0.0273 -0.5571 -0.0930 -1.1746 -0.1090 -1.5697 -0.1416 
  (-0.24) (-0.24) (-0.87) (-0.87) (-0.82) (-0.82) (-1.10) (-1.11) 
STATE  -1.4688* -0.2604* -1.8739** -0.3130** -2.5851* -0.2399* -3.0417** -0.2745** 
  (-1.95) (-1.94) (-2.51) (-2.47) (-1.67) (-1.69) (-1.97) (-1.98) 
DISP  -0.1676 -0.0297 -0.2645 -0.0442 -0.2116 -0.0196 -0.3048 -0.0275 
  (-0.26) (-0.26) (-0.41) (-0.41) (-0.16) (-0.16) (-0.23) (-0.23) 
ROA  10.124*** 1.7954*** 10.267*** 1.7153*** 11.869*** 1.1015*** 11.709*** 1.0568*** 
  (8.61) (9.06) (8.70) (9.53) (8.01) (8.52) (8.03) (8.55) 
M/B  -0.1941** -0.0344** -0.2041** -0.0341** -0.3836*** -0.0356*** -0.3751*** -0.0338*** 
  (-2.21) (-2.24) (-2.50) (-2.55) (-3.38) (-3.49) (-3.30) (-3.38) 
DEBT  -2.8512*** -0.5056*** -2.7053*** -0.4519*** -4.3435*** -0.4031*** -4.0674*** -0.3671*** 
  (-8.55) (-9.53) (-7.53) (-8.44) (-5.06) (-5.10) (-4.84) (-4.92) 
AGE   0.4923*** 0.0873*** 0.5041*** 0.0842*** 0.8863** 0.0822** 0.8982** 0.0810** 
  (3.36) (3.38) (3.39) (3.38) (2.26) (2.31) (2.18) (2.21) 
SIZE  0.6488*** 0.1150*** 0.6914*** 0.1155*** 1.1050*** 0.1025*** 1.0687*** 0.0964*** 
  (12.16) (11.52) (11.35) (10.84) (7.51) (9.58) (6.99) (7.91) 
Constant   -5.7711***  -5.0468***  -10.193***  -8.4581***  
  (-6.83)  (-6.52)  (-5.59)  (-4.64)  
YEAR  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
INDUSTRY  - - Yes  Yes  - - Yes  Yes  
Number of Observations 1,846 1,846 1,846 1,846 1,846 1,846 1,846 1,846 
Wald X2  422.29***  452.09***  194.09***  198.83***  
Pseudo R2  35.88%  38.22%      
Rho Value       0.6530  0.6231  
Likelihood Ratio Test     335.29***  280.09***  
The table reports the logit estimations and z-statistics in the parentheses. ***, ** and * stand for significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Independent 
variables are one-year lagged. The pooled models are tested using White’s corrected heteroscadasticity robust regressions. 
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Furthermore, both pooled and panel (random effects) logit regressions estimations are 
employed in order to identify which one is more favourable in investigating the 
dividend puzzle in the context of developing Turkish market.
89
 Accordingly, Panel A in 
Table 5.6 displays the results of pooled logit estimation coefficients and marginal 
effects, whereas Panel B in the same table shows the results of random effects (panel) 
logit estimation coefficients and marginal effects of the independent variables on the 
probability of paying dividends for Model 1 and Model 2. The following conclusions 
can be drawn from Table 5.6. 
1. When Model 1 and Model 2 are estimated by the pooled logit regressions, they 
are overall statistically significant at the 1% level as evidence by the Wald X
2 
tests. 
Also, the Pseudo R
2 
values for the models (35.88% and 38.22% respectively) suggest a 
good indication about the prediction power of the models. Similarly, the random effects 
(panel) logit regressions estimate that the models (Model 1 and 2) are also overall 
statistically significant at the 1% level as reported by the Wald X
2
 tests.  However, the 
Likelihood-ratio tests are statistically significant at the 1% for both Model 1 and 2, 
indicating that the proportion of the total variance contributed by the panel-level 
variance component, rho, values are significantly different from zero (0.6530 and 
0.6231 respectively); therefore, this suggests that panel models are more favourable 
than pooled models. Hence, the following results are reported based on the random 
effects logit models (Panel B).  
 
2. The results from the random effects logit regressions in Model 1 and Model 2 
(when the industry effect is controlled) show that the coefficients and marginal effects 
of all control variables, in other words firm-specific (financial) variables, ROA, M/B, 
DEBT, AGE and SIZE, are all statistically significant determinants (at the 1%, 1%, 1%, 
5% and 1% level respectively) in affecting Turkish firms’ decisions whether to pay cash 
dividends. Further, the probability of a Turkish firm paying dividends is positively 
affected by the ROA, AGE and SIZE, whereas it is negatively influenced by the M/B 
and DEBT variables. These results are consistent with the previous findings in Chapter 
3, as well as in line with prior research taken in both developed and emerging markets, 
suggesting that more profitable (Lintner, 1956; Bhattacharya, 1979; Miller and Rock, 
1985; Jensen et al., 1992; Benartzi et al., 1997; Aivazian et al., 2003b; Al-Najjar, 2009; 
Kirkulak and Kurt, 2010), more mature (Grullon et al., 2002) and larger sized firms 
                                                          
89
  It is worth noting that this chapter of the study also employs probit estimations on the probability of 
paying dividends. The corresponding pooled and panel (random effects) probit models provide very 
similar findings with the logit estimations. The results are reported in Table 5.10 in Appendix III.  
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(Lloyd et al., 1985; Moh’d et al., 1995; Fama and French, 2001; Al-Najjar, 2009; 
Imran, 2011; Kisman, 2013) are more likely to pay dividends. Whereas firms with 
higher growth opportunities (Rozeff, 1982; Myers and Majluf, 1984; Lang and 
Litzenberger, 1989; Schooley and Barney, 1994; Kisman, 2013) and with more debt 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1979; Jensen, 1986; Crutchley and Hansen, 1989; Aivazian et 
al., 2003b; Al-Najjar, 2009; Kisman, 2013) are less likely to pay dividends in the 
Turkish market.  
 
3. With regard to the test variables, in other words ownership structure variables, a 
number of conclusions are drawn from the random effects logit models. First, in order 
to investigate how family control influences the probability of paying dividends, two 
family effect variables are created, namely family share ownership (FAMILY) and 
family control through the board by family members (FAMBOARD). However, the 
results show no significant relation between the family control variables, both FAMILY 
and FAMBOARD, and the probability of a Turkish firm to pay dividends, since the 
coefficients and the marginal effects of the variables are negative but not statistically 
significant at any conventional significance levels in both Model 1 and Model 2. These 
findings are inconsistent with the expropriation argument (Sheleifer and Vishy, 1997; 
Anderson and Reeb, 2004; Villalonga and Amit, 2006), outcome and substitute model 
of dividends (La Porta et al., 2000) as well as the evidence provided in emerging 
markets by a few studies (Faccio et al., 2001; Chen et al., 2005; Wei et al., 2011; 
Aguenaou et al., 2013; Gonzalez et al., 2014).  
 
4. Among non-family blockholders, FOREIGN has a significantly negative impact 
on the probability of a Turkish firm paying dividends. The coefficients of the variable 
are statistically significant and negative at the 10% level in Model 1, and at the 5% level 
in Model 2 when the industry effect in controlled. Further, the marginal effects of 
FOREIGN are also found to be negatively significant at the 10% level in Model 1 and 
significant at the 5% level in Model 2 (-0.1766 and -0.2125 respectively), suggesting 
that one unit of increase in FOREIGN will decrease the probability of a Turkish firm to 
pay dividends by about 17-21% for an average firm. The evidence of the negative 
correlation is consistent with Glen et al. (1995) and Lin and Shiu (2003), and may 
suggest that foreign investors invest in stocks of Turkish firms for their long-run growth 
potential rather than the short-term dividend income. This may also be indicating that, 
along with the significant improvements in many areas for corporate governance and 
transparency and disclosure practices in Turkey since 2003, the increase in foreign 
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ownership provides more monitoring on the managements’ activities and hence less 
need for the dividend-induced monitoring device. Further, it may as well be reflecting 
the uneven tax treatment between capital gains and cash dividends imposed by the 
Turkish tax regime, which provides foreign shareholders with tax advantages for capital 
gains over dividends, and therefore foreign investors possibly prefer none or lower 
dividend payouts in order to reduce their tax burden on cash dividends. 
 
5. Similarly, the panel logit estimations show that state ownership (STATE) has 
also a significantly negative effect on the probability of paying dividends in Turkey. 
The coefficients and marginal effects of the variable (suggesting that one unit of 
increase in STATE will reduce the probability of a Turkish firm paying dividends by 
around 24-27% for an average firm) are reported to be negative and statistically 
significant at the 10% level in Model 1 and even more significant (at the 5% level) 
when the industry dummies are added in Model 2. This finding is in contrast with the 
evidence of Gugler (2003), Wei et al. (2011), Wang et al. (2011) and Lam et al. (2012) 
who reported a positive relationship between state ownership and dividend payments. 
However, it is consistent with Kouki and Guizani (2009) who found a negative impact 
of the state on dividend policy in Tunisia. Accordingly, the evidence may imply that, 
after the implementation of major reforms, starting with the fiscal year 2003, the 
accelerated privatisation programme, which included the divestiture of considerably 
large SOEs, executed by the Turkish government provide relatively more efficient 
ownership structures which resulted in better corporate governance, transparency and 
disclosure practices environment in Turkey, and therefore the state ownership is 
involved with less need for the dividend-induced capital market monitoring.  
 
6. Moreover, the results reveal that domestic financial institutions (INST) and 
minority (DISP) shareholdings have no impact on the Turkish firms’ decisions on 
whether to pay dividends. The coefficients and marginal effects of both variables are 
negative but not statistically significant at any conventional significance levels in both 
Model 1 and Model 2. Contrarily, the variable BOARD is highly significant (at the 1% 
level in both Model 1 and 2) and positively affects the probability of a Turkish firm to 
pay dividends (the marginal effects of the variable suggest that, one unit increase in 
BOARD will increase the probability of paying dividends by about 2.5-2.6% for an 
average Turkish firm). This result is consistent with the argument that larger firms have 
larger size of boards (Fiegener et al., 2000; Gabrielsson, 2007; Huda and Abdullah, 
2013) and therefore the larger the board is the more likelihood that the firm pays 
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dividends. In fact, the controlling owners, generally families in Turkey, are most likely 
to not appoint boards that will limit their control, and usually the boards of the family-
owned companies often act mostly as rubber stamps for decisions made by the majority 
shareholder (IIF, 2005; Ararat et al., 2011; Caliskan and Icke, 2011). Hence, the size of 
board (BOARD) reflects the firm size, as hypothesised, and it is positively related to 
dividend policy, also in line with the previous firm-specific variable (SIZE) proxying 
for the firm size.  
 
7. Consequently, random effects logit estimates report that Turkish firms’ 
decisions regarding whether to pay dividends are negatively affected by the FOREIGN, 
STATE, M/B and DEBT variables, but positively influenced by the ROA, AGE, SIZE 
and BOARD variables, while the FAMILY, FAMBOARD, INST and DIPS variables 
have no significant effects. Further, the industry effect is attempted to control by adding 
14 different industries classification dummies in the multivariate tests. Even though 
inclusion of industry dummies changes the significance levels of the significant 
variables in a couple of cases (FOREIGN and STATE), and slightly changes the 
marginal effects of the significant variables, it shows no considerable impact.  
 
 
5.4.2 Results of the Tobit Estimations  
The effect of ownership structure of Turkish firms on their dividend policy decisions 
regarding the amount of dividend payouts is examined by the tobit regressions. 
Accordingly, the continuous dependent variable, dividend payout ratio, which is 
denoted as DPOUT and left censored at zero, is employed. Model 1 includes the set of 
all independent variables (test and control variables) to indentify the ownership 
structure influence while Turkish firms set their actual level of payout ratios, whereas 
Model 2 expands the regression model by adding industry dummies to control for 
different industry classifications effect of the sample.  
Panel A in Table 5.7 on the next page illustrates the results of pooled tobit estimation 
coefficients and marginal effects, whereas Panel B in the same table presents the results 
of random effects tobit estimation coefficients and marginal effects of the independent 
variables on the dividend payout levels for Model 1 and Model 2.  The following 
conclusions are made from Table 5.7.  
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Table 5.7 Results of the Tobit Estimations on Dividend Payout Ratio 
Model Variables  
PANEL A: Pooled Tobit PANEL B: Random Effects Tobit 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Dependent Variable:  Dividend Payout Ratio Dividend Payout Ratio Dividend Payout Ratio Dividend Payout Ratio 
Independent Variables: 
Coefficient 
Estimates 
Marginal 
Effects 
Coefficient 
Estimates 
Marginal 
Effects 
Coefficient 
Estimates 
Marginal 
Effects 
Coefficient 
Estimates 
Marginal 
Effects 
FAMILY  -0.6073 -0.1307 -1.1287** -0.2357** -1.2628** -0.1555** -1.6226** -0.2012** 
  (-1.36) (-1.36) (-2.12) (-2.12) (-1.99) (-2.02) (-2.51) (-2.54) 
FAMBOARD  -0.0405 -0.0087 -0.0236 -0.0049 -0.0353* -0.0043* -0.0337* -0.0039* 
  (-0.92) (-0.92) (-1.46) (-1.46) (-1.67) (-1.69) (-1.78) (-1.79) 
BOARD  0.0924** 0.0198** 0.1093** 0.0228** 0.1122** 0.0138** 0.1277** 0.0158** 
  (2.07) (2.07) (2.35) (2.36) (2.18) (2.19) (2.51) (2.54) 
FOREIGN   -0.6140 -0.1322 -1.1893** -0.2484** -1.6753*** -0.2062*** -2.0909*** -0.2593*** 
  (-1.49) (-1.48) (-2.43) (-2.43) (-2.67) (-2.74) (-3.28) (-3.39) 
INST  -0.5656 -0.1218 -1.1957** -0.2497** -1.3125* -0.1616* -1.8156** -0.2251** 
  (-1.29) (-1.29) (-2.33) (-2.34) (-1.69) (-1.70) (-2.37) (-2.40) 
STATE  -1.1506** -0.2477** -1.6342*** -0.3413*** -2.0521** -0.2526** -2.3636** -0.2931** 
  (-2.07) (-2.07) (-2.86) (-2.86) (-2.07) (-2.09) (-2.45) (-2.48) 
DISP  -0.4618 -0.0994 -1.1769* -0.2458* -1.3861* -0.1706* -1.8475** -0.2291** 
  (-0.86) (-0.86) (-1.95) (-1.95) (-1.82) (-1.84) (-2.40) (-2.43) 
ROA  5.7681*** 1.2420*** 6.2965*** 1.3150*** 5.8393*** 0.7190*** 6.0372*** 0.7487*** 
  (5.78) (5.91) (6.16) (6.37) (7.42) (7.66) (7.73) (7.97) 
M/B  -0.1808*** -0.0389*** -0.1578*** -0.0329*** -0.2309*** -0.0284*** -0.2128*** -0.0263*** 
  (-2.94) (-2.98) (-3.02) (-3.04) (-3.46) (-3.50) (-3.20) (-3.24) 
DEBT  -1.7987*** -0.3873*** -1.4978*** -0.3128*** -1.7991*** -0.2215*** -1.5526*** -0.1925*** 
  (-6.06) (-6.26) (-5.04) (-5.18) (-3.65) (-3.67) (-3.26) (-3.28) 
AGE   0.4696*** 0.1011*** 0.2751** 0.0574** 0.4856** 0.0597** 0.3294* 0.0408* 
  (3.56) (3.59) (2.08) (2.08) (2.33) (2.34) (1.80) (1.81) 
SIZE  0.3944*** 0.0849*** 0.4006*** 0.0836*** 0.5101*** 0.0628*** 0.4987*** 0.0618*** 
  (5.72) (5.81) (5.71) (5.80) (6.49) (7.16) (6.05) (6.51) 
Constant   -4.5158***  -3.0207***  -4.8019***  -3.3581***  
  (-3.76)  (-3.12)  (-4.96)  (-3.48)  
YEAR  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
INDUSTRY  - - Yes  Yes  - - Yes  Yes  
Number of Observations 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800 
F Test  5.28***  5.12***      
Wald X2      198.39***  217.47***  
Pseudo R2  14.22%  16.02%      
Rho Value       0.3772  0.3309  
Likelihood Ratio Test     161.46***  120.43***  
The table reports the tobit estimations and t/z-statistics in the parentheses. ***, ** and * stand for significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Independent 
variables are one-year lagged. The pooled models are tested using White’s corrected heteroscadasticity robust regressions. 
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1. When Model 1 and Model 2 are estimated by the pooled tobit regressions, they 
are overall statistically significant at the 1% level, as evidence by the F-test values. 
Also, the random effects (panel) tobit regressions estimate that the models (Model 1 and 
2) are also overall statistically significant at the 1% level, as reported by the Wald X
2
 
tests.  However, the Likelihood-ratio tests are statistically significant at the 1% for both 
Model 1 and 2, indicating that the proportion of the total variance contributed by the 
panel-level variance component, rho, values are significantly different from zero 
(0.3772 and 0.3309 respectively); therefore, this suggests that panel models are more 
favourable than pooled models. Hence, the following results are reported based on the 
random effects tobit models (Panel B).  
 
2. The results from the random effects tobit regressions in Model 1 and Model 2 
(when the industry effect is controlled) indicate that the coefficients and marginal 
effects of all control variables, ROA, M/B, DEBT, AGE and SIZE, are all statistically 
significant. Further, the amount of dividend payout ratio is positively affected by the 
ROA, AGE and SIZE, whereas it is negatively influenced by the M/B and DEBT 
variables. These results are consistent with the panel logit models results previously 
reported, suggesting that more profitable, more mature and larger sized Turkish firms 
pay higher dividends, whereas the ones with higher growth opportunities and more debt 
pay lower dividends.  
 
3. Regarding the test variables, the panel tobit regressions report that all the 
ownership variables, FAMILY, FAMBOARD, BOARD, FOREIGN, INST, STATE and 
DISP, are statistically significant, unlike the panel logit estimations. More interestingly, 
they are all negatively affecting the amount of dividend payouts of the Turkish firms, 
except BOARD, which is indeed found to be reflecting the firm size. The results show 
that FOREIGN and STATE variables are significantly and negatively related to 
dividend payouts of Turkish firms (as well as the probability of the dividend payment 
decisions, as reported by the panel logit estimations), indicating that higher foreign and 
state ownerships lead to lower dividend payments. 
 
4. The coefficients of the family control variables, FAMILY and FAMBOARD, 
are both significantly negative at the 5% and the 10% level, respectively in Model 1 and 
Model 2 (when the industry dummies are included). The marginal effects of the 
variables indicate that one unit increase in FAMILY and FAMBOARD variables will 
reduce the amount of payout ratio by about 15-20% and 0.4%, respectively for an 
average Turkish firm. These results are consistent with the evidence provided by Faccio 
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et al. (2001) in East Asia, Chen et al. (2005) for small firms in Hong Kong, Wei et al. 
(2011) in China and Aguenaou et al. (2013) in Morocco, who reported a significantly 
negative impact on dividend policy of family control. Additionally, Gonzalez et al. 
(2014) also reported that family ownership has a negative impact on dividend policies 
of Colombian firms, but they contrarily found that family representation through board 
has a positive effect on dividends. Therefore, the results imply that families in Turkey 
tend to exacerbate expropriation of wealth from minority investors by paying lower 
dividends in line with the Agency Problem II argument (Sheleifer and Vishy, 1997; 
Anderson and Reeb, 2004; Villalonga and Amit, 2006). However, considering the non-
significant impact of Turkish families on the decisions to pay or not pay dividends (if 
the expropriation argument through dividends holds true for Turkish families, their 
control should also be significantly and negatively affecting the probability of paying 
dividends) and the significantly negative effects of all other blockholders (foreign and 
domestic financial investors, and the state), and even minority shareholders on the 
dividend payout ratio, the evidence for expropriation argument for Turkish families is 
relatively weak. In fact, this negative correlation may suggest that families are likely to 
cater for the dividend preferences of their shareholders, consistent with the catering 
theory of dividends90 developed by Baker and Wurgler (2004a; 2004b).  
 
5. Likewise, the variables INST and DISP, which have no significant effect on the 
probability of paying dividends, are reported to be significantly and negatively affecting 
the amount of payout ratios of the Turkish firms by the panel tobit estimations (the 
coefficients of both variables are negative and significant at the 10% level in Model 1 
and at the 5% level in Model 2). The marginal effects of the two variables suggest that 
one unit increase in INST and DISP will decrease the amount of payout ratio by about 
16-22% and 17-23% respectively, for an average Turkish firm. The evidence of the 
inverse relationship between the minority shareholders, DISP, and the payout ratio is 
contrary to the statement of La Porta et al. (2000), that minority shareholders might 
have a taste for higher dividends to reduce the risk of expropriation of their wealth by 
controlling shareholders, and inconsistent with a number of studies (Rozeff, 1982; 
Schooley and Barney, 1994; Moh’d et al., 1995; Manos, 2002; Farinha, 2003). 
However, this finding implies that small shareholders have preferences for capital gains 
                                                          
90
 According to the catering theory of dividends, investors’ preferences for dividends may change over 
time and the decision by firms to pay dividends is driven by investors’ preferences for dividends. 
Therefore, managers cater to investors by distributing dividends when investors put a premium on such 
stocks. Correspondingly, managers will omit dividends when investors rate more highly firms that do not 
pay dividends. Consequently, managers recognize and cater to shifts in investors demand for dividend 
preferences (Baker and Wurgler, 2004a; 2004b). 
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over cash dividends to avoid tax burden, due to a favourable tax treatment on capital 
gains provided by the Turkish tax regime. This is in line with Lam et al. (2012), who 
reported a negative relationship for the same reason in China. Moreover, higher stock 
ownership of domestic financial investors (INST) in a Turkish firm associates with 
lower dividend ratios, which is contrary to evidence provided by Manos (2002), Ullah et 
al. (2012) and Thanatawee (2013), who argue that greater agency conflicts and poor 
legal protection given to the investors in emerging markets lead to institutional investors 
failing to directly monitor the managements, hence they prefer dividend-induced capital 
market monitoring. In fact, consistent with studies such as Kouki and Guizani (2009) 
and Huda and Abdullah (2013), the evidence suggests that increasing ownership of 
Turkish institutional investors in general reduce the need for high dividend payouts, 
which may be due to their efficient monitoring on the firms’ management.  
 
6. The negative relationship between ownership variables and payout ratios of 
Turkish firms may be the reflection of the uneven tax treatment imposed by the Turkish 
tax regime. The CMB of Turkey re-introduced the mandatory dividend policy in 2003 
to attract the investors, who suffered from substantial loses from prior economic crisis, 
back to the stock market. Initially, capital gains and dividends were taxed equally, 
regardless of the type of investor, but the Turkish tax regime changed significantly at 
the beginning of 2006, providing a favourable tax treatment on capital gains over cash 
dividends for foreign investors (both corporations and individuals) and domestic 
individual investors. This may imply why these investors generally have preferences for 
capital gains over cash dividends, to avoid tax burden. However, the tax-preference 
explanation does not solely explain the whole puzzle, since Turkish corporations (both 
financial and non-financial) are not subject to any taxes, both for capital gains and cash 
dividends, but in general they have tendencies to require lower dividend payouts. As 
illustrated in Table 5.2, there are indeed different clienteles, including all types of 
investors, who own stocks of non-dividend payers and less frequent dividend paying or 
frequent dividend paying Turkish firms. Therefore, this implies support for the tax 
clientele theory (Miller and Modigliani, 1961; Black and Scholes, 1974; Miller and 
Scholes, 1978), arguing that each investor has their own implied calculations of 
choosing between high or low cash dividends and selecting dividend policies according 
to their tax category circumstances or their own cash flow requirements. 
 
7. As previously mentioned, although the outcome model of dividends, proposed by 
La Porta et al. (2000), argues that dividends are an outcome of an effective system of 
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legal protection of shareholders, therefore suggesting higher dividend payments, it also 
predicts that, other things being equal, firms with better investment opportunities should 
in general pay lower payout ratios in countries with good shareholder protection. Based 
on this argument, and considering the results of tobit regressions reporting that all the 
ownership variables, family, foreign, domestic institutional, state and even minority 
shareholdings, are statistically and negatively affecting the amounts of dividend payout 
ratios of the Turkish firms, the evidence implies that the implementation of various 
major economic and structural reforms in cooperation with the IMF and the EU 
directives and best-practice international standards, including the CMB’s Corporate 
Governance Principles in line with the World Bank and the OECD, starting with the 
fiscal year 2003, have resulted significant improvements for the ISE-listed firms 
corporate governance, transparency and disclosure practices and better shareholder 
protection. Accordingly, investors in general have preference for the potential long-run 
growth opportunity for the stocks they hold in the ISE, since Turkey is a fast-growing 
market.  
 
8. Finally, in line with the prior results, the panel tobit estimations show no 
considerable industry impact when the industry dummes are included in the equation.  
5.4.3 Further Analyses  
In this sub-section, additional tests are conducted in order to confirm the primary 
findings. This is done by employing an alternative dividend policy measure, namely 
dividend yield.91 Since dividend yield (DYIELD) is a continuous variable, which is left 
censored at zero and the distribution of the sample is a mixture of discrete and 
continuous variables, a tobit estimation is appropriate. Therefore, dividend yield is 
substituted for dividend payout ratio as the dependent variable,92 to further examine the 
effect of ownership structure on dividend policy decisions of Turkish firms regarding 
how much dividends to pay, and to check the robustness of the primary findings from 
tobit estimations.  
                                                          
91
 Dividend yield variable (denoted as DYIELD) is measured as the ratio of dividend per share to price 
per share of firm i at year t during the period, 2003-2012. The descriptive statistics of DYIELD are 
illustrated below. As can be seen that the mean ratio of the dividend yield is 0.0185, indicating that the 
sampled Turkish firms had the dividend yield of just below 2% over the entire period.  
 
Variable Observations Mean Median Std Dev. Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
DYIELD      2,112 0.0185 0.000 0.0403 0.000 0.6630 4.5661 44.418 
 
 
 
 
 
92
 Additionally, using dividend yield variable avoids problems associated with negative or extremely high 
percentages of payout ratios (Rozeff, 1982; Schooley and Barney, 1994). Also, substituting dividend 
yield, which is a market measure, for dividend payout ratio, which is an accounting measure, will provide 
more evidence from a different perspective regarding dividend puzzle.  
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Table 5.8 Results of the Tobit Estimations on Dividend Yield 
Model Variables  
PANEL A: Pooled Tobit PANEL B: Random Effects Tobit 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Dependent Variable:  Dividend Yield Dividend Yield Dividend Yield Dividend Yield 
Independent Variables: Coefficient 
Estimates 
Marginal 
Effects 
Coefficient 
Estimates 
Marginal 
Effects 
Coefficient 
Estimates 
Marginal 
Effects 
Coefficient 
Estimates 
Marginal 
Effects 
FAMILY  -0.0126 -0.0536 -0.0104 -0.0437 -0.0211* -0.0787* -0.0218* -0.0806* 
  (-0.84) (-0.85) (-1.10) (-1.11) (-1.93) (-1.94) (-1.92) (-1.93) 
FAMBOARD  -0.0037** -0.0157** -0.0042** -0.0177** -0.0031** -0.0118** -0.0031** -0.0116** 
  (-2.28) (-2.37) (-2.50) (-2.57) (-2.27) (-2.27) (-2.26) (-2.26) 
BOARD  0.0036*** 0.0155*** 0.0044*** 0.0185*** 0.0054*** 0.0202*** 0.0057*** 0.0213*** 
  (3.08) (3.32) (3.65) (3.85) (3.14) (3.20) (3.33) (3.38) 
FOREIGN   -0.0006 -0.0001 -0.0102 -0.0427 -0.0379* -0.1412* -0.0447** -0.1652** 
  (-0.39) (-0.39) (-0.62) (-0.60) (-1.72) (-1.74) (-1.97) (-1.98) 
INST  -0.0196 -0.0834 -0.0084 -0.0354 -0.0175* -0.0646* -0.0247* -0.0914* 
  (-1.28) (-1.30) (-1.53) (-1.53) (-1.67) (-1.69) (-1.88) (-1.89) 
STATE  -0.0170 -0.0722 -0.0344* -0.1441* -0.0367** -0.1367** -0.0452** -0.1670** 
  (-0.84) (-0.83) (-1.73) (-1.70) (-2.10) (-2.10) (-2.35) (-2.36) 
DISP  -0.0124 -0.0528 -0.0115 -0.0483 -0.0110* -0.0203* -0.0120* -0.0221* 
  (-0.74) (-0.75) (-0.99) (-1.00) (-1.67) (-1.67) (-1.69) (-1.69) 
ROA  0.3312*** 1.4061*** 0.3437*** 1.4371*** 0.3124*** 1.1629*** 0.3150*** 1.1627*** 
  (7.66) (10.62) (7.82) (10.60) (13.35) (13.55) (13.48) (13.63) 
M/B  -0.0108*** -0.0460*** -0.0103*** -0.0430*** -0.0093*** -0.0348*** -0.0090*** -0.0333*** 
  (-4.27) (-4.54) (-4.18) (-4.54) (-4.53) (-4.54) (-4.33) (-4.33) 
DEBT  -0.0916*** -0.3889*** -0.0839*** -0.3507*** -0.0853*** -0.3177*** -0.0811*** -0.2995*** 
  (-7.91) (-9.22) (-6.49) (-7.65) (-5.67) (-5.68) (-5.41) (-5.41) 
AGE   0.0216*** 0.0920*** 0.0198*** 0.0830*** 0.0244*** 0.0909*** 0.0237*** 0.0876*** 
  (4.87) (5.51) (3.74) (4.32) (3.16) (3.21) (2.84) (2.87) 
SIZE  0.0146*** 0.0621*** 0.0146*** 0.0611*** 0.0164*** 0.0614*** 0.0155*** 0.0573*** 
  (9.88) (10.10) (8.19) (9.16) (6.20) (6.71) (5.41) (5.68) 
Constant   -0.1941***  -0.1615***  -0.2105***  -0.1762***  
  (-6.62)  (-4.92)  (-6.08)  (-4.93)  
YEAR  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
INDUSTRY  - - Yes  Yes  - - Yes  Yes  
Number of Observations 1,846 1,846 1,846 1,846 1,846 1,846 1,846 1,846 
F Test  14.55***  12.30***      
Wald X2      372.33***  381.72***  
Pseudo R2  14.59%  15.37%      
Rho Value       0.5397  0.5221  
Likelihood Ratio Test     349.92***  313.65***  
The table reports the tobit estimations and t/z-statistics in the parentheses. ***, ** and * stand for significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Independent 
variables are one-year lagged. The pooled models are tested using White’s corrected heteroscadasticity robust regressions. 
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Panel A in Table 5.8 on the previous page reports the results of pooled tobit estimation 
coefficients and marginal effects, whereas Panel B in the same table presents the results 
of the random effects (panel) tobit estimation coefficients and marginal effects of the 
independent variables on the levels of dividend yield of Turkish firms for Model 1 and 
Model 2.  
At first glance, the results display that both pooled tobit models and panel tobit models 
are overall statistically significant at the 1% level. However, the Likelihood-ratio tests 
are statistically significant at the 1% for both Model 1 and 2, indicating that the 
proportion of the total variance contributed by the panel-level variance component, rho, 
values are significantly different from zero (0.5397 and 0.5221 respectively). Therefore, 
as in case of the prior results, this suggests that panel tobit models are more favourable 
than pooled tobit models. Hence, the following results are reported based on the random 
effects tobit models (Panel B). 
The results reported in Table 5.8 show that the random effects tobit estimations, when 
the dividend yield is used as the dependent variable, provide very similar findings in 
line with the previous results regarding the dividend payout ratio. Although the 
significance levels of some explanatory variables and the marginal effects are found to 
be different, the amounts of the dividend yield of Turkish firms are significantly 
affected by the same variables with the same directional impacts, as in the case of their 
dividend payout ratio levels. Particularly, the amount of dividend yield is significantly 
and positively affected by ROA, AGE and SIZE, whereas it is significantly and 
negatively influenced by M/B and DEBT. Regarding the test variables, FAMILY, 
FAMBOARD, FOREIGN, INST, STATE and DISP have significantly negative impacts 
but BOARD has a significantly positive effect on the amounts of dividend yield of 
Turkish firms. Also, inclusion of INDUSTRY dummies shows no substantial impact. 
Subsequently, when the panel tobit regression estimates are used to examine the effect 
of ownership structure on dividend policy decisions of Turkish firms, regarding how 
much dividends to pay, by employing an alternative dependent variable (dividend 
yield), the results report very similar evidence confirming the robustness of the primary 
findings from the panel tobit regressions performed on the dividend payout ratios of the 
Turkish firms.  
The summary of the empirical results for the research hypotheses is illustrated in Table 
5.9 on the next page.   
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Table 5.9 Summary of Estimations Results for the Research Hypotheses 
Variables 
Predicted 
Sign 
Realised 
Sign 
Findings 
Justification of the 
Hypotheses 
FAMILY (-) 
 
(-) 
 
Family control variables are both found to be negative but insignificant factors on the probability of a 
Turkish firm paying dividends. However, they are both significantly negative determinants in setting 
dividend payout ratio once the Turkish firm decides to pay dividends. Hence, the evidence does not show 
enough support for the expropriation argument based on Agency Problem II perspective (Sheliefer and 
Vishny, 1997; Anderson and Reeb, 2004; Villalonga and Amit, 2006) and for the results provided by Faccio 
et al. (2001), Chen et al. (2005, Wei et al. (2011) and Aguenaou et al. (2013). 
Hypothesis 1 and 2 are 
partially supported. 
FAMBOARD (-) (-) 
BOARD (+) (+) 
The size of board is in fact found to be reflecting the firm size. The evidence supports the argument that 
larger firms have larger size of boards (Fiegener et al., 2000; Gabrielsson, 2007; Huda and Abdullah, 2013) 
and therefore the larger the board is more likelihood that the firm pay larger dividends.  
Hypothesis 3 is supported. 
FOREIGN (-) (-) 
Foreign ownership has a significantly negative effect on both the decisions of Turkish firms regarding 
whether to pay cash dividends and how much dividends to pay. The evidence is consistent with Glen et al. 
(1995) and Lin and Shiu (2003) suggesting that foreign investors invests in stocks for their long-term 
potential rather than the short-term dividend income. This may be implying that along with the significant 
improvements in many areas for corporate governance and transparency and disclosure practices in Turkey 
since 2003, the increase in foreign ownership provides more monitoring on the managements’ activities and 
hence less need for the dividend-induced monitoring device. Further, it may also be reflecting the uneven 
tax treatment imposed by the Turkish tax regime, which provides foreign shareholders with tax advantages 
for capital gains over dividends. 
Hypothesis 4 is supported. 
INST (-) (-) 
Domestic financial institutions ownership has no significant effect on the probability of paying dividends 
even though it is negatively correlated. However, it is found to be significantly and negatively affecting the 
amount of the payout rations of the Turkish firms. Hence, the evidence is consistent with the studies such as 
Kouki and Guizani (2009) and Huda and Abdullah (2013), suggesting that the increasing ownership of 
Turkish institutional investors reduces in general the need for high dividend payouts, which may be due to 
their efficient monitoring on the firms’ management.  
Hypothesis 5 is partially 
supported. 
STATE (+) or (-) (-) 
State ownership has a significantly negative effect on both the decisions of Turkish firms regarding whether 
to pay cash dividends and how much dividends to pay. The evidence in line with Kouki and Guizani (2009), 
implying that the state ownership involves with the less need for the dividend-induced capital market 
monitoring.  
Hypothesis 6a is supported.  
DISP (+) (-) 
Minority shareholders ownership has no significant effect on the probability of paying dividends but it is 
significantly and negatively affecting the amount of the payout ratios of Turkish firms. The evidence is 
contrary to the argument that minority shareholders have a taste for higher dividends to reduce the risk of 
expropriation of their wealth by controlling shareholders (La Porta et al., 2000) and it implies that small 
shareholders have preferences for capital gains over cash dividends to avoid from tax burden due to a 
favourable tax treatment on capital gains provided by the Turkish tax regime, which is consistent with Lam 
et al. (2012) who reported a negative relationship for the same reason in China. 
Hypothesis 7 is not 
supported. 
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5.5 Conclusions  
This chapter of the study investigates the effect of ownership structure on dividend 
policy decisions after the implementation of major economic and structural reforms, 
starting with the fiscal year 2003, in the Turkish market. Turkey offers an ideal setting 
to study the dividend behaviour of an emerging market (a civil law originated country), 
which employed the common laws in order to integrate with world markets. Therefore, 
the study focuses on a recent panel dataset of 264 companies (non-financial and non-
utility) listed on the ISE, over a ten-year period 2003-2012, including 1,846 firm-year 
observations in logit models and 1,800 firm-year observations in tobit models. 
Particularly, it examines the effect of family control, through their ownership and board 
representatives, on cash dividend payment decisions based on the agency cost 
explanation. Furthermore, the study also considers the impacts of the non-family 
blockholders (foreign investors, domestic financial institutions, and the state) and 
minority shareholders on the ISE-listed firms’ dividend policy decisions. In addition, it 
employs richer research models (pooled and panel logit/probit and tobit estimations), 
and uses alternative dividend policy measures (the probability of paying dividends, 
dividend payout ratio and dividend yield) in order to provide more valid, consistent and 
robust results.  
The dividend policy of Turkish firms is analysed in two steps: (1) decision to pay or not 
to pay and (2) how much dividends to pay. The results indicate that control variables 
(firm-specific factors) all significantly affect the dividend policy decisions of the 
Turkish firms, consistent with the results in Chapter 3. Specifically, the dividend policy 
is positively influenced by profitability, firm age and firm size, whereas it is negatively 
affected by investment opportunities and debt level in the context of Turkish market.  
The results further report that Turkish firms have highly concentrated ownership 
structure and are mostly owned by families followed by foreign investors, while other 
blockholders, Turkish financial institutions and the state, show relatively lower 
shareholdings. Moreover, it is found that foreign and state ownership are associated 
with a less likelihood of paying dividends, while other ownership variables are 
insignificant in affecting the probability of a Turkish firm to pay cash dividends. 
However, all the ownership variables, family effect (both control through ownership 
and board representation), foreign investors, domestic financial institutions, the state 
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and minority investors ownerships, have significantly negative impacts on the amount 
of dividend payouts of Turkish firms.  
Accordingly, the study presents consistent evidence that foreign investors invest in 
stocks of Turkish firms for their long-run growth potential, rather than the short-term 
dividend income. This may be implying that, along with the significant improvements 
in many areas for corporate governance and transparency and disclosure practices in 
Turkey since 2003, the increase in foreign ownership provides more monitoring on the 
managements’ activities and hence less need for the dividend-induced monitoring 
device. Further, it may also be reflecting the uneven tax treatment between capital gains 
and cash dividends imposed by the Turkish tax regime, which provides foreign 
shareholders with tax advantages for capital gains over dividends, and thus foreign 
investors possibly prefer none or lower dividend payouts in order to reduce their tax 
burden on cash dividends. Moreover, the empirical findings show evidence that state 
ownership and dividend policy are negatively correlated, which may suggest that,  after 
the implementation of major reforms starting with the fiscal year 2003, the accelerated 
privatisation programme that included the divestiture of considerably large SOEs 
executed by the Turkish government, provide relatively more efficient ownership 
structures, which resulted in better corporate governance, transparency and disclosure 
practices environment in Turkey and, therefore, state ownership involving less with the 
need for the dividend-induced capital market monitoring.  
The expropriation argument based on the principal-principal conflict (Agency Problem 
II) argues that when large shareholders, such as families, hold almost full control, they 
prefer none or lower dividends to preserve cash flows that they can potentially 
expropriate. Nevertheless, the study reports inconclusive evidence in this respect. Even 
though family control has a significantly negative effect on the amount of dividend 
payouts of Turkish firms, considering the non-significant impact of Turkish families on 
the decisions to pay or not pay dividends (if the expropriation argument through 
dividends holds true for Turkish families, their control should also be significantly and 
negatively affecting the probability of paying dividends) and the significantly negative 
relationship between dividend payout ratio and all other blockholders and even minority 
shareholders, the evidence of expropriation argument for Turkish families is relatively 
weak. In fact, this negative correlation may suggest that families are likely to cater for 
the dividend preferences of their shareholders, consistent with the catering theory of 
dividends developed by Baker and Wurgler (2004a; 2004b).  
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Similarly, domestic financial institutions and minority investors’ stock ownership have 
no significant effect on Turkish firms’ decisions regarding whether to pay dividends, 
but they are both significantly and negatively affecting the amount of the payout ratios. 
Hence, higher stock ownership of domestic financial investors in a Turkish firm 
associates with lower dividend ratio, which is contrarily to the argument that greater 
agency conflicts and poor legal protection given to the investors in emerging markets, 
fail institutional investors in directly monitoring the management; thus, they prefer 
dividend-induced capital market monitoring. Indeed, the evidence suggests that the 
increasing ownership of Turkish institutional investors reduces in general the need for 
high dividend payouts, which may be due to their efficient monitoring on the firms’ 
management. Further, the evidence of the inverse relationship between the minority 
shareholders and the payout ratio is contrary to the statement of La Porta et al. (2000), 
that minority shareholders might have a taste for higher dividends to reduce the risk of 
expropriation of their wealth by controlling shareholders. Instead, it implies that small 
shareholders have preferences for capital gains over cash dividends to possibly avoid 
from tax burden due to a favourable tax treatment on capital gains provided by the 
Turkish tax regime. 
Overall, the study findings reveal that cash dividends are not used as a monitoring 
mechanism by investors in order to control for agency problems in Turkish market. 
Also, there is not enough evidence that families are likely to expropriate by paying 
lower dividends. Rather, the negative relationship between ownership variables and 
payout ratios of Turkish firms may be the reflection of the uneven tax treatment 
imposed by the Turkish tax regime, which provides a favourable tax treatment on 
capital gains over cash dividends for foreign investors (both corporations and 
individuals) and domestic individual investors. However, the tax-preference explanation 
does not solely explain the whole puzzle since Turkish corporations (both financial and 
non-financial) are not subject to any taxes both for capital gains and cash dividends but, 
in general, they have tendencies to require lower dividend payouts. In fact, the results 
show that there are different clienteles, among all types of investors, who own stocks of 
non-dividend payers and less frequent dividend paying or frequent dividend paying 
Turkish firms, suggesting support for the tax clientele theory.   
Even though the outcome model of dividends, proposed by La Porta et al. (2000), 
argues that dividends are an outcome of an effective system of legal protection of 
shareholders, and therefore suggests higher dividends payments, it also predicts that, 
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other things being equal, firms with better investment opportunities should in general 
pay lower payout ratios in countries with good shareholder protection. Based on this 
argument, the evidence implies that the implementation of various major economic and 
structural reforms in cooperation with the IMF and the EU directives and best-practice 
international standards, including the CMB’s Corporate Governance Principles in line 
with the World Bank and the OECD, starting with the fiscal year 2003, have resulted 
significant improvements for the ISE-listed firms corporate governance, transparency 
and disclosure practices and better shareholder protection. Consequently, investors in 
general have preference for the potential long-run growth opportunity for the stocks 
they hold in the ISE, since Turkey is a fast-growing market.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Birkbeck University of London Page 306 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX III 
RESULTS OF THE PROBIT ESTIMATIONS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Birkbeck University of London Page 307 
Probit regression models are employed to test the research hypotheses and to validate 
the results from the logit models. Hence, the corresponding probit models, where the 
dependent variable is a binary variable (0/1) and the independent variables have the 
same previous definitions, are developed to examine the influence of Turkish firms’ 
ownership structure on their dividend policy decisions, regarding whether or not to pay 
dividends, and to check whether they will confirm similar results as reported by logit 
estimations. Accordingly, Panel A in Table 5.10 on the next page displays the results of 
pooled probit estimation coefficients and marginal effects, whereas Panel B in the same 
table shows the results of random effects (panel) probit estimation coefficients and 
marginal effects of the independent variables on the probability of paying dividends for 
Model 1 and Model 2.  
The results display that both pooled probit models and panel probit models are, overall, 
statistically significant at the 1% level. However, the Likelihood-ratio tests are 
statistically significant at the 1% for both Model 1 and 2, indicating that the proportion 
of the total variance contributed by the panel-level variance component, rho, values are 
significantly different from zero (0.6626 and 0.6336 respectively). Therefore, as in case 
of the logit estimations, this suggests that panel probit models are more favourable than 
pooled probit models. Hence, the following results are reported based on the random 
effects probit models (Panel B). 
As can be observed from Table 5.10, the random effects probit estimations confirm 
almost the same results (the same levels of significance of the coefficients and very 
similar marginal effects) as reported by the random effects logit models. Particularly, 
the probability of a Turkish firm paying dividends is significantly and positively 
affected by ROA, AGE and SIZE, whereas it is significantly and negatively influenced 
by M/B and DEBT. With regard to the test variables, FOREIGN and STATE have a 
significantly negative effect but BOARD has a significantly positive impact, while 
FAMILY, FAMBOARD, INST and DIPS have a negative, but not statistically 
significant, effect on the probability of paying dividends. Also, inclusion of 
INDUSTRY dummies shows no considerable impact. Consequently, the results of the 
panel probit models are consistent, compared to the results of logit models, confirming 
very similar findings regarding the decisions of Turkish firms on whether to pay cash 
dividends or not.  
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Table 5.10 Results of the Probit Estimations on Probability of Paying Dividends 
Model Variables  
PANEL A: Pooled Probit PANEL B: Random Effects Probit 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Dependent Variable:  Cash Dividends Paid (0/1) Cash Dividends Paid (0/1) Cash Dividends Paid (0/1) Cash Dividends Paid (0/1) 
Independent Variables: Coefficient 
Estimates 
Marginal 
Effects 
Coefficient 
Estimates 
Marginal 
Effects 
Coefficient 
Estimates 
Marginal 
Effects 
Coefficient 
Estimates 
Marginal 
Effects 
FAMILY  -0.2335 -0.0730 -0.2448 -0.0741 -0.6059 -0.1004 -0.5992 -0.0968 
  (-0.81) (-0.80) (-0.85) (-0.84) (-0.94) (-0.95) (-0.91) (-0.91) 
FAMBOARD  -0.0086 -0.0027 -0.0138 -0.0042 -0.0183 -0.0030 -0.0129 -0.0020 
  (-0.31) (-0.31) (-0.47) (-0.47) (-0.24) (-0.24) (-0.17) (-0.17) 
BOARD  0.0600*** 0.0187*** 0.0858*** 0.0259*** 0.1524*** 0.0252*** 0.1639*** 0.0265*** 
  (2.84) (2.84) (3.91) (3.92) (2.85) (2.93) (3.08) (3.18) 
FOREIGN   -0.2625 -0.0820 -0.5726** -0.1734** -1.0417* -0.1727* -1.2979** -0.2098** 
  (-0.94) (-0.94) (-2.05) (-2.03) (-1.68) (-1.67) (-2.01) (-2.05) 
INST  -0.0504 -0.0157 -0.2986 -0.0904 -0.6190 -0.1026 -0.8385 -0.1355 
  (-0.15) (-0.15) (-0.87) (-0.87) (-0.77) (-0.77) (-1.04) (-1.05) 
STATE  -0.8705** -0.2721** -1.1432*** -0.3462*** -1.4682* -0.2435* -1.7391** -0.2811** 
  (-2.04) (-2.03) (-2.76) (-2.73) (-1.77) (-1.79) (-2.06) (-2.11) 
DISP  -0.0670 -0.0209 -0.1303 -0.0394 -0.0628 -0.0104 -0.1049 -0.0169 
  (-0.20) (-0.20) (-0.37) (-0.37) (-0.08) (-0.08) (-0.14) (-0.14) 
ROA  5.3226*** 1.6635*** 5.4281*** 1.6442*** 6.6430*** 1.1018*** 6.5607*** 1.0607*** 
  (7.85) (8.20) (8.07) (8.65) (8.28) (8.81) (8.32) (8.83) 
M/B  -0.1191*** -0.0372*** -0.1198*** -0.0362*** -0.2214*** -0.0367*** -0.2159*** -0.0349*** 
  (-2.64) (-2.67) (-2.87) (-2.91) (-3.56) (-3.67) (-3.46) (-3.54) 
DEBT  -1.6239*** -0.5075*** -1.5058*** -0.4561*** -2.4230*** -0.4018*** -2.2749*** -0.3678*** 
  (-8.41) (-9.03) (-7.58) (-8.20) (-5.11) (-5.12) (-4.88) (-4.94) 
AGE   0.2858*** 0.0893*** 0.2951*** 0.0894*** 0.4994** 0.0828** 0.5060** 0.0818** 
  (3.53) (3.55) (3.48) (3.48) (2.27) (2.31) (2.19) (2.21) 
SIZE  0.3896*** 0.1217*** 0.4091*** 0.1239*** 0.6204*** 0.1029*** 0.6012*** 0.0972*** 
  (12.53) (12.07) (11.74) (11.38) (7.66) (9.56) (7.12) (8.04) 
Constant   -3.4551***  -3.0311***  -5.7694***  -4.7931***  
  (-7.79)  (-7.19)  (-5.67)  (-4.70)  
YEAR  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
INDUSTRY  - - Yes  Yes  - - Yes  Yes  
Number of Observations 1,846 1,846 1,846 1,846 1,846 1,846 1,846 1,846 
Wald X2  522.38***  551.20***  214.65***  219.55***  
Pseudo R2  35.74%  38.01%      
Rho Value       0.6626  0.6336  
Likelihood Ratio Test     339.99***  286.42***  
The table reports the probit estimations and z-statistics in the parentheses. ***, ** and * stand for significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Independent 
variables are one-year lagged. The pooled models are tested using White’s corrected heteroscadasticity robust regressions. 
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6.1 Introduction  
This concluding chapter illustrates an overall summary of the research results. In 
addition, it gives recommendations for practice, addresses the research limitations and 
provides suggestions for possible future research.  
The main aim of this doctoral thesis is to carry the dividend debate into an emerging 
market context and contribute more evidence to dividend literature. However, the 
difference from prior research is that the dividend policy behaviour of an emerging 
market is examined over a period, where serious economic and structural reforms have 
been implemented, in order to integrate with world markets. Accordingly, this research 
endeavours to uncover what behaviour the dividend policy of this emerging market 
shows. In particular, the dividend policies of the companies listed on the Istanbul Stock 
Exchange (ISE) are analysed, since Turkey offers an ideal setting for the purpose of this 
thesis in allowing a study in dividend behaviour of a developing country, which has 
implemented major reforms, starting with the fiscal year 2003, in compliance with the 
IMF stand-by agreement, the EU directives and best-practice international standards for 
a better working of the market economy, outward-orientation and globalisation.  
This thesis has six chapters. The first chapter is an introduction to the study that 
discusses the study background and motivation. It further provides a summary of 
important developments of the ISE and justifies the rationale of choosing the ISE-listed 
firms as the study sample. The chapter also supplies an overview of the importance of 
this doctoral thesis. In Chapter 2, a detailed literature review on the dividend puzzle is 
presented, including the leading dividend policy theories and empirical studies from 
both developed and developing countries. Chapter 3 provides empirical research for the 
firm-specific determinants affecting dividend policy decisions of the ISE-listed firms, 
over a decade after Turkey adopted serious economic and structural reforms, including 
the IFRS and inflation accounting, starting with the fiscal year 2003. Chapter 4 focuses 
on the signalling theory of dividends. By using Lintner’s (1956) partial adjustment 
model, it examines whether the ISE firms adopt deliberate cash dividend policies to 
convey signals to investors, and whether they follow stable cash dividend payments, as 
in developed markets, after the implementation of major reforms in 2003. Chapter 5 
empirically investigates the link between ownership structure and dividend policy based 
on the agency cost theory. Particularly, it analyses the effect of family control on 
dividend policy from the principal-principal conflict perspective and also considers the 
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impacts of the non-family blockholders, such as foreign investors, domestic financial 
institutions, the state, and minority shareholders on the ISE firms dividend policy 
decisions, over a decade when Turkey employed major reforms, including the 
publication of the CMB’s Corporate Governance Principles in the fiscal year 2003. 
Finally, the current chapter, Chapter 6, presents an overall summary of the research 
results, provides reccomendations for practice, addresses the research limitations, and 
gives future research suggestions.   
 
6.2 Overall Summary of Results  
After the introduction chapter, the study provides, in Chapter 2, a literature review on 
the dividend debate, which asserts that corporate dividend policy literature offers 
various explanations and contains voluminous research. Although Miller and 
Modigliani’s (1961) dividend irrelevance theory is logical and consistent under the 
circumstances of perfect capital market assumptions, in real markets, where various 
imperfections exist, this theory becomes highly debatable. Indeed, researchers proposed 
a range of leading dividend theories involved with the relaxation of M&M’s 
assumptions, and dealt with dividends in the presence of the various market 
imperfections, including the signalling theory, agency cost theory, transaction cost 
theory, tax-related explanations, bird-in-the-hand theory, pecking order theory, residual 
dividend theory, catering theory and maturity hypothesis. However, it is concluded that 
none of these theories explain the dividend puzzle single-handedly.  
Chapter 2 also illustrates that empirical research regarding dividend policy is extensive. 
Many scholars have built and empirically tested a great number of models relating to 
these theories to explain why companies should pay or not pay dividends, whereas 
others have surveyed managers to learn their thoughts about dividends. However, the 
chapter shows an inconclusive judgment on the actual motivation for paying dividends, 
despite countless research, as in line with Fisher Black’s (1976, p.5) statement that “The 
harder we look at the dividend picture, the more it seems like a puzzle, with pieces that 
just don’t fit together.” 
Furthermore, it is observed that all these leading dividend policy theories, models and 
frameworks are originally formulated based on developed markets. In fact, earlier 
research on dividend policy, in terms of developing theories and empirical tests were, 
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focused on mainly the US market, followed by the UK market. Therefore, less is known 
about dividend behaviour and the explanatory power of models for other countries, 
particularly developing (emerging) economies, where market imperfections are the 
norm rather than expectations, and are much stronger than in developed countries. 
Nevertheless, considering the growing importance of emerging markets in terms of 
global equity investments, these markets have recently started attracting considerable 
international investors. Accordingly, emerging markets attach more pieces to the 
dividend puzzle and researchers have started investigating the dividend behaviour of 
corporations in developing countries (Glen et al., 1995; Adaoglu, 2000).  
Even though the empirical research in developing markets has relatively contributed 
little evidence compared to developed markets, researchers have also started examining 
the dividend policy behaviour in emerging economies, especially over the past two 
decades. A number of studies reviewed in Chapter 2, in the context of emerging 
markets, have mostly confirmed that dividend policy behaviour in these markets 
generally tend to be, not surprisingly, different from developed markets in many aspects 
due to the various factors such as political, social and financial instability, lack of 
adequate disclosure, poor laws and regulations, weaker financial intermediaries, newer 
markets with smaller market capitalisations, weaker corporate governance and different 
ownership structures  (La Porta et al., 1999; 2000; Kumar and Tsetsekos, 1999; 
Aivazian et al., 2003a and 2003b; Yurtoglu, 2003).  
On the other hand, while examining dividend policy behaviour in different emerging 
markets, researchers have not clearly stated or distinguished, as suggested by Bekaert 
and Harvey (2002), between the concepts of regulatory liberalisation or integration 
undertaken in those markets for their study sample periods. Hence, it can be argued that 
dividend policy decisions of companies in an emerging market should be better 
understood if researchers report whether the emerging market examined passes laws for 
financial liberalisation or attempts to implement serious economic and structural 
reforms to integrate with world markets. In this respect, dividend policies of companies 
may significantly differ based on the process of liberalisation or integration undertaken 
in the emerging market in which they operate. Accordingly, this thesis is also motivated 
in carrying the dividend debate into an emerging market but by examining the dividend 
policy behaviour of a particular emerging market that implemented serious economic 
and structural reforms for the integration with world markets and attempts to identify 
what behaviour the dividend policy of this emerging market shows afterwards.  
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Moreover, Turkey has had a very late start in the liberalisation of its economy and the 
establishment of its stock market, the ISE, whose history only dates back to 1986. As 
illustrated in the literature review, there is very limited evidence about dividend policy 
in Turkey from a few studies (La Porta et al., 2000; Adaoglu, 2000; Aivazian et al., 
2003a; 2003b and Kirkulak and Kurt, 2010), which were undertaken in the earlier stage 
of the ISE, while the Turkish economy was yet implementing its financial liberalisation 
programme, suffering long-standing macro-economic imbalances and experiencing a 
number of financial crises. Following the November 2002 elections, which resulted in 
one-party government, political uncertainty, to some degree, diminished, and economic 
programmes and structural reforms were jointly carried out by the government and the 
IMF, starting in March 2003 (CMB, 2003). Further, Turkey’s progress in achieving full 
membership of the EU, during this period, also provided the strongest motivation in 
establishing new reforms, rules and regulations to improve corporate governance and 
transparency and disclosure practices; therefore, to integrate its economy with Europe 
and to harmonise its institutions with those of the EU (IIF, 2005; Aksu and Kosedag, 
2006).  
Accordingly, the Turkish stock market offers an ideal setting for the purpose of this 
thesis, and therefore the study provides empirical evidence about the dividend policy 
behaviour of publicly listed companies in Turkey, during its market integration period. 
In order to fulfil the research purpose, the sample is drawn from the Istanbul Stock 
Exchange. The study sample contains a recent large panel dataset of 264 non-financial 
and non-utility firms listed on the ISE, from 14 different industries, during the period 
2003-2012, including 1,846 firm-year observations (it is 1,800 firm-year observations 
when the dividend pout ratio is used as a dependent variable).   
The three chapters of this thesis, Chapter 3, 4 and 5, are empirical in nature. First, the 
financial reporting standards of the ISE firms were only based on the generally accepted 
principles of accounting and auditing. Even though Turkey generally enjoyed an 
economic growth in 1990s, it was overall an economically unstable decade experiencing 
a number of financial crises and having high inflation rates that surpassed 100% during 
this decade. Due to the inconsistent and unclear accounting practices and the absence of 
inflation accounting standards, the historical financial statements of the ISE firms lost 
their information value and misinformed investors. However, the CMB of Turkey 
adopted the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in 2003 and enforced 
listed firms to use the new rules. In addition, the CMB obliged the implementation of 
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inflation-adjusted accounting at the same time. This has resulted in a more transparent 
and more efficient worldwide financial reporting standards, providing comparable and 
consistent financial data for foreign and domestic investors, and other institutions. 
Likewise, the adoption of the IFRS and inflation accounting has given researchers a 
way better opportunity to study firm-specific characteristics of firms in the Turkish 
market. Therefore, Chapter 3 empirically investigates what firm-specific (financial) 
determinants affect dividend policy decisions of the ISE firms, over a decade after 
Turkey adopted the IFRS and inflation accounting, starting with the fiscal year 2003.  
The results in Chapter 3 illustrate that profitability, firm size and firm age have 
significantly positive effects, whereas debt level and investment opportunities have 
significantly negative impacts on the dividend policy decisions of the ISE firms. 
Further, the results show no significant relationship between dividend policy and 
business risk, free cash flow, assets liquidity and assets tangibility, and therefore they 
are not considered as the important firm-specific determinants while the ISE firms set 
their dividend policies. Also, it is revealed that industry effect shows no considerable 
impact.  
According to Aivazian et al. (2003b), the dividend policies of firms in emerging 
markets are affected by the same firm-specific determinants as their counterparts in the 
US; however, emerging market firms may be more sensitive to some of these 
determinants and may react differently, indicating the greater financial constrains in 
different countries under which they operate. Consequently, the results of Chapter 3 are 
consistent with the study of Aivazian et al. (2003b) and suggest that Turkish firms 
follow the same determinants of dividend policy as proposed by dividend theories and 
as empirically suggested by developed markets, after Turkey adopted the IFRS and 
inflation accounting starting with the fiscal year 2003. Particularly, the primary firm-
specific determinants of dividend policy are profitability, debt level, firm size, 
investment opportunities and firm age in the context of the emerging Turkish market.  
Table 6.1 on the next page summarises the theoretical findings obtained from the results 
of the single equation models related to the firm-specific determinants of dividend 
policy of the ISE-listed firms, which are reported in Chapter 3.  
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Table 6.1 Summary of Theoretical Findings of Chapter 3 
The table presents a summary of the theoretical findings obtained from the results of the single 
equation models related to the firm-specific determinants of dividend policy of the ISE-listed 
firms, which are reported in Chapter 3. 
 
Variables       Theory  
Theory 
Prediction 
 
Empirical Evidence 
of the Study 
      
Profitability Signalling Theory  
Residual Dividend Theory 
 Positive 
Positive 
  
 
      
Investment 
Opportunities 
Transaction Cost Theory 
Pecking Order Theory 
Overinvestment Hypothesis 
Substitute Model 
 Negative 
Negative 
Negative 
Positive 
  
 
 
X 
      
Business Risk Transaction Cost Theory  Negative  Not significant 
      
Debt Policy Agency Cost Theory  Negative   
      
Free Cash Flow Free Cash Flow Theory  Positive  Not significant  
      
Liquidity Signalling Theory  Positive  Not significant  
      
Assets Tangibility Agency Theory  Negative  Not significant  
      
Firm Age Maturity Hypothesis   Positive   
      
Firm Size Agency Cost Theory 
Transaction Cost Theory 
 Positive 
Positive 
  
 
      
Notes:  stands for the consistency between the theoretical prediction and the results of the study.  
            X reports no evidence identified from the results.  
 
The evidence from cross-country studies (Glen et al., 1995; La Porta et al., 2000; 
Aivazian et al., 2003a) revealed that emerging market governments are likely to enforce 
constraints on dividend policy in order to protect both minority shareholders and 
creditors. Similarly, the dividend policy in the ISE was heavily regulated during the 
period 1985-1994 due to the first mandatory dividend policy imposed by the CMB, 
which obliged to pay at least 50% of the distributable income as cash dividends. Earlier 
studies (Adaoglu, 2000; Aivazian et al., 2003a) reported that the ISE firms followed 
unstable dividend policies, since cash dividend payments were solely dependent on the 
firm’s current year earnings, as forced by regulations, and any variability in earnings 
was directly reflected in the level of cash dividends. However, the CMB of Turkey 
implemented various reforms in terms of accounting standards, corporate governance, 
and transparency and disclosure practices. In order to prevent insider lending, in other 
words non-arms length transactions, the CMB regulated private banks by establishing 
risk group definition and calculation of loan limits for a single business group, which 
generally includes banks, businesses and subsidiaries in the same group. Further, the 
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CMB also employed much flexible mandatory dividend policy regulations (during 
2003-2008) and eventually removed the restrictions forced on the dividend payments 
(2009 and onwards). These developments may force the ISE firms to the equity market 
with greater incentive for more transparent financing, since insider lending is prevented 
and also allow the ISE managers to set their own dividend policies to reflect their 
judgements in the share prices. Hence, Chapter 4 investigates whether the ISE firms 
adopt deliberate cash dividend policies to signal information to investors and whether 
they follow stable cash dividend payments, as in developed markets, after the 
implementation of major reforms in 2003, by using Lintner’s (1956) partial adjustment 
model and several extensions of this model.  
The empirical results in Chapter 4 show that current earnings and lagged cash dividend 
payments are positively significant factors in determining current cash dividend 
payments in the listed Turkish firms, which indicate that the Lintner’s (1956) partial 
adjustment model works well for explaining cash dividend payments behaviour of the 
ISE-listed firms during the period 2003-2012. The results also indicate that the ISE 
managers now adjust their cash dividends by a serious degree of smoothing that is 
generally almost as smooth as their counterparts in the developed US market, compared 
to previous studies. These findings are contrary to earlier research (Adaoglu, 2000; 
Aivazian et al., 2003a) taken in the Turkish market, which showed no support to the 
validity of the Lintner model and reported that the ISE-listed firms did not smooth their 
cash dividends during the earlier years, between 1985 and 1997.  
Furthermore, the empirical results from several extensions of the Lintner model reveal 
some important facts regarding the Turkish market over the research period. It is found 
that current earnings encourage firms to increase/decrease their cash dividends but the 
levels of lagged earnings are the dominant component in terms of net earnings, while 
the ISE-listed firms make their dividend policy decisions in order to avoid spectacular 
and frequent changes, which is in line with Lintner’s (1956) argument. When external 
finance (current and lagged total debt) is included into the Lintner model, significantly 
negative correlation between the cash dividends and external finance is reported, which 
possibly reflects that the ISE corporations find external finance, they now obtain from 
arm’s length parties, more costly. By adding yearly dummies from year 2008 to 2012 
into the model, the effect of the 2008 global crisis and its impact in the following years 
are analysed. It is found that although the September 2008 global crisis markedly hit 
Turkey, as in many other world markets, including both developed and developing 
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countries, it did not significantly affect cash dividend payments decisions of the ISE 
firms, as well as their preferences of following stable dividend policies.  
Table 6.2 below summarises the best models obtained from applying Lintner’s (1956) 
partial adjustment model and several extensions of this model related to the signalling 
theory on dividend policy of the ISE-listed firms, which are reported in Chapter 4. 
Table 6.2 Summary of Best Models of Chapter 4 
The table illustrates a summary of the best models from Lintner’s (1956) partial adjustment model 
and several extensions of this model related to the signalling theory on dividend policy of the ISE-
listed firms, which are reported in Chapter 4.  
 
  Dependent Variable: Cash Dividend Payments      
 
 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
 Independent 
 Variables 
 
Pooled 
OLS 
System 
GMM 
 
Pooled 
OLS 
System 
GMM 
 
Pooled 
OLS 
System 
 GMM 
 
Pooled 
OLS 
System 
GMM 
              
  Earnings 
   0.146*** 
  (4.01) 
  0.133*** 
  (3.52) 
  0.059*** 
 (4.98) 
  0.057*** 
   (3.88) 
 0.162*** 
(4.09) 
0.153*** 
 (4.22) 
    0.146*** 
   (4.01) 
0.135*** 
(3.47) 
             
  CashDivt-1 
   0.658*** 
  (6.41) 
  0.690*** 
  (9.10) 
  0.594*** 
 (6.74) 
  0.615*** 
   (8.10) 
 0.642*** 
(6.52) 
0.663*** 
 (10.28) 
        0.659*** 
 (6.44) 
0.688*** 
(9.02) 
             
  Earningst-1 
     0.189*** 
 (3.62) 
   0.187*** 
    (3.11) 
      
             
  Debt 
       -0.043** 
(-2.24) 
-0.042** 
  (-2.18) 
   
             
  Debtt-1 
       -0.053** 
(-2.57) 
-0.052** 
  (-2.41) 
   
             
  Year2008 
             2.871 
   (0.97) 
2.338 
(1.26) 
             
  Year2009 
             -4.921 
  (-1.51) 
-3.344* 
(-1.83) 
             
  Year2010   
             1.587 
   (0.39) 
0.438 
(0.18) 
             
  Year2011 
              1.718 
   (0.33) 
0.402 
(0.13) 
             
  Year2012 
             0.151 
   (0.06) 
0.026 
(0.01) 
             
  Constant 
   3.816 
  (1.24) 
3.102 
(1.17) 
     -0.818 
     (-0.92) 
-1.619 
(-1.41) 
  0.141 
(0.01) 
0.622 
(0.53) 
    0.352 
   (0.04) 
0.192 
(0.17) 
             
  Industry  
    Yes Yes     Yes Yes  Yes     Yes      Yes Yes 
             
  TPR(r) 
       0.427 0.429     -          -     0.452 0.454      0.428 0.432 
  SOA(c) 
    0.342 0.310  0.406       0.385     0.358 0.337      0.341 0.312 
             
  Number of  
  Observations  
   
  1,846 
 
1,846 
     
   1,846 
 
1,846 
    
 1,846 
 
   1,846 
     
    1,846 
 
1,846 
             
  R-squared 
    81.4%      83.7%     82.2%      81.4%  
             
Notes: TPR = Target payout ratio, SOA = Speed of adjustment. ***, ** and * stands for significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.  
 
The empirical findings in Chapter 4, overall, suggest that implementing major economic 
and structural reforms as well as adopting more flexible mandatory dividend policy 
regulations and attempting to prevent insider lending (non-arm’s length transactions) 
lead the ISE firms to follow the same determinants as suggested by Lintner (1956) and 
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as followed by the US (developed) companies. Particularly, dividend payments of the 
ISE firms seem to be affected by previous dividend levels and current earnings. 
Furthermore, they attempt to adjust partially their dividends towards their target payout 
ratio, more interestingly with a relatively low speed of adjustment as their counterparts 
in developed markets. This implies that Turkish companies tend to smooth their 
dividends, and adopt stable dividend policies, and therefore it can be concluded that 
Turkish corporations have been using cash dividends as a signalling mechanism since 
2003, with the implementation of severe economic and structural reforms.  
In 2003, the CMB of Turkey published its Corporate Governance Principles in 
cooperation with the World Bank and the OECD in order to improve the ISE firms’ 
corporate governance practices and to ensure that markets are functioning in a safer, 
more transparent and more efficient manner. The CMB Principles consisted of four 
major parts; specifically, shareholders, disclosure-transparency, stakeholders and board 
of directors, and all firms traded in the ISE need to comply with these principles and 
publish compliance reports yearly. Even though many areas have improved in Turkish 
corporate governance practices since 2003, the ISE firms have highly concentrated 
ownership structures and are heavily characterised by families. In this context, cash 
dividends can be used to either reduce or exacerbate the principal-principal conflicts, 
since dividends are the substitutes for legal protection of minority shareholders in the 
countries with weak legal protections. By paying dividends, controlling shareholders 
return profits to investors, which reduce the possibility of expropriation of wealth from 
others. Accordingly, Chapter 5 empirically investigates the link between ownership 
structure and dividend policy based on the agency cost theory of dividends for the ISE 
firms over a period after Turkey implemented major reform, including the publication 
of the CMB’s Corporate Governance Principles in the fiscal year 2003. 
Particularly, it analyses the effect of family control, through their ownership and board 
representatives, on dividend policy of the ISE firms in order to indentify whether 
families tend to expropriate wealth from other investors by using dividends. Further, it 
considers the impacts of the non-family blockholders, including foreign investors, 
domestic financial institutions, and the state, on dividend policy, to find out whether 
cash dividends are used as a monitoring device by these investors in minimising agency 
problems in Turkish market. Also, the attitude of minority shareholders toward cash 
dividends in the ISE is tested to detect whether they have a taste for higher dividends to 
reduce the risk of expropriation of their wealth by controlling shareholders.  
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The empirical results in Chapter 5 report that Turkish firms have highly concentrated 
ownership structure and are mostly owned by families followed by foreign investors, 
while other blockholders, Turkish financial institutions and the state, show relatively 
lower shareholdings. Moreover, it is found that foreign and state ownership are 
associated with less likelihood of paying dividends, while other ownership variables are 
insignificant in affecting the probability of a Turkish firm to pay cash dividends. 
However, all the ownership variables, family effect (both control through ownership 
and board representation), foreign investors, domestic financial institutions, the state 
and minority investors ownerships, have significantly negative impacts on the amount 
of dividend payouts of Turkish firms. Therefore, the findings present consistent 
evidence that foreign investors invest in stocks of Turkish firms for their long-run 
growth potential rather than the short-term dividend income. This may be implying that 
the increase in foreign ownership provides more monitoring on the managements’ 
activities and hence less need for the dividend-induced monitoring device. It may also 
be reflecting the uneven tax treatment between capital gains and cash dividends 
imposed by the Turkish tax regime, which provides foreign shareholders with tax 
advantages for capital gains over dividends and thus foreign investors possibly prefer 
none or lower dividend payouts in order to reduce their tax burden on cash dividends. 
Similarly, there is consistent evidence that state ownership and dividend policy are 
negatively correlated, which suggests that state ownership involves less of a need for 
dividend-induced capital market monitoring in Turkey.  
Even though family control has a significantly negative effect on the amount of 
dividend payouts of Turkish firms, considering the non-significant impact of Turkish 
families on the decisions to pay or not pay dividends (if the expropriation argument 
through dividends holds true for Turkish families, their control should also be 
significantly and negatively affecting the probability of paying dividends), and the 
significantly negative relationship between dividend payout ratio and all other 
blockholders and even minority shareholders, the chapter shows inconclusive evidence 
for the expropriation argument. Indeed, this negative correlation may suggest that 
families are likely to cater for the dividend preferences of their shareholders. Similarly, 
domestic financial institutions and minority investors’ stock ownership have no 
significant effect on Turkish firms’ decisions regarding whether to pay dividends, but 
they are both significantly and negatively affecting the amount of the payout ratios. 
Hence, the evidence suggests that the increasing ownership of Turkish institutional 
Birkbeck University of London Page 320 
investors reduces, in general, the need for high dividend payouts, which may be due to 
their efficient monitoring on the firms’ management. Further, the evidence of the 
inverse relationship between the minority shareholders and the payout ratio is contrary 
to the statement of La Porta et al. (2000) that minority shareholders might have a taste 
for higher dividends to reduce the risk of expropriation of their wealth by controlling 
shareholders, but it implies that small shareholders have preferences for capital gains 
over cash dividends, in order to possibly avoid a tax burden, due to a favourable tax 
treatment on capital gains provided by the Turkish tax regime. 
The empirical results in Chapter 5, after all, reveal that cash dividends are not used as a 
monitoring mechanism by investors in order to control for agency problems in Turkish 
market. Also, there is not enough evidence that families are likely to expropriate by 
paying lower dividends. Rather, the negative relationship between ownership variables 
and payout ratios of Turkish firms may be the reflection of the uneven tax treatment 
imposed by the Turkish tax regime, with a favourable tax treatment on capital gains 
over cash dividends for foreign investors (both corporations and individuals) and 
domestic individual investors. However, the tax-preference explanation does not solely 
explain the whole puzzle, since Turkish corporations (both financial and non-financial) 
are not subject to any taxes both for capital gains and cash dividends, but they generally 
tend to require lower dividend payouts. However, the results show that there are 
different clienteles among all types of investors who own stocks of non-dividend payers 
and less frequent dividend paying or frequent dividend paying Turkish firms, suggesting 
support for the tax clientele theory. Although the outcome model of dividends, proposed 
by La Porta et al. (2000) argues that dividends are an outcome of an effective system of 
legal protection of shareholders, therefore suggesting higher dividends payments, it also 
predicts that, other things being equal, firms with better investment opportunities should 
generally pay lower payout ratios in countries with good shareholder protection.  
Consequently, the evidence implies that the implementation of various major economic 
and structural reforms in cooperation with the IMF and the EU directives and best-
practice international standards, including the CMB’s Corporate Governance Principles 
in line with the World Bank and the OECD, starting with the fiscal year 2003, have 
resulted in significant improvements for the ISE-listed firms corporate governance, 
transparency and disclosure practices, and better shareholder protection. Therefore, 
investors in general have preference for the potential long-run growth opportunity for 
the stocks they hold in the ISE, since Turkey is a fast-growing market.  
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Table 6.3 below summarises the empirical results obtained from the single equation 
models related to the relationship between ownership variables and dividend policy of 
the ISE-firms, which are reported in Chapter 5. 
Table 6.3 Summary of Empirical Results of Chapter 5 
The table shows a summary of the empirical results obtained from the single equation models related 
to the relationship between ownership variables and dividend policy of the ISE-listed firms, which 
are reported in Chapter 5.  
 
  Variables 
Realised  Signs 
Empirical Results 
DPAY DPOUT 
    
   
   
  Family  
  Ownership 
 
 
Not 
Significant 
 
 
Negative 
 
 Evidence does not show enough support for the expropriation 
argument.  
 
 Evidence may suggest that families tend to cater for the dividend 
preferences of their shareholders, consistent with the catering theory 
of dividends.  
 
 Evidence reveals that foreign investors tend to prefer stocks with 
long-run growth potential rather than the short-term dividend 
income. 
 
 Evidence shows that the dividend-induced capital market 
monitoring is not preferred by investors to control for agency 
problems.  
 
 Evidence reports that small shareholders have preferences for 
capital gains over cash dividends, which implies a tendency for the 
tax-preference explanation due to the uneven tax treatment between 
capital gains and dividends, imposed by the Turkish tax regime.  
 
 Evidence also suggests support for the tax-clientele theory since 
there are different clienteles among all types of investors who own 
stocks from non-dividend payers to frequent dividend paying firms.  
 
 Evidence supports the argument that larger firms have larger size of 
boards and therefore the larger the board is more likely that firms 
pay larger dividends.  
 
 Evidence suggests that the implementation of major reforms in 2003 
have resulted significant improvements for corporate governance, 
transparency and disclosure practices and better shareholder 
protection in Turkish stock market, therefore investors prefer to hold 
stocks for the potential long-run growth opportunities, consistent 
with the outcome model of dividends.  
 
 
 
  
  Family  
  Directors  
Not 
Significant 
Negative 
  
 
 
  Board Size Positive Positive 
  
 
 
  Foreign  
  Ownership 
Negative Negative 
  
 
 
  Institutional  
  Ownership 
Not 
Significant 
Negative 
  
 
 
  State  
  Ownership 
Negative Negative 
 
 
  
  Ownership  
  Dispersion 
Not 
Significant 
Negative 
   
Notes: DPAY = The probability of paying dividends and DPOUT = Dividend payout ratio.  
 
6.3 Recommendations for Practice   
Based on findings acquired through this enquiry, recommendations can be made to 
participants of this complex modern economic environment, who seek useful guidance 
from relevant literature. Indeed, empirical results from this thesis have significant 
implications for policy makers, regulators, investors and fellow researchers.  
The findings infer important policy implications. First, dividend policy makers, in the 
emerging Turkish market, tend to make more stable dividend payments and adjust their 
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target payout ratios at a lower speed. The adoption of more stable dividend policies 
supports the view that policy makers regard this corporate decision as a signalling 
mechanism. This also implies that dividend policy makers only increase dividend 
payments when they believe that earnings can sustain higher dividend levels 
permanently. They are also reluctant to decrease or cut dividends drastically, since 
dividend decreases and cuts are bad signals to the market of firms’ future prospects, 
especially in emerging economies where financial markets are much less stable 
compared to developed economies.  
Second, the results show that investment opportunities have a significant negative effect 
on the dividend policy decisions of ISE firms. They also revealed that investors 
generally have preference for the potential long-run growth opportunities for the stocks 
they hold in the ISE, since Turkey is a fast-growing market. In this respect, dividend 
policy makers should carefully consider the influence of their firms’ investment projects 
on dividend policies. This is because poor judgement might result in severe agency 
problems that involve the overinvestment hypothesis. By paying none or lower 
dividends, they may overinvest in projects with negative NPVs, instead of undertaking 
positive NPV investment projects with this cash. Contrarily, they may omit investing in 
profitable projects by paying higher dividends.  
The results further indicate that there are different clienteles, among all types of 
investors who own shares in non-dividend payers or less-frequent or more-frequent 
dividend paying Turkish firms. Through these results, it is worth bearing in mind that 
investors’ preferences for dividend may change over time. Therefore, companies’ 
dividend policy makers should make an effort to recognise and cater to shifts in 
investors’ demands for dividend preferences. Careless and drastic changes in dividend 
policy may cause a change in clientele and could be costly, due to trading costs.  
The findings of this enquiry show significant implications to regulators, such as the 
Capital Markets Board (CMB) of Turkey and the Capital Markets Law (CML). The 
results show that the CMB attributed great importance to improve communications with 
investors, issuers and other institutions in 2003, in order to ensure that markets function 
in a safer, more transparent and efficient manner, in accordance with regulations that 
were adopted in harmony with international norms and developments. This has resulted 
in important improvements for the ISE-listed firms’ corporate governance, transparency 
and disclosure practices, and better shareholder protection as well as attracting a 
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considerable amount of foreign investments, and Turkish investors back to the stock 
market. Since Turkey is a fast-growing market, these significant improvements lead to 
investors investing in stocks for their long-run growth potential rather than short-term 
dividend income, which indicate that cash dividends are not used as a monitoring 
mechanism in order to control agency problems by investors. In addition, the uneven tax 
treatment imposed by the Turkish tax regime with a favourable tax treatment on capital 
gains over cash dividends for foreign investors and domestic individual investors 
encourages these investors to hold their stocks for longer periods of time in order to 
avoid tax burden. 
At this point, the less usage of dividend-induced capital monitoring might result in 
severe agency problems, as Turkish firms have a highly concentrated ownership 
structure, especially dominated by families who can potentially expropriate wealth from 
minority shareholders. Accordingly, regulators should take this potential danger into 
account and maintain the high quality of corporate governance, transparency and 
disclosure standards or even improve towards better shareholder protection. This could 
be done by an efficient monitoring on family-controlled firms and the imposition of 
appropriate regulations, encouraging independent and non-executive board members to 
be more active in making corporate decisions, increasing the monitoring role of foreign 
and institutional shareholders, and providing better protection for minority shareholders.  
Furthermore, the results of this thesis can help investors gain a broad understanding of 
the different roles and preferences of policy makers and various shareholders, in 
shaping their corporate dividend policies. In addition, findings show that profitability, 
firm size and firm age have significantly positive effects, whereas debt and investment 
opportunities have significantly negative impacts on dividend payments in the emerging 
Turkish market. This will help investors determine their investment strategies related to 
their dividend preferences.  
Finally, the results of this enquiry show that dividend policy decisions of companies in 
an emerging market differ significantly, based on the process of liberalisation or 
integration undertaken in the emerging market in which they operate. Accordingly, this 
thesis suggests that, in line with Bekaert and Harvey (2002), researchers should report 
whether the emerging market examined passes laws for financial liberalisation or 
attempts to implement serious economic and structural reforms to integrate with world 
markets, while examining dividend polices of different emerging markets.  
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6.4 Study Limitations and Further Research 
This doctoral thesis has several limitations and further research is required to explore 
more about the dividend puzzle. First, the study is limited to a sample of industrial 
companies by excluding financial firms and utilities, since they are governed by 
different regulations and follow arguably different financial policies. Further research, 
therefore, could be conducted by incorporating financial and utility sector companies 
listed on the ISE in order to identify their dividend policy behaviour after the 
implementation of major reforms in Turkey in the fiscal year 2003. This would provide 
a more complete picture of dividend policy behaviour of all companies trading in the 
ISE. 
Another limitation involves the nature of the research methodology. Although the study 
covers appropriate econometrics and various alternative regression analysis techniques 
(the pooled and panel logit/probit, tobit, pooled OLS, random and fixed effects, and 
system GMM models), the empirical results of the regression analyses on secondary 
data only reveal whether or not any correlation exists between dependent variable and 
independent variables. They do not, however, explain why a correlation exists. Hence, 
further research on primary data, such as interviews and questionnaire surveys 
conducted from the ISE managers, would be useful in understanding their perceptions 
about dividend policy. This would also increase the explanatory power of the various 
dividend theories and models as well as providing an additional perspective from the 
managers, who are actually responsible for making dividend policy decisions of the ISE 
firms.  
Corporate dividend policy literature mainly focuses on explaining cash dividend 
payments behaviour of companies by various theories and voluminous empirical 
research, since cash dividends are the most common way of distributing profits to 
shareholders. This thesis is also limited to the analyses of cash dividend behaviour of 
the ISE-listed firms. However, dividend policy may consist of other types of payouts, 
such as stock dividends or share repurchases. Considering the major reforms 
implemented and recent developments of regulatory changes of dividend policy in 
Turkey, it is worth conducting further research on stock dividends and share 
repurchases in order to find out whether they can be alternative payout policies for cash 
dividends for the ISE firms.  
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Finally, this thesis is limited to the firms listed on the ISE. The implementation of major 
reforms and regulatory changes, however, may produce different results in different 
emerging markets. Therefore, conducting further research on dividend policy behaviour 
of other emerging markets is also suggested, and these future studies should not be 
limited to regulatory liberalisation of these markets but should extend to the periods 
when they make serious attempts for economic and structural reforms to integrate with 
world markets. In this respect, conducting parallel studies in the context of different 
emerging markets and making relevant comparisons between the findings would be 
worthwhile in strengthening the empirical results, to generalise these results for such 
markets.  
This doctoral thesis, after all, extends the empirical research on dividend policy into an 
emerging market, which has not only passed laws for financial liberalisation, but 
implemented serious reforms to integrate with world markets by using a large panel 
dataset from Turkey. Surely, further empirical work is vital for further knowledge 
generation, and scholars are encouraged to carry on future studies in both Turkish 
market and other emerging markets. However, it is believed that this thesis can be a 
valuable benchmark for further longitudinal and cross-country research on this aspect of 
the dividend puzzle.  
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